Olin v. L.A. County Sheriff's Dept. CA2/1

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Filed 6/24/24 Olin v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dept. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

JEFFREY J. OLIN, B324159
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 22STCV08788)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING
LOS ANGELES COUNTY OPINION (NO CHANGE IN
SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT et al., JUDGMENT) AND DENYING
APPELLANT’S PETITION
Defendants and Respondents. FOR REHEARING

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on May 30,
2024 is modified as follows:

1. On pages 6–7, the entire sentence beginning with the
words, “At the time, Jeffrey believed he was being detained” is
replaced with the following sentence (including unrevised fn. 5):
At the time, Jeffrey believed he was being detained “as a suicide
risk,” but he later learned that he was being “held for threatening
‘to kill a judge.’ ”5

 It is helpful at this point to describe some of the statutorily
prescribed procedures for initiating a 5150 hold. Namely, “[w]hen
a peace officer takes a person into custody under section 5150
and presents that person to a facility designated by the county
for evaluation and treatment, the officer must provide a written
application describing the circumstances that brought the person’s
condition to the officer’s attention and stating the officer ‘has
probable cause to believe that the person is, as a result of a mental
health disorder, a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or
gravely disabled.’ (§ 5150, subd. (e).) In determining whether there
is probable cause, a person authorized to make that determination
may consider ‘available relevant information about the historical
course of the person’s mental disorder’ (§ 5150.05, subd. (a))
and ‘shall not be limited to consideration of the danger of imminent
harm’ (§ 5150, subd. (b)). [¶] Before admitting a person into
a designated facility, ‘the professional person in charge of the
facility or his or her designee shall assess the individual in person
to determine the appropriateness of the involuntary detention.’
(§ 5151.) ‘If, in the judgment of the professional person in charge
of the facility designated by the county for evaluation and
treatment [or other authorized individuals], the person cannot
be properly served without being detained, the admitting facility
shall require an application in writing stating the circumstances
under which the person’s condition was called to the [facility’s]
attention . . . and stating that [the facility] has probable cause
[to detain the person].’ (§ 5150, subd. (e).)” (Julian, supra,
11 Cal.App.5th at pp. 375-376, capitalization & fn. omitted.)
Notably, Jeffrey does not allege in a nonconclusory fashion that
Wing or other individuals involved in initiating his section 5150
failed to comply with these procedures, except to claim that there
was an insufficient basis for the requisite finding of probable cause.

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2. On page 11, the following two sentences are deleted:
“The court later sustained demurrers and granted anti-SLAPP
motions filed by all remaining defendants, including the County.
The court entered corresponding judgments of dismissal.”

3. On page 11, the entire paragraph beginning with
the words: “Jeffrey filed a timely notice of appeal” is deleted and
replaced with the following paragraph:

Jeffrey filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the court’s
rulings on the R&M defendants’ demurrer and anti-SLAPP motion
and the LASD’s demurrer. The instant appeal does not challenge
rulings regarding any other defendants.

4. On page 20, the following sentences are deleted:

Jeffrey added the County as a defendant in his first amended
complaint, but Jeffrey failed to appeal the court’s subsequent
judgment of dismissal in the County’s favor. His pursuit of the
instant appeal thus can only be understood as an effort to hold
LASD, rather than the County, liable for the actions of LASD
deputies. But because LASD deputies are County employees,
this is fundamentally incorrect.

5. On page 20, footnote 8 is inserted at the end of the
following sentence as shown below:

We acknowledge the potential for such liability, but not where,
as here, the plaintiff has identified the incorrect defendant to
hold liable under what must necessarily be a theory of vicarious
liability, because the complaint lacks any nonconclusory allegations

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supporting an LASD policy or practice giving rise to the alleged
injury.1

6. On page 21, footnote 9 is inserted at the end of the
following sentence as shown below:

Nor does the first amended complaint contain any additional
factual allegations that would address these issues.2

These modifications do not constitute a change in the
judgment.
Appellant’s petition for rehearing filed on June 14, 2024
is denied.

_______________________________________________________________
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. CHANEY, J. WEINGART, J.

1 In noting that the County, rather than LASD, is the
appropriate defendant, we do not intend to express any opinion on
the merits of the claims against the County Jeffrey sets forth in the
first amended complaint.

2 The proposed addition of the County as a defendant in the
first amended complaint does not breathe life into Jeffrey’s claims
against LASD or otherwise render the court’s order dismissing his
claims against LASD incorrect.

4
Filed 5/30/24 Olin v. L.A. County Sheriff’s Dept. CA2/1 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

JEFFREY J. OLIN, B324159

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV08788)
v.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from judgments and orders of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Gail Killefer, Judge. Affirmed.
Jeffrey J. Olin, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of Torres & Brenner and Anita Susan Brenner
for Defendant and Respondent Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s
Department.
Clyde & Co US, Douglas J. Collodel and Gretchen S.
Carner for Defendants and Respondents Rombro & Manley,
S. Roger Rombro and Melinda A. Manley.
Appellant Jeffrey J. Olin appeals from orders and
judgments in his lawsuit against respondent Los Angeles
County Sheriff ’s Department (LASD); LASD Detective
David Wing; the Los Angeles County Superior Court and
two judicial officers thereof; his former wife, Kelly Olin; and
Rombro & Manley, LLP, Roger Rombro, and Melinda A. Manley
(collectively, R&M defendants), the attorneys representing Kelly3
in family law proceedings against Jeffrey. Jeffrey’s lawsuit
asserts numerous causes of action, all relating to an alleged
conspiracy among the defendants to alienate Jeffrey from
his son. Jeffrey argues the court reversibly erred when
it (1) sustained, without leave to amend, the R&M defendants’
demurrer, (2) granted the R&M defendants’ special motion to
strike the claims against them as a strategic lawsuit against
public participation (SLAPP) under Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute) and awarded them
attorney fees under that statute, and (3) sustained, without
leave to amend, LASD’s demurrer.
The causes of action against the R&M defendants are
based entirely on their assisting Kelly in preparing and filing
a declaration in family law proceedings. In that declaration,
Kelly states Jeffrey was temporarily detained under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 5150.4 Jeffrey’s lawsuit alleged

3 To avoid confusion, we refer to Jeffrey Olin and Kelly
Olin by their first names. No disrespect is thereby intended.
4 Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent statutory
references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. Section 5150
“allows temporary detention of mentally disordered individuals
who pose a danger either to themselves or to others, for

2
that this disclosure violated his constitutional right to privacy
and the confidentiality requirements of section 5328. We hold
the court correctly concluded the litigation privilege barred these
claims and, on this basis, correctly granted the R&M defendants’
anti-SLAPP motion and sustained their demurrer without leave
to amend.
As to the causes of action against LASD, we conclude the
complaint does not allege any LASD policy or practice, as it must
to support Jeffrey’s federal civil rights causes of action against
LASD. We further conclude that the actions of the individual
LASD personnel in the complaint cannot provide a basis for
LASD to be held vicariously liable, because these individuals
are employees of Los Angeles County (the County), not LASD.
Finally, we hold the court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Jeffrey leave to amend his complaint to address these
deficiencies. As to what additional allegations he would include,
were he granted leave to amend, Jeffrey identifies only those
reflected in the first amended complaint5 he filed after the

treatment and evaluation.” (Jacobs v. Grossmont Hospital (2003)
108 Cal.App.4th 69, 71–72.) We shall refer to such a detention as
a “5150 hold,” consistent with the parties’ briefing and common
vernacular. (See fns. 4 & 5, post, for additional detail regarding
section 5150 holds.)
5 This amended complaint still names LASD and the R&M
defendants as defendants, despite the court’s order sustaining
their demurrers without leave to amend. The court apparently
accepted the document as an amended complaint against the
remaining defendants, the claims against whom had not yet been
dismissed at the time Jeffrey filed the amended complaint, as
well as against the County, which the first amended complaint
adds as a defendant.

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challenged rulings. But nothing in the amended complaint
addresses the deficiencies in his original claims against the R&M
defendants and LASD.
Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
A. Factual Allegations in the Complaint
In an appeal from a judgment of dismissal following the
sustaining of a demurrer, our review is de novo, and we must
“determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d
311, 318.) Because a demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency
of the pleading, we accept as true all properly pleaded material
facts, and are “not concerned with the ‘plaintiff ’s ability to
prove . . . allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such
proof.’ ” (Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th
949, 958, quoting Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2
Cal.3d 493, 496.) We disregard, however, allegations constituting
contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Blank,
supra, at p. 318.) “Facts appearing in exhibits attached to
the first amended complaint also are accepted as true and are
given precedence, to the extent they contradict the allegations.”
(Paul v. Patton (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1091.) The
following factual summary is thus based on properly pleaded
factual allegations in Jeffrey’s complaint, as well as the
documents it attaches and incorporates by reference:
Kelly and Jeffrey were divorced in 2011. On July 21, 2018,
Jeffrey “became aware that he was a victim of parental alienation
caused by Kelly.” On August 3, 2018, Jeffrey sent Kelly a text
message stating that he “inten[ded] to appear ex parte . . . to

4
ask the court to appoint a therapist to evaluate [their son] for
parental alienation.” Kelly “retaliated” by seeking a restraining
order against Jeffrey in the pending family law proceedings
between them. In November 2018, the family law court, through
Commissioner Glenda Veasey (defendant below, but not a party
to this appeal), granted Kelly’s request for a domestic violence
restraining order (DVRO) against Jeffrey for a period of five
years. The restraining order was affirmed on appeal, and
required, inter alia, that Jeffrey “surrender any firearms in
his possession.” Around this same time—in the “latter half
of 2018”—Kelly and Veasey began a conspiracy to “destroy
[Jeffrey’s] relationship with his only child,” which would later
expand to include the other defendants Jeffrey named in his
lawsuit.
In March 2019, Jeffrey filed a declaration in the family
court proceedings, over which Veasey was still presiding, stating
that he had been “ ‘caused to sink into the deepest depths of
suicidal depression.’ ” In another filing with the court in April
2019, Jeffrey stated that he had been “ ‘rendered suicidal by
the malicious actions of [his ex-wife] in combination with the
injustices that have been meted out by Glenda Veasey,’ ” that
he “ ‘hopes this ends soon, one way or the other,’ ” and that
“ ‘[t]he only reason [he] is still alive is that [he] got a list of four
people who need to precede him.’ ” Veasey experienced these
statements, taken in the context of Jeffrey’s “open hostility
against [her]” in other ways, to be “frightening and credible
death threats.”
On October 3, 2019, “Veasey and Kelly met, in private,
outside the presence of the court reporter.” (Capitalization
omitted.) A minute order attached to the complaint reflects

5
that Veasey considered on this date “an ex parte application
from [Kelly]” to amend the existing DVRO and granted the
application. Veasey “modified the existing restraining order . . .
to specify that [Jeffrey] shall not possess any swords, knives,
daggers, fixed blade knives or other stabbing weapons and that
all stabbing weapons must be turned over to law enforcement.”
Kelly and Veasey then contacted LASD Detective David
Wing (defendant below, but not a party to this appeal) and
“he agreed to go [to] [Jeffrey’s] home with the intent to ‘5150’
[Jeffrey] [i.e., place him on a 5150 hold] at Veasey’s request,
because [Jeffrey] had expressed he was suicidal no less than
[six] months before.”6 Wing and other LASD deputies went to
Jeffrey’s home “concerned with was whether [Jeffrey] was feeling
suicidal” and did not immediately reference the amended DVRO,
although Wing ultimately obtained a copy and provided it to
Jeffrey at Jeffrey’s request. Jeffrey allowed Wing and LASD
deputies into his home to retrieve the weapons prohibited by the
amended DVRO. LASD did not document the property they took
in this process, and later denied having records of the property.
Jeffrey was “put . . . in handcuffs” and “informed he was being
[section] 5150’d. He was transported to College Hospital of
Cerritos and placed on a 72-hour hold.” At the time, Jeffrey
believed he was being detained because he was suicidal, but he

6 As noted, section 5150 “allows law enforcement
officers . . . to bring an individual to an appropriate facility for
assessment, evaluation, and treatment for up to 72 hours where
there is ‘ “probable cause to believe that the person is, as a result
of mental disorder, a danger to others, or to himself or herself,
or gravely disabled.” ’ ” (Julian v. Mission Community Hospital
(2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 360, 375 (Julian).)

6
later learned that he was being “held for threatening ‘to kill
a judge.’ ”7 On the recommendation of the psychologist

7 It is helpful at this point to describe some of the
statutorily prescribed procedures for initiating a 5150 hold.
Namely, “[w]hen a peace officer takes a person into custody
under section 5150 and presents that person to a facility
designated by the county for evaluation and treatment,
the officer must provide a written application describing
the circumstances that brought the person’s condition to the
officer’s attention and stating the officer ‘has probable cause
to believe that the person is, as a result of a mental health
disorder, a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely
disabled.’ (§ 5150, subd. (e).) In determining whether there is
probable cause, a person authorized to make that determination
may consider ‘available relevant information about the historical
course of the person’s mental disorder’ (§ 5150.05, subd. (a))
and ‘shall not be limited to consideration of the danger of
imminent harm’ (§ 5150, subd. (b)). [¶] Before admitting a
person into a designated facility, ‘the professional person in
charge of the facility or his or her designee shall assess the
individual in person to determine the appropriateness of the
involuntary detention.’ (§ 5151.) ‘If, in the judgment of the
professional person in charge of the facility designated by
the county for evaluation and treatment [or other authorized
individuals], the person cannot be properly served without
being detained, the admitting facility shall require an application
in writing stating the circumstances under which the person’s
condition was called to the [facility’s] attention . . . and stating
that [the facility] has probable cause [to detain the person].’
(§ 5150, subd. (e).)” (Julian, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 375-376, capitalization & fn. omitted.) Notably, Jeffrey
does not allege in a nonconclusory fashion that Wing or other
individuals involved in initiating his section 5150 failed to
comply with these procedures, except to claim that there was
an insufficient basis for the requisite finding of probable cause.

7
who evaluated Jeffrey, Jeffrey was released early—after
approximately 56 hours—from the 5150 hold.
In early 2021, Jeffrey filed a motion in the family law
proceedings seeking a forensic psychologist evaluation of his
son to assess the parental alienation that had been concerning
him since 2018. To support her opposition to the motion, Kelly
filed a declaration, which the R&M defendants assisted her in
preparing and filing. In it, she declares that Jeffrey “was taken
into [LASD] custody on or about the evening of October 4, 2019,
under . . . section 5150, presumably due to his menacing and
unstable behavior. At that time, [LASD personnel] contacted
[her] advising [her] to ‘get out of town for the weekend because
they weren’t sure how long he would be held.’ As a safety
precaution, [she was] escorted by [LASD deputies] both into
and out of the courtroom, on multiple occasions.” A copy of this
declaration is attached to the complaint.
Also attached to the complaint is a copy of a declaration
by Veasey.8 The Veasey declaration states that “[o]n information
and belief, on or about October 4, 2019, representatives went
to [Jeffrey’s] residence to take possession of [the] weapons
[prohibited by the amended DVRO], and during such contact,
[Jeffrey] was placed on a . . . section 5150 psychiatric hold.”
Neither Kelly’s declaration nor Veasey’s declaration contains
any further details regarding Jeffrey’s section 5150 hold, mental
health, or mental health treatment.
The complaint describes the Kelly and Veasey declarations
as reflecting that both Veasey and Kelly were “told about the

8 Veasey filed this declaration in July 2021 in connection
with subsequent efforts to obtain her own protective order
against Jeffrey after he allegedly threatened her and her family.

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[section] 5150 hold by LASD personnel” and as proof that “LASD
personnel kept both of the women in the conspiracy [Kelly and
Veasey] apprised of the status of [Jeffrey’s] constitutionally and
statutorily-confidential medical information throughout . . . [such
that they] knew what was happening from beginning to end.”
Later in 2021, Wing executed a search warrant to
investigate claims by Veasey that Jeffrey had sent Veasey
threatening emails. Jeffrey “posited that he had been hacked
and that someone else sent some or all of the emails to Veasey.”
Wing, as opposed to another LASD detective, investigated these
claims because a different detective would not “conceal[ ] [LASD]
wrongdoing.” Wing “demonstrably failed to follow the law with
regard to that search warrant” by never providing Jeffrey with
a copy. Jeffrey asked LASD for the records of his 5150 hold and
was told that there was no record of it.9
As a result of the time Jeffrey spent in detention pursuant
to the 5150 hold and the conspiracy against him, he suffers from
posttraumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder.
Based on these allegations, the complaint plead several
causes of action: a false imprisonment claim against Kelly,
Veasey, Wing, and LASD; a claim for intentional interference
with parent-child relationship against all defendants except the
R&M defendants, based on the custody and restraining order
rulings of Veasey, which the complaint attributes to the broader
conspiracy among all defendants; claims for “publication of
private facts” (capitalization, boldface & underscoring omitted)
and “intrusion into private matters” (capitalization, boldface

9 The complaint also contains numerous allegations against
the court and judicial officers that are not relevant to the instant
appeal, and we therefore do not summarize them here.

9
& underscoring omitted) against all defendants based on
disclosure by LASD (to Veasey and Kelly) and by Kelly and the
R&M defendants (to the court in Kelly’s declaration) of Jeffrey’s
“statutorily-confidential information”—namely, the fact that
Jeffrey was placed on a 5150 hold; a claim against all defendants
for denial of due process under the California and federal
Constitutions; a claim under section 1983 of title 42 of the
United States Code against all defendants for violation of
Jeffrey’s federal civil rights and a companion claim against
LASD and the Los Angeles County Superior Court only under
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S.
658, 694; a derivative claim for interference with exercise of civil
rights (Civ. Code, § 52.1) against all defendants; and a derivative
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against all
defendants.

B. Procedural History
In response to the complaint, the R&M defendants filed
a demurrer and special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP
statute. The court concluded that all claims against the R&M
defendants arose from petitioning activity protected under the
anti-SLAPP statute, and that litigation privilege barred these
claims. On this and other bases, the court sustained the R&M
defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend and granted the
R&M defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, including the motion’s
request for attorney fees and costs.
LASD also filed a demurrer, which the court sustained
without leave to amend on the grounds that LASD is not a suable
entity in a money damages lawsuit under California law, and
that the complaint was vague and fatally flawed as to LASD.
Following the orders sustaining the dismissal of claims against

10
LASD and the R&M defendants without leave to amend, the
court entered corresponding judgments of dismissal in these
defendants’ favors.
On October 4, 2022, Jeffrey filed a first amended
complaint as to the remaining defendants, adding the County
as a defendant as well. The court later sustained demurrers and
granted anti-SLAPP motions filed by all remaining defendants,
including the County. The court entered corresponding
judgments of dismissal.
Jeffrey filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the
court’s rulings on the R&M defendants’ demurrer and anti-
SLAPP motion and LASD’s demurrer. He did not file an
appeal challenging any of the court’s rulings regarding any
other defendants, including the order sustaining the County’s
demurrer and the resulting judgment of dismissal in the
County’s favor.

DISCUSSION
A. Rulings Regarding the R&M Defendants
The complaint alleges the R&M defendants participated in
the conspiracy and committed the torts alleged solely by assisting
Kelly in preparing and filing a declaration stating that Jeffrey
had been placed on a 5150 hold. The complaint alleges no other
conduct by the R&M defendants in furtherance of the conspiracy
or as a basis for any of the other causes of action. Jeffrey argues
that disclosing the fact of his 5150 hold in Kelly’s declaration
violated his constitutional right to privacy, as well as his
statutory right under section 5328 to keep such information
confidential. These violations form the basis for all causes of
action against the R&M defendants in the complaint.

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Section 5328 requires that “[a]ll information and records
obtained in the course of providing services under[, inter alia] . . .
Division 5 (commencing with Section 5000) . . . to either
voluntary or involuntary recipients of services are confidential,”
subject to the exceptions enumerated in the section. (§ 5328,
subd. (a).) Because section 5150 is within Division 5, “all
information, records, and services provided pursuant to
section 5150 involuntary psychiatric holds are confidential.”
(In re M.L. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1469.) “Any person
may bring an action against an individual who has willfully
and knowingly released confidential information or records
concerning him or her in violation of [section 5328].” (§ 5330,
subd. (a).)
Jeffrey argues that the fact of his “having been subjected
to a . . . 5150 hold” constitutes “confidential medical information”
protected from disclosure under section 5328. We are aware
of no case, and Jeffrey cites none, holding that the fact of
an individual being detained under a section 5150 hold is
“information” of the type section 5328 protects. We need not
resolve this issue, however, because even accepting, for the
purposes of Jeffrey’s arguments on appeal, that section 5328
protects against disclosure of the fact that an individual was
detained on a section 5150 hold, we agree with the trial court
that the litigation privilege bars any cause of action based on
the R&M defendants disclosing this information by filing Kelly’s
declaration.

1. Demurrer ruling
The litigation privilege, set forth in Civil Code section 47,
subdivision (b), “applies to any publication required or permitted
by law in the course of a judicial proceeding to achieve the objects

12
of the litigation, even [if] the publication is made outside the
courtroom and no function of the court or its officers is involved.”
(Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212; accord, Rusheen v.
Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1057.) “The usual formulation
is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other
participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the
litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation
to the action.” (Silberg, supra, at p. 212.) The purposes of the
privilege include “afford[ing] litigants and witnesses free access
to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by
derivative tort actions, . . . encourag[ing] open channels of
communication and zealous advocacy, . . . promot[ing] complete
and truthful testimony” (Rusheen, supra, at p. 1063), and
“promot[ing] effective judicial proceedings by encouraging
‘ “open channels of communication and the presentation of
evidence” ’ without the external threat of liability [citation],
and ‘by encouraging attorneys to zealously protect their clients’
interests.’ ” (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 322.) “To
further these purposes, the privilege has been broadly applied.
It is absolute and applies regardless of malice.” (Jacob B. v.
County of Shasta (2007) 40 Cal.4th 948, 955 (Jacob B.).) The
concerns underlying the privilege apply with particular force
in the context of family law proceedings, because “when a court
must make very difficult and critical decisions regarding child
visitation, it should receive the maximum amount of relevant
information. Accordingly, ‘[c]ase law is clear that [Civil Code]
section 47[, subd.] (b) absolutely protects litigants and other
participants from being sued on the basis of communications

13
they make in the context of family law proceedings.’ ” (Jacob B.,
supra, at p. 956.)
Here, the Kelly declaration, including its reference to
the section 5150 hold, is “a communication to the court relevant
to a family law decision [the court] must make”—namely, a
decision regarding the relationship between Jeffrey and his son,
something that Jeffrey’s mental state necessarily factors into.
(Jacob B., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 959.) “[S]uch a communication
is privileged even if a specific communication might not be
permitted by law because . . . it was . . . meant to be kept
confidential. . . . [T]he privilege . . . extends to communications
otherwise within its reach that might be deemed confidential.”
(Ibid.) Indeed, our state Supreme Court has concluded that
the privilege applies “even to a constitutionally based privacy
cause of action.” (Id. at p. 961.) Because all causes of action
against the R&M defendants in the complaint are based on a
communication protected by the litigation privilege, the court
correctly sustained the demurrer against these causes of action.

2. Anti-SLAPP ruling
The court did not err in granting the R&M defendants’
anti-SLAPP motion for much the same reason it correctly
sustained the R&M defendants’ demurrer. The anti-SLAPP
statute permits any cause of action against a person “arising
from any act . . . in furtherance of the . . . right of petition or free
speech” to be stricken unless the court finds a “probability” that
the plaintiff will prevail on the claim involved. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) When a defendant files an anti-SLAPP
special motion to strike, the court proceeds with a two-step
analysis. “At the first step of the analysis, the defendant must
make two related showings. Comparing its statements and

14
conduct against the statute, it must demonstrate activity
qualifying for protection. (See [Code Civ. Proc.,] § 425.16,
subd. (e).) And comparing that protected activity against the
complaint, it must also demonstrate that the activity supplies
one or more elements of a plaintiff ’s claims. ([Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 425.16], subd. (b)(1).)” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc.
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 887.) That is, that the claim “arise[s] from”
the protected activity. (Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 620.) If the defendant establishes this,
the court proceeds to the second step, and considers whether
the plaintiff has established a probability that he will prevail
on the merits under a summary-judgment-like analysis. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1); see Kyle v. Carmon (1999) 71
Cal.App.4th 901, 907.)
Our review of an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion is
de novo. (Geragos v. Abelyan (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1005, 1020.)
We employ the same two-pronged analysis as the trial court
in determining whether the anti-SLAPP motion was properly
granted. (Mendoza v. ADP Screening & Selection Services, Inc.
(2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1652.)
The R&M defendants met their burden below of
establishing the claims against them arose from protected
conduct “ ‘in furtherance of a person’s right of petition’ ” under
the anti-SLAPP statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
The statute defines such conduct as including: “any written or
oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or
judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized
by law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e)(1).) Indeed, “all
communicative acts performed by attorneys as part of their
representation of a client in a judicial proceeding or other

15
petitioning context are per se protected as petitioning activity
by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Cabral v. Martins (2009) 177
Cal.App.4th 471, 480.) This protected activity provided an
element of all Jeffrey’s claims against the R&M defendants,
because it is effectively the only conduct by the R&M defendants
the complaint alleges. The claims against the R&M defendants
thus arise from protected activity.
This shifted the burden to Jeffrey to make the substantial
likelihood of success showing in the second step of the anti-
SLAPP analysis. Jeffrey did not and could not make that
showing because, for the reasons outlined above, the litigation
privilege bars these claims. Accordingly, the court correctly
granted the R&M defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion.
Jeffrey argues that “case law explicitly says that . . .
section 5150 holds are not the type of subject the SLAPP statute
was intended to protect.” But the authority he cites for this
proposition addresses the implementation of a 5150 hold, not
communication regarding the hold. (See Swanson v. County of
Riverside (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 361, 373.) Specifically, in that
case, unlike here, the plaintiffs “[did] not seek recovery for the
[defendant’s] act of communicating information . . . [regarding]
medical records. Instead, their allegations regard[ed] the
[defendant’s] alleged . . . decision to release [a plaintiff] before
72 hours [of his section 5150 hold] expired. There [was] nothing
in the [defendant’s] decision to release [plaintiff] before the
72-hour hold that implicate[d] the rights of free speech or
petition. Therefore, it is not protected by the anti-SLAPP
statute.” (Swanson, supra, at p. 373.)

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B. Rulings Regarding the LASD Demurrer
1. Federal civil rights causes of action
“The United States Supreme Court has held that cities,
counties, and local officers sued in their official capacity are
themselves ‘persons’ for purposes of [United States Code]
section 1983 and, although they cannot be held vicariously liable
under section 1983 for their subordinate officers’ unlawful acts,
they may be held directly liable for constitutional violations
carried out under their own regulations, policies, customs, or
usages by persons having ‘final policymaking authority’ over the
actions at issue.” (Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32
Cal.4th 820, 829 (Venegas), italics omitted; see Julian, supra, 11
Cal.App.5th at p. 384 [quoting this language from Venegas; cited
by Jeffrey as supporting the viability of his federal claims against
LASD].) Jeffrey’s Monell claim likewise requires allegations to
support a policy, custom or practice that was the “ ‘moving force’ ”
behind the constitutional violation. (Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic
Festival Assn. (9th Cir. 2008) 541 F.3d 950, 957 [claim requires
“ ‘a direct causal link between a [county] policy or custom and the
alleged constitutional deprivation’ ”].)
The parties disagree as to whether LASD is a “person”
for the purposes of Jeffrey’s claim under United States Code
section 1983 or the Monell variation thereof. Even assuming,
for the sake of argument, that LASD is a “person” in this sense,
however, the complaint does not contain any nonconclusory
allegations that could establish an LASD “polic[y] [or] custom[ ]”
that violated Jeffrey’s constitutional rights or caused his alleged
injury, nor that any LASD agent with “ ‘final policymaking
authority’ ” took actions having this effect. (Venegas, supra,
32 Cal.4th at p. 829.) To the contrary, the complaint alleges a

17
conspiracy aimed at a specific individual (Jeffrey), carried out
through the actions of specific individuals at LASD—primarily
Wing. Indeed, some allegations are inconsistent with Wing’s
actions being part of an LASD practice or policy—for example,
that Wing handled the investigation of emails Veasey claimed
Jeffrey sent to her, because a different detective would not
“conceal[ ] [LASD] wrongdoing.” Because the complaint lacks
nonconclusory allegations of an LASD custom, practice, or policy,
Jeffrey’s federal civil rights causes of action fail as a matter
of law—even under the very authority Jeffrey cites in arguing
to the contrary. Namely, in Julian, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th 360,
on which Jeffrey relies to support the viability of his federal
claims, the court held that “[e]ven if the [defendants] [the
Los Angeles Unified School District and the Los Angeles School
District Police] were ‘persons’ for purposes of United States
Code section 1983, [plaintiff] did not state a claim against them[,
because] [g]overnment entities are liable under [United States
Code] section 1983 only where their ‘regulations, policies,
customs, or usages by persons having “final policymaking
authority” ’ violate another’s constitutional rights . . .
[citations] . . . [and plaintiff] did not identify any such regulation,
policy, or custom that allegedly violated [his] constitutional
rights.” (Julian, supra, at pp. 386–387.) In the other case on
which Jeffrey primarily relies, Streit v. County of Los Angeles
(9th Cir. 2001) 236 F.3d 552, the court held that LASD could
be sued for federal civil rights violations resulting from actions
“implementing [LASD] policy of conducting prisoner release
records checks.” (Id. at p. 555, italics added.) Whether or not
LASD is acting as an agent of the state or the County in engaging
in the acts alleged here—a key issue in Streit and similar cases,

18
and a point of contention in the parties’ briefing—the complaint
does not allege in a nonconclusory way that LASD was
implementing any sort of broader LASD policy to alienate Jeffrey
from his son, or that this conspiracy was the result of any LASD
policy. Accordingly, Jeffrey’s federal civil rights claims against
LASD fail as a matter of law. (See id. at p. 559 [“[a] county is
subject to [United States Code] section 1983 liability for such
suits if its policies . . . caused the particular constitutional
violation at issue”].)

2. LASD is not the appropriate entity to
sue based on the actions of Wing or
other LASD personnel
As noted above, the complaint does not allege an LASD
policy, pursuant to which these individuals took the actions
alleged, and the overarching theory of the complaint—a
conspiracy to alienate Jeffrey from his son—is inconsistent
with these alleged actions being part of a broader LASD policy.
The complaint instead alleges actions of Wing and various
other unnamed LASD personnel as the sole basis for all state
law claims against LASD. But “the sheriff ’s department is
a political subdivision of the county and not a separate legal
entity (Pierce v. San Mateo County Sheriff ’s Dept. (2014) 232
Cal.App.4th 995, 1000, fn. 1 . . . [‘The [s]heriff ’s [d]epartment
is not a separate government entity, but [it] is a department’ of
the county]; Trejo v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th
129, 135 . . . [sheriff ’s department is a political “subunit” of
the county]), and those employed by the sheriff ’s department,
including sworn peace officers, are paid by the county (see
County of Kern v. Sparks (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 11, 16–17 . . .
[county board of supervisors, not the sheriff, has authority to

19
set the compensation of employees in the sheriff ’s department]).”
(People v. Tice (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 246, 254.) Accordingly, the
County can be held vicariously liable for certain actions of LASD
personnel, as they are County employees. (See Rodriguez v.
County of Los Angeles (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 806, 807; see also
Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara (1995) 11 Cal.4th
992 [discussing scope of county’s vicarious liability for county
sheriff ’s deputies’ conduct, describing them as county, not
sheriff ’s department, employees].) Thus, Jeffrey should have
sued the County, rather than LASD. Jeffrey added the County
as a defendant in his first amended complaint, but Jeffrey failed
to appeal the court’s subsequent judgment of dismissal in the
County’s favor. His pursuit of the instant appeal thus can only
be understood as an effort to hold LASD, rather than the County,
liable for the actions of LASD deputies. But because LASD
deputies are County employees, this is fundamentally incorrect.
In arguing to the contrary, Jeffrey cites authority for
the proposition that “aggrieved individuals can enforce the . . .
provisions [of which section 5328 is a part] through . . . common
law and statutory causes of action, such as negligence, medical
malpractice, false imprisonment, assault, battery, declaratory
relief, United States Code section 1983 for constitutional
violations, and Civil Code section 52.1.” (See Julian, supra, 11
Cal.App.5th at p. 382.) Our holding regarding Jeffrey’s claims
against LASD does not suggest otherwise. We acknowledge the
potential for such liability, but not where, as here, the plaintiff
has identified the incorrect defendant to hold liable under
what must necessarily be a theory of vicarious liability, because
the complaint lacks any nonconclusory allegations supporting
an LASD policy or practice giving rise to the alleged injury.

20
Because the complaint does not state a legally viable
claim against LASD for these reasons, we may affirm the order
sustaining the demurrer without addressing whether the basis
set forth in the trial court’s order would likewise support this
outcome. (See Schermer v. Tatum (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 912,
923 [“ ‘If a demurrer is sustained, we exercise our independent
judgment on whether a cause of action has been stated as a
matter of law, regardless of reasons stated by the trial court.
[Citation.] We affirm if the trial court’s decision was correct
on any theory.’ ”].)

C. Leave to Amend
“ ‘If it is reasonably possible [the complaint that is the
subject of a sustained demurrer] can be cured by amendment,
the trial court abuses its discretion by not granting leave to
amend. [Citation.] The plaintiff has the burden of proving
the possibility of cure by amendment.’ ” (Nolte v. Cedars-Sinai
Medical Center (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1406.) Jeffrey
argues that “the first amended complaint, filed after the
demurrers and anti-SLAPP motion from which this appeal
resulted, shows that [he] could have amended his complaint” to
state a legally viable claim for relief. (Capitalization omitted.)
He specifically notes that the complaint added a claim under
section 5330, the section providing for a private right of action
based on the violation of, inter alia, section 5328. This does not
change the fatal flaws in Jeffrey’s claims against LASD or the
R&M defendants noted above. Nor does the first amended
complaint contain any additional factual allegations that would
address these issues. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its
discretion in denying leave to amend.

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DISPOSITION
The judgments and orders are affirmed. Respondents are
awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

CHANEY, J.

WEINGART, J.

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