CourtListener 9774050•People v. Figueroa CA5
Texte intégral
Filed 6/24/24 P. v. Figueroa CA5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F077514
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. VCF331062)
v.
AURELIO MORENO FIGUEROA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Joseph A.
Kalashian, Judge.
Patricia L. Brisbois, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Amanda D. Cary, and
Lewis A. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Detjen, Acting P. J., Smith, J. and Meehan, J.
This case returns to this court after the California Supreme Court recently decided
In re Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th 706 (Vaquera). In the prior appeal, we held the People
properly pleaded and proved Aurelio Moreno Figueroa committed crimes under the One
Strike law carrying a mandatory 25 years to life prison sentence. (See Pen. Code,1
§ 667.61.)
After Vaquera was decided and the matter transferred back to this court, we
solicited additional briefing directing the parties to discuss the impact, if any, of that
decision on the issues in this case. The People now concede the crimes pleaded and
proved in this case carry 15 years to life terms, as originally imposed by the trial court.
We accept the concession.
Figueroa had also challenged the consecutive sentences imposed by the trial court,
and also various fines and fees imposed as part of the sentence. We previously found
these claims moot, but now address and reject them on the merits. We will affirm the
judgment.
BACKGROUND
Charges
The Tulare County District Attorney charged Figueroa with committing seven
crimes. Counts 1 and 2 charged violations of section 288, subdivision (b)(1), forcible
lewd act on a victim under 14 years old. Each count included a special allegation the
crimes involved binding and tying the victim within the meaning of section 667.61,
subdivisions (a), (b), and (e).
Counts 3, 4, and 5 charged violations of section 288, subdivision (a), lewd act on a
victim under 14 years old. Counts 4 and 5 included a special allegation the crimes
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2.
involved substantial sexual conduct within the meaning of section 1203.066, subdivision
(a)(8).2
Count 6 charged a violation of section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2), dissuading a
witness from participating with the prosecution. Count 7 charged a violation of section
273.6, subdivision (a), disobeying a domestic relations court order.
Trial Evidence
The victim testified Figueroa assaulted her while she was sleeping in her bed.
After binding her wrists with window curtains and electrical cords, he attempted to
penetrate her and grabbed her breast. DNA samples taken near the victim’s genitalia
matched Figueroa’s DNA profile.
The victim also testified to two other incidents involving Figueroa. In one
incident, he carried her to bed and, while lying down with her, grabbed her breast. In the
other incident, he placed his hand atop her clothes near her vagina. After she removed his
hand, he replaced it.
After Figueroa was arrested, he wrote several letters to the victim’s mother. In the
letters he variously stated that not cooperating with the prosecution would benefit his
case.3
Verdicts and Sentence
Figueroa was convicted as charged. All special allegations were found true. He
was sentenced to serve 40 years eight months to life in prison as follows: Count 1, 15
years to life; Count 2, 15 years to life; Count 3, six years; Count 4, two years; Count 5,
two years; Count 6, eight months.4 As part of the sentence, the court imposed a $10,000
2 This allegation renders a person ineligible for probation.
3 Before trial, Figueroa pleaded no contest to Count 7, disobeying a domestic
relations order.
4 The court imposed no additional incarceration on Count 7.
3.
restitution fine, $280 in court operations fees, $210 in criminal conviction fees, and $800
for a victim-exam fee.
DISCUSSION
Moreno raises two arguments on appeal. First, did the court properly impose
consecutive terms? Second, did the court improperly impose fines and fees without
considering ability to pay?
The People originally raised a third argument, contending the trial court erred in
sentencing Figueroa to serve 15 years to life terms rather than 25 years to life terms. The
People have since conceded the terms as imposed were proper. We accept the concession
and otherwise find no error in imposing consecutive terms or fines and fees.
I. One Strike Sentence
“California’s ‘One Strike’ law … is an alternative sentencing scheme that applies
when the prosecution pleads and proves specific aggravating circumstances in connection
with certain sex offenses.” (Vaquera, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 712.) “The law applies
when the prosecution pleads and proves specific factual circumstances in addition to the
elements of the underlying sex offense. [Citation.] When the prosecution is pursuing
sentencing under the One Strike law, the jury decides first whether the prosecution has
proved the elements of the charged offense; if the jury convicts, it then independently
considers whether the prosecution has proved the circumstances alleged to support
sentencing under the One Strike law.” (Id. at p. 713.)
A One Strike “offense generally will be punishable by an indeterminate sentence
of either 15 years to life or 25 years to life. (See § 667.61, subds. (a)-(e).) As relevant
here, under subdivision (b), the sentence is 15 years to life if the jury has found the crime
was committed under one of the circumstances listed in subdivision (e) of the One Strike
law,” including the “binding and tying” allegation in this case. (Vaquera, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 713.)
4.
Originally, the People argued the court should have sentenced Figueroa to serve 25
year to life terms under the One Strike law, and we agreed. The People now concede the
court’s 15 years to life impositions were proper. We accept the concession.
II. Consecutive Sentences
Figueroa complains the trial court failed to state reasons for imposing consecutive
terms, necessitating a remand for resentencing. We disagree remand is necessary.
It is true the trial court did not state reasons for imposing consecutive terms. (See
§ 1170, subd. (c) [“The court shall state the reasons for its sentence choice on the record
at the time of sentencing.”].) But it does not follow resentencing is necessary.
“[C]laims of error in the trial court’s exercise of its sentencing discretion are
likewise forfeited if not raised at the sentencing hearing. Such errors are essentially
factual, and thus distinct from ‘ “clear and correctable” ’ legal errors that appellate courts
can redress on appeal ‘independent of any factual issues presented by the record at
sentencing.’ ” (People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 856-857.) Figueroa did not
object to the sentence nor did he ask the court to state its reasons for imposing
consecutive terms.
Now, Figueroa claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to object or pressing
the court to state its reasons. “ ‘In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, defendant bears the burden of demonstrating, first, that counsel’s performance
was deficient because it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness [¶] … under
prevailing professional norms.” [Citations.] Unless a defendant establishes the contrary,
we shall presume that “counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professional
competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of
sound trial strategy.” [Citation.] If the record “sheds no light on why counsel acted or
failed to act in the manner challenged,” an appellate claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel must be rejected “unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to
provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” [Citations.] If
5.
a defendant meets the burden of establishing that counsel’s performance was deficient, he
or she also must show that counsel’s deficiencies resulted in prejudice, that is, a
“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” ’ ” (People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 125.)
Here, Figueroa cannot show counsel’s performance was deficient. A simple and
satisfactory explanation for why counsel did not object to the sentence or ask the court to
state its reasons for sentencing is that there was little, if anything, redeeming about
Figueroa’s conduct. Indeed, he does not suggest anything other than minimal prior
criminal history to support his argument. But the crimes in this case evinced heinous,
sophisticated conduct.
Similarly, Figueroa cannot show prejudice. There is no reason to believe the trial
court would have imposed a different sentence had counsel objected or asked the court to
state its reasoning on the record.5 In sum, the consecutive terms were not improperly
imposed.
III. Fines and Fees
As noted, the trial court also imposed several fines and fees: $10,000 restitution
fine, $280 court operations fees, $210 criminal conviction fees, and $800 victim-exam
fee. Figueroa contends the court erred because it did not hold an ability-to-pay hearing.
He notes the judgment in this case predates People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th
1157 (Dueñas). There, the Court of Appeal held imposing nonpunitive fees, like the
court operations and criminal conviction fees in this case, without determining an ability
to pay was “fundamentally unfair.” (Id. at p. 1168.)
5 Figueroa simply suggests concurrent terms were a probable outcome because
the sex crimes occurred without a “real break in time.” The suggestion is not persuasive.
6.
The court here, however, also imposed a $10,000 restitution fine pursuant to
section 1202.4. That section requires a minimum fine of $300. In increasing the fine
over $300, a judge must consider “inability to pay.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (d).)
A trial judge is presumed to follow and apply the applicable law. (People v.
Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 106, 125; Evid. Code, § 664.) Accordingly, the court here
already considered ability to pay and concluded a $10,000 restitution fine was
appropriate. There is no reason to believe the court would reach a different conclusion as
to other fines totaling less than $2,000.6
Finally, the fines imposed are not excessive under the Eighth Amendment. An
approximate $12,000 total fine is not disproportionate to the criminality in this case—
sexually abusing a minor and dissuading a witness, i.e., attempting to cover up the crime.
(People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728
[proportionality is the touchstone of Eighth Amendment analysis]; cf. People v. Potts
(2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1056 [$10,000 restitution fine not invalid due to inability to pay].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
6 Notably, Dueñas. supra, did not create a right to object. And inability to pay
was as a palpable issue at the time of sentencing in this case because the trial court
imposed more than the minimum restitution fine. (People v. Frandsen (2019) 33
Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153-1154.) Because the issue was not raised in the trial court, the
claim is forfeited. (Ibid.)
7.
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