People v. Rojas CA2/3

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Filed 6/20/24 P. v. Rojas CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B326045

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA123646)
v.

HERMENEGILDO ROJAS, Jr., et al.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Law Offices of Allen G. Weinberg, Derek K. Kowata, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant
Joseph Hodge.
Emry J. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Hermenegildo Rojas, Jr.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
In 2014, Hermenegildo Rojas, Jr., and Joseph Hodge
(collectively, defendants) pleaded no contest to voluntary
manslaughter. In 2022, they petitioned for resentencing under
Penal Code section 1172.6,1 which limits accomplice liability for
murder. The trial court found that neither defendant established
a prima facie case for relief and denied the petitions. On appeal,
they contend that they established a prima facie case, and
therefore the trial court should have issued an order to show
cause and held an evidentiary hearing. The People concede, and
we agree Rojas and Hodge established a prima facie case for
relief under section 1172.6.
BACKGROUND
Rojas, Hodge, Matthew Fernandez, and Rigoberto Haro
belonged to the same gang. Gang members hung out at Rojas’s
house. The victim, Benjamin Juarez, belonged to a rival gang.
On July 15, 2012, Fernandez shot and killed Juarez as Juarez sat
in his car. A witness heard the gunshots and saw Fernandez
running with Haro to Rojas’s nearby house. Law enforcement
found the gun used to kill Juarez in Rojas’s backyard. The four
men were arrested and placed in a patrol car, where, during a
surreptitiously recorded conversation, Fernandez admitted he
was the shooter.

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

2
Rojas, Hodge, Fernandez, and Haro were charged with
murder.2 At their joint trial, a jury found Fernandez guilty of
first degree murder and found true personal gun use allegations.
However, the jury deadlocked as to Rojas, Hodge, and Haro.
Following the mistrial, Rojas and Hodge pleaded no contest
to voluntary manslaughter and admitted personal gun use
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C))
allegations. Rojas’s and Hodge’s counsel each stipulated to
unspecified factual bases for the pleas. The trial court sentenced
Hodge to 16 years in prison and Rojas to 26 years in prison.
In 2022, Rojas and Hodge separately petitioned for
resentencing under section 1172.6. The trial court appointed
counsel for each and held hearings on whether they had
established a prima face case for relief. Relying on jury
instructions from the mistrial, the trial court noted that their
jury was not instructed on felony murder, the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, or any theory under which
malice could have been improperly imputed to them. Instead,
Rojas and Hodge were convicted as direct aiders and abettors
with the specific intent to commit murder. The trial court denied
defendant’s petitions in October and November 2, 2022.
DISCUSSION
Hodge and Rojas contend that the trial court erred in
finding them ineligible for relief as a matter of law at the prima
facie stage. As we explain, we agree.
To the end of ensuring a person’s sentence is commensurate
with the person’s individual criminal culpability, Senate Bill

2 Rojas was also charged with being an accessory after the
fact. (§ 32.)

3
No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) limited
accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule, eliminated the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to
murder, and eliminated convictions for murder based on a theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime. (See generally People v. Reyes
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
957, 959 (Lewis); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–
843.) Senate Bill 1437 added section 189, subdivision (e)
(limiting application of the felony-murder rule) and section 188,
subdivision (a)(3) (stating that “to be convicted of murder, a
principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought” and
malice “shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or
her participation in a crime”). As amended by Senate Bill
No. 775, effective January 1, 2022, these ameliorative changes to
the law now expressly apply to attempted murder and voluntary
manslaughter.
Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedure, codified in
section 1172.6, for a person convicted of murder, attempted
murder, or voluntary manslaughter under the former law to be
resentenced if the person could no longer be convicted of those
crimes under current law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959;
People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.) A defendant
commences that procedure by filing a petition containing a
declaration that, among other things, the defendant could not
presently be convicted of murder, attempted murder, or voluntary
manslaughter under current law. (People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698, 708.)
At this prima facie stage, the trial court takes as true the
petitioner’s factual allegations and assesses whether the

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petitioner would be entitled to relief if those allegations were
proved. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In determining
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief, the
trial court may look at the record of conviction, including jury
instructions, verdicts and closing argument, to determine readily
ascertainable facts such as the crime of conviction. (People v.
Duchine (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 798, 815; see, e.g., People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 56.) At the prima facie stage,
the trial court does not engage in fact finding that involves
weighing evidence or exercising discretion. (Lewis, at p. 972.) If
a petition establishes a prima facie case for relief, the trial court
must appoint counsel if requested, issue an order to show cause,
and hold an evidentiary hearing at which the parties may offer
new or additional evidence and the trial court sits as an
independent factfinder to determine beyond a reasonable doubt
whether the defendant is guilty of murder under a valid theory.
(People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 745.)
But if at the prima facie stage, the record of conviction
establishes that the petition is meritless, the trial court may
dismiss it. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
On review, we consider de novo whether the petitioner was
ineligible for relief as a matter of law at the prima facie stage.
(People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251.)
The trial court here found that Rojas and Hodge could not
establish a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6
because their jury was not instructed on felony murder, the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory
under which malice was improperly imputed to them. Although
the parties dispute whether those jury instructions were part of
the record of conviction that the trial court could consider in

5
deciding defendants’ eligibility for relief, we will assume, without
deciding, that they were. (See generally People v. Bartow (1996)
46 Cal.App.4th 1573, 1580 [trial is part of record of conviction];
People v. Pickett (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 982, 988, review granted
Oct. 11, 2023, S281643 [preliminary hearing transcript is part of
record of conviction].)
Assuming that the trial court could consider the jury
instructions, they did not preclude eligibility for relief. That is,
the jury instructions failed to establish that Rojas and Hodge
could not have been convicted under a now-invalid theory of, for
example, felony murder or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. Rather, a condition of relief under section
1172.6 is that the charging document allowed the “prosecution to
proceed under” a now-invalid theory. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).)
The charging document here, an information, alleged that Rojas
and Hodge committed murder generically and did not specify a
degree of murder or limit the prosecution to a particular theory of
liability. (See generally People v. Didyavong (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 85, 96 & fn. 4, review granted June 28, 2023,
S280047, review dismissed.) At trial, however, the prosecution
limited itself to a direct aiding and abetting theory and did not
pursue felony murder or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.
But once the jury deadlocked, the prosecution was entitled
to retry Rojas and Hodge. Had it done so, the prosecution was
free to pursue a different theory of liability than it had at the
first trial. The prosecution could have, for example, pursued a
natural and probable consequences theory of liability.
Accordingly, the prosecution could have proceeded under a theory

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of liability that Senate Bill 1437 and amendments thereto have
now rendered invalid. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).)
Nor did Rojas’s and Hodge’s pleas preclude relief as a
matter of law. When a conviction results from a guilty plea, the
record of conviction includes facts the defendant admitted as “the
factual basis for a guilty plea.” (People v. Gallardo (2017) 4
Cal.5th 120, 136; see also People v. Das (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
954, 961–964 [court couldn’t rely on prosecutor’s factual
recitation defendant didn’t stipulate to].) In People v. Gaillard
(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1209, for example, the defendant
pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter. In finding that the
defendant established a prima facie case for section 1172.6 relief,
the court noted that he merely admitted his guilt as an aider and
abettor of voluntary manslaughter generically. (Gaillard, at
p. 1212.) Nothing in the record of conviction otherwise
conclusively established that “Gaillard admitted his guilt on a
direct aiding and abetting theory, rather than a natural and
probable consequences theory.” (Ibid.)
Similarly, when Rojas and Hodge entered their pleas to
voluntary manslaughter, neither specified a factual basis for the
pleas, and they did not admit or specify any fact or theory of
liability that would preclude section 1172.6 relief. Therefore,
their pleas did not refute the allegations in their section 1172.6
petitions that they could not presently be convicted of murder
because of changes made to sections 188 and 189. (See, e.g.,
People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 987 [petitioner who
did not admit or stipulate to any particular murder theory
established eligibility for relief]; People v. Eynon (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 967, 977 [same]; cf. People v. Fisher (2023) 95

7
Cal.App.5th 1022, 1028–1029 [defendant admitted he was actual
killer at plea].)
We therefore conclude that Rojas and Hodge established a
prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6.
DISPOSITION
The orders denying Hermenegildo Rojas’s and Joseph
Hodge’s petitions for resentencing are reversed with the direction
to the trial court to issue orders to show cause and hold
evidentiary hearings consistent with Penal Code section 1172.6.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

LAVIN, J.

EGERTON, J.

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