CourtListener 9567904•People v. Christopher CA4/1
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Filed 6/18/24 P. v. Christopher CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082182
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD285304)
VICTORIA CHRISTOPHER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Polly H. Shamoon, Judge. Affirmed.
Benjamin Kington, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier, Warren J. Williams, and Sahar Karimi, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Victoria Christopher appeals her midterm sentence, claiming the trial
court erred by (1) using the wrong legal standard in determining whether her
childhood trauma qualified as a mitigating factor, and (2) concluding her
trauma did not qualify her for a presumptive low-term sentence. We
conclude that, even if the trial court adopted the incorrect standard, the error
was harmless. We further conclude (1) the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that Christopher’s trauma was not a mitigating factor,
and (2) even if the court did err, the error was harmless. Thus, we affirm.
I.
Christopher was in line at a gas station when J.L. pulled in front of
her. Christopher got out of her car and demanded J.L. move his car. After he
refused, she threatened to shoot him. He refused again. She then returned
to her car, got a firearm, shot the front tires of J.L.’s car, and left the scene.
The jury convicted Christopher, as relevant here, of shooting at an
unoccupied vehicle (Pen. Code, § 247, subd. (b); count 1); possession of a
firearm by a felon (§ 29800(a)(1); count 2); discharging a firearm in a grossly
negligent manner (§ 246.3(a); count 3); and attempted making of a criminal
threat (§§ 664, 422; count 4). Further, the jury found true the allegations
that Christopher personally used a: (1) deadly weapon, as to counts 1 and 3
(Pen. Code, §1192.7(c)(23)), and (2) firearm, as to count 4 (§ 12022.5(a)). The
trial court also found true beyond a reasonable doubt the allegations that
Christopher had a serious felony prior (§ 667(a)(1)) and a strike prior
(§§ 667(b)-(i), 1170.12, 668).
At Christopher’s initial sentencing hearing, the trial court denied
Christopher’s motions to dismiss her strike prior and the serious felony prior
enhancement, given her history of aggression and numerous convictions of
increasing seriousness. The court imposed a total prison term of 10 years
and 4 months, comprised, as relevant, of: the midterm sentence of 2 years on
count 1, doubled to 4 years given Christopher’s strike prior; a consecutive
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sentence of 16 months on count 2 (one-third of the 2-year midterm, doubled);
and a 5-year consecutive sentence for the serious felony prior.
On direct appeal, we affirmed Christopher’s conviction but remanded
for resentencing. (People v. Christopher (Aug. 26, 2022, D078892) [nonpub.
opn.].) On remand, Christopher requested the trial court impose the low
term under section 1170(b) due to a mitigating factor—childhood trauma—
that outweighed any aggravating factors. Relying on a psychological
evaluation, Christopher argued her abusive childhood contributed to the
offense because it caused her to become “aggressive toward any perceived
threats.” She also renewed her motions to dismiss the strike prior and the
serious felony prior enhancement.
At the resentencing hearing, the trial court stated “it is clear”
Christopher “has suffered past trauma in her life,” but it was “very clear also
. . . that it had nothing to do with anything in this case.” The court thus
concluded the trauma was not a “substantial contributing factor at all.” The
court noted it “did consider the mitigation,” but it did not believe the low
term was “appropriate based on all of the factors laid out by the People and
probation in their report.” The court therefore reimposed the original
sentence of 10 years and 4 months.
II.
We review sentencing errors for abuse of discretion (People v. Sandoval
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847) and will reverse only when “it is reasonably
probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,
836.) The trial court’s application of the law to the facts is reversible only if
“arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th
706, 711-712.)
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Under section 1170(b)(6), the trial court shall impose the low term if
the defendant experienced “childhood trauma” that was a “contributing
factor” in the commission of the offense. If, however, “the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances” such that imposing
the low term would be “contrary to the interests of justice,” the trial court
need not impose the low term. (§ 1170(b)(6).)
With these principles in mind, we conclude that, even if the trial court
erred in considering whether the trauma was a “substantial contributing
factor,” the error was harmless. (Italics added.) The court found that
Christopher’s childhood trauma had no connection whatsoever to the crime.
Thus, even if the court had applied the correct standard and considered
whether Christopher’s trauma was a “contributing factor” rather than a
substantial one, it is not reasonably probable the court would have imposed
the low term.
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in concluding
Christopher’s trauma did not contribute to the offense at all. The trial judge
acknowledged Christopher’s trauma made her “aggressive towards any
perceived threats.” However, the People noted during sentencing that J.L.
did not threaten Christopher. We also cannot find anything in the record
suggesting J.L. intimidated Christopher by cutting in front of her or refusing
to move such that she reasonably could have perceived his actions as a
threat. On this evidence, the court’s finding that Christopher’s childhood
trauma did not contribute to the offense was not arbitrary and capricious.
Even were that finding an abuse of discretion, any error was harmless.
As the People argued and the trial court acknowledged, there were multiple
aggravating circumstances and only a single mitigating factor. Christopher
was on parole for her strike prior at the time she committed the instant
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offense; she had numerous probation violations, revocations, and
terminations; and she continued to reoffend while on probation. The People
noted Christopher used a deadly weapon to threaten J.L. without
provocation, showing she was a danger to society. The People and probation
also noted, as the court had previously found, that Christopher’s prior
convictions were numerous and of increasing seriousness. In declining to
impose the low term, the trial court stated, “I do not believe it’s appropriate
based on all of the factors laid out by the People and probation in their
report.” Given these significant aggravating circumstances, it is not
reasonably probable the court would have imposed the low term even if it
concluded Christopher’s childhood trauma was a mitigating factor. We thus
conclude the trial court did not err in reimposing the midterm sentence.
III.
We affirm the judgment.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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