CourtListener 9567847•People v. Castillo CA2/7
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Filed 6/18/24 P. v. Castillo CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B329861
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA097079)
v.
EVELYN CASTILLO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David Walgren, Judge. Dismissed.
Lise M. Breakey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Yun K. Lee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Evelyn Castillo appeals from a judgment entered after she
pleaded no contest to one count of felony possession of personal
identifying information with intent to defraud. In the
respondent’s brief, the Attorney General argues the trial court
erroneously failed to impose and suspend a parole revocation fine
that matches the $300 restitution fine, as required under Penal
Code section 1202.45.1 We impose and suspend the parole
revocation fine “without remanding for further proceedings.”
(People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 854.) We otherwise
dismiss the appeal because Castillo failed to obtain a certificate
of probable cause and her appeal challenges the validity of her
plea.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 28, 2021, police officers stopped Castillo and two
passengers for driving a car without license plates. Castillo
handed police officers a driver’s license that did not match her
identity. Officers also recovered debit cards and other
identification cards belonging to other people. On September 2,
2021, a complaint charged Castillo with one felony count of
possession of personal identifying information with intent to
defraud after a prior conviction (count 1; § 530.5, subd. (c)(2)),
and one misdemeanor count of giving false information to a police
officer (count 4; § 148.9, subd. (a)). The complaint further alleged
that as to count 1 Castillo suffered three prior felony convictions
within the meaning of section 1203, subdivision (e)(4).
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
On August 5, 2022, Castillo agreed to plead no contest to
count 1 and, in exchange, receive a two-year sentence and
dismissal of count 4. The plea form indicated the maximum
penalty for count 1 was three years and a parole revocation fine
would be imposed and suspended unless parole is revoked. It
also included what is known as a Cruz waiver: “I understand
that the Court is allowing me to surrender at a later date to begin
my time in custody. I agree that if I fail to appear on the date set
for surrender without a legal excuse, then my plea will become an
open plea to the Court and I may be sentenced to anything up to
the maximum allowed by law.”2 Castillo signed the plea
agreement and confirmed to the court she had read and
understood it.
During the plea colloquy, defense counsel noted for the
record that the People agreed to reduce the offer from the original
two years to 16 months if Castillo agreed to turn herself in that
day. The prosecutor stated the 16-month offer was made
partially because Castillo was tardy to court and had previously
missed court dates. Against counsel’s advice, Castillo declined
the reduction because she wanted to surrender at a later date.
The trial court asked Castillo, “Do you understand that if you
commit any criminal offenses between now and your surrender,
or if you fail to appear in court on time, instead of two years, it
will be three years. Do you understand that?” Castillo responded,
“Yes, Your Honor.” The court accepted Castillo’s plea.
2 People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247.
3
Castillo failed to appear for sentencing multiple times due
to medical issues arising from her high-risk pregnancy. The trial
court continued her sentencing hearings each time but ultimately
after six continuances it issued a bench warrant for her arrest.
The trial court held Castillo’s sentencing hearing on
March 15, 2023, seven months after it accepted her plea. The
court indicated it was inclined to sentence Castillo to the upper
term of three years. Defense counsel objected on the ground the
prosecution failed to give notice to Castillo that she could be
subject to a sentence other than the middle term because the
felony complaint did not allege factors in aggravation to support
the upper term.3
3 Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 567 amended
section 1170 to limit the trial court’s discretion to impose a
sentence greater than the middle term. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1), (2),
as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) Section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2), provides: “The court may impose a sentence
exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in
aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” Additionally,
“the court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in
determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction
without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(3).)
4
The prosecutor argued Castillo received notice of the
aggravating factors when she received her rap sheet in discovery,
the probation report listing her prior convictions, and notice that
the court had been given a certified record listing them. The
prosecutor also noted Castillo admitted a prior violation of
section 530.5 as part of her plea to count 1. Defense counsel
responded Castillo did not receive notice the People would be
using her prior convictions as aggravating factors to support an
increase in punishment. Further, the previous section 530.5
conviction could not be used both to turn the current conviction
into a felony and to increase the sentence to the upper term.
The trial court imposed the three-year sentence, reasoning:
“There’s a line of cases that say when it is part of the plea
agreement, no factors in aggravation need to be proven
arguably because it is part of the plea agreement. She was
very clearly told it’s two years, ‘but if you fail to show up to
court, it’s three years. Do you understand that?’ And the
defendant says, ‘Yes, Your Honor.’
“So I think it could very legitimately be argued that was the
agreement and no factors in aggravation needs [sic] to be
proved. However, setting that aside, as the People also
pointed out, she admitted by virtue of her plea to count 1
that she also suffered a prior conviction.
“I would agree with the People that that could form a basis
for California Rules of Court 4.421(b)(2) that her
convictions are numerous or increasing.
5
“Third, I am in receipt of a certified rap sheet provided by
the People. I have reviewed and considered that. So
setting aside everything else, based on my review of the
certified rap sheet, I do, find pursuant to California Rules
of Court 4.421(b)(2) . . . the defendant’s prior convictions as
an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency
proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness.
“Based on everything she was advised of, her failure to
appear in court and an agreement that was reached and
the finding of factor [sic] in aggravation . . . I am
sentencing the defendant to the high term of three years.”
(Italics added.)
Castillo timely filed a notice of appeal. She did not obtain a
certificate of probable cause. As a result, this Court ordered that
the issues on appeal were limited to ones that did not require a
certificate of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
The People argue Castillo’s appeal must be dismissed
because she failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause, which
is required under section 1237.5, subdivision (b), for an appeal
from a judgment after a plea of no contest.
Castillo counters that a certificate of probable cause is not
required when she does not attack the validity of the plea.
Castillo claims she seeks instead to uphold the terms of her plea
agreement. She characterizes her plea agreement as one in
which she would receive the middle term of two years or, if she
failed to appear for sentencing, the “maximum penalty allowed by
law.” Castillo relies on section 1170, subdivision (b)(1), to argue
6
the “maximum penalty allowed by law” in her case is the two-
year middle term because the People failed to plead any
aggravating factors that would authorize imposition of the upper
term.4 Given these circumstances, Castillo contends she did not
knowingly and intelligently agree to a three-year sentence. She
also argues her challenge to the sentence arises from the court’s
exercise of its sentencing discretion after her plea.
A. Applicable Law
“Section 1237.5 provides that an appeal may not be taken
after a plea of guilty or no contest unless the defendant has filed
a statement showing reasonable grounds for appeal and the trial
court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause. This
requirement does not apply, however, if the appeal is based upon
grounds that arose after entry of the plea and that do not affect
the validity of the plea.” (People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36,
43 (French); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(2)(B).) “‘In the
absence of full compliance and a certificate of probable cause, the
reviewing court may not reach the merits of any issue
challenging the validity of the plea, but must order dismissal of
the appeal. [Citation.] Our Supreme Court has expressly
disapproved the practice of applying the rule loosely in order to
reach issues that would otherwise be precluded.’” (People v.
Becerra (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 178, 185.)
4 Castillo also contends imposition of the upper term
constituted a violation of her constitutional rights to a jury trial
but acknowledges the California Supreme Court has determined
otherwise in People v. Towne (2008) 44 Cal.4th 63, 77-79.
Castillo states she raises the issue only to preserve it for federal
review.
7
If a defendant agrees to a specified term as part of a plea,
then a challenge to the sentence is “an attack on the validity of
the plea, for which a certificate [is] required.” (People v. Buttram
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 782 (Buttram).) But “where the terms of
the plea agreement leave issues open for resolution by litigation,
appellate claims arising within the scope of that litigation do not
attack the validity of the plea, and thus do not require a
certificate of probable cause.” (Id. at p. 783.)
B. Castillo Agreed to a Specified Three-year Sentence if She
Did Not Personally Appear at Sentencing
Under the plea agreement, Castillo agreed to a two-year
term if she did not violate the Cruz waiver or a three-year term if
she failed to appear at sentencing. Her challenge to the three-
year agreed-upon sentence is “an attack on the validity of the
plea, for which a certificate [is] required.” (Buttram, supra,
30 Cal.4th at p. 782.) The plea agreement, which Castillo read,
understood, and signed, set out the maximum sentence to count 1
was three years and that Castillo could receive a sentence “up to
the maximum allowed by law” if she failed to appear on the date
set for surrender. During the plea colloquy, the trial court asked
Castillo if she understood she would receive a three-year sentence
if she failed to appear in court for sentencing. She said she
understood.
The facts in this case mirror those in People v. Vargas
(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 644 (Vargas). There, the defendant
signed a written plea agreement containing a Cruz waiver that
permitted the court to impose any sentence up to the maximum if
the defendant committed other crimes or failed to return for
sentencing. (Id. at p. 646.) In taking the defendant’s guilty plea,
8
the trial court expressly advised the defendant that if he violated
the terms of the Cruz waiver, the trial court would sentence
defendant to the maximum of eight years. The defendant
confirmed he understood. (Id. at p. 652.) Before his sentencing
hearing, the defendant committed a residential robbery. The
trial court found a violation of the Cruz waiver and imposed the
maximum sentence. (Id. at p. 647.)
On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court abused its
discretion because imposition of the maximum term violated
section 654, his right to a jury trial, and constituted double
punishment in violation of the double jeopardy clause. Vargas
held the defendant agreed to a specified eight-year sentence
reasoning, “although the written terms of the Cruz waiver stated
that the trial court could impose any sentence up to the
maximum, in taking defendant’s guilty plea, the trial court
expressly advised defendant that if he violated the terms of the
Cruz waiver, the trial court would sentence defendant to the
maximum term of eight years. Defendant confirmed that he
understood and, in doing so, agreed to that eight-year sentence as
part of the Cruz waiver. The Cruz waiver in turn was an integral
part of defendant’s plea agreement.” (Vargas, supra,
148 Cal.App.4th at p. 652.) As a result, the defendant’s challenge
to his sentence was a challenge to the validity of his plea “and
such a challenge requires a certificate of probable cause.” (Ibid.)
As in Vargas, here the written plea agreement shows
Castillo understood and agreed she could be sentenced up to the
maximum sentence allowed by law. The plea agreement further
set out that the maximum sentence was three years. During the
plea colloquy, the trial court confirmed with Castillo that it would
impose a three-year sentence if Castillo failed to appear for
9
sentencing. Under Vargas, Castillo’s affirmative response to the
court’s question—“Do you understand that . . . if you fail to
appear in court on time, instead of two years, it will be three
years”—meant she agreed to a specified three-year sentence as
part of her Cruz waiver.
Castillo attempts to characterize her acknowledgement of
the court’s question this way: “There is no indication in the
record that she was informed the maximum was only two years,
so her response of ‘I understand’ was merely an acknowledgment
of what the judge erroneously claimed he could impose, not an
agreement that he could impose more than the statutory
maximum. (Mabry v. Johnson (1984) 467 U.S. 504, 507-511
[ambiguities are construed in favor of the defendant.])”5 In other
words, Castillo argues the three-year term was unauthorized and
she did not agree to an unauthorized sentence. We are not
persuaded.
Generally, “defendants may challenge an unauthorized
sentence on appeal even if they failed to object below,” but this
rule is “subject to an exception: Where . . . defendants have
pleaded guilty in return for a specified sentence, appellate courts
will not find error even though the trial court acted in excess of
jurisdiction in reaching that figure, so long as the trial court did
5 Mabry v. Johnson (1984) 467 U.S. 504, 511, disapproved of
on another ground by Puckett v. United States (2009) 556 U.S.
129, 138, footnote 1, does not help Castillo. Mabry does not
address ambiguity in a plea bargain but whether a defendant’s
acceptance of a prosecutor’s proposed plea bargain, later
withdrawn, creates a constitutional right to have the bargain
specifically enforced. (Mabry, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 506.)
10
not lack fundamental jurisdiction. The rationale behind this
policy is that defendants who have” negotiated a specified
sentence “should not be allowed . . . to better the bargain through
the appellate process.” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290,
295.) There is no contention the trial court lacked fundamental
jurisdiction over Castillo or her case.
C. Castillo’s Appeal Is Not Based on Grounds Arising After the
Plea
Castillo asserts on reply the sentence imposed was an
abuse of discretion that arose after the plea, citing French, supra,
43 Cal.4th 36 and People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189
(Hilburn). As an initial matter, we need not consider arguments
raised for the first time on reply. (See People v. Duff (2014)
58 Cal.4th 527, 550, fn. 9 [claim raised by defendant for the first
time in reply brief is waived].)
In any event, French and Hilburn are distinguishable.
Both cases hold a certificate of probable cause is not required
when an appellant claims the trial court committed sentencing
error when choosing among a range of permissible sentences up
to and including a maximum sentence “lid.” (French, supra,
43 Cal.4th at p. 44; Hilburn, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 198.) As
discussed above, Castillo agreed to a specified three-year
sentence if she failed to appear; her plea does not include a
sentence lid.
11
D. The Trial Court Was Required to Impose a $300 Parole
Revocation Fine
At sentencing, the trial court imposed a $300 restitution
fine pursuant to section 1202.4, but did not impose a matching
parole revocation fine as required under section 1202.45. There
is no dispute the sentence included a period of parole. (§ 3000,
subd. (a).) As noted above, the Attorney General raised this issue
in the respondent’s brief and asked that we “impose and suspend”
the parole revocation fine. Castillo did not address this issue in
her reply, effectively conceding it.
We are directed by the Supreme Court in Smith, supra,
24 Cal.4th at page 854, to correct this error. In Smith, the trial
court imposed a parole revocation fine that did not match in
amount the restitution fine. The high court found this error “so
obvious and so easily fixable that correction of these errors in the
absence of an objection at sentencing will not unduly burden the
courts or the parties.” (Ibid.) Smith accordingly held “the Court
of Appeal may correct this error without remanding for further
proceedings in the presence of defendants.” (Ibid.) We correct
this error in our disposition.
DISPOSITION
The abstract of judgment is modified to reflect the
imposition and suspension of a $300 parole revocation fine under
section 1202.45. The trial court is directed to prepare a corrected
12
abstract of judgment and to forward it to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. The appeal is otherwise
dismissed.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
RAPHAEL, J. *
* Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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