CourtListener 9567822•People v. Dungan CA2/6
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Filed 6/18/24 P. v. Dungan CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B323384
(Super. Ct. No. 19CR10611)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v. ORDER MODIFYING
OPINION AND DENYING
JOHN RODERICK DUNGAN, REHEARING
[NO CHANGE IN
Defendant and Appellant. JUDGMENT]
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on May 30, 2024,
be modified as follows:
On page 3, the last two sentences of the third full
paragraph are modified to read:
At the time of the collision the seatbelt was not
buckled. There was evidence he did not take evasive
action to avoid the collision.
There is no change in judgment.
Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.
YEGAN, Acting P. J. BALTODANO, J. CODY, J.
2
Filed 5/30/24 P. v. Dungan CA2/6 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B323384
(Super. Ct. No. 19CR10611)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
JOHN RODERICK DUNGAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
John Roderick Dungan drove into oncoming traffic at over a
hundred miles per hour, killing the driver of an oncoming car and
her two young children. Dungan appeals from the judgment after
the jury acquitted him of first degree murder and convicted him
of three counts of second degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd.
(a), 189, subd. (b)).1 The trial court sentenced him to 45 years to
life in prison.
Dungan contends there was insufficient evidence of malice
to support convictions for murder. He also contends the trial
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
court erred when it precluded argument regarding a lesser
related offense; limited psychiatric testimony; and admitted
opinions of investigating officers, a text message, and
photographs of letters. He additionally contends cumulative
error mandates reversal. We correct errors in the abstract of
judgment. In all other respects, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Traffic collision
On October 25, 2019, Dungan drove his Camaro in Santa
Barbara toward State Route 154 (SR-154). At 4:31 p.m., Dungan
texted a friend, Ricardo F., asking him to send a message to a
woman Dungan knew in junior high school. He wanted to
express his feelings for her and to say, “I just wanted to let you
know that way too late rather than regret never having told you
it ever.” One minute later, Dungan texted, “Have a nice life
Ricardo, thanks for being a good friend.”
Dungan entered westbound SR-154, a winding mountain
road. At 4:33 p.m., he texted his parents: “Even though you may
have disappointed me sometimes, I still love you both.”
As SR-154 approached Cold Spring Bridge, it narrowed to
one lane in each direction divided by a double yellow line. The
posted speed limit was 55 miles per hour (mph). Signs advised to
not pass, and that a narrow bridge was ahead. The bridge has
one lane in each direction, with no shoulder.
Carrie Purcell was driving westbound on SR-154 at about
60 or 65 mph. There were no cars in front of her in her lane. She
saw Dungan pass her on the left in the oncoming traffic lane
going 90 mph or more. All the Camaro’s tires were in the
eastbound lane. She could see Dungan was heading toward
oncoming cars and there would be a collision. She stopped right
2
before the bridge to avoid being involved in the collision.
Nicholas Goddard was driving an SUV eastbound on
SR-154 near the bridge directly behind a Chevrolet Volt. He saw
the Camaro fully in the lane on the wrong side of the road driving
in a straight line into the path of the Volt.
At 4:45 p.m., Dungan hit the Volt head-on.2 The driver was
Vanessa Bley. Her children, Lucienne, age 2, and Desmond, age
4 months, were in the back seat, strapped into car seats. The
Volt burst into flames. All three victims died of blunt force
trauma.
Examination of the Camaro and its event data recorder
showed Dungan’s speed at 111 mph five seconds before impact.
He accelerated to 119 mph at the time of impact with full throttle
application. He unbuckled his seat belt right before the collision.
There was no evidence he took evasive action to avoid the
collision.
Evidence of suicidal intent
The prosecution presented evidence that Dungan
intentionally caused the collision based on his statements
suggesting he was suicidal. Eight months before the collision, he
sent a text message to friends that stated in part: “I’m too
sensitive for this reality with a cursed blessing/blessed curse that
makes life in this body on this planet not worth living. Enough is
enough. If noone [sic] can/will help me solve this problem or kill
me, then I will try as hard as I can to solve it myself and either
succeed or die. . . . If I don’t make it, I apologize to everyone I did
not get to say goodbye to.” Based on this text, Dungan was
2 Dungan presented evidence that the collision was “offset”
in that the center to center-left of each vehicle took the brunt of
the collision.
3
placed on a mental health welfare hold.
On unknown dates, Dungan sent texts to Ricardo F. that
expressed “suicidal ideation.” The day before the collision,
Dungan asked his mother to tell the cat he loved him. On the
morning of the collision, Dungan texted his parents, “I hope one
day after I’m gone you realize what you did wrong and
understand that I loved you.” That afternoon, Dungan’s mother
found a note on the dashboard of her vehicle that expressed his
innocence in a criminal case pending against him. It continued,
“I am too sensitive for this reality and I am done [a]llowing an
unjust justice system to push me around and bully me. [¶] I love
you all, [¶] Goodbye [¶] – John Dungan.”
Dungan’s mother texted a photograph of the note to the
mental health facility where he was residing. When a mandated
reporter at the facility received the text, she called 911 due to a
“potential risk” of suicide.
After the collision, police searched Dungan’s journals. The
final entry, dated the day of the collision, said, “I did alright.” It
ended with the word “Goodbye.” None of his other journal entries
said “goodbye.”
Three days after the collision, photographs of several
letters purportedly authored by Dungan were anonymously
dropped off at the California Highway Patrol (CHP) office. Some
of the letters thanked individuals for being Dungan’s friend or for
being “part of my life.” Several of the letters asked the recipients
to “accept this gold” as a symbol of Dungan’s gratitude, or had
Post-it notes stating “Put 1 oz gold in here.”
DISCUSSION
Evidence of malice
Dungan contends the evidence did not establish either
4
express or implied malice. We disagree.
We “ ‘ “review the whole record in the light most favorable
to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] ‘Substantial evidence includes
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn
from that evidence.’ ” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 942-
943.) The substantial evidence test also applies to the intent
element of the crime. (Id. at pp. 945-946.)
Murder requires express or implied malice. (§ 188, subd.
(a).) “Malice is express when there is manifested a deliberate
intention to unlawfully take away the life of a fellow creature.”
(§ 188, subd. (a)(1).) “Murder is committed with implied malice
when ‘the killing is proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the natural
consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was
deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct
endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious
disregard for life.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981,
988.) “Implied malice requires that the defendant act with a
wanton disregard of the high probability of death,” including a
subjective awareness of such risk. (People v. Moore (2010) 187
Cal.App.4th 937, 941.) The jury may infer malice “ ‘from the
defendant’s acts and the circumstances of the crime.’ ” (People v.
Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 701.)
In our view, Dungan drove with conscious disregard for life.
On a windy day at almost 5:00 p.m., he drove on a winding
mountain road while texting. He disregarded the “do not pass”
sign, crossed over the double yellow lines, drove with his entire
5
vehicle in the opposing traffic lane, and accelerated to 119 mph
directly toward the victims’ vehicle without taking evasive action.
Because it “takes no leap of logic for the jury to conclude” that
Dungan “acted with wanton disregard of the near certainty that
someone would be killed” (People v. Moore, supra, 187
Cal.App.4th at pp. 941-942), we conclude substantial evidence
supports the murder convictions.
In addition to Dungan’s life-threatening driving, there was
substantial evidence of implied malice based on the theory that
Dungan intended to commit suicide by intentionally causing a
collision. Dungan suggests alternative interpretations for some
of his statements, e.g., that he intended to see Ricardo F. again
and was just being “dramatic.” “But it is the jury’s province, in a
homicide case, to . . . probe defendant’s state of mind, and
determine whether or not a defendant killed with implied
malice.” (In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593, 607.) “ ‘[T]he
judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’ ”
(People v. Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 703.)
Lesser related offense
Dungan contends the trial court abused its discretion when
it precluded jury argument that he was guilty of only gross
vehicular manslaughter. Again, we disagree.
Dungan requested a jury instruction for the uncharged
lesser related offense of gross vehicular manslaughter (CALCRIM
No. 592). The prosecution objected and the court denied the
request. Dungan does not challenge this ruling on appeal.
Neither vehicular manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (c)(2)) nor
gross vehicular manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (c)(1)) is a lesser
included offense of murder because neither the elements of
6
murder nor the accusatory pleading required driving a vehicle.
(People v. Bettasso (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1057-1059; People
v. Wolfe (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 673, 685-686.) Without the
consent of the prosecutor, the court had no obligation to instruct
on a lesser related offense such as gross vehicular manslaughter.
(People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 136.)
Dungan told the court he intended to argue to the jury that
“there are other crimes short of murder that . . . may apply . . .
that are less than murder but don’t require an outright
acquittal.” The court ruled that Dungan “could not discuss the
elements of any type of manslaughter or discuss manslaughter as
a charge but that it was permissible to talk about that the
prosecution has filed this as a murder or nothing situation and
. . . acquittal on murder is not the same in this situation as lack
of criminal culpability.”
Without mentioning manslaughter, Dungan’s counsel
argued that the jury was “stuck with” the prosecution’s “murder
or nothing” charging decision, and that finding Dungan not guilty
of murder would not mean it was an accident, or excusable
homicide, or that he was innocent, or that “a horrible crime
wasn’t committed.”
The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion to limit
the scope of closing arguments. (§ 1044; People v. Simon (2016) 1
Cal.5th 98, 147-148.) Because the distinctions between homicide
offenses are technical, we disagree with Dungan’s contention that
he was entitled to argue gross vehicular manslaughter as a
“matter[] of common knowledge.” (People v. Farmer (1989) 47
Cal.3d 888, 922.) It would have confused the jurors’ task to argue
that Dungan may have committed a specific crime that was
neither charged nor defined. Instead, counsel was “allowed to
7
‘make his central point and to argue in general terms’ ” that
Dungan might be guilty of some offense less than murder.
(Simon, at p. 147.)
The jury was instructed that an unlawful killing,
“depending on the circumstances,” is “either murder or
manslaughter,” and the jury must decide “what specific crime
was committed.” (CALCRIM No. 500 (modified).) But the
instructions did not define manslaughter. The prosecution told
the trial court that leaving in the reference to manslaughter was
“an oversight.” In light of this instruction, Dungan contends that
allowing him to argue manslaughter would have enlightened
rather than confused the jurors. But the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in concluding otherwise.
Psychiatric testimony
Dungan contends the trial court erred when it precluded
psychiatric testimony regarding lack of suicidal ideation at the
time of the collision.
After Dungan’s arrest, forensic psychologist Trayci Dahl,
Ph.D., interviewed Dungan and gave him psychological tests.
Dungan sought to call Dr. Dahl to testify he “was not suffering
from a clinical diagnosis of clinical depression with suicidal
ideation” at the time of the collision. The court ruled that “to
testify that Mr. Dungan was not suicidal on the day of the
incident or at the moment of the collision is essentially saying
that the defendant did not have the intent to kill. . . . Mr.
Dungan’s intent at the time in question is an issue that must be
left in the capable hands of the trier of fact.”
The court nonetheless ruled that Dr. Dahl could testify that
Dungan “suffers from a mental illness and . . . what symptoms
that mental illness manifests.” The defense chose not to call Dr.
8
Dahl. Instead, they called a psychiatrist, Dr. Adham Malaty. He
concluded Dungan was not suicidal when he evaluated him nine
days after the collision. Dr. Malaty was unable to determine if
the collision was a suicide attempt. But because “there were a lot
of red flags,” Dr. Malaty recommended discharging Dungan “back
to jail with suicide precautions.”
“Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental
disorder is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the
accused actually formed a required specific intent, premeditated,
deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought.” (§ 28, subd. (a),
italics added.) But “[n]othing in [section 28] shall limit a court’s
discretion, pursuant to the Evidence Code, to exclude psychiatric
or psychological evidence on whether the accused had a mental
disease, mental defect, or mental disorder at the time of the
alleged offense.” (§ 28, subd. (d); see Evid. Code, § 352.)
Section 29 prohibits expert testimony “about a defendant’s
mental illness, mental disorder, or mental defect . . . as to
whether the defendant had or did not have the required mental
states, which include, but are not limited to, purpose, intent,
knowledge, or malice aforethought, for the crimes charged.” It
“prohibits an expert witness from giving an opinion about the
ultimate fact whether a defendant had the required mental state
for conviction of a crime.” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353,
431.)
There is authority that supports the exclusion of evidence
here. In People v. Nunn (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1364, an
expert’s “opinion that appellant had fired impulsively was
inadmissible since it was a conclusion concerning appellant’s
intent at the time of the shooting.” (Id. at p. 1362.) The
psychologist could testify that Nunn’s “condition could result in
9
appellant acting impulsively under certain particular
circumstances,” but not “that appellant had acted impulsively,
that is, without the intent to kill, that is, without express malice
aforethought.” (Id. at p. 1365, italics added.) And in People v.
Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, the court excluded evidence that
before shooting and killing two of his former coworkers, the
defendant “ ‘thought’ about committing a ‘101 California’ ”
(referring to a recent workplace mass murder) because it
“essentially asked the expert to provide an opinion about the
required mental state (premeditation and deliberation) and thus
was improper under section 29.” (Id. at pp. 442, 444.)
But other authority would allow Dr. Dahl’s testimony. In
People v. Cortes (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 873, the expert should
have been permitted to testify that the defendant “ ‘entered a
dissociative state after he began to stab [the victim],’ ” from
which the jury could infer he lacked malice, premeditation, or
deliberation. (Id. at pp. 909, 912, italics omitted.) And in People
v. Herrera (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 467, a divided panel of this
division concluded that the trial court improperly excluded expert
evidence that the defendant suffered from a peritraumatic
dissociative state at the time of the offense, which deprived him
of evidence that “he might not have deliberately premeditated the
infliction of [21] wounds on the victim.” (Id. at pp. 475, 478.)
We need not decide if limiting Dr. Dahl’s testimony here
was error because it was harmless. Regardless of any evidence of
suicidal ideation, we conclude that implied malice was
established by overwhelming evidence. Dungan drove on the
wrong side of a winding narrow mountain road and accelerated to
119 mph directly into the path of an oncoming vehicle evincing
“wanton disregard of the near certainty that someone would be
10
killed.” (People v. Moore, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 941.) It is
not “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the
appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the
error.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) And under
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, we conclude the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v.
Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 408-409 [§ 29 violation
harmless under Watson and Chapman].)
Opinion testimony
Dungan contends the trial court prejudicially abused its
discretion when it permitted two law enforcement officers to
testify the collision was intentional. We are not persuaded.
Sheriff’s Detective Michael Carlson was assigned to the
coroner’s bureau for nine years and investigated over a thousand
deaths. Based on his investigation, Carlson testified: “[I]f there
would have been no indication of the suspect in this case having
suicidal ideation and making the statements that he wanted to
collide with someone on 154”3 then he “would be dealing with an
accident. But in this case it changes the manner of death
completely when there’s an intentional act that occurs.”
CHP Detective Jeffrey Clements testified as the lead
investigator. Based on his investigation and interviews,
Clements testified: “The highway patrol defines a traffic collision
as an unintended event that causes damage or injury. So in this
case it was my belief that this was intentional.” Clements
clarified that he was not giving an opinion of “the state of mind of
3 The court overruled the objection that the testimony was
speculation. Dungan correctly notes that there was no other
evidence that Dungan said he wanted to collide with someone on
SR-154.
11
the defendant.” The trial court overruled objections based on
improper opinion testimony and relevancy.
Expert testimony is admissible on a subject “sufficiently
beyond common experience” if based on matter “of a type that
reasonably may be relied upon by an expert.” (Evid. Code, § 801,
subds. (a) & (b).) A police officer trained and experienced in
traffic accident investigations may testify regarding the cause of
an accident. (People v. Singh (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1362-
1364, 1377-1378 [opinion that accidents were staged]; Enos v.
Montoya (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 394, 399 [opinion of what speed
reasonable].) An expert may testify to an opinion that “embraces
the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” (Evid. Code,
§ 805; People v. Spence (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 478, 509.) We
review admission of such evidence for abuse of discretion. (People
v. Waidla (2000) 22 Ca1.4th 690, 717-718.)
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting these opinions. The detectives’ testimony that the
collision was intentional was reasonably based upon their review
of the facts. Moreover, admission of this testimony was not
prejudicial because it is not reasonably probable a result more
favorable to Dungan would have been reached in the absence of
this evidence. (People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 395.)
Text message
Dungan also contends the trial court abused its discretion
when it admitted a text message Dungan sent eight months
before the collision stating he was “too sensitive for this reality”
and that life was “not worth living.”
We conclude there was no abuse of discretion here. (People
v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 717.) The text message was
relevant to whether Dungan intended suicide at the time of the
12
collision and no more prejudicial than Dungan’s other texts and
letters. The age of the text message affects its weight, not its
admissibility. (People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 490 [habit of
staying out late several months before crime]; People v. Taylor
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1172-1173 [statement of intent three
years earlier].)
Letters
Dungan contends that photographs of letters, envelopes,
and Post-it notes anonymously provided to the CHP four days
after the accident were insufficiently authenticated, irrelevant,
and unduly prejudicial. We disagree.
The letters were signed “John Dungan” or “John.” An
investigating officer testified the letters were all on the same type
of lined paper, with similar handwriting, and used the same type
of pen. The officer properly opined that the letters had the same
handwriting as the journal entries he had seen. (Evid. Code,
§ 1416.) In addition, Dungan’s journal entry the day before the
collision mentioned wanting to deliver a letter to the addressee of
one of the letters. The letter was thus “authenticated by evidence
that the writing refers to or states matters that are unlikely to be
known to anyone other than the person who is claimed by the
proponent of the evidence to be the author of the writing.” (Evid.
Code, § 1421.)
We conclude the trial court properly exercised its discretion
to determine the preliminary fact of sufficiency of the evidence of
authenticity of the writings. (Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (a)(3);
People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 466.) And the jury
determined the authenticity of the letters and was properly
instructed to consider Dungan’s oral or written statements only if
it decided he made them. (CALCRIM No. 358: see Evid. Code,
13
§ 1417.) “ ‘The fact conflicting inferences can be drawn regarding
authenticity goes to the document’s weight as evidence, not its
admissibility.’ ” (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 267.)
Dungan also contends the letters were irrelevant because
they did not prove an intent to commit suicide. We disagree
because the jury could reasonably conclude that the letters
showed suicidal intent. They thanked several people, including
childhood friends, for their friendship. One letter said, “I am
satisfied with your chapter in my life story.” Another said, “I
wish I had been a better person for you in this [life].” A
reasonable inference is that Dungan was saying goodbye to
individuals who had been meaningful in his life, and bequeathing
them his gold. “The existence of [a] possible conflicting inference
goes to the weight rather than the admissibility of the [evidence],
because conflicting inferences are for the jury to resolve.” (People
v. Garcia (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 324, 329.)
Cumulative error
Dungan contends that cumulative errors constitute
prejudicial error. The claim is rejected because “ ‘ “defendant
received due process and a fair trial.’ ” ” (People v. Rivas (2013)
214 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1436.)
Abstract of judgment
We agree with the parties that section 1 of the abstract of
judgment must be corrected to include the offenses of which
Dungan was convicted (counts 1, 2, and 3: Pen. Code, § 187, subd.
(a)), the year they were committed (2019), the date of conviction
(August 2, 2022), that the convictions were by jury, and the
sentences are consecutive; and in section 8 to delete the
inapplicable references to sections 667, subdivisions (b)-(i) and
1170.12 (Three Strikes Law).
14
DISPOSITION
We order the abstract of judgment to be corrected as stated
above. (§ 1260.) The trial court shall prepare an amended
abstract of judgment and send a certified copy to the Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
CODY, J.
15
Thomas R. Adams, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Victor J. Morse, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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