CourtListener 9567819•People v. Romero CA2/1
Texte intégral
Filed 6/17/24 P. v. Romero CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B330046
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA140096)
v.
AMILCAR JESUS ROMERO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.
Steven A. Brody, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Lindsay Boyd,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
Defendant Amilcar Jesus Romero, convicted in 1997 of two
counts of attempted murder, appeals from the denial of his
resentencing petition under Penal Code1 section 1172.6. The
resentencing court found defendant had not made a prima facie
showing for relief because, inter alia, his jury had not been
instructed on the natural and probable consequences, felony
murder, or any other theory of imputed malice.
On appeal, defendant contends the prosecutor at his trial
made statements in closing that effectively instructed the jury on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. We conclude the
prosecution’s statements would not have led the jury to believe it
could convict defendant without a finding of malice.
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
To provide context for the charges and arguments in this
case, we briefly summarize a portion of the testimony from
defendant’s trial.
On October 21,1996, Richard Rhee was on his way to the
bank to deposit $470,000 in cash, food stamps, and checks from
the markets he owned. Rhee was driving in his Cadillac,
accompanied by two security guards each driving their own
vehicles, a Ford Taurus and a Lexus.
A yellow car suddenly struck Rhee’s car, then struck one of
the security guard’s cars. Defendant got out of the yellow car
armed with a shotgun and began shooting towards Rhee. Rhee
saw people inside a van also shooting at him.
1 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2
Rhee was armed and fired back, as did the security guards.
Defendant dropped his shotgun and ran away, limping. The van
drove off.
Police found defendant lying in the bushes, bleeding from
his upper thigh.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Conviction
An information charged defendant with two counts of
attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, two
counts of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle, one count of
attempted second degree robbery, three counts of assault with a
firearm, and one count of assault with a deadly weapon and by
means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. The
information further alleged firearm and prior conviction
enhancements, as well as a prior strike supporting sentencing
under the “Three Strikes” law.
The trial court instructed the jury on all charges and
provided an instruction on aiding and abetting liability. That
instruction provided, in relevant part, “A person aids and abets
the commission of a crime when he, [¶] (1) with knowledge of the
unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and [¶] (2) with the intent or
purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the
commission of the crime, . . . [¶] (3) by act or advice aids,
promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.”
The attempted murder instruction required, inter alia, that “[t]he
person committing the act harbored express malice aforethought,
namely, a specific intent to kill unlawfully another human being.”
The trial court did not instruct the jury on implied malice or on
3
the felony murder or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.
The trial court further instructed the jury, “If anything
concerning the law said by the attorneys in their arguments or at
any other time during the trial conflicts with my instructions on
the law, you must follow my instructions.”
On April 17, 1997, the jury found defendant guilty of the
two attempted murders, but could not reach a verdict as to
whether the attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and
premeditated. The jury acquitted defendant of one of the two
counts of shooting at an occupied vehicle. The jury found
defendant guilty of all other charges and found the firearm
allegations true. The trial court found the prior conviction
allegation to be true.
The trial court sentenced defendant to 44 years 4 months in
prison. We affirmed the judgment on direct appeal, rejecting
defendant’s sole argument that the prior conviction finding was
not supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Romero (Jun.
30, 1998, B112947) [nonpub. opn.].)
2. Petition for resentencing
On October 24, 2022, defendant filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6.2 The resentencing court
appointed counsel and the People filed opposition to the petition.
Following a hearing at which the defense presented no additional
argument, the resentencing court denied the petition. The court
2 The form petition listed former section 1170.95 as the
applicable statute, but by October 2022, that section had been
renumbered without substantive change as section 1172.6. (See
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708, fn. 2.)
4
stated, “[I]t looks like the defendant was found guilty of willful,
premeditated, deliberate attempted murder, plus it was found
true that he personally used the firearm during the commission
of that crime. [¶] Looking at the jury instructions, there was no
natural and probable consequence [instruction] given, nor was
there any theory in which responsibility can be imputed, and
[defendant] was the actual shooter.”
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law
Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
“ ‘ “[a] person who knowingly aids and abets criminal conduct is
guilty of not only the intended crime [target offense] but also of
any other crime the perpetrator actually commits [nontarget
offense] that is a natural and probable consequence of the
intended crime.” ’ [Citation.] ‘Thus, for example, if a person aids
and abets only an intended assault, but a murder results, that
person may be guilty of that murder, even if unintended, if it is a
natural and probable consequence of the intended assault.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 161.)
Pursuant to this doctrine, a defendant could be convicted of
murder without proof of malice aforethought. (People v. Lee
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 254, 260.)
In 2018, the Legislature amended the Penal Code to
eliminate the natural and probable consequences theory of
murder by providing, “ ‘Malice shall not be imputed to a person
based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’ ” (People v.
Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1173 (Lee), quoting § 188,
subd. (a)(3).) The Legislature also amended section 189 to limit
5
the scope of the felony murder rule. (Lee, at p. 1173.) The
Legislature further enacted former section 1170.95, now
numbered 1172.6, which created a procedure by which
defendants who no longer could be convicted after the changes to
the Penal Code could seek resentencing retroactively. (Lee, at
p. 1173.) The current version of the statute provides relief to
those convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the felony
murder rule, or any “ ‘other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1174.)
“If a petitioner makes a prima facie showing of relief under
section 1172.6—that is, a showing that the petitioner was
convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter under a
theory no longer valid under the amended Penal Code—the
resentencing court must issue an order to show cause for an
evidentiary hearing.” (Lee, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1174.) “If,
however, the record of conviction or the court’s own documents
indicate the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of
law”—that is, the petitioner fails to make a prima facie showing
of eligibility for relief—“the resentencing court may deny the
petition without issuing an order to show cause.” (Ibid.) We
review de novo the resentencing court’s finding that a defendant
has not made the requisite prima facie showing. (Ibid.)
B. Defendant Is Ineligible for Relief as a Matter of Law
In the instant case, the trial court did not instruct the jury
on any theory of imputed malice, including the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or felony murder. Defendant
contends that the prosecution’s statements during closing
argument effectively instructed the jury on the natural and
6
probable consequences doctrine, thus suggesting the jury could
convict defendant of attempted murder without a finding of
malice. We disagree that the prosecutor’s statements are
sufficient to support prima facie eligibility under section 1172.6.
1. Additional background
Defendant identifies the following statement by the
prosecutor during closing argument regarding the attempted
murder counts: “Count I, count II he’s guilty of, and it doesn’t
matter—the judge has told you that about the concept of aiding
and abetting. It doesn’t matter whether [defendant] fired the
shots or some other people fired the shots. Because under the
concept of aiding and abetting, if you know that another person is
participating in a crime and you aid and abet him, you assist, you
are just as liable for the consequences as that other person. [¶]
That’s the concept of aiding and abetting. So it doesn’t matter
who pulls the—who fires the gun. So if someone says, well,
there’s no proof that he fired the gun—even though there is.
[One of the security guards] did say that the defendant fired at
him. He fired several times. And he fired at him, and he shot his
car that he was hiding behind at the time. The defendant shot it.
But it doesn’t really matter.”
Later, when describing the series of events underlying the
charges, the prosecutor stated, “So immediately after colliding
with [the other security guard’s] car they began shooting. They
wanted to establish superiority, superiority of firearms by laying
down some fire power to either kill or intimidate the security
guards so that they would not fire back. That was the theory of
the robbers. [¶] And you can see that when you look at [a
particular trial exhibit], and you see how many shots the robbers
fired. . . . [¶] These are all shots fired by the robbers. So you
7
know that at that point in time the robbers were just laying down
fire power. They’re just shooting holes into the Taurus, and then
they were shooting at the Lexus, and they didn’t care whether
the people in those cars lived or died. In fact, they didn’t care if
the people in the neighborhood lived or died.”
2. Analysis
Defendant focuses on the prosecutor’s statement that “if
you know that another person is participating in a crime and you
aid and abet him, . . . you are just as liable for the consequences
as that other person.” Defendant argues this statement suggests
“it didn’t matter whether [defendant] had intent to kill, as long as
he assisted ‘another person . . . participating in a crime.’ ”
Defendant argues the prosecutor reinforced this suggestion by his
statement that the shooters “didn’t care” whether the robbery
victims “lived or died,” which defendant contends suggested to
the jury defendant was guilty even if he lacked intent to kill.
Defendant asserts, “If anything, this is a formulation of the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, less the requirement
that a reasonable person could anticipate the possible
commission of the nontarget offense.”
As an initial matter, to the extent the prosecution’s
comments mischaracterized or deviated from the jury
instructions, defense counsel could have objected at the time or
defendant could have raised the issue on direct appeal. Courts
have held that “ ‘[s]ection 1172.6 does not create a right to a
second appeal, and [defendant] cannot use it to resurrect a claim
that should have been raised in his [direct] appeal.’ [Citations].”
(People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921, 936, first
bracketed insertion added.) Because we conclude defendant’s
arguments on the merits do not entitle him to relief, we will
8
assume arguendo he may raise them in this resentencing
proceeding.
On the merits, we disagree the prosecutor’s comments
identified by defendant would lead the jury to believe it could
convict defendant without a finding of malice. It is true that in
the context of explaining, correctly, that defendant could be guilty
of attempted murder even if he was not the shooter, the
prosecutor did not mention the other elements of aiding and
abetting, namely that defendant share the direct perpetrator’s
intent to kill. Defendant cites no authority, however, that a
prosecutor misstates the law by discussing or emphasizing some
elements and not others.
Nor did the prosecutor otherwise suggest that the jury
could convict absent a finding that defendant had an intent to
kill. The prosecutor’s comment that the shooters did not care if
their targets lived or died was not part of the discussion of aiding
and abetting liability. Rather, it arose in an entirely different
context in which the prosecutor was taking the jury step by step
through the events underlying the charged offenses, and the
prosecutor sought to convey dramatically the many bullets fired
by the perpetrators. The prosecutor did not link his statement
about the perpetrators not caring whether their victims lived or
died to any element of the offense so as to suggest intent to kill
was not a required element of attempted murder.
To the extent arguendo there was any tension between the
prosecutor’s statements and the jury instructions, our Supreme
Court has stated, “ ‘When argument runs counter to instructions
given a jury, we will ordinarily conclude that the jury followed
the latter and disregarded the former, for “[w]e presume that
jurors treat the court’s instructions as a statement of the law by a
9
judge, and the prosecutor’s comments as words spoken by an
advocate in an attempt to persuade.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 676 (Centeno).) Indeed,
in the instant case the trial court specifically instructed the jury,
“If anything concerning the law said by the attorneys in their
arguments or at any other time during the trial conflicts with my
instructions on the law, you must follow my instructions.” The
presumption stated in Centeno, along with the trial court’s
express instruction to follow its articulation of the law rather
than the attorneys’ articulation, further reinforces our conclusion
the prosecutor’s statements here would not have led the jury to
conclude it could convict defendant of attempted murder without
a finding of intent to kill.
Defendant notes that in Centeno, the Supreme Court
concluded a prosecutor’s misstatements of the law required
reversal of the judgment, despite the general presumption that
the jury follows the jury instructions over the attorneys’
statements of the law. (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 677–
678.) In Centeno, the prosecutor during closing argument
misrepresented the reasonable doubt standard, first by
explaining the standard using a diagram and hypothetical
situation with no relationship to the facts of the case, and then by
suggesting in argument the prosecution could meet its burden so
long as its account of the evidence was reasonable. (Id. at
pp. 670, 673.) Defense trial counsel did not object to the
prosecutor’s argument. In addressing ineffective assistance of
counsel, our high court concluded the prosecutor’s misconduct in
misdescribing her burden of proof was prejudicial in a close case
that relied on the victim’s credibility and in which the victim’s
10
testimony changed throughout trial and she refused to answer
questions. (Id. at p. 677.)
In contrast, here, defendant has identified a single
comment by the prosecutor in which he provided an incomplete
summary of the elements of aiding and abetting, and an
unrelated comment about the perpetrators not caring if the
victims lived or died. This is not comparable to Centeno, in which
the prosecutor engaged in a detailed yet legally erroneous
discussion purporting to instruct the jury on the reasonable doubt
standard, complete with a diagram and hypothetical, followed by
repeated misstatements of the applicable standard of proof.
Defendant also cites our decision in People v. Fay (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 767 (Fay). In Fay, the jury during deliberations
twice asked the court for clarification of the implied malice
instruction, and later reported they were deadlocked. (Id. at
pp. 771–772.) The trial court allowed counsel to present
supplemental argument, during which the prosecutor misstated
the implied malice standard, relying on dictum from a 1985 Court
of Appeal case that conflicted with later Supreme Court
authority. (Id. at pp. 772, 774–776.) When the jury asked for the
source of the standard stated by the prosecutor, the trial court,
after conferring with counsel, informed the jury, “ ‘The statement
of the attorney came from case law decisions and you are
reminded that arguments of counsel are not evidence.’ ” (Id. at
p. 773.) Less than an hour later, the jury found the defendant
guilty of second degree murder. (Ibid.)
We reversed the judgment. (Fay, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at
p. 776.) We observed that, based on the jury’s questions to the
court and the fact that they originally deadlocked, it appeared the
jurors were divided as to the nature of implied malice. (Id. at
11
p. 776.) Upon receiving the prosecutor’s incorrect articulation of
the law, the deadlock broke and the jury returned a guilty
verdict. (Ibid.) “The prejudice,” we concluded, “is unmistakable.”
(Ibid.) We also observed the trial court had compounded the
error by informing the jury the prosecutor’s standard was based
on case law, thus “effectively endors[ing] the prosecutor’s
misstatement and g[iving] it the force of law on a par with the
formal instructions the jury had received.” (Id. at p. 776.)
Fay is not instructive here. The prosecutor in Fay made his
misstatements in direct response to questions from the jury
regarding the implied malice standard, after which the trial court
essentially endorsed the standard by attributing it to case law.
The previously deadlocked jurors returned a guilty verdict
shortly thereafter. Under these circumstances, it was not only
possible but probable the jurors embraced the prosecutor’s
incorrect implied malice standard over the trial court’s original
instructions.
The record contains no such indication here. Although the
prosecutor in discussing aiding and abetting did not provide a full
summary of the elements, he was not purporting to clarify an
instruction about which the jury had asked or suggesting the jury
should preference his articulation of the law over the instructions
previously given by the trial court. Nor did the trial court
endorse, expressly or implicitly, the prosecutor’s statements.
Thus, there is no reason to conclude the jury took the prosecutor’s
statements as the final word on aiding and abetting, as opposed
to the trial court’s unequivocal instructions on intent to kill as an
element of aiding and abetting an attempted murder.
Defendant contends the resentencing court made two
additional errors: first, it stated defendant had been convicted of
12
premeditated attempted murder, when in fact the jury had hung
on the question of premeditation, and second, it concluded
defendant, as an actual shooter, was ineligible for relief, a
conclusion defendant argues is not consistent with the law that
defendant claims distinguishes an “actual killer” from an “actual
shooter.” Assuming arguendo these findings were in error, they
have no impact on our holding. We may affirm the trial court if
correct on any theory, even for reasons other than those given by
the trial court. (People v. Evans (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735,
742.)
The resentencing court correctly found defendant’s jury
had not been instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or any theory of imputed malice. We have
further concluded the prosecutor’s statements would not have
misled the jury as to the elements of aiding and abetting so as to
override the trial court’s instructions. Defendant therefore was
not convicted under a now-invalid theory, and is ineligible for
relief as a matter of law.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J. WEINGART, J.
13
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.