People v. Sanchez CA2/5

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Filed 6/17/24 P. v. Sanchez CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B324184

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA096833)
v.

LUIS R. SANCHEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Los Angeles County
Superior Court, Hayden A. Zacky, Judge. Affirmed.
Nathanael C. Crowley, by appointment from the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Nicholas J. Webster,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________________
A jury convicted Luis Sanchez (defendant) of assault with a
deadly weapon after he attacked a laundromat attendant with a
garden rake. Defendant argues that the court erred by not
instructing the jury sua sponte on self-defense, and that
insufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that the rake was
a deadly weapon. These arguments lack merit, so we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
On the night of July 1, 2021, Gonzalo Rosales drove to his
workplace, a laundromat in Northridge, to clean and lock up for
the night. Rosales picked his daughter up from her job on his
way there. He parked his truck outside the laundromat and
observed defendant “walking around pushing trash cans.”
Rosales had seen defendant there before, but they had only
exchanged greetings once. At about 10:40 p.m., defendant
approached Rosales’s truck and began to strike and kick it.
Rosales locked his daughter and himself in the truck and called
the police.
Defendant left the scene and Rosales entered the
laundromat to do his work, leaving his daughter in his locked car.
A few customers were inside finishing their laundry, as shown in
a surveillance camera footage at the back of the laundromat that
faced the front of the business. Defendant reappeared and
entered the laundromat carrying a garden rake. He announced
to the customers that he owned the laundromat. Rosales
demanded that defendant leave. Defendant, still carrying the
rake, approached Rosales and backed him into a corner, where
the men stood outside the surveillance camera’s view for several
seconds. Rosales testified that while he was backed into the
corner, defendant threatened to “beat [him] up.” Defendant

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retreated to the front of business, but did not leave. Rosales
followed him to the front of the store, where they stood arguing.
Defendant then swung the rake at Rosales, who raised his arm to
protect his face. The rake hit Rosales’s arm. Defendant swung
the rake at Rosales again, this time hitting him on the back of his
head. The blows from the rake caused scratches to Rosales’s arm,
and a welt on his head.
Defendant continued to threaten Rosales, and Rosales
demanded he leave and stated that the police were coming.
Defendant lingered around the entrance, while Rosales lined up
the laundry carts for the night and walked to the back of the
store to retrieve the handle from a mop. Rosales walked back to
the front of the store to defendant, and the men engaged in what
the prosecutor described as a “sword fight.” The police came and
arrested defendant. They recovered a lightweight, metal rake
handle where defendant was standing, and the rake head from a
trash can in the laundromat. The head consisted of metal tines
in a plastic frame.
II. Procedural Background
The People charged defendant with a single count of
assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)),1 and
further alleged that defendant had a prior serious or violent
felony conviction (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)).
The matter proceeded to trial by jury. The arresting officer
testified to the circumstances leading to defendant’s arrest, and
identified the rake recovered from the scene. Rosales testified to
the details of the assault. The jury heard the 911 call, and was
shown security camera footage from inside the laundromat and
photos of the rake defendant wielded.

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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The jury was instructed on the elements of assault with a
deadly weapon as well as simple assault, a lesser included
offense. Defense counsel did not request, and the court did not
give instructions on self-defense. Nor did defense counsel argue
self-defense in closing. Instead, counsel argued that the rake was
not a deadly weapon, and that if the jury finds defendant guilty of
any offense, it should be simple assault.
The jury convicted defendant of assault with a deadly
weapon and found true the allegation that defendant had a prior
strike conviction. The trial court sentenced defendant to six
years in state prison, composed of three years for assault, times
two for the strike conviction.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to
instruct the jury on self-defense sua sponte (which he urges
violated his due process rights), and that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to request self-defense instructions.
Defendant also argues that insufficient evidence supports the
jury’s finding that the garden rake was a deadly weapon.
I. The Court Did Not Err in Omitting Self-Defense
Instructions
In a criminal case, the trial court has a duty to instruct on
general principles of law applicable to the case. (People v.
Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 873; People v. Anderson (2011)
51 Cal.4th 989, 996 (Anderson).) That duty extends to
instructions on defenses, but only if the defendant is relying on
such a defense, or if the defense is supported by substantial
evidence and is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of
the case. (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 824; People

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v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 424.) To justify as self-defense
an act charged as an assault (§ 245), a defendant “ ‘must have an
honest and reasonable belief that bodily injury is about to be
inflicted on him.’ ” (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055,
1065.) Any right of self-defense is limited to such force that is
“ ‘reasonable under the circumstances.’ ” (Ibid.) We
independently review a trial court’s decision not to give a self-
defense instruction (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326;
People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 133); in doing so, we must
determine whether substantial evidence supported the defense,
and we resolve any doubts in favor of the accused (People v.
Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 944).
To support his argument that substantial evidence
supported a self-defense instruction, defendant relies on a poor-
quality surveillance video, which he interprets as showing
defendant “being hit first.”2 The footage, which we have
reviewed, is blurry and does not show that Rosales hit defendant
first. The only discernable violent actions are defendants’ acts of
swinging the rake at Rosales. Defendant’s assertion based on the
footage thus extends “ ‘beyond [the realm] of reasonable
inferences into the realm of speculation, conjecture, surmise, or
guesswork,’ ” and thus falls short from being “ ‘reasonable,
credible, and of solid value.’ ” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th
1, 57; People v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 168-169; People
v. Soriano (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 278 [substantial evidence means
evidence, not guesswork].) Defendant’s position is particularly
tenuous in view of the uncontroverted evidence in the record,
which shows that defendant kicked Rosales’s truck, entered the

2 Defendant raises his contention that Rosales hit him first
for the first time on appeal.

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laundromat with a rake, and threatened to beat Rosales before
the physical conflict ensued. Under these circumstances, no
reasonable juror could infer, based solely on the grainy
inconclusive footage, that defendant was acting in self-defense
when he hit Rosales with the rake. (See People v. Millbrook
(2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1137 [evidence is substantial if “ ‘a
reasonable jury could find [it] persuasive’ ”].)
Defendant resists this conclusion by urging that Rosales’s
“credibility was in question” because Rosales’s claim that
defendant had struck his truck was not corroborated by any other
evidence, and Rosales’s testimony differed from what was shown
in the surveillance videos. This argument is misplaced because
Rosales’s credibility is not a proper consideration in our review
for substantial evidence. (See People v. Breverman (1998)
19 Cal.4th 142, 163 [courts should not examine credibility of
witnesses in deciding whether substantial evidence supports jury
instructions].)
Having concluded there was no instructional error, we do
not reach harmlessness. And defendant’s ineffective assistance of
counsel and due process claims also necessarily fail. (People v.
Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1092 (Beasley) [counsel’s
failure to make unmeritorious argument is not deficient
performance].)
II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Finding
That the Rake Was a Deadly Weapon
“ ‘As used in section 245, subdivision (a)(1), a “deadly
weapon” is “any object, instrument, or weapon which is used in
such a manner as to be capable of producing and likely to
produce, death or great bodily injury.” ’ ” (People v. Aledamat
(2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 6 (Aledamat).) Some objects, such as dirks

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and blackjacks, have been held to be deadly per se. (Ibid.) Other
objects, while not deadly per se, may be used in a manner to
produce death or great bodily injury. (Ibid.) “ ‘In determining
whether an object not inherently deadly or dangerous is used as
such, the trier of fact may consider the nature of the object, the
manner in which it is used, and all other facts relevant to the
issue.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023,
1028-1029.) The determination of whether an object is a deadly
weapon “must rest on evidence of how the defendant actually
‘used’ the object.” (In re B.M. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 528, 534 (B.M.).)
We review the jury’s finding on this issue for substantial
evidence. (Id. at p. 536.)
Defendant relies on Beasley, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th 1078
in arguing that insufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding.
Beasley is distinguishable, however, because unlike here—where
defendant struck the victim in the head with a metal object—the
defendant in Beasley struck the victim with a broomstick on her
“arms and shoulders,” and with a “hollow” “plastic” “vacuum
attachment” on her back and shoulder. (Id. at pp. 1087, 1088.)
Further, there was no evidence of the “degree of force” the
defendant used when striking the victim with the broomstick,
whereas here there is evidence of force sufficient to cause the
metal tines to bend. (Ibid.)
Here, defendant first swung the rake at Rosales’s head
with the end of a rake that contained metal tines. (See People v.
Page (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1473 [pencil held to neck was
deadly weapon]; cf. B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 536 [defendant
did not use knife to attack victim’s head, but rather limited
attack to victim’s legs].) Rosales defended this blow with his arm,
but a jury could find that blindness was a likely consequence of

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being hit by the head of the rake. (B.M., at p. 535; see People v.
Roberts (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 960, 965 [“blindness” is “surely a
great bodily injury”]; accord People v. Lochtefeld (2000)
77 Cal.App.4th 533, 540, 541.) Defendant also landed a blow on
defendant’s head using the metal handle of the rake. (See People
v. Jaramillo (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 830, 837 [stick used to strike
children was deadly weapon within meaning of section 12022,
subdivision (b)].) We cannot say no reasonable factfinder could
conclude that defendant’s use of the rake in this manner was
likely to cause great bodily injury.
Defendant correctly observes that the handle appeared to
be lightweight, and that Rosales suffered relatively minor
injuries—a bump on his head and a scratch on his arm. Although
relevant, the extent of Rosales’s injury is not dispositive; indeed,
no physical contact is required to sustain a finding that a deadly
weapon was used. (People v. Koback (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 912,
925 [defendant who lunged at person with car key, but missed,
used the key as a deadly weapon].) It is not our task to reweigh
the evidence, and reversal “is not warranted simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616,
639.)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

LEE, J.*
WE CONCUR:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

KIM, J.

 Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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