People v. Harless CA3

CourtListener 9567451Calctapp17 juin 2024

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Filed 6/17/24 P. v. Harless CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C099672

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 98F06291)

v.

BENJAMIN HARLESS,

Defendant and Appellant.

In April 1998, as a juvenile, defendant Benjamin Harless was convicted of robbery
and second degree murder and received a sentence of 15 years to life in prison. Almost a
year later, a jury found defendant guilty of threatening a witness and terrorist threats.
The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life.

In 2023, the trial court denied defendant’s petition for resentencing filed pursuant
to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) (unless otherwise stated, statutory section
citations that follow are to the Penal Code) because defendant had not been sentenced to
life without parole and his sentence was not the functional equivalent of life without
parole. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in this determination. He further

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argues we should order the trial court to hold a hearing pursuant to section 3051. We
affirm the trial court’s order.

FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This case arises from defendant’s two prior convictions as a juvenile. Defendant
was born in 1981. In December 1997, at the behest of a third person, defendant went to
the 70-year-old victim’s home to collect on a $50 debt owed to that third person. The
third person also instructed defendant to teach the victim a lesson. Doing as instructed,
when he went to collect the debt, defendant repeatedly hit the victim in the head with a
metal baseball bat brutally killing him. He then stole a gun and jewelry and set the
victim’s home on fire. Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and robbery
(§§ 187, 212.5) and the trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life on the count
charging murder with a nine-year concurrent sentence for the robbery.
In 1998, defendant was in a courthouse holding cell waiting to testify in a murder
trial. When he saw the victim of the threats and intimidation charges later brought
against him, defendant started shouting loud and angry threats at her, “Bitch! You testify
and I’ll kill you! You testify and I’ll kill your family.” Later when the officers returned
to his cell, defendant was still extremely agitated and yelled he was not afraid of them.
Defendant said, “I heard [the victim] crying, was she? Good, I hope so, she deserves it,
the bitch.”
A jury convicted defendant of threatening a witness and terrorist threats.
(§§ 136.1, subd. (c), 422.) The trial court sentenced defendant to three strike sentences of
25 years to life (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) for each count but stayed the sentence on
the terrorist threats pursuant to section 654. The trial court ordered the new sentence to
be served consecutive to his existing 15-year-to-life sentence.
In 2023, defendant filed a petition seeking to have his sentence recalled and for a
new sentencing hearing pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). The trial court

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denied the petition finding defendant’s sentence was neither a life without parole
sentence nor its functional equivalent and denied the petition.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION
Defendant first argues the trial court erred in finding his 40-year-to-life sentence
was not the functional equivalent of life without parole, and thus he was entitled to be
resentenced under section 1170, subdivision (d). We disagree.
Section 1170, subdivision (d) provides, “When a defendant who was under 18
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was
sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated
for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall
and resentencing.” Under its express terms, this resentencing opportunity is limited to
juvenile defendants who have been sentenced to life without a parole term.
People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 (Heard) extended the reach of this
statute. In Heard, the trial court sentenced the minor defendant to 23 years plus 80 years
to life for two counts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, along with
enhancements for committing the crime for the benefit of a criminal street gang and using
a firearm and voluntary manslaughter. (Id. at pp. 613-614.) In rejecting his subsequent
petition for resentencing, the trial court concluded this sentence was not a life without
parole and he was therefore statutorily ineligible for resentencing under section 1170,
subdivision (d). (Heard, at pp. 621-622.)
The appellate court agreed the trial court’s ruling was correct as a matter of
statutory interpretation. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 626.) But the appellate
court further concluded that denying juvenile offenders who were sentenced to the
functional equivalent of life without parole the opportunity to petition for resentencing
violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. (Ibid.) In examining

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defendant’s sentence, the appellate court concluded because defendant would have to
serve 103 years before becoming eligible for parole, his sentence was a de facto life
without parole sentence. (Id. at p. 629.) The appellate court was “unable to identify a
rational basis for making juveniles sentenced to an explicitly designated life without
parole term, but not juveniles sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without
parole, eligible to petition for resentencing under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). As a
consequence, denying [the defendant] the opportunity to petition for resentencing under
this provision violates his right to equal protection of the laws.” (Id. at pp. 633-634, fn.
omitted.)
Here, the case turns on the question of whether defendant’s sentence of 40 years to
life for his homicide, robbery, intimidating a witness and terrorist threats imposed upon
him for crimes he committed as a juvenile is the functional equivalent of life without
parole. We conclude it is not.
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 provides us with some guidance. In
Franklin, the defendant was convicted of a first degree murder he committed when he
was 16 years old and sentenced to 50 years to life in prison. (Id. at p. 268.) The
defendant was entitled to parole consideration after 25 years pursuant to section 3051.
(Id. at p. 269.) In discussing its prior precedent that a 110-year-sentence was the
functional equivalent of life without parole, the Franklin court noted that defendant’s life
expectancy was a relevant factor in determining whether the sentence is that functional
equivalent for a murderer. (Id. at pp. 275-276, [quoting from Sumner v. Shuman (1987)
483 U.S. 66, 83, [“there is no basis for distinguishing . . . between an inmate serving a
life sentence without possibility of parole and a person serving several sentences of a
number of years, the total of which exceeds his normal life expectancy”].) The Franklin
court continued, “we did not further elaborate what it means for a sentence to be the
‘functional equivalent’ of [life without parole], and we left open how our holding should
be applied in the case of a juvenile homicide offender.” (Franklin, at p. 276.)

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Ultimately, the Franklin court concluded that the de facto sentence the defendant
received (25 years to life) was not the functional equivalent of life without parole noting
the defendant “does not argue that a life sentence with parole eligibility during his 25th
year of incarceration, when he will be 41 years old, is the functional equivalent of [life
without parole]. We conclude that such a sentence is not the functional equivalent of [life
without parole].” (Id. at p. 279.)
In support of his appeal, defendant cites People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349.
There, the Supreme Court in Contreras held sentences of 50 years to life and 58 years to
life for nonhomicide offenses committed by two 16-year-old defendants violated the
Eighth Amendment. (Id. at p. 356.) As a result, it directed the trial court on remand to
consider “any mitigating circumstances of defendants’ crimes and lives, and the impact
of any new legislation and regulations on appropriate sentencing.” (Id. at p. 383.) The
Contreras court acknowledged its holding in Franklin that 25 years to life was not the
functional equivalent of life without parole. (Id. at p. 359.) The Contreras court,
however, rejected the Attorney General’s proffered “life expectancy” test as the bright
line arbiter of whether a sentence is the functional equivalent of life without parole. (Id.
at pp. 368-370.) It did so because that test would in and of itself potentially inject
discriminatory treatment for persons based on their life expectancy noting that women
often live longer than men and certain groups live longer than others. (Id. at pp. 361-
363.)
Turning to the specific sentences imposed in its case, the Contreras court
concluded the term of 50 years to life would not allow a juvenile offender to rejoin
society for a sufficient period to achieve reintegration as a productive and respected
member of the citizenry. (People v. Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 368.) The court
further concluded a 50-year-to-life sentence for a juvenile -- that contemplates returning
defendant to society in his late sixties or early seventies -- would deny the defendant the
incentives to change going forward and has an attenuated relationship to any penological

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goals for nonhomicide offenders. (Id. at pp. 368-369.) Further, the conclusion that this
sentence was a functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence was consistent with
conclusions reached in other states. (Id. at p. 369 [citing examples of sentences of 50
years, 45 years to life, 75 years [with parole eligibility at 52.5 years], 57 years [with a
possible reduction to 50 years].)
Here, defendant concedes he will be eligible for parole consideration at the age of
56. Thus, he is not serving a sentence like the 103-year-to-life sentence given to the
defendant in Heard. While we conclude the Contreras limitation of 50 years to life for
nonhomocide offenses does not provide us with relevant guidance for this juvenile
murderer, we also conclude the potential for defendant’s release at 56 years of age is
fundamentally different than a release a decade later in his late sixties or into his
seventies. This release date gives defendant the opportunity to rejoin society for a
sufficient period to achieve reintegration as a productive and respected member of the
citizenry. It also provides an incentive to change for the better while he is in prison and
is in line with the penological goals for sentencing murderers. The Franklin court’s
conclusion that 25 to life for a homicide defendant was not the functional equivalent of
life without parole supports our conclusion as well. Thus, we agree with the trial court
that this sentence is not the functional equivalent of life without parole.
We further reject defendant’s attempt to inject extrajudicial evidence in his reply
brief for the first time as to the practices of the parole board, as we treat arguments raised
for the first time in a reply brief as forfeited. (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192,
1218.)
Finally, defendant requests that we join any remand order we issue with a
direction to the trial court to hold a hearing pursuant to People v. Franklin, supra,
63 Cal.4th at page 268, to allow defendant to present mitigating factors defendant could
present to the parole authority. Because we affirm the order on the resentencing petition,
we decline this invitation without prejudice to defendant’s ability to file a motion in the

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trial court in the first instance under section 1203.01. (In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439,
455-456, 458.)

DISPOSITION
The order denying the defendant’s petition is affirmed.

HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MAURO, J.

WISEMAN, J.

 Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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