People v. Le CA4/1

CourtListener 9567227Calctapp14 juin 2024

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Filed 6/14/24 P. v. Le CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082173

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD212126)

ERIK HUNG LE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Polly H. Shamoon, Judge. Reversed.
Laura P. Gordon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa
Mandel and Seth M. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Defendant Erik Le appeals from an order denying his petition for

resentencing relief under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 His appointed counsel
filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 stating counsel was unable to
identify any arguable issues on appeal. Le filed a supplemental brief.
Based on our independent review of the record, we requested
supplemental briefing from the parties addressing whether the matter should
be remanded for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6,
subdivision (d). The Attorney General concedes in its supplemental brief that
the trial court erred and remand is required. We accept the Attorney
General’s concession and reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2010, a jury convicted Le and his codefendant of first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), attempted premeditated murder (§§ 187, subd. (a),
189, 664; count 2), shooting from a motor vehicle (§ 12034, subd. (d); count 3),
and two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b);
counts 4 & 5). The jury also found true that all counts were committed for
the benefit of a street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)); that as to counts 1, 2, and 3,
Le and his codefendant were principals in the offenses and that during their
commission at least one principal used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) &
(e)); and that as to counts 3 and 4, Le’s codefendant personally used a firearm
(former § 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)). Le was sentenced to 14 years plus 82 years
to life.
This court affirmed the judgment in the direct appeal. (People v. Le
(Apr. 27, 2012, D057392) [nonpub. opn.].)

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
In July 2019, Le filed a petition for resentencing under former

section 1170.95, now section 1172.6.2 After the appointment of counsel, the
submission of written briefs and arguments by the attorneys, the trial judge
(Hon. Charles G. Rogers) found that Le set forth a prima facie claim for relief
and issued an order to show cause. In its written decision, the court
concluded that the record of conviction did not establish Le was ineligible for
relief as a matter of law, since jurors at Le’s trial were instructed to consider
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The court reasoned, “[I]t is
probable that the jurors, or some of them, relied on natural and probable
consequences liability . . . . The intended crimes were presented as separate
counts, and the jurors found petitioner guilty of them as charged. These are
count 3 (discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle) and counts 4 and 5
(assault with a semi-automatic firearm). Having made that finding, all they
had to do is ask if a reasonable person would have known that murder was a
natural and probable consequence of either crime.”
Following the order to show cause, the parties jointly requested that
the trial court admit and consider a disk containing a full and complete copy
of all trial record transcripts. The People then filed a return to the order to
show cause, contending Le was not entitled to resentencing relief because the
trial transcripts established he is guilty of murder and attempted murder
beyond a reasonable doubt as a direct aider and abettor. In his reply, Le
contended the trial transcripts were insufficient to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt his liability as a direct aider and abettor under current law.

2 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We refer to
the statute by its current designation.
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After the case was reassigned due to Judge Rogers’s retirement, the
trial court (Hon. Polly H. Shamoon) held a hearing on May 12, 2023 and
denied the petition. At the hearing, the court explained its decision as
follows:
“After reviewing and considering the record of conviction,
the Court finds that the Defendant failed to state a prima
facie case for relief. In looking at the record of conviction,
what’s considered in that is the verdict forms were
clearly—jurors heard evidence of the witnesses, however
troubling counsel may find their testimony, and despite
them found guilty verdicts. And the People have proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant, Le, was
guilty of murder with express malice, attempted murder
with express malice, shooting from a motor vehicle, assault
with [a] semiautomatic firearm, and assault with a
semiautomatic firearm as an aider and abettor. And as to
the attempted murder, it is clear to this Court that that
was done—based on all of the actions in the record of
conviction that that was an express malice with regard to
Mr. Le’s actions.”

The court also issued a written order denying the petition. The written
order stated: “This being the time set for PRIMA FACIE HEARING
(pursuant to PC1192.6 [sic] formally [sic] PC1170.95) . . . [¶] [¶] After
considering the record of conviction the Court finds that the defendant failed
to state a prima facie claim for relief. Defendant’s petition for resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code PC1192.6 [sic] formally [sic] PC1170.95 is DENIED.”
DISCUSSION
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) amended the felony
murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine as related
to murder “ ‘to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is
not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to

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human life.’ ” (Ibid.; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).)
“The Legislature also amended the natural and probable consequences
doctrine by adding subdivision (a)(3) to section 188, which states that
‘[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.’ ” (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 51.)
In addition, Senate Bill No. 1437 created procedures “for convicted
murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended to
retroactively seek relief.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957.) The
Legislature subsequently extended relief to defendants convicted of
attempted murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
(Sen. Bill No. 775, ch. 551 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) § 1.)
Under these procedures, a person convicted of “murder or attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine . . . may file a
petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the . . .
conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) After receipt of such petition, the trial court must “hold
a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case
for relief.” (Id., subd. (c).) The court may rely on the record of conviction in
determining whether a prima facie showing has been made. (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
Once a petitioner establishes a prima facie case for relief, the trial court
issues an order to show cause and holds an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether to vacate the murder conviction, recall the sentence, and resentence
the petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) At the
evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is . . . ineligible
for resentencing. If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the

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prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the
conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the
remaining charges. The prosecutor and the petitioner may rely on the record
of conviction or offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective
burdens.” (Id., subd. (d)(3).)
In this case, Le established a prima facie case for relief under
section 1172.6 because the record of conviction does not establish that Le is
ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of law. At Le’s trial, the jury was
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. “[U]nder the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor is guilty
not only of the intended crime, but also ‘for any other offense that was a
“natural and probable consequence” of the crime aided and abetted.’ ” (People
v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117.) The jury was also instructed that as
to the crime of attempted murder, the “attempted murder was done willfully
and with deliberation and premeditation if either the defendant or co-
defendant or both of them acted with that state of mind.” At the time of Le’s
trial, a defendant could be found guilty of premeditated attempted murder
even if he or she did not personally act with willfulness, deliberation, and
premeditation. (People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 624.) The record of
conviction, therefore, does not conclusively establish the jury relied on a still-
valid theory of liability when it found Le guilty of murder and attempted
murder.
The Attorney General concedes that Le is not ineligible for
section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. Thus, to the extent Judge Shamoon
reconsidered Judge Rogers’s prior ruling and concluded that Le failed to
establish a prima facie claim for resentencing relief, the Attorney General
concedes this was error. The Attorney General further concedes that the

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record is too ambiguous to determine whether Judge Shamoon made an
alternative finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Le was guilty of murder
or attempted murder under current law. The Attorney General states,
“Whatever the explanation for the trial court’s ruling, [Le] should get a new
hearing so the court can clarify its findings and the basis for them.”
We accept these concessions and remand the matter for an evidentiary
hearing. We express no opinion on the outcome of that hearing.
DISPOSITION
We reverse the order denying the petition. On remand, the trial court
is directed to conduct an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6,
subdivision (d).

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

DO, J.

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