CourtListener 9546399•In re Itzel R. CA2/1
Texte intégral
Filed 6/13/24 In re Itzel R. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b).
This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule
8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re ITZEL R., a Person Coming B332141
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP02205)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DENNIS R.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, D. Brett Bianco, Judge. Dismissed.
John M. Kennedy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant
County Counsel, and Jessica Buckelew, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to
California Standards of Judicial Administration, Standard 8.1.
___________________________
On August 30, 2023, appellant Dennis R. (Father) appealed
a juvenile court order sustaining jurisdictional findings under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001 regarding Father’s
daughter, Itzel R. (born August 2022). Father argues that, at
the time of the jurisdictional hearing, substantial evidence did not
support that the alleged domestic violence between himself and
the children’s mother, B.R. (Mother),2 placed Itzel at sufficient
risk to justify juvenile court jurisdiction under either section 300,
subdivision (a) or section 300, subdivision (b)(1).
Since Father filed his appeal, on February 28, 2024, the court
issued an order terminating its jurisdiction over Itzel and a juvenile
court custody order3 granting shared legal and physical custody of
Itzel to Father and Mother.4 Neither parent appealed the court’s
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 Mother did not appeal the jurisdictional findings and is not a
party to this appeal.
3 We hereby grant DCFS’s motion to take judicial notice that
encompasses these orders.
4 The custody order does not further specify how the physical
custody is to be divided as between the parents, except by noting
under “visitation” that “Father’s shared parenting time [is] on
Friday[s] through Sundays or as mutually agreed upon by the
parents.” (Boldface & capitalization omitted.) In the absence of any
argument to the contrary, we understand this order as permitting
Mother and Father to structure the joint legal and physical custody
of the child as they see fit. Accordingly, it does not reflect a change
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termination of jurisdiction or the juvenile court custody order,
and the statutory deadline for doing so has passed.
DCFS argues that we should dismiss Father’s appeal as
moot because the court terminated the dependency proceedings.
We agree that this development prevents us from granting
Father any effective relief and thus renders the appeal moot.
(See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (In re D.P.) [the rule
that “[a] case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[ ] it impossible
for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to
grant him any effect[ive] relief ” ’ ” “applies in the dependency
context”].) The juvenile court already granted Father the exact
relief he seeks on appeal—termination of juvenile court jurisdiction
over his children. Moreover, the jurisdictional findings he
challenges do not affect his legal status in any other way. (See
id. at p. 277 [“to show a need for effective relief, the plaintiff must
first demonstrate . . . some effect on the plaintiff ’s legal status
that is capable of being redressed by a favorable court decision”].)
Father does not deny that his appeal is moot. Rather,
he argues that “[t]his court must exercise its discretion to
review the jurisdictional [findings],” noting that a failure to
do so would “saddle[ ]” “this young family . . . with sustained
juvenile dependency findings.” Courts of Appeal may “exercise
their inherent discretion to decide certain challenges to juvenile
court jurisdictional findings, notwithstanding mootness.” (In re
D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 285.) Our state Supreme Court has
identified various factors for consideration in deciding whether
to do so (see id. at pp. 285–286), and noted that “[t]he exercise
of discretionary review may . . . be informed by whether the
to the state of custody that existed prior to the court taking
jurisdiction.
3
jurisdictional finding is based on particularly pernicious or
stigmatizing conduct.” (Ibid.) Here, the sustained allegations are
that Mother and Father engaged in a violent physical altercation
in the presence of Itzel, during which Father pushed and threw a
diaper at Mother, Mother attempted to push Father’s hands down
and scratched Father’s chest and face, Father struck Mother on
her mouth and caused injury, and maternal grandmother had
to intervene. These findings are insufficient to alone justify
discretionary review.5 After considering this and the other factors
set forth in In re D.P., we decline to exercise our discretion to reach
the merits of Father’s moot appeal.
5 In so concluding, we do not intend to minimize or condone
the violence described in the section 300 petition.
4
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
CHANEY, J.
BENDIX, J.
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