CourtListener 9540998•People v. Ramos CA4/3
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Filed 6/12/24 P. v. Ramos CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G062801
v. (Super. Ct. No. 18NF0718)
JOSUE RAMOS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Scott A. Steiner, Judge. Affirmed.
Laura Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney
General, James M. Toohey and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2018, Josue Ramos pled guilty to aiding and abetting
attempted murder, carjacking, and criminal street gang activity. In
2023, he filed a petition for resentencing of his attempted murder
conviction, which the trial court denied at the prima facie stage of
review. The trial court concluded Ramos was statutorily ineligible
because he admitted to aiding and abetting the attempted murder with
specific intent to kill. Ramos appealed, arguing the factual admissions
in his guilty plea did not conclusively establish he was statutorily
ineligible for resentencing relief. Following a de novo review of the
record, we conclude Ramos has not made a prima facie case for
resentencing relief under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 Accordingly, we
affirm.
FACTS
I. Charging Document and Plea
On March 14, 2018, the Orange County District Attorney
filed a felony complaint against Ramos and two codefendants, charging
them with premeditated attempted murder (count 1), carjacking (count
2), and street terrorism (count 3). It was further alleged that the
attempted murder and carjacking were committed for the benefit of, at
the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang, Folks.
On December 10, 2018, Ramos pleaded guilty to the three
counts in the felony complaint and the gang enhancement. As the
factual basis for his plea, he admitted that on October 10, 2017, “I
aided/abetted, with the specific intent to kill, the attempt to kill John
1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless
otherwise stated.
2
Doe, a human being [and] also the felonious and unlawful taking by
means of force, a motor vehicle against the will of and from the
immediate presence of John Doe, who was the driver, with[] the intent
to temporarily deprive him of possession. I committed the crime in
count 1 for the benefit of [and] in association with ‘Folks,’ a criminal
street gang per [section] 186.22(a) with the intent to further criminal
conduct by members of that gang while an active participant/member of
Folks and with knowledge of its primary activities.”
The trial court sentenced Ramos to 15 years, eight months in
state prison.
II. Petition for Resentencing Relief
On January 17, 2023, appellant filed a form petition for
resentencing of his attempted murder conviction. In his petition, he
stated that (1) he was charged with attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine; (2) he accepted a plea offer
in lieu of trial at which he could have been convicted of attempted
murder; and (3) he could not presently be convicted of attempted
murder because of changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective
January 1, 2019.
In response, the district attorney requested the trial court
deny the petition at a prima facie hearing. The district attorney argued
Ramos did not plead guilty to attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine because (1) he pleaded guilty as a direct
aider and abettor with intent to kill, (2) his admission of having an
intent to kill is inconsistent with the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, and (3) his plea is distinguishable from “no contest” pleas
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because it showed how and in what manner Ramos committed the
attempted murder.
In reply, Ramos argued his admission of a specific intent to
kill, which is part of the generic language of attempted murder, does not
legally foreclose his prosecution under a natural and probable
consequences theory.
Following the prima facie hearing, the trial court denied the
resentencing petition without an order to show cause. It concluded
Ramos was ineligible for resentencing relief based on “[h]is express
admission to aiding and abetting an attempted murder with the specific
intent to kill . . . .”
On June 21, 2023, Ramos timely noticed an appeal from the
postjudgment order denying his resentencing petition.
DISCUSSION
Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part that
a “person convicted of . . . attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine . . . may file a petition with the court
that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s . . . attempted
murder . . . conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining
counts when all of the following conditions apply: [¶] (1) A complaint . . .
was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed
under a theory of . . . attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner . . . accepted a plea offer in
lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of
murder or attempted murder. [¶] (3) The petitioner could not presently
be convicted of . . . attempted murder because of changes to Section 188
or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” The petitioner has the burden
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of making a prima facie case for relief. The prima facie stage bar is
“‘very low,’” but not nonexistent. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
972 (Lewis).) “If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the
petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show
cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
The court may deny the petition at the prima facie stage if
the record of conviction discloses that the petitioner is ineligible for
relief as a matter of law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970-971.) “In
reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary
juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’” (Id. at p. 972.)
“When the petitioner’s conviction resulted from a guilty plea rather
than a trial, the record of conviction includes the facts ‘the defendant
admitted as the factual basis for a guilty plea.’” (People v. Gaillard
(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211-1212.) We independently review the
trial court’s determination that the petitioner failed to make a prima
facie showing for relief. (People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 975
(Eynon).)
Here, Ramos satisfied the first prong of the prima facie case
because the felony complaint generically charged Ramos with
premeditated attempted murder. At the time Ramos was charged,
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and
abettor could be found guilty of premeditated attempted murder, even if
the aider and abettor did not personally act with premeditation and
deliberation, as long as the direct perpetrator acted with premeditation
and deliberation. (People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 880.) Thus,
“the generic [attempted] murder charge allowed the prosecution to
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proceed on any theory of liability, including natural and probable
consequences . . . .” (Eynon, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 978.)
As to the second prong, Ramos accepted a plea in lieu of
going to trial at which he could have been convicted of attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Thus,
he satisfied this element of the prima facie case.
The third and final prong of the prima facie case requires
that Ramos “could not presently be convicted of . . . attempted murder
because of changes to section 188 or 189 made effective January 1,
2019.” (§ 1172.6 (a)(3).) Although attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine no longer exists due to recent
changes in sections 188 and 189, “[d]irect aiding and abetting remains a
valid theory of attempted murder . . . .” (People v. Coley (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 539, 548.) As we explain, because Ramos admitted he
“aided/abetted, with the specific intent to kill, the attempt to kill John
Doe, a human being,” Ramos is statutorily ineligible for resentencing
relief.
“A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he
or she, (i) with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator,
(ii) and with the intent or purpose of committing, facilitating or
encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or advice, aids,
promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.”
(People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164, citing People v. Beeman
(1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561.) “‘[U]nder direct aiding and abetting
principles, an accomplice is guilty of an offense perpetrated by another
[e.g., murder] if the accomplice aids the commission of that offense with
“knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and [with] an
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intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends.”’” (People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 463, internal citation omitted (Curiel).)
“[T]he phrase ‘aid and abet’ represents a legal theory. Each
term therein performs a function necessary to justify the imposition of
criminal liability. ‘Aid’ requires some conduct by which one becomes
‘concerned in the commission of a crime’ ( § 31), whether it be to aid
(i.e., assist or supplement), promote, encourage, or instigate. (See
People v. Nguyen [(1993)] 21 Cal.App.4th [518,] 529.) ‘Abet,’ on the
other hand, requires that this conduct be accompanied by the requisite
criminal state of mind, i.e., knowledge of the perpetrator’s unlawful
purpose and with the intent that it be facilitated. (People v. Beeman,
supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 560-561.)” (People v. Campbell (1994) 25
Cal.App.4th 402, 413-414 (Campbell).)
Here, the factual admissions in Ramos’s guilty plea embody
all the elements of direct aiding and abetting liability for attempted
murder. First, he admitted he had the specific intent to kill. Second,
his admission he provided “aid[ ]” establishes he “assist[ed]” in
achieving the attempt to kill. Third, his admission he “[]abetted” the
attempt to kill establishes he acted with “knowledge of the perpetrator’s
unlawful purpose [vis-a-vis the attempted killing] and with the intent
that it be facilitated.” (Campbell, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at pp. 413-414.)
Combined, these admissions show as a matter of law Ramos committed
the necessary actus reus and had the requisite mental state for aiding
and abetting liability because he had “‘knowledge of the direct
perpetrator’s unlawful intent’” and his aiding was committed with “an
intent to assist in achieving [the attempted murder].” (Curiel, supra, 15
7
Cal.5th at p. 463.) Accordingly, Ramos was statutorily ineligible for
resentencing relief on his attempted murder conviction.
Relying on People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217
(Rivera), and Eynon, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 967, Ramos contends he is
not precluded from resentencing relief because the factual admissions
in his guilty plea only mirror the language in the attempted murder
statute. Rivera and Eynon are inapposite. In Eynon, the petitioner
pleaded guilty to first degree murder. “As a factual basis for the guilty
plea, Eynon admitted that he did ‘what Count 1 of th[e] Information
says [he] did, when it says [he] did it.’” (Enyon, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at
p.91.) He further admitted ‘that this was a first-degree murder by
virtue of being a felony murder[,] that being murder that occurred
during the commission of a robbery.’” ( Id. atp. 972.) The appellate
court concluded the petitioner was not categorically excluded from
resentencing relief. It reasoned: “Although he admitted that he was
liable for a murder committed with malice, deliberation, and
premeditation, he did not admit that he acted with malice, deliberation,
or premeditation. And although he admitted that he was liable for a
murder committed in the course of a robbery, he did not admit that he
was the actual killer, acted with intent to kill, or was a major
participant in the robbery and acted with reckless indifference to
human life.” (Id. at p. 979.) Here, in contrast, Ramos admitted
everything necessary for direct aider and abettor liability.
In Rivera, the petitioner had pleaded “no contest” to
“willfully, unlawfully[,] and with malice aforethought murder[ing]” the
victim. (Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 225.) His trial counsel
“‘stipulate[d] to a factual basis’ for the plea . . . based on the transcript
8
of the grand jury proceedings.” (Rivera, at pp. 225-226, fn. omitted.)
The appellate court concluded the petitioner was not ineligible for
resentencing relief at the prima facie stage because he “made no
admissions related to the murder other than pleading no contest to the
count as charged,” (Id. at p. 234), and “did not admit to the truth of any
of the evidence presented to the grand jury. ” (Id. at p. 235.) The court,
however, stated that “[i]n some cases, the record may reveal that a
defendant admitted more than the elements of the offense charged, and
such additional admissions may preclude relief . . . .” (Id. at p. 234.)
That is the case here. Ramos pleaded to a specific theory of liability for
attempted murder, and that theory of liability remains valid under the
amended murder statutes.
In sum, the trial court properly denied Ramos’s petition for
resentencing of his attempted murder conviction because the record of
conviction conclusively refutes his claim that he could not be convicted
of attempted murder under a valid theory of liability. (See Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463 [“At the prima facie stage, a court must
accept as true a petitioner’s allegation that he or she could not currently
be convicted of a homicide offense because of changes to section 188 or
189 made effective January 1, 2019, unless the allegation is refuted by
the record.”].) Ramos’s admission he “aided/abetted, with the specific
intent to kill, the attempt to kill John Doe” conclusively establishes all
of the elements for attempted murder under a direct aiding and
abetting theory of liability. Thus, the trial court did not err in
summarily denying his resentencing petition.
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DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying Ramos’s petition for
resentencing is affirmed.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
GOODING, J.
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