CourtListener 9523084•People v. Mangham CA2/1
Texte intégral
Filed 6/10/24 P. v. Mangham CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B331500
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA107281)
v.
NAHMER SHARONE MANGHAM,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Thomas R. Sokolov, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Andrea S. Bitar, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Shezad H. Thakor,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
Nahmer Sharone Mangham pleaded guilty to one count of
assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.
The trial court placed him on formal probation for two years,
after suspending execution of a prison sentence. Mangham
obtained a certificate of probable cause and appealed from the
judgment. He contends the trial court abused its discretion by
denying his pre-plea motion for mental health diversion,
pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1001.36, based on a finding he
posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety because he
was likely to commit a “super strike” offense. We agree with
Mangham and reverse the judgment.
BACKGROUND
I. Current Offense and Prior Criminal History
A felony complaint, filed on January 25, 2023, charged 37-
year-old Mangham with attempted carjacking. (§§ 215, subd. (a)
& 664.) He pleaded not guilty to the charge. We take our
account of the circumstances of the offense from the probation
report, as the parties also did in their appellate briefing.
On January 23, 2023, in Los Angeles County, Mangham
approached a man in a shopping center parking lot, grabbed the
man’s arm as he was about to open the trunk of his car, and
demanded the keys to the car. Fearing for his safety, the man
walked backward away from Mangham and tried to obtain help
from a passerby. Mangham said he would get a gun if the man
did not turn over the keys. Mangham went to the driver’s side of
the car and attempted to open the front door several times. Next,
Mangham told the man he would shoot him if he did not hand
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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over the keys.2 The man refused to give the keys to Mangham,
and Mangham walked away. Officers were called to the scene,
and they arrested Mangham.
As set forth in the probation report, Mangham has the
following prior convictions: (1) a 2010 felony conviction for
assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm (§ 245, subd.
(a)(1)), for which he was sentenced to probation for three years,
with some jail time served; (2) a 2010 misdemeanor conviction for
trespass—entering and occupying property without consent
(§ 602, subd. (m)); (3) a 2016 misdemeanor conviction for battery
(§ 242); (4) a 2016 misdemeanor conviction for exhibiting a deadly
weapon other than a firearm (§ 417, subd. (a)(1)); and (5) a 2018
felony conviction for second degree robbery (§ 212.5, subd. (c)),
arising from a 2016 incident, for which he was sentenced to two
years in prison. For each of the misdemeanors, he was sentenced
to jail time. Each of the three 2016 incidents occurred on a
different date.
II. Motion for Mental Health Diversion
A. Moving papers
On April 17, 2023, Mangham filed a motion for mental
health diversion pursuant to section 1001.36. He stated he was
statutorily eligible for diversion, based on the information in an
attached report describing his February 23, 2023 psychological
evaluation by a forensic and clinical psychologist.
The psychologist stated Mangham had the following
diagnoses: schizophrenia, severe cannabis use disorder, severe
opioid use disorder, and alcohol use disorder. (See § 1001.36,
2 There is no indication Mangham had ready access to a
firearm.
3
subd. (b)(1) [eligibility for mental health diversion requires that
the defendant “has been diagnosed with a mental disorder,”
including schizophrenia].) He continued to experience paranoid
delusional ideation, even though he had not used substances
since his arrest.
As stated in the report, at the time of the current offense,
Mangham had been “missing” from a mental health facility in
Santa Barbara for a few weeks, and he was not taking his
psychiatric medication. When he was arrested, Mangham told
the officers he believed he was in Santa Barbara (although he
was in Los Angeles County), and he made “nonsensical
statements” and changed topics to unrelated subjects. The
psychologist opined that Mangham’s schizophrenia “played a
significant role in [his] commission of the instant offense.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2) [eligibility for mental health diversion
requires that the “defendant’s mental disorder was a significant
factor in the commission of the charged offense”].)
The psychologist set forth in her report the reasons she
believed Mangham’s “symptoms motivating the criminal behavior
would respond to mental health treatment,” and she explained
how the recommended treatment (residential treatment) would
meet his specialized needs. (See § 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)
[suitability for mental health diversion requires, “In the opinion
of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of
the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the
criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment”].)
She also stated Mangham was amenable to treatment, and he
was “motivated and able to learn from his mistakes.” (See
§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(3) [suitability for mental health diversion
requires that the “defendant agrees to comply with treatment as
4
a condition of diversion”].) Mangham attached to his motion a
conditional letter of acceptance into a residential treatment
program.
The psychologist administered the Violence Appraisal
Guide risk assessment and determined Mangham had a low risk
for future violent behavior and dangerousness to the community.
(See §§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4) [suitability for mental health
diversion requires that the “defendant will not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section
1170.18, if treated in the community”] & 1170.18, subd. (c)
[“ ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ means an
unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent
felony within the meaning of clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of
paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667,” i.e., a “super
strike” offense].) One of the considerations for this assessment
was his criminal history.
The district attorney did not file an opposition to
Mangham’s motion for mental health diversion.
B. The hearing
On June 7, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the
motion. Defense counsel updated the court on Mangham’s recent
acceptance into a “locked,” 12-month residential program
administered by the department of mental health, and his plan to
live with his mother thereafter.
The trial court expressed concern about granting mental
health diversion, citing a “risk of harm” to the public, based on
the “very serious” nature of the current offense and, more
importantly, Mangham’s “[p]rior record of violence or attempted
violence or propensity for violence.” Regarding the current
offense, defense counsel noted that Mangham walked away,
5
without inflicting injury on the victim. Regarding the prior
criminal history, defense counsel argued it did “not involve any
actual violence,” and it did not indicate Mangham was likely to
commit a “super strike” (the measure of “unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety” in § 1001.36, subd. (c)(4)). The deputy
district attorney informed the court that the prosecution did not
oppose Mangham’s motion for mental health diversion in light of
the facts of the current offense, his acceptance into a program at
a “locked facility,” and the “high burden” of showing he posed an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.
The trial court denied the motion, stating that Mangham’s
record shows “a pattern of violence or possible violence that
makes the court feel there’s a likelihood that he could commit a
super strike.” The court also noted that in the current offense,
Mangham grabbed the victim’s arm and threatened to retrieve a
gun and shoot him; and the victim feared for his life.
III. Guilty Plea
The same day as the hearing on the motion for mental
health diversion, the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion
to amend the complaint to add a count for assault by means of
force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4);
count 2). Mangham waived his constitutional rights, withdrew
his not guilty plea, and pleaded guilty to the amended charge.
He also admitted he had served a prior prison term under section
1170, subdivision (h), within the meaning of California Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(b)(3). Under the terms of the plea negotiation,
the trial court suspended execution of a middle term prison
sentence of three years and placed Mangham on formal probation
for two years. The terms and conditions of probation included
that Mangham serve 300 days in jail, with credit for 272 days,
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and that he cooperate with the probation department for
placement at the mental health facility, where he would serve the
remainder of the jail time. The trial court dismissed count 1 for
attempted carjacking.
Mangham filed a timely notice of appeal from the
judgment, stating he was challenging the denial of the motion for
mental health diversion. The trial court granted his request for a
certificate of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
Mangham contends the trial court erred in denying his
motion for mental health diversion, arguing there was nothing in
his record indicating he posed an unreasonable risk to public
safety (i.e., he was likely to commit a super strike offense).
Diversion under section 1001.36 “allows for the suspension
of criminal proceedings and potential dismissal of charges upon
successful completion of mental health treatment.” (Sarmiento v.
Superior Court of San Diego County (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882,
890 (Sarmiento).) One of the express purposes of the legislation
is “[i]ncreased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to
mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal
justice system while protecting public safety.” (§ 1001.35, subd.
(a).)
“[M]ental health diversion requires trial court findings that
the defendant is both eligible for diversion and suitable for the
program. The criteria for each are specified in the statute.
(§ 1001.36, subds. (b) & (c).) Defendants are eligible if they have
been diagnosed with a recognized mental disorder that was a
significant factor in the commission of the criminal offense with
which they are charged. (Id., subd. (b).) They are suitable if: (1)
in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s
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mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant
agrees to waive their speedy trial rights; (3) the defendant agrees
to comply with treatment requirements; and (4) the defendant
will not pose an ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ as
defined in sections 1170.18 and 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv).
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c).)” (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p.
891.)
This appeal concerns only the fourth suitability criterion
listed above—no unreasonable risk of danger to public safety—as
there is no dispute here that Mangham has shown he is eligible
for mental health diversion and meets the first three suitability
criteria. Unreasonable risk of danger to public safety means “a
likelihood that if the defendant is granted diversion, [he or] she
will commit one of the ‘super strike’ violent felonies enumerated
in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv),” including, but not
limited to, a homicide or attempted homicide offense, solicitation
to commit murder, a sexually violent offense, or a sexual offense
against a minor under the age of 14. (Sarmiento, supra, 98
Cal.App.5th at p. 895; People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440,
449-450 (Moine).)3 In deciding whether a defendant poses an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, the “court may
consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a
qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s
treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the
3 “A defendant may not be placed into a diversion program”
if his or her current charged offense is one of a number of super
strike offenses specifically enumerated in the diversion statute.
(§ 1001.36, subd. (d).) Mangham’s charged offense did not so
disqualify him from the diversion program.
8
current charged offense, and any other factors that the court
deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
If “the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements,” and
“the court determines that the defendant is suitable for [pretrial]
diversion,” the trial “court may, in its discretion, and after
considering the positions of the defense and prosecution, grant
pretrial diversion to [the] defendant.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).) The
court must exercise its discretion “consistent with express
statutory requirements and the underlying purposes of mental
health diversion . . . .” (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp.
895-896.) “A court abuses its discretion when it makes an
arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal
standard [citations], or bases its decision on express or implied
factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence
[citation].” (Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 449.) We review a
trial court’s finding that a defendant poses an unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety for substantial evidence. (Sarmiento, at
p. 897; People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1150
(Whitmill).)
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying
mental health diversion, as there is no substantial evidence
supporting the court’s finding that Mangham was unsuitable
because he was likely to commit a super strike if the court
granted diversion.
The psychologist who evaluated Mangham found him
suitable for mental health diversion, considering the current
offense, his criminal history, and the proposed treatment plan.
After administering a standardized assessment tool, the
psychologist determined Mangham had a low risk for future
violent behavior and dangerousness to the community. In
9
explaining to the trial court why it did not oppose diversion, the
prosecution referenced the facts of the current offense, that
Mangham was accepted into a “locked” residential treatment
facility, and the “high burden under the mental health diversion
statute of proving that the defendant . . . poses a risk to commit a
super strike.”
In the current offense, Mangham did not use a weapon.
Although he grabbed the victim’s arm, he did not inflict any
physical injury. He voluntarily walked away when the victim
refused to hand over the keys to the car. Mangham’s threat to go
get a gun and come back and shoot the victim does not show the
requisite likelihood that Mangham would commit a super strike
(e.g., a homicide or attempted homicide offense) if granted
diversion and treated in the community. (See Whitmill, supra, 86
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1143, 1156 [the circumstances of the
defendant’s charged offenses, including that he fired a gunshot
into the air and threatened to kill his girlfriend, did not
constitute substantial evidence “support[ing] the trial court’s
finding that [he] posed an unreasonable risk of committing a
super strike if treated in the community”]; Moine, supra, 62
Cal.App.5th at pp. 444-445, 451 [the circumstances of the
defendant’s charged offenses, including that he engaged in a
fistfight with another patient in an urgent care facility and
threatened to go get a gun from his home and shoot everyone in a
different urgent care facility a year later, did “not support the
trial court’s implied finding that [he] was likely to commit a
super-strike offense if he received mental health treatment in the
community”].)
The Attorney General argues that Whitmill and Moine are
distinguishable because in those cases, the defendants did not
10
have a prior history of violent conduct. Mangham has a 2010
felony conviction for assault with an (unspecified) weapon other
than a firearm; a 2016 misdemeanor conviction for battery; a
2016 misdemeanor conviction for exhibiting an (unspecified)
deadly weapon other than a firearm; and a 2018 felony conviction
for second degree robbery, arising from a 2016 incident, for which
he was sentenced to two years in prison. Mangham’s criminal
history does not include a super strike offense, and there is no
evidence he has ever inflicted physical injury upon anyone.
While it is possible, nothing in the record before us indicates
Mangham is likely to use deadly force against someone while
undergoing treatment in the community in a locked residential
facility. We note that the trial court did not execute a prison
sentence, but rather deemed Mangham suitable for probation, a
condition of which was that he agree to placement in the same
facility where he would have been placed if the court granted
diversion.
The trial court abused its discretion in denying mental
health diversion because it based its decision on a finding not
supported by substantial evidence. The positions taken below by
the defense, the prosecution, and the psychologist who evaluated
Mangham are consistent with the evidence in the record before
us: Mangham is eligible and suitable for mental health
diversion. If he successfully completes mental health treatment,
the charges against him should be dismissed. (§ 1001.36, subd.
(h).)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded with
directions that the trial court grant Mangham’s motion for
pretrial mental health diversion under section 1001.36.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
CHANEY, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
WEINGART, J.
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