CourtListener 9511335•People v. Oliver CA1/5
Texte intégral
Filed 6/5/24 P. v. Oliver CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
A167019
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (San Francisco County
Super. Ct. Nos. SCN113500 &
JACK T. OLIVER,
CT691880)
Defendant and Appellant.
Jack T. Oliver (appellant) appeals from the trial court’s denial of his
petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 (former
§ 1170.95)1 following an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Section
1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6, without substantive change,
effective June 30, 2022. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For clarity, we will refer
to the section by its current numbering.
1
BACKGROUND2
We recite only those background facts relevant to our resolution of this
appeal. In 1985, appellant was found guilty, following a jury trial, of first
degree murder on a felony-murder theory, and other crimes. In 2019,
appellant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. Following an
evidentiary hearing (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3)),3 the trial court denied appellant’s
petition.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Background
“Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill No. 1437) significantly limited the scope of the felony-murder
rule,” providing that “a defendant who was not the actual killer and did not
act with the intent to kill can only be liable for murder if she was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
human life.” (People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 122–123
(Guiffreda).) In addition, “[a] theory of direct aiding and abetting remains a
valid theory after Senate Bill No. 1437.” (People v. Coley (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 539, 546.)
“Senate Bill No. 1437 also established a new procedure to allow
defendants who could not have been convicted under the new law to petition
the sentencing court to vacate their murder convictions and resentence them
on any remaining counts.” (Guiffreda, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 122.) “If
2 Both parties request we take judicial notice of the record in
appellant’s prior appeal, No. A159606. We grant the requests.
3 The trial court initially summarily denied the petition, and this court
reversed and remanded. (People v. Oliver (Nov. 4, 2021, A159606) [nonpub.
opn.].)
2
the defendant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court
must . . . hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether relief should be
granted. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(3).) [¶] . . . [T]he burden of proof at a
resentencing hearing under this section is ‘on the prosecution to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder’ under
California law as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437 . . . .” (Id. at pp. 122–
123.)
“On appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition after an
evidentiary hearing, we review the superior court’s factual findings for
substantial evidence and the court’s application of the law to those facts de
novo.” (People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1066.)
II. Analysis
Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is the trial court impermissibly
found appellant guilty of “an amalgamation of second-degree malice murder
with first-degree felony murder.” We disagree with appellant’s
characterization of the court’s ruling. The court made discrete and
alternative findings that appellant was guilty as the actual killer, as a major
participant acting with reckless indifference, or as a direct aider and abettor.
The court found appellant “was either the actual killer in this case, or
that he directly aided and abetted the killing, or that he was a major
participant in the underlying felony acting with reckless indifference to
human life.” After finding that evidence “place[d] [appellant] in the situation
of an actual killer which would again simply end the inquiry,” the court
continued, “[b]ut I did go a step further to take a look at what if he’s really
just a major participant given the facts and circumstances.” (Italics added.)
The separate and alternative nature of this analysis is further made clear by
the court’s later statement, “even if there’s an argument to be made that
3
[appellant] wasn’t the actual killer in this case, the Court finds that . . . he
was a major participant in the killing and he acted with reckless indifference
to human life at the time of the killing.” (Italics added.) The court’s finding
as to direct aiding and abetting was similarly separate and alternative: “I
think there’s adequate evidence that [appellant] and his co-participant were
the actual killers here. To the extent that [appellant] could claim that he was
an aider and abettor, it appears that he was a direct aider and abettor with
knowledge of the extent of the danger in terms of what he was doing as it
relates to the victim and aiding the co-participant in the co-participant’s
actions.” (Italics added.)
Appellant properly concedes that a finding “beyond a reasonable doubt
that murder, under each theory, severally and discretely, had been proven . . .
would justify rejection of the petition.” Appellant also expressly states that
his challenge “is not the sufficiency of the evidence to support each theory
severally and discretely,” and appellant’s reply brief did not respond to the
People’s argument that substantial evidence supports the individual findings
(other than to dispute that substantial evidence was the appropriate
standard). Accordingly, any substantial evidence challenge is forfeited.
(Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1066 [“On
appeal we need address only the points adequately raised by [appellant] in
his opening brief on appeal.”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
4
SIMONS, J.
We concur.
JACKSON, P. J.
BURNS, J.
(A167019)
5
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.