CourtListener 9509833•People v. Thomas CA5
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Filed 6/3/24 P. v. Thomas CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F086297
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F15907476)
v.
KESHAWN THOMAS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Jonathan M.
Skiles, Judge.
Jean M. Marinovich, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Jeffery A.
White, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Penal Code section 1385 encourages the dismissal of enhancements when certain
“mitigating circumstances” are shown to exist. (Id., subd. (c)(2); all undesignated
statutory references are to the Penal Code.) One such circumstance is where imposing an
enhancement “could result in a sentence of over 20 years.” (Id., subd. (c)(2)(C).)
Another is where the underlying offense “is connected to prior victimization or childhood
trauma.” (Id., subd. (c)(2)(E).) Sentencing courts must “consider and afford great
weight” to the specified circumstances, meaning “the presence of one or more of these
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court
finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.” (Id., subd.
(c)(2).)
Keshawn Thomas (defendant) claims the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss a
firearm enhancement that caused his prison sentence for attempted murder to exceed 20
years. He disputes the trial court’s finding of danger to public safety, and he further
alleges the court overlooked evidence of “childhood trauma.” In the alternative,
defendant seeks reversal based on his alleged absence during the pronouncement of
judgment due to “technical issues” with his remote appearance by phone.
There is insufficient evidence to support defendant’s claim of absence from his
sentencing hearing. Nor does the record show the mitigating circumstance of “childhood
trauma” as defined by section 1385, subdivision (c). The dispositive issue is whether the
trial court abused its discretion by declining to strike the firearm enhancement for public
safety reasons. We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion. The judgment
must therefore be affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This is defendant’s third appeal since being convicted of multiple felonies in 2016.
His unopposed request for judicial notice of the appellate record in People v. Thomas,
F073552 (Thomas I), is hereby granted. We refer to the second appeal, People v.
Thomas, F078649, as Thomas II.
2.
The Underlying Offenses
In the early hours of September 27, 2014, victim M.D. agreed to pay a prostitute
$100 for a 30-minute encounter. The prostitute took M.D.’s money and eventually
departed from the rendezvous in a Mercedes sedan occupied by defendant and additional
passengers. As more fully explained in the Thomas I opinion, M.D. felt the prostitute had
not earned the $100 and wanted to get his money back. He pursued the Mercedes in his
truck, and both vehicles eventually pulled into a parking lot.
Defendant exited the Mercedes and approached the victim’s truck. The victim
remained seated in his vehicle, and defendant attempted to rob him at gunpoint. When
the victim tried to drive away, defendant shot him. The victim survived but required
surgery to remove a .25-caliber bullet from his heart.
Thomas I
In March 2016, a jury convicted defendant of attempted murder (§§ 187, 664;
count 1), assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); count 2), and attempted
robbery (§§ 211, 664; count 3). Firearm enhancement allegations under section
12022.53, subdivision (d) were found true in relation to counts 1 and 3. A firearm
enhancement allegation under section 12022.5, subdivision (a) was found true in relation
to count 2.
In April 2016, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 30 years to
life based on the lower term for attempted murder without premeditation (§ 664, subd. (a)
[five years]) plus the enhancement of 25 years to life under section 12022.53, subdivision
(d). Punishment for count 2 was stayed (§ 654) and a concurrent prison term was
imposed for count 3. During sentencing, the trial court noted its lack of discretion
regarding the imposition of a life term under California’s “Use a gun and you’re done”
law, i.e., section 12022.53.
Defendant filed an appeal, which was pending when Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 620) took effect in January 2018. The legislation amended
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sections 12022.5 and 12022.53 to allow trial courts, “in the interest of justice pursuant to
Section 1385 and at the time of sentencing, [to] strike or dismiss [a firearm] enhancement
otherwise required to be imposed ….” (§§ 12022.5, subd. (c), 12022.53, subd. (h).) In
Thomas I, this court affirmed defendant’s convictions but concluded Senate Bill 620
applied retroactively to his case. The cause was remanded to allow the trial court to
consider exercising its discretion under sections 12022.53, subdivision (h), and 1385.
Thomas II
In January 2019, the trial court declined to alter the original sentence. The
following explanation was provided:
“… If I had the discretion to sentence [defendant] to a 12022.53(c)
enhancement on Count 1, I would consider granting the request … and
sentence him to up to 29 years determinate. Neither the statute nor any
reported case I have found, nor [the opinion in Thomas I] tells me that I
have that discretion. And if I were limited in my available sentence by
striking the 12022.53(d) enhancement to Count 1 to impose 19 years
determinate as the maximum sentence, I would find that that is an
inappropriate exercise of discretion….
“So for what it’s worth, the Court declines to exercise its discretion
under 1385 with the understanding that it cannot replace the enhancement
with a lesser enhancement not found by the jury even though the facts
found by the jury, per their verdict[,] support that lesser enhancement. And
if the Court of Appeal[] feels that I can, in fact, impose that lesser
enhancement, this case should be remanded to me to exercise that
discretion, but I decline to exercise discretion under my understanding of
this code section, and what little case law there is that interprets it to this
point. The Court [of Appeal] says I could strike the enhancement and
impose a different sentence. It says nothing about modifying the
enhancement, imposing a lesser enhancement, and I decline to strike the
enhancement if my only discretion is to drop to a sentence of 13, 16, or 19
years determinate.”
Defendant filed another appeal, claiming the trial court misunderstood the scope of
its discretion. While the Thomas II appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court
decided People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688. The Tirado opinion holds that when a
sentencing court “determines that the section 12022.53(d) enhancement should be struck
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or dismissed under section 12022.53(h), the court may, under section 12022.53(j), impose
an enhancement under section 12022.53(b) or (c).” (Id. at p. 700.) Based on this
holding, the People conceded the merits of defendant’s claim. This court accepted the
concession and remanded the cause for a new sentencing hearing.
The Present Appeal
By the time Thomas II was decided, the trial judge had retired. The case was
assigned to a different judge for the proceedings on remand. In April 2023, the defense
filed a sentencing memorandum requesting defendant “be sentenced to 19 years.” The
calculation for a 19-year determinate term was not explained. Defendant’s arguments for
relief under section 1385, subdivision (c) are detailed elsewhere in the opinion.
A resentencing hearing was conducted on April 12, 2023. The prosecutor did not
argue for a specific punishment, but he did note the following with regard to the prior
sentencing:
“Understanding that this Court does have the discretion, if it were so
inclined, to reduce the 25 to life down to a lesser firearm enhancement, I
think Judge Hamlin, who, did, again, hear the evidence in the trial, felt that
the 29-year determinate term would be, to him, the only acceptable
resentencing.
“Judge [Hamlin] did make a statement that 19 years, a 19-year
sentence would not—would be not inappropriate exercise of discretion.
[Sic.] It would not be [an] appropriate exercise of discretion.
“Unfortunately, I think 29 years would require—to get to 29 years,
the Court could give 20 years on the gun and an aggravated term of 9 years
on the attempted murder. That would require, that is, the aggravated term
that would require [defendant], I believe to stipulate to aggravating
circumstances for the Court to get to an aggravated term so I think if
[defendant] were asking the Court to come off of the 25 to life on the
firearm enhancement he should be willing and must be willing to stipulate
to aggravating factors and I would submit it on that.”
The defense, having previously requested a 19-year term in its sentencing
memorandum, asked the court to also consider, in the alternative, a 27-year term. We
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assume defense counsel was impliedly proposing the middle term of seven years for
attempted murder without premeditation (§ 664, subd. (a)) and a consecutive 20-year
determinate term under section 12022.53, subdivision (c).
The trial court ruled as follows:
“Well, I was not the judge that did the trial so I’m going off of what
is in the court file. I will note that this is a case where it’s just a hair shy of
miraculous that this was not a homicide. The bullet that was fired collapsed
a lung and was lodged in the victim’s heart, so it’s extraordinarily serious
as far as what happened when the gun was used.
“And I am aware that the Court does have discretion to substitute
either a 12022.53(b) or subdivision (c) enhancement in place of the
subdivision [(d)] enhancement that was found true by the jury, but the
Court finds that dismissing or reducing the firearm enhancement would be
a danger to public safety given the egregious nature and violent nature of
the defendant’s conduct and I am finding a dismissal [or] the reduction of
the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to
others.”
DISCUSSION
I. Defendant’s Due Process Claim Is Unsubstantiated
“[A] criminal defendant has a constitutional and statutory right to be present at
sentencing.” (People v. Fedalizo (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 98, 110.) Under state law, if
the defendant “is currently incarcerated in the state prison,” a sentencing hearing may be
conducted “by two-way electronic audio[/]video communication between the defendant
and the courtroom in lieu of the physical presence of the defendant in the courtroom.”
(§ 977.2, subd. (a).) The constitutional right to be present, which may be waived, is
guaranteed as a matter of due process to the extent “‘“‘(1) the proceeding is critical to the
outcome of the case, and (2) the defendant’s presence would contribute to the fairness of
the proceeding.’”’” (People v. Miranda-Guerrero (2022) 14 Cal.5th 1, 23.)
In defendant’s opening brief, it is alleged he was absent from the resentencing
hearing. The claim is based on speculation by defendant’s counsel below, and that
attorney primarily relied on ambiguous third-party hearsay. There is no evidence of
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defendant ever personally claiming to have been absent during the proceedings. For the
following reasons, we agree with the People that defendant’s claim is not substantiated by
the record.
A. Additional Background
Defendant was ordered to be present at a hearing scheduled for January 13, 2023.
The appellate record indicates the trial court and defense counsel expected defendant
would appear in person. According to a minute order issued on the scheduled date, the
hearing was continued on the court’s own motion. The minute order states, in relevant
part, “[C]ounsel is to make arrangement for with [sic] CDCR to have the defendant
appear via zoom. [¶] Finding: Zoom appearance approved for the next hearing.
[¶] Defendant ordered to be present at the next hearing.” We assume all references to
“zoom” and “Zoom” essentially mean a remote appearance by way of video conferencing
technology. The record offers no insight into why arrangements were made for defendant
to appear remotely instead of in person.
The continued hearing took place as scheduled on April 12, 2023. The following
statements were made on the record when the hearing began:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Good morning, Your Honor. Jane Boulger
on behalf of [defendant], who is appearing via the phone from North
County or North Kern prison.
“THE COURT: I think technically, he’s appearing via Zoom but by
audio only. There’s no video.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: There we go.
“THE COURT: And [defendant] has stated off the record right before
we called the matter that he was still wanting to go forward by telephone as
opposed to waiting for Zoom.”
The hearing proceeded with arguments from the prosecutor and defense counsel,
followed by the trial court’s sentencing decision. The hearing concluded with the court
asking, “Anything else that either side would like to put on the record?” Neither side had
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anything to add. The trial court never asked any questions of defendant, nor did defense
counsel ever indicate defendant had a desire to address the court. A minute order issued
on the day of the hearing includes this notation: “Defendant present: Yes—Zoom Audio
at North Kern State Prison.”
Three weeks later, on May 4, 2023, defense counsel filed a document labeled
“Memo For New Hearing [¶] Amendment of Minute Order From April 12, 2023.”
(Boldface and some capitalization omitted.) The first page of the filing gave notice of a
hearing allegedly scheduled for May 16, 2023, and of the intention to move for “a new
hearing as to the defendant’s re-sentencing pursuant to defendant’s right to be present at
the hearing.” The second page of the filing alleged defendant “was cut off after parties
made their appearances and he agreed to use zoom’s audio.”
Attached to the above-described filing, which we will call a motion for ease of
reference, was an eight-paragraph declaration by defense counsel. We reproduce those
paragraphs verbatim:
“1. I am a licensed attorney in both the State of California and the
Eastern District of California.
“2. I am a sole practitioner practicing criminal law exclusively.
“3. I was appointed to represent [defendant] for a re-sentencing
hearing.
“4. I was present on April 12, 2023, when the hearing took place.
“5. The prison where [defendant] is housed has a room used for
Zoom court proceedings.
“6. The video was not functioning; however, the audio did project
[defendant]’s voice during only one interaction when he was asked to
consent to audio-only hearing. His voice was not heard at any time
afterwards nor were any background noises from the prison.
“7. As soon as I returned to my office my assistant contacted the
litigation department at North Kern Prison where [defendant] is housed.
8.
“8. Officer [S.L.] confirmed by e-mail that the phone, after the
initial interaction with the court, played ‘hold’ music and after
approximately two hours on hold [defendant] went back to his unit. [¶] I
declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and if
called upon to testify as a witness, I could competently do so.”
Missing from the declaration was any reference to attached documents or exhibits.
None of the preceding pages of the motion referenced any attachments or exhibits.
However, immediately following the declaration was a page containing the words
“Attachment A.” The next and final page of the motion appeared to be a printout of an
e-mail purportedly sent by a North Kern State Prison employee with the initials D.A. to a
recipient with the initials M.J. The document did not show an e-mail address for M.J. or
explain M.J.’s connection to the case. Readers of the motion were perhaps expected to
surmise that M.J. was the “assistant” to whom defense counsel had referred in her
declaration.
The e-mail message from D.A. to M.J. consisted of one sentence: “Please see
email below.” On the bottom half of the page was a copied or forwarded message from
“Officer [S.L.]” of the North Kern State Prison to D.A. The body of the message read:
“Hello. I know that [inmate] Thomas BA0357 [defendant] was scheduled
for a video hearing with Fresno County from 0800–0900 but there were
connection issues so the judge requested to conduct the hearing via
landline. [¶] [Defendant] was placed on the call a few minutes later. The
phone was left on speaker and I did heard [sic] ‘hold’ music at one point.
However approximately two hours later and still on hold [defendant]
requested to be escorted back to his housing unit.”
The appellate record contains a file-stamped copy of the motion, but there is no
proof of service. There are no other documents pertaining to the motion. Nothing in the
reporter’s transcript or clerk’s transcript indicates the motion was ever heard or ruled
upon.
B. Analysis
“[O]n appeal a judgment is presumed correct, and a party attacking the judgment,
or any part of it, must affirmatively demonstrate prejudicial error.” (People v. Garza
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(2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 881, citing Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
An appellant “further bears the burden to provide a record on appeal which affirmatively
shows that there was an error below, and any uncertainty in the record must be resolved
against the defendant.” (People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 549.) In other
words, error will not be presumed from an ambiguous record.
The People point out, as noted above, that both the reporter’s transcript and minute
order from the sentencing hearing indicate defendant’s remote presence during
sentencing. Several weeks after the hearing, defense counsel filed a motion alleging
otherwise. But it does not appear the motion was ever served, heard, or ruled upon.
Defendant’s appellate counsel does not attempt to explain these circumstances, but
seemingly expects this court to assume the motion had merit.
Defense counsel did not attest to having personal knowledge of defendant’s
absence from the sentencing hearing. The attorney declaration implies counsel suspected
he was absent because she did not hear “any background noises from the prison” during
the hearing (though counsel never explained why she did not raise those concerns at the
time of sentencing). Counsel’s suspicions were otherwise based on hearsay contained in
an unauthenticated document.
“‘Hearsay evidence’ is evidence of a statement that was made other than by a
witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter
stated.” (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) “Hearsay is generally considered to be
unreliable, and for that reason is inadmissible unless an exception applies.” (People v.
Myers (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1226–1227; see Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (b).)
“Documents like letters, reports, and memoranda are often hearsay because they are
prepared by a person outside the courtroom and are usually offered to prove the truth of
the information they contain.” (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 674.) If a
document is offered to prove the truth of matters asserted therein, the document “itself is
a hearsay statement made by the person who wrote it.” (Id. at p. 675.) A document may
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contain multiple levels of hearsay, and an exception for each level must be found before
the document can be admitted into evidence. (Id. at pp. 674–675; Evid. Code, § 1201.)
Regardless of whether a hearsay exception exists for a written statement, the
writing must be authenticated before it can be considered as evidence. (Evid. Code,
§ 1401, subd. (a).) The use of attorney declarations to authenticate exhibits is “routine in
law and motion practice” (Greenspan v. LADT LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 523)
but was not done here. Defense counsel made no attempt to authenticate the e-mail
messages attached to the motion, nor did counsel explain how the messages could be
relied upon for the truth of the hearsay declarant’s statements. “The burden of producing
evidence to establish these foundational facts fell to defendant as the proponent of the
evidence, and in the absence of such foundational evidence, we will not assume [the
evidence was admissible].” (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 27.)
Even if we could assume the admissibility of the e-mails and the truth of the
hearsay, defendant’s claim would still fail. The hearsay declarant did not claim personal
knowledge of defendant’s absence from the hearing. The declarant’s notably vague
statements raise the question of whether the declarant was with defendant the entire time
or only during part of the relevant period. According to defense counsel, defendant’s
voice could be heard in the courtroom during “one interaction when he was asked to
consent to [an] audio-only hearing.” The hearsay declarant, in contrast, said, “[T]here
were connection issues so the judge requested to conduct the hearing via landline.
[¶] [Defendant] was placed on the call a few minutes later. The phone was left on
speaker and I did heard [sic] ‘hold’ music at one point. However approximately two
hours later and still on hold [defendant] requested to be escorted back to his housing
unit.” (Italics added.) Admissibility issues aside, this evidence does not affirmatively
prove defendant was absent from the sentencing hearing.
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II. Section 1385’s “Childhood Trauma” Provision Is Not Applicable
Under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(E), the circumstance of a current offense
being “connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma” weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing any related sentencing enhancements. Defendant complains of the trial
court’s failure to acknowledge “that [he] suffered childhood trauma that impacted his
conduct during the crime.” As we explain, the argument is misguided.
A. Additional Background
Defendant’s sentencing memorandum contained the following allegations:
“[Defendant] … suffered many traumas as a child that we now know caused serious
effects on one’s behavior. [Defendant’s] parents passed away and he was put in foster
care. His father’s death was drug related. His mother was in and out of prison[,] suffered
from drug addiction and ultimately died from complications of AIDS.” The quoted
statements were unverified and appeared in the body of the memorandum.
Attached to the sentencing memorandum were several unauthenticated documents,
including excerpts from a handwritten letter. The excerpts were undated and unsigned
and did not identify the author. As relevant here, the letter contained these statements: “I
want to be the father to my son that I’ve never had. I think if I would have had parents in
my life things would have been different. … I would like to be there for [my son] so he
[doesn’t] go through the childhood trauma that I went through growing up.”
During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel said the letter was written by
defendant. Counsel also made the following statements: “[B]oth his parents died, had
died, you know, slow deaths, especially his mother was—she wasn’t taking medication
because she was using and she was—she suffered greatly. It is just by chance that he
ended up with these wonderful people that call themselves his parents now. Just by
chance. And he was very fortunate. He has support from them.”
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B. Analysis
“It is axiomatic that the unsworn statements of counsel are not evidence.” (In re
Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413, fn. 11; see, e.g., People v. Manibusan (2013) 58
Cal.4th 40, 55 [unsworn statements of counsel in defendant’s motion held “insufficient”
to support the motion].) As such, the trial court was not obligated to accept as true the
unverified statements of defense counsel in the sentencing memorandum and at the
hearing. Defendant’s appellate counsel has not provided any record citations that would
substantiate the defense attorney’s unsworn allegations. We have searched the current
appellate record, as well as the records in Thomas I and II, and have found nothing
corroborative of those statements. We do note the probation report says defendant was
raised by a “‘[f]amily friend’” and that both of his parents are deceased.
Even accepting all of defense counsel’s statements as true, as well as the
statements in defendant’s handwritten letter, the mitigating circumstance of “childhood
trauma” is not established. Defendant cites and relies upon section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2)(E), but fails to acknowledge or discuss the explanatory language of subdivision
(c)(6)(A):
“‘Childhood trauma’ means that as a minor the person experienced
physical, emotional, or sexual abuse, physical or emotional neglect. A
court may conclude that a defendant’s childhood trauma was connected to
the offense if, after reviewing any relevant and credible evidence,
including, but not limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts,
witness statements, medical records, or records or reports by qualified
medical experts, the court concludes that the defendant’s childhood trauma
substantially contributed to the defendant’s involvement in the commission
of the offense.”
On a silent record, appellate courts imply all findings necessary to support a trial
court’s sentencing decision. (See, e.g., People v. Kelly (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 886, 904.)
We thus presume the trial court found the defense either failed to prove the allegation of
childhood trauma or failed to establish the necessary causal connection to the attempted
murder. The implied finding is supported by the lack of evidence that defendant suffered
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abuse or neglect, and the lack of an affirmative finding of the requisite connection to
defendant’s criminal behavior. (Not only did the defense fail to present evidence of prior
abuse, but the probation report says defendant previously denied “experiencing any form
of abuse during his childhood.”)
We do not mean to trivialize whatever difficult circumstances defendant may have
experienced in his youth. “Childhood trauma” has a specific legal meaning for purposes
of section 1385, and the defense allegations fell short of meeting that definition. The
defense also made virtually no effort to show, and thus failed to demonstrate, that
defendant’s childhood experiences “substantially contributed to [his] involvement in the
commission of the offense.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(6)(A), italics added.) Instead, defense
counsel simply argued it was significant that defendant “was not the initial aggressor”
because “when you have childhood trauma[,] … you’re always, always, on the highest
level of just anxiety and being aware.” Counsel then alleged, without any supporting
evidence, that “it’s shown through tests as far as their cortisol levels and everything.”
Consequently, the mitigating circumstance of “childhood trauma” under section
1385, subdivision (c), was not established.
III. The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion
A. Additional Background
In the letter attached to his sentencing memorandum, defendant expressed remorse
and claimed to have matured in prison. Defendant’s appellate counsel submits that he
“wrote eloquently on his own behalf,” which is a fair statement. There is nothing in the
record to indicate the trial court disbelieved or doubted the sincerity of the letter.
Defendant’s letter also discussed his efforts at rehabilitation and personal growth,
including his progress toward a college degree through a full-time distance learning
program. The sentencing memorandum included additional documents that appeared to
be prison records and certificates, which indicated defendant’s successful completion of
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various rehabilitative programs between 2018 and 2022 (accounting for pretrial
detention, he has been incarcerated since October 2014).
For purposes of this discussion, we will ignore defense counsel’s failure to
authenticate the above-referenced documents and failure to address hearsay issues. The
People did not object to the documents, and the trial court appears to have considered and
relied upon them. During the hearing, the trial court noted defendant was 25 years old
when he committed the offenses and is eligible for youth offender parole (see § 3051,
subd. (b)(3)). While discussing his eligibility for early parole, the court remarked, “I
think the conduct that he’s engaging in now still can bode well for him getting out, [i.e.,]
not having to serve that full time.”
B. Analysis
A mitigating circumstance listed in section 1385 “weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing [a sentencing] enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) If imposing an
enhancement “could result in a sentence of over 20 years[,] … the enhancement shall be
dismissed.” (Id., subd. (c)(2)(C).) The appellate districts have interpreted the quoted
language in different ways, creating a split of authority now under review by the
California Supreme Court.
One view holds the “mandate to ‘afford great weight’ to mitigating circumstances
erects a rebuttable presumption that obligates a court to dismiss the enhancement unless
the court finds that dismissal of that enhancement—with the resultingly shorter
sentence—would endanger public safety.” (People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386,
391, review granted Mar. 22, 2023, S278309.) The opposing view is that enhancements
may be imposed without a public safety determination, even if one or more of the
mitigating circumstances are established. (People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087,
1096–1098, review granted Apr. 12, 2023, S278894.) A third approach essentially makes
public safety a threshold determination. Thus, “if the court finds that dismissal of an
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enhancement ‘would endanger public safety,’ then the court need not consider the listed
mitigating circumstances.” (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 296.)
It is unnecessary for us to endorse one interpretation of section 1385 over another.
Despite the split of authority, case law uniformly holds that mitigating circumstances do
not automatically require dismissal of an enhancement. (See People v. Cota (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 318, 335 [the argument for mandatory dismissal “has been rejected by every
court that has considered it”].) To be clear, defendant’s claim would fail under any of the
various interpretations of section 1385, subdivision (c).
Defendant frames the issue in terms of whether the trial court abused its discretion
by refusing to dismiss the gun enhancement. Defendant also contends the trial court’s
finding of dangerousness is “not supported by the record,” but that argument really
concerns the balancing of competing factors. The weighing of considerations for and
against a particular sentencing choice is a matter of judicial discretion. (See People v.
Cattaneo (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1577, 1588 [“The trial court has broad discretion in
weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors”].)
“The abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential.” (People v. Mendoza,
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) “That deferential standard asks not whether the trial
court’s decision was correct in the sense that it is the same decision we would have
made; rather, it asks whether the court’s decision falls within the range of outcomes
permitted by the controlling law.” (People v. Bernal (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1170.)
A discretionary sentencing choice will be upheld “so long as there is a reasonable or even
fairly debatable justification” for it. (People v. Parra Martinez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
317, 322.) “The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the
sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez)
(1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977.)
Under section 1385, the dismissal of an enhancement will “endanger public
safety” if there is “a likelihood that the dismissal … would result in physical injury or
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other serious danger to others.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) A trial court’s finding of such a
likelihood may be based upon the circumstances of the current offense. (See, e.g., People
v. Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) In Mendoza, the sentencing court’s finding
of dangerousness and its refusal to dismiss a firearm enhancement was based on the
appellant’s use of a gun during a residential robbery. The appellant had “held the gun
barrel against the chest of one of the victims” before firing a bullet into a nearby
television set, and then “re-aimed the gun” at the victim while demanding his money.
(Mendoza, at p. 291.) The appellate court affirmed the sentencing court’s ruling.
Defendant attempts to distinguish Mendoza by noting the dismissal of the
enhancement in that case would have resulted in the appellant’s immediate release. We
are not persuaded. The Mendoza appellant had already served approximately 15 years
(more than half of the originally imposed sentence) and “asked the [sentencing] court to
take into consideration the rehabilitative efforts he [had] made in prison, which he
claimed included … participation in numerous self-help groups.” (People v. Mendoza,
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 292.) The appellate court noted the claimed rehabilitative
efforts were not corroborated by additional evidence, but it does not appear that made a
difference in the sentencing court’s decision. The opinion states, in relevant part:
“[T]he [sentencing] court considered that Mendoza discharged a gun with
victims present in a residence during a home invasion robbery, and the
court found that the circumstances involved ‘incredibly harmful and
dangerous conduct.’ The court explained that a person who ‘commit[s] this
type of an offense is a serious threat to society and a relatively long prison
sentence is necessary to protect the public and keep the defendant away
from the public and to provide time for the defendant to become
rehabilitated.’ Given the court’s consideration of the circumstances of the
crime and the court’s determination that a long sentence was necessary for
Mendoza to become rehabilitated after committing such a crime, we cannot
say that the court’s determination that dismissal of the enhancement ‘would
endanger public safety’ [citation] was ‘so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it’ [citation].” (Mendoza, supra, at p.
299, quoting § 1385, subd. (c)(2) and People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th
367, 377.)
17.
Here, although victim M.D. could be viewed as an instigator or initial aggressor,
defendant shot him as he was trying to retreat. Moreover, defendant was attempting to
commit an armed robbery when the victim began driving away. Defendant reacted by
firing a bullet into the victim’s chest at close range, very nearly killing him. Although
defendant’s prior adult criminal record was relatively insignificant, he was on probation
at the time of the shooting. It was not unreasonable for the trial court to view defendant’s
conduct as “egregious” and “extraordinarily serious as far as what happened when the
gun was used.” The circumstances of the offense could be viewed as worse than those in
Mendoza, and they support the finding of dangerousness within the meaning of section
1385, subdivision (c)(2).
Conduct in prison is one of many factors a trial court may consider in deciding
whether to dismiss an enhancement. (People v. Yanaga (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 619, 627.)
Defendant’s commendable self-improvement efforts are probative of rehabilitation but
not overwhelmingly compelling of the conclusion he has fully reformed. The trial court’s
finding of dangerousness based on the facts of the attempted murder, despite some
evidence of rehabilitation and a mitigating circumstance under section 1385, subdivision
(c) was not “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.”
(People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
PEÑA, J.
WE CONCUR:
HILL, P. J.
DE SANTOS, J.
18.
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