CourtListener 9509559•People v. Zamora CA2/7
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Filed 5/31/24 P. v. Zamora CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B329521
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA155326)
v.
VICTOR HUGO ZAMORA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Connie R. Quinones, Judge. Affirmed with
directions.
Elizabeth Richardson-Royer, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Nicholas J. Webster and
Michael C. Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
_______________
Victor Hugo Zamora appeals from a judgment of conviction
after the jury found him guilty of multiple sexual and violent
offenses against his former girlfriend Cindy M., including forcible
rape, inflicting corporal injury on a person in a dating
relationship, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, making a
criminal threat, and attempting to dissuade a witness. The jury
also convicted Zamora of attempted murder of a peace officer,
assault with a semiautomatic firearm on a peace officer, and
attempted carjacking in connection with Zamora’s attempt to
evade police. On appeal, Zamora contends the trial court abused
its discretion in admitting evidence Zamora was a gang member
and erred in allowing Cindy’s statements to law enforcement and
a sexual assault response team (SART) nurse into evidence under
the fresh complaint doctrine.
We affirm the judgment. However, we direct the trial court
to correct a clerical error in the abstract of judgment to reflect
that the trial court imposed a 10-year firearm enhancement on
count 9 for forcible rape, rather than on count 7 for possession of
a firearm by a felon.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Evidence at Trial
1. The August 18, 2021 rape of Cindy M.
(a) Cindy’s testimony
Cindy testified she was in a “boyfriend and girlfriend”
relationship with Zamora for a few months in 2021. Zamora
frequently bought her gifts and gave her money, but she was not
a “prostitute” and he did not pay her for sex. Towards the end of
their relationship Zamora frequently accused Cindy of having sex
2
with his “homies.” After they broke up, he sent her angry text
messages such as, “‘So you want to be enemies? You want
everyone to laugh at me?’” and “I [would] rather be friends, but
fuck you and whoever you kick it with too. This is Tone from
CVTF.’” Cindy knew Zamora was a member of the Compton
Varrio Tortilla Flats gang with the nickname “Tone.” Zamora
sent Cindy text messages referring to her stupidity and saying,
“Let me whoop your ass so I can teach you.’” Cindy blocked
Zamora’s phone number, but he continued to contact her using
other numbers.
On August 18, 2021 Zamora contacted Cindy using a
messaging application and invited her to come to the motel where
he was living. She agreed to go because Zamora was being nice
and he promised to give her money he owed her. Zamora picked
Cindy up at her family home around 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. and drove
her to his motel in Compton.
Once inside the motel room, “the whole world just flipped,”
and Zamora started “getting crazy.” He accused Cindy of
sleeping with his friend and said, “‘You think I’m fucking
stupid?’” He pushed her head against a wall and tried to force
her to ingest or snort a white powder he placed on his fingers
that she believed was crystal methamphetamine. After she spat
it out, he hit her on her face with his hand and cautioned her,
“‘Don’t fucking spit,’” or he would feed her more drugs. He called
her a “‘bitch’” and “whore” and said he would put her in a dog
cage. After an extended period of trying to force Cindy to take
drugs and pacing back and forth in the room, Zamora hit Cindy
in the face, causing her lip to bleed. This further agitated
Zamora who said he now would have to kill her because he did
not know what else to do with her.
3
About two hours into the ordeal, Zamora removed a
semiautomatic handgun1 from under the mattress, put it inside
Cindy’s mouth, and told her to take off her pants. Cindy
complied, convinced he would otherwise kill her. Zamora then
pushed her onto the bed and put his penis in her vagina while
holding the gun in his hand. Cindy was crying, and after a time
Zamora stopped, got up, and paced back and forth in the room,
saying words to the effect of “what the fuck am I doing?” and that
he would have to kill her. Then he returned to the bed and
resumed sexual penetration. This cycle continued two or three
times, while Cindy continued to cry and fear for her life.
Cindy pleaded with Zamora to let her go, begging him at
least to let her leave so she could see her young children again.
She promised to return to him after she took the children to
school. Zamora eventually said he would let her go if she
promised not to tell his friends or the police; otherwise, he would
kill her. At about 6:00 or 7:00 a.m. on August 19, Zamora
allowed Cindy to leave the motel. He pointed his gun at her as
she walked out to his vehicle, and he drove her home, repeating
that she should not tell anybody.
Once Cindy got home, she “had to pull [herself] together,”
and she took her children to school. Without showering, Cindy
went to the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) station in
south Los Angeles to report the assault. The LAPD officers told
her they could not help her because the incident occurred in the
City of Compton, and they gave her the address for the Compton
sheriff’s station. Cindy went to the Compton station where she
1 Cindy testified the gun Zamora used to assault her looked
similar to the 9-millimeter semiautomatic handgun that police
later recovered.
4
reported the assault to Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD)
deputies.
(b) Cindy’s police station interview
A videotape recording of a portion of Cindy’s August 19
interview with three sheriff’s deputies was played for the jury,
and the jury was given a transcript of the audio. During the
interview, Cindy described how Zamora pulled a gun out from
under the mattress, cocked it back, put it in her mouth, and told
her, “take off your fucking pants.” She explained that she
repeatedly threw herself on the floor to protect herself, but
fearing for her life, she took off her underwear and got onto the
bed and lay on her back while Zamora sexually penetrated her.
Cindy was crying and Zamora stopped “because at that point he
realized it was rape,” and then he vacillated between pacing
around while saying words to the effect of, “I don’t know what I’m
doing tonight,” and continuing to rape her because he had
already gone too far. Cindy did not know if his strange behavior
was also a result of his being on drugs. One of the officers asked
Cindy about a lip injury she had showed the officer before the
interview; Cindy said Zamora “backhanded” her, making her lip
bleed. She also said she had dried blood on her ear, which she
believed was caused by an earring that popped out when Zamora
grabbed her head and pulled her hair. She also reported injuries
to the outside of her legs.
(c) Examination by the SART nurse
Sheriff’s deputies brought Cindy to a hospital in Torrance
where she was examined by SART nurse Elizabeth Castillo at
around 1:00 p.m. on August 19. Castillo collected Cindy’s clothes
and took photographs and swab samples from Cindy’s body.
5
Photographs admitted into evidence showed injuries to Cindy’s
lower and upper lips and bruising above her left knee, which
Cindy testified was the result of her repeatedly throwing herself
on the floor when Zamora was on top of her. Zamora’s DNA was
found on samples taken from Cindy’s face, earlobe, neck, breast,
and vulva.
Castillo testified that Cindy was crying and trembling
when the sheriff’s deputies brought her into the hospital, but she
was coherent and there was no indication she was under the
influence of alcohol or drugs. Castillo observed abrasions on
Cindy’s lips, right wrist, left forearm, left earlobe, neck, the front
and side of her left thigh and her knee, as well as a bruise on her
leg. Castillo recalled that Cindy stated her boyfriend had said he
“was going to kill her, he was going to put her in a dog cage if she
told anybody that he would kill her” and “he had no choice but to
finish what he started.” Cindy told Castillo that Zamora put a
gun to her head and in her mouth and he “backhanded” her on
the face. Cindy also told Castillo that Zamora had been “‘doing
drugs like crystal meth,’” and he kept putting the drugs on her
mouth and up her nose. During cross-examination, Castillo
testified she did not see anything that appeared to be crystal
methamphetamine on Cindy’s nose or mouth. Castillo admitted
that other than Cindy’s statements to her, Castillo could not tell
from her physical examination whether Cindy had consensual
sexual intercourse with Zamora.
6
2. The August 19, 2021 police chase, shooting, and
attempted carjacking2
LASD Sergeants Valerie Franco and David Fujiki, and
Deputy Juan Tobias went to Zamora’s motel at around 4:30 p.m.
on August 19, 2021 to follow up on Cindy’s report. Deputy Tobias
went to the motel registration window to inquire about Zamora
while Sergeants Franco and Fujiki parked in an alley behind the
motel. As Deputy Tobias was waiting for the manager to come
out, he saw a man matching Zamora’s description3 walking
through the motel parking lot. Zamora saw Deputy Tobias,
stopped, faced Deputy Tobias, and reached for his waistband. As
Deputy Tobias moved behind a parked vehicle for cover, he pulled
out his gun and instructed Zamora: “‘Let me see your hands.’”
Zamora pulled out his own gun and shot at Deputy Tobias, who
then returned fire. Zamora shot at Tobias again, and Tobias fired
back.
Zamora ran toward the alley where Sergeants Franco and
Fujiki were waiting. Zamora pointed his gun at Sergeant Franco
and tried to shoot her, but the gun appeared to jam. After
Sergeant Franco returned fire, Zamora threw his gun in her
direction and fled down the alley. Multiple police officers
pursued Zamora on foot. Zamora was apprehended after he
jumped on the hood of a car driving by, the car slammed on its
2 Because Zamora does not challenge his convictions of
attempted murder, assault on a peace officer, and attempted
carjacking, we only briefly summarize this portion of the evidence
at trial.
3 Cindy had shown the LASD deputies a photograph of
Zamora when she reported the assault. Deputy Tobias, among
others, identified Zamora in the courtroom during trial.
7
brakes, and Zamora flew off. Zamora was arrested and taken to
the hospital.
LASD investigators recovered Zamora’s gun from an alley
behind the motel. The gun was an unregistered 9-millimeter
semiautomatic ghost gun without a serial number. The gun
appeared to have malfunctioned with a shell casing stuck in the
barrel, preventing another bullet from being fed into the
chamber. Zamora’s DNA, along with the DNA of three others,
was found on the magazine.
3. Zamora’s jailhouse call to Cindy
Zamora called Cindy from jail sometime after his arrest. A
recording of the 30-minute call was played for the jury. At the
beginning of their conversation, Zamora said to Cindy, “I was just
checking up on you, making sure you’re good.” Cindy responded,
“[D]on’t even try to call me and sit here and try to act like
everything’s cool,” and “What the fuck? You had a gun in my
mouth, nigga. How the fuck do you expect me to feel?” Zamora
responded, “I don’t want to talk about none of that right now on
this.” Zamora then said, “You know I care about you, nigga . . .
[¶] . . . Like you mean the world to me,” to which Cindy
responded, “If you cared about me, you wouldn’t have done what
you did.”
Zamora told Cindy he needed her help to move some money
around and wanted the number of “Gismo”; Cindy refused to
help, saying, “Hell, no. You brought the nigga around who’s
trying to kill me and shit.” Zamora told Cindy she was crazy and
“that wasn’t me.” Zamora continued to press her for help to
contact other associates, move money around, and “to do some
things out there.” Cindy again refused, saying “What the fuck?
8
You tried to kill me.” Zamora said, “I was not trying to kill you,
man” and “I just slapped you around a couple times. That’s it.
I’ll apologize for slapping you around if you want to hear.”
Zamora suggested Cindy’s jealousy was “the biggest issue
we had between us.” Cindy disagreed and said the biggest issue
was that Zamora “lost it” because he got in a fight with his friend
after his ex-wife “started fucking with [his] head laughing at
[him]” and he became “hella tweaked out” on drugs. Zamora
responded, “We both fucked up. We both fucked [up] by having
jealousy issues . . . [¶] . . . But mostly it was you.”
Towards the end of the call, Zamora again asked Cindy, “I
need help to maneuver things around.” Cindy responded, “I’m
the last person that’ll help you. . . . [You] fucked up, my
nigga, . . . and I can’t even get an apology.” Zamora responded, “I
already told you I apologize for beating you up. . . . For slapping
your ass around so much,” and he asked whether, if he came
home from jail, she was “still gonna be my girl.” Cindy said no,
saying she could not forgive him.
4. Zamora’s ex-wife’s testimony
Zamora’s ex-wife, Magali Tinoco, testified that Zamora was
physically abusive for several years during their marriage, and
he had been convicted of domestic violence. She recounted that
in February 2015, after Zamora hit Tinoco during an argument,
she moved with their five children into her parents’ house.
Zamora came to the parents’ house, cursed at Tinoco, slapped
her, and was arrested. While in jail, and continuing after he was
released on bail, Zamora repeatedly called Tinoco to ask her to
help him, and on multiple occasions when she refused to talk to
him, he sent her a text message with a picture of a gun. On one
9
occasion when Zamora was upset at Tinoco, he told her he was a
member of the “Compton T. Flats” gang. Later in 2015 Zamora
slapped Tinoco and pulled her hair in an alley behind her
parents’ house in the presence of their four-year-old daughter.
Zamora called Tinoco again in 2021 to ask for help while he
was in jail on the charges filed in this case, but she refused.4
B. The Verdicts and Sentencing
The jury found Zamora guilty of attempted murder of a
peace officer (Deputy Tobias) (count 1; Pen. Code, §§ 187,
subd. (a), 664);5 assault with a semiautomatic firearm upon a
peace officer (Deputy Tobias) (count 4; § 245, subd.(d)(2)); and
attempted carjacking (count 8; §§ 215, subd. (a), 664).6 With
respect to Cindy, the jury found Zamora guilty of forcible rape
(count 9; § 261, subd. (a)(2)); inflicting corporal injury on a person
in a dating relationship (count 10; § 273.5, subd. (a)); assault with
a semi-automatic firearm (count 11; § 245, subd. (b)); making a
criminal threat (count 12; § 422, subd. (a)); and dissuading a
witness by force or threat (count 13; § 136.1, subd. (c)(1)). Before
trial, Zamora pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm by a
felon (count 7; § 29800). As to counts 1, 4, 9, and 11 the jury
found true Zamora personally used a firearm in the commission
of the offenses (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). As to count 1, the jury also
4 Zamora did not call any witnesses or present evidence at
trial.
5 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
6 The jury found Zamora not guilty of the attempted assaults
with a firearm of Sergeants Fujiki and Franco, as charged in
counts 5 and 6.
10
found true the attempted murder of Deputy Tobias was
committed against a peace officer in the performance of his duties
(§ 664, subd. (e)).
In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true
Zamora suffered a prior strike conviction in 2016 for making a
criminal threat (§ 422). The court also found true four
circumstances in aggravation under California Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(2), and (b)(3).
The trial court sentenced Zamora to an aggregate term of
55 years to life. On count 1 for the attempted murder of Deputy
Tobias, the court imposed an indeterminate term of 24 years to
life, comprising the base term of seven years to life, doubled
under the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12,
subd. (c)(1)), plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement. The
court imposed a 26-year base term on count 9 for the rape of
Cindy M., comprising the upper term of eight years doubled
under the three strikes law, plus 10 years for the firearm
enhancement.7 The court imposed consecutive terms of two years
on count 13 for dissuading a witness (one-third the middle term
doubled); one year eight months on count 8 for attempted
7 The abstract of judgment incorrectly states that the court
imposed a 10-year enhancement for personal use of a firearm
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) on count 7 instead of count 9. The trial
court should correct the clerical error. (See People v. Mitchell
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [“Courts may correct clerical errors at
any time, and appellate courts . . . have ordered correction of
abstracts of judgment that did not accurately reflect the oral
judgments of sentencing courts”]; People v. Gobert (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 676, 689 [same].)
11
carjacking (one-third the middle term of five years);8 and one year
four months on count 7 for possession of a firearm by a felon (one-
third the middle term of two years doubled). The court stayed
the sentences on the remaining counts pursuant to section 654.
Zamora timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting
Evidence of Zamora’s Gang Membership
1. Relevant proceedings
The People in their trial brief requested an in limine
determination of “[t]he relevancy of any testimony and evidence
regarding the gang membership of [Zamora] and Cindy M. under
an Evidence Code section 352 analysis.” The trial court ruled on
the motion at the pretrial hearing: “Based on what the court’s
heard thus far about telephone calls, jail calls how he identifies
himself as Tone from a particular gang, the court’s going to admit
this over defense objection. So that would be coming in, even
though there’s not a gang allegation and there’s not any further
punishment what have you for gang. But it will come in and
jurors will hear about your gang affiliation, as well as the
victim[’]s.”
In his opening argument, the prosecutor read Zamora’s text
message to Cindy stating, “‘[F]uck you and whoever you kick it
with too. This is Tone from CVTF,’” and explained that Tone was
8 The sentence on the attempted carjacking count was for
one-half the term of imprisonment under section 664,
subdivision (a), but it was then doubled under the three strikes
law.
12
Zamora’s gang moniker and he was a member of the Compton
Varrio Tortilla Flats gang. The prosecutor argued Cindy was
affiliated with gangs and knew other gang members, and
Zamora’s messages after their breakup reflected that “he was
constantly jealous and worried about being laughed at by his
homies, by his fellow gang members [and] that Cindy was dating
or hanging out with his fellow gang members.”
Cindy testified she was not a member of the Compton
Varrio Tortilla Flats gang and she did not know any of its
members besides Zamora. But she testified she knew Zamora
was a member of the gang during their relationship. Tinoco
likewise testified that Zamora told her he was a member of the
gang. There were no other direct references to Zamora’s gang
membership during the trial or in the closing arguments.
However, the topic of Zamora’s “homies” and associates arose in
multiple contexts: Cindy testified Zamora was fixated on the idea
she had been having sex with his homies; Zamora threatened to
kill her if she told his homies about the August 18 rape; and
during the jailhouse call Cindy told Zamora she believed he
“brought the nigga around who’s trying to kill me and shit,” in an
apparent reference to one an associate of Zamora with the
nickname “Gismo.”
2. Governing law
Zamora contends the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of his gang membership because the evidence was
substantially more prejudicial than probative under Evidence
Code section 352. Evidence Code section 352 provides, “The court
in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
13
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” (Accord, People v. Holmes, McClain and
Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 771; People v. Chhoun (2021)
11 Cal.5th 1, 26 (Chhoun).) “‘[T]he prejudice which exclusion of
evidence under Evidence Code section 352 is designed to avoid is
not the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows
from relevant, highly probative evidence. “[A]ll evidence which
tends to prove guilt is prejudicial or damaging to the defendant’s
case. The stronger the evidence, the more it is ‘prejudicial.’ The
‘prejudice’ referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to
evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against
the defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on
the issues.”’” (People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 610; accord,
People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 105 [“‘“Evidence is not
prejudicial, as that term is used in [an Evidence Code]
section 352 context, merely because it undermines the opponent’s
position or shores up that of the proponent.”’”].)
“The People are generally entitled to introduce evidence of
a defendant’s gang affiliation and activity if it is relevant to the
charged offense.” (Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 31; accord,
People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 655 (McKinnon).)
“‘Evidence of the defendant’s gang affiliation . . . can help prove
identity, motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means of
applying force or fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the
charged crime.’” (Chhoun, at p. 31; accord, People v. Becerrada
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1009, 1022; People v. Hernandez (2004)
33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049 (Hernandez).) “Even when it is relevant,
however, ‘courts should carefully scrutinize evidence of a
defendant’s gang membership because such evidence “creates a
14
risk the jury will improperly infer the defendant has a criminal
disposition and is therefore guilty of the offense charged.”’”
(Chhoun, at p. 31; accord, People v. Melendez (2016) 2 Cal.5th 1,
28-29; see Hernandez, at p. 1049 [“In cases not involving the gang
enhancement, we have held that evidence of gang membership is
potentially prejudicial and should not be admitted if its probative
value is minimal.”].)
“On appeal, we review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s
ruling on whether the evidence is relevant, not unduly
prejudicial, and thus admissible.” (McKinnon, supra,
52 Cal.4th at p. 655.) “‘[T]he trial court is vested with wide
discretion in determining relevance and in weighing the
prejudicial effect of proffered evidence against its probative value.
Its rulings will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of
that discretion.’” (People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 87; accord,
People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 634-635 [“a trial court’s
discretionary ruling under [Evid. Code, § 352] ‘“must not be
disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised
its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd
manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice”’”].)
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
any prejudicial effect of Zamora’s gang membership
did not substantially outweigh its probative value
Zamora contends the probative value of the evidence he
was a member of the Compton Varrio Tortilla Flats gang was
“minimal at best” and limited to whether Zamora committed the
offenses of making a criminal threat and dissuading a witness.
Further, he argues, Cindy’s testimony that Zamora threatened to
kill her and she feared for her life was based on his words and
15
behavior, not his gang affiliation. Zamora’s gang membership
was probative of multiple issues, and the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting it.
The trial court allowed evidence of Zamora’s gang
membership based on the fact Zamora identified himself as “Tone
from CVTF” in a text message threatening Cindy around the time
of their breakup. Zamora’s identification as a gang member was
therefore central to the nature of this threat and its effect on
Cindy. In addition, Zamora referred to his homies and used
nicknames for other associates in his messages and calls with
Cindy. And, as defense counsel acknowledged in his questioning
of Cindy, during the jailhouse call Zamora asked her to try “to get
ahold of different people, to Chuco and Smalls and et cetera,” to
help Zamora from outside the jail.
Moreover, the central theory of the prosecution case was
that Zamora was fixated on his belief Cindy was cheating on him
with his gang associates and they were laughing at him behind
his back, enraging Zamora and motivating him to hurt and
humiliate Cindy. This theory was supported by Zamora’s
accusatory messages around the time of their breakup, his threat
during the rape that he would kill her if she told the police or his
homies, and the jailhouse call in which he continued to focus on
whether she was having a sexual relationship with “Gismo” and
other associates. Cindy’s (and Tinoco’s) brief testimony that
Zamora identified himself as a member of Compton Varrio
Tortilla Flats gang with the moniker “Tone” was essential context
for this evidence, which in turn was critical to establishing
Cindy’s credibility, Zamora’s motive, and the circumstances in
which he committed the rape and other offenses against her.
(See Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th 1 at pp. 31-32 [court did not
16
abuse its discretion admitting evidence of defendant’s gang
affiliation and other gang evidence in robbery-murder case to
explain defendants’ relationship with accomplices, his identity as
one of the perpetrators, his role during the orchestrated robbery,
and his motive]; McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 655 [trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting gang evidence to
show defendant’s motive for shooting victim was to retaliate for
murder committed by rival gang]; People v. Brown (2003)
31 Cal.4th 518, 547 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting evidence that defendant took an oath on his gang when
he shot the victim, which showed his statement that he shot the
victim was truthful and not “mere bravado”].)
Evidence of Zamora’s gang affiliation was also relevant to
prove Zamora was guilty of making a criminal threat. To prove
the offense, the prosecution had to establish, among other
elements, that Zamora’s threats caused Cindy to be in actual and
reasonable sustained fear for her own safety and the safety of her
family. (§ 422, subd. (a); In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620,
630.)9 The fact that Zamora was a gang member—and explicitly
9 The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 1300, as
follows: “To prove that the defendant is guilty of [criminal threat
under section 422], the People must prove that: 1. The
defendant willfully threatened to unlawfully kill or unlawfully
cause great bodily injury to Cindy M.; [¶] 2. The defendant
made the threat; [¶] 3. The defendant intended that statement
be understood as a threat; [¶] 4. Under the circumstances, the
threat was so clear, immediate, unconditional, and specific that it
communicated to Cindy M. a serious intention and the immediate
prospect that the threat would be carried out; [¶] 5. The threat
actually caused Cindy M. to be in sustained fear for her own
17
identified himself as a gang member in a message threatening
her—was relevant to explain Cindy’s sustained fear for her own
safety. (See People v. Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1053
[“[g]ang testimony was relevant . . . to explain how [defendant’s]
statement could induce fear in the victim”].)
Zamora argues the gang evidence was cumulative because
if the jury believed Cindy’s testimony, there was much stronger
evidence that she was placed in sustained and reasonable fear
based on Zamora’s repeated threats to kill her over several hours,
his holding a gun to her head or in her mouth, and his erratic
behavior. While this is compelling evidence, the proof relies
entirely on the jury believing Cindy’s testimony at trial and that
she truthfully reported the rape to the police and SART nurse.
Evidence of Cindy’s fear beyond her own testimony was more
limited, based principally on her actions, demeanor, and injuries
on the morning of August 19. Although it is true Cindy testified
she knew Zamora was a gang member while they were dating
and she was not bothered by it, in the jailhouse call Cindy did not
respond to Zamora’s inquiry as to where she was at the time,10
and she stated her belief he sent an associate “who’s trying to kill
me and shit.”
Thus, although the evidence Zamora was a gang member
may have been prejudicial, it helped to bolster the People’s case
safety; and [¶] 6. Cindy M.’s fear was reasonable under the
circumstances.”
10 During the jail call Zamora asked, “Where are you at now?
Where you at? Home or what?” Cindy responded, “Right now I’m
in—don’t worry about where the fuck I’m at. What the fuck?”
18
that otherwise depended heavily on Cindy’s testimony. Its
probative value was therefore far from “‘minimal,’” and the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it. (People v.
Becerrada, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1022; People v. Hernandez,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1049.)
B. The Trial Court Erred in Admitting All of Cindy’s Police
Interview and Her Statements to the SART Nurse, but the
Error Was Harmless
1. Relevant proceedings
The People in their trial brief requested permission to
introduce “[t]estimony and evidence regarding Cindy M.’s
statement to deputies and the SART nurse under the ‘Fresh
Complaint’ Doctrine[.]” At the pretrial hearing, defense counsel
declined the trial court’s offer to present argument, stating “[j]ust
objection,” and he did not request a limiting instruction. The
court found, “[B]eing that it’s within hours of the allegations in
this matter that [Cindy] went to the L.A. County Sheriff’s
Department, spoke to deputies, I understand that there is body
cam and her demeanor was that she was upset, possibly crying,
exhibiting fear, and that she went directly to the police after she
dropped her children off, did not shower, and went to a SART
nurse and was then examined, the court’s going to find that this
is relevant, and the prejudicial value does not outweigh the
probative value. [¶] And so the court’s going to admit it as being
relevant. And so that’s going to come in as a fresh
[complaint] . . . . So the court’s going to admit the statements
that she made to the deputies and the SART nurse.”
As discussed, a video recording of an extended portion of
Cindy’s August 19, 2021 interview with sheriff’s deputies was
19
played for the jury, without redaction.11 In addition, Castillo
testified with respect to Cindy’s statements during her physical
examination on the afternoon of August 19, including details
about Zamora’s threats and the unfolding of events on August 18.
Zamora’s attorney did not object at trial to the scope of the prior
complaints evidence. The trial court instructed the jury with
CALCRIM No. 318 that it could consider witness statements
before trial “in two ways: to evaluate whether the witness’[s]
testimony in court is believable; and as evidence that the
information in earlier statements is true.”
2. The fresh complaint doctrine
Under the fresh complaint doctrine, “proof of an
extrajudicial complaint, made by the victim of a sexual offense,
disclosing the alleged assault, may be admissible for a limited,
nonhearsay purpose—namely, to establish the fact of, and the
circumstances surrounding, the victim’s disclosure of the assault
to others—whenever the fact that the disclosure was made and
the circumstances under which it was made are relevant to the
trier of fact’s determination as to whether the offense occurred.”
(People v. Brown (1994) 8 Cal.4th 746, 749-750 (Brown); accord,
People v. Manning (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 870, 880 (Manning).)
As the Supreme Court explained in Brown, evidence the
victim made a complaint and the circumstances surrounding her
disclosure are properly admissible because the evidence
“frequently will help place the incident in context, and may assist
the jury in arriving at a more reliable determination as to
11 The record does not reflect that the video was redacted
although, as noted, only a portion of the interview was played.
20
whether the offense occurred.” (Brown, supra, 8 Cal.4th at
p. 760; accord, People v. Ramirez (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1512,
1522 (Ramirez) [“Evidence admitted pursuant to this doctrine
may be considered by the trier of fact for the purpose of
corroborating the victim’s testimony, but not to prove the
occurrence of the crime.”]; Manning, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at
p. 880 [same].) Such evidence may be relevant “[f]or a variety of
nonhearsay purposes”; for example, “if such a victim did, in fact,
make a complaint promptly after the alleged incident, the
circumstances under which the complaint was made may aid the
jury in determining whether the alleged offense occurred.
Furthermore, admission of evidence that such a prompt
complaint was made also will eliminate the risk that the jury, if
not apprised of that fact, erroneously will infer that no such
prompt complaint was made.” (Brown, at p. 761.)
“[O]nly the fact that a complaint was made, and the
circumstances surrounding its making, ordinarily are admissible;
admission of evidence concerning details of the statements
themselves, to prove the truth of the matter asserted, would
violate the hearsay rule.” (Brown, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 760; see
People v. Loy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 46, 55, 65-67 (Loy) [trial court
erred in admitting evidence under the fresh complaint doctrine of
statements made by victim of rape and murder to a friend that
the defendant had previously touched her, although the error was
harmless]; Ramirez, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1522, 1526
[trial court erred in admitting under the fresh complaint doctrine
the victim’s statements to third parties that a man she met the
21
prior night at a party raped her and dropped her off when his car
got a flat tire, but the error was harmless].)12
3. The trial court erred in admitting Cindy’s prior
complaints, and we decline to find forfeiture
Zamora contends the trial court erred in allowing the
People to present evidence of Cindy’s complaints to the police and
Castillo under the fresh complaint doctrine because the
statements went far beyond the fact she made the complaints and
the circumstances surrounding them. Further, the court
instructed the jurors they could consider Cindy’s prior statements
for their truth and failed to give a limiting instruction.
We agree the trial court erred in allowing the jury to view
an unredacted and extended video of Cindy’s interview with the
LASD sheriffs and in allowing Castillo to recount all of Cindy’s
statements during her SART examination. The court described
the law correctly when it reasoned that Cindy’s demeanor in the
prior complaints, including the fact she was upset, crying, and
fearful, and the circumstances of her complaint, such as the fact
she went directly to the police on the morning of August 19
without showering, constituted admissible, relevant evidence
under the fresh complaint doctrine to prove the rape and assault
had occurred. (Brown, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 760 [“evidence of the
circumstances surrounding a victim’s reporting or disclosure of
12 In Loy, supra, 52 Cal.4th 46 and Ramirez, supra,
143 Cal.App.4th 1512, the courts also rejected the People’s
argument the statements were admissible as spontaneous
statements. The People in this case do not argue Cindy’s hearsay
statements were admissible under any hearsay exception.
22
an alleged crime clearly falls within the bounds of ‘relevant
evidence’”].)
However, the evidence the trial court allowed in granting
the prosecutor’s in limine motion went beyond the fact and
circumstances of Cindy’s complaints. During the police interview
played for the jury, Cindy gave a detailed account of the events
that occurred in Zamora’s motel room on August 18, 2021,
including that Zamora produced a gun from under the mattress,
told Cindy he would kill her if she did not undress, cocked the
gun before holding it in her mouth, stopped several times during
the rape to pace around the room “because he realized that [it]
was rape,” told Cindy he would kill her if she said anything to his
homies or the police, and may have acted “all weird” because he
was on drugs. Similarly, Castillo’s testimony was not limited to
Cindy’s injuries, appearance, and demeanor during the
examination, nor the necessary context to explain the scope of
Castillo’s forensic examination. Instead, the prosecutor elicited
Castillo’s testimony that Cindy reported Zamora was a
“boyfriend” who told her he was going to “put her in a dog cage”;
told her during the rape he had “no choice but to finish what he
started”; and was using crystal methamphetamine. Admission of
these details served no cognizable non-hearsay purpose. (Brown,
supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 760-761; see Loy, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 65;
Ramirez, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1522.)
In their respondent’s brief, the People do not substantially
dispute that admission of Cindy’s prior complaints was error.
They argue instead that Zamora forfeited the issue because his
attorney did not seek to narrow or redact the prior complaints
evidence, and further, he failed to request a limiting instruction.
The People are correct that a defendant’s bare objection to
23
evidence generally is inadequate to preserve the objection on
appeal. (See People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-434
[“‘we have consistently held that the “defendant’s failure to make
a timely and specific objection” on the ground asserted on appeal
makes that ground not cognizable’”]; id. at p. 434 [“[A] specifically
grounded objection to a defined body of evidence serves to prevent
error. It allows the trial judge to consider excluding the evidence
or limiting its admission to avoid possible prejudice. It also
allows the proponent of the evidence to lay additional foundation,
modify the offer of proof, or take other steps designed to minimize
the prospect of reversal.”].) Likewise, a limiting instruction is
only required if it is requested. (See Manning, supra,
165 Cal.App.4th at p. 880 [“On request, the trial court must
instruct the jury as to the limited purpose for which the fresh
complaint evidence was admitted. [Citation.] However, the trial
court has no duty to give such an instruction in the absence of a
request.”’].)
However, “application of the forfeiture rule is not
automatic.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293; accord,
Unzueta v. Akopyan (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 199, 215.) The
People’s trial brief properly relied on Brown, supra, 8 Cal.4th at
page 760 with respect to application of the fresh complaint
doctrine (limiting the scope of the admissible evidence), and it
may not have been clear to Zamora’s attorney until the trial court
made its ruling that the court would fail to distinguish between
the admissible testimony (of the fact of the complaint and
circumstances) and the inadmissible details of the complaint.
Moreover, in light of the extensive details in Cindy’s prior
complaints presented at trial, it is unlikely a limiting instruction
would have been adequate to prevent the jury from considering
24
improper hearsay. (Brown, at p. 763 [“if the details of the
victim’s extrajudicial complaint are admitted into evidence, even
with a proper limiting instruction, a jury may well find it difficult
not to view these details as tending to prove the truth of the
underlying charge of sexual assault [citation], thereby converting
the victim’s statement into a hearsay assertion”].) We therefore
decline to find forfeiture.
4. Admission of Cindy’s statements was harmless
Although we find the trial court erred in admitting the
details of Cindy’s prior complaints, we agree with the People the
error was harmless. We will not reverse a judgment for the
improper admission of hearsay unless it is reasonably probable
that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been
reached in the absence of the error under the standard
enunciated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. (People v.
Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 840; Loy, supra, 52 Cal.4th at
p. 67; Ramirez, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1526.) There is no
reasonable probability Zamora would have received a more
favorable result if the hearsay statements in Cindy’s complaints
to the police and to Castillo had been excluded.
Cindy testified at length about the assault and rape and
the surrounding circumstances, including her relationship with
Zamora and how she voluntarily went to the motel on August 18.
She testified that once she went inside the motel room he hit her,
called her names, threatened to lock her in a dog cage, tried to
force her to ingest crystal methamphetamine, produced a gun,
put it in her mouth, and threatened to kill her if she did not
cooperate. Further, she described how during the rape he
repeatedly stopped to pace around the room, ranting about
25
needing to kill her, and when he allowed her to leave to see her
children, he pointed a gun at her on the ride home and again
threatened to kill her if she said anything to his homies or the
police. With the single exception of Cindy’s statement to the
sheriff’s deputies that Zamora’s gun was cocked when he put it in
her mouth, the details in Cindy’s prior complaints were
cumulative of her much more detailed trial testimony. The jury
did not have to rely on any hearsay statement in the complaints
to determine if and how Zamora raped, assaulted, and criminally
threatened Cindy.
Zamora argues the trial court’s error was not harmless
because “[g]iven Cindy’s credibility issues, the corroborating,
largely, consistent reports she gave the day after the events
impermissibly bolstered her believability in the jury’s eyes.”
However, the jury had the opportunity to evaluate Cindy’s
credibility at trial, and defense counsel cross-examined her about
the inconsistencies in her story and her motive to lie about a
consensual encounter.13 The prosecution also presented ample
evidence to support her account separate from Cindy’s prior
complaints, including Zamora’s threatening text messages and
the jail call in which Zamora admitted he “slapped [Cindy]
around” and, when she accused him of holding a gun in her
mouth and trying to kill her, he responded only with “I don’t
13 For example, defense counsel impeached Cindy’s testimony
that Zamora had promised to pay her back with money he owed
her if she came to the motel on August 18 with her testimony at
the preliminary hearing that Zamora had offered her a gift of
money and there was no debt.
26
want to talk about none of that right now on this” and “I’ll
apologize for slapping you around if you want to hear.” Zamora’s
text messages and statements on the jail call also established
Zamora’s motivating jealousy and undermined the defense theory
that Cindy was a prostitute who was lying about having a dating
relationship with Zamora. The jury heard Tinoco’s account of
domestic abuse during her marriage with Zamora, which
included striking Tinoco in front of their young child and an
implied threat of gun and gang violence,14 and the jury heard
about Zamora’s attempts to shoot Deputy Tobias on August 19.
Finally, consistent with the fresh complaint doctrine, the jury
could consider the circumstances of Cindy’s prior complaints,
including the fact she went to two police stations without
showering within hours after Zamora raped her to report the
crime, and the jury properly relied on Cindy’s appearance and
demeanor on the police interview video, and Castillo’s
observations about how Cindy looked and acted, to make a “more
reliable determination as to whether the offense occurred.”
(Brown, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 760.)
14 The trial court allowed Tinoco to testify about Zamora’s
domestic abuse as propensity evidence under Evidence Code
section 1109. Zamora does not challenge this ruling on appeal.
27
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to
correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that the court imposed
a 10-year sentence enhancement for personal use of a firearm
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) on count 9 for forcible rape (§ 261,
subd. (a)(2)) and not on count 7 for possession of a firearm by a
felon (§ 29800), and to send a corrected abstract of judgment to
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
RAPHAEL, J.*
* Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
28
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