CourtListener 9509155•People v. Ware CA1/4
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Filed 5/30/24 P. v. Ware CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168221
v. (Alameda County
CHRISTOPHER SAMUEL WARE, Super. Ct.No. 20-CR012239A)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Christopher Samuel Ware appeals for the second time from
his sentence of seventeen years, four months for two robbery convictions. By
unpublished decision in People v. Ware (Jun. 17, 2022, A162314) (Ware I), we
affirmed the convictions but vacated the sentence and remanded for further
sentencing proceedings in light of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 567).
The trial court conducted a brief resentencing on remand, and
reimposed the original sentence. We conclude that, in doing so, the court
erred in two respects: first, under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision
(b)(5),1 by relying on an aggravating factor that was also used as a sentencing
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
All rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
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enhancement, and second, by summarily refusing to entertain Ware’s motion
for replacement of his counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118
(Marsden).
We now vacate the sentence and once again remand for further
consideration of the sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
“In July 2020, Ware robbed a 75-year-old woman at gunpoint in front of
the woman’s house. Ware took the woman’s purse, which contained a credit
card that someone used shortly after the robbery to make a $500 purchase.
[¶] Two weeks later, Ware approached a woman walking to her car in a store
parking lot and grabbed the woman’s purse, causing her to fall to the ground.
Ware then ran off with the purse. A warrant was issued for Ware’s arrest
that same day. [¶] About a week later, police arrested Ware after they
spotted him entering a vehicle. A search of the vehicle revealed a loaded
handgun.
“In November 2020, Ware was charged by consolidated information
with two counts of second degree robbery (§ 211), one with special allegations
that Ware personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense
(§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b)); identity theft (§ 530.5, subd. (a));
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)); carrying a loaded
firearm on one’s person in a city (§ 25850, subd. (a)) with a special allegation
that he was not in lawful possession of the firearm as a prohibited person
(§ 25850, subd. (c)(4)); carrying a concealed firearm within a vehicle (§ 25400,
subd. (a)(1)), again with a special allegation that he was not in lawful
possession of the firearm (§ 25850, subd. (c)(4)); and possession of
ammunition by a prohibited person (§ 25400, subd. (c)(4)).” (Ware I, supra,
A162314.)
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Ware agreed to bifurcated court trial on his prior convictions and
stipulated to two felonies, a February 2017 conviction for burglary (§ 459),
and an October 2019 conviction for assault upon the person of another likely
to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)). At the time of each of the
charged offenses, as well as the two stipulated prior convictions, Ware was on
felony probation.
During trial, Ware asked the court if he could state some concerns
about his appointed counsel on the record. The court sought clarification
from Ware as to whether he was seeking to replace his counsel. Ware said he
was not; he merely wanted to document what he felt were lapses in
communication. The court offered to clear the courtroom and asked clarifying
questions about the nature of defendant’s complaints about his counsel.
Ware again stated that he was not seeking to replace his counsel, and the
following colloquy took place: “THE COURT: All right. So you said you do
feel uncomfortable. Are you asking that Mr. Alpers be relieved as your
attorney? THE DEFENDANT: No, because I do want to move on with the
process, but I just wanted to say this on the record.” Nonetheless, in an
abundance of caution, the court cleared the courtroom and conducted a
Marsden hearing. In a confidential proceeding, the court conducted various
inquiries pertinent to Ware’s dissatisfaction with his counsel. Trial continued
thereafter, with the same lawyer, Steven Alpers, representing Ware.
In February 2021 the jury found Ware guilty as charged on all counts
and found the firearm allegations true. At the sentencing hearing the
following month, the trial court imposed an aggregate prison term of 17
years, four months, explaining as follows: Ware is sentenced “to the upper
term of five years on the first count of second degree robbery and to the upper
term of 10 years for the firearm enhancement for that count[,]” plus “one-
third of the midterm for counts two, three, and four, for a total of two years
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four months for those counts, to be served consecutively with the 15-year
term for count one.” (Ware I, supra, A162314.) The court stayed the
sentences on the rest of the counts pursuant to section 654. (Ibid.)
On appeal, we affirmed the judgment of conviction but vacated the
sentence and remanded for resentencing, because in light of changes in the
law brought about by Senate Bill No. 567, applied retroactively,2 “the record
does not clearly indicate that the trial court would have imposed the upper
term sentences despite the amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b).”
(Ware I, supra, A162314.)
We explained, “Although the trial court discussed Ware’s criminal
history and his probation performance, it also mentioned several other
aggravating circumstances, noting that there are ‘so many’ factors in
aggravation related to his more recent crimes. The record does not indicate
that Ware stipulated to the facts underlying those aggravating circumstances
or that the jury or judge at trial found those facts true beyond a reasonable
doubt. The trial court stated it was selecting the upper term ‘for the reasons
. . . stated’ and did not expressly exclude any of the improper aggravating
circumstances. We cannot discern from this record whether the trial court
would have found a departure from the presumptive middle term to be
justified based solely on Ware’s criminal history.” (Ware I, supra, A162314.)
At the proceeding upon remand, the court reimposed the original
sentence, this time stating as follows: “I believe that one factor in
aggravation, which was proven, which the jury found, was that he was armed
2 The revisions to California’s triad felony sentencing scheme enacted
by Senate Bill 567 apply retroactively to this case as “an ameliorative change
in the law applicable to all nonfinal convictions on appeal. (People v. Superior
Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 308.)” (People v. Flores (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039, fn. omitted.)
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with or used a weapon at the time of the commission, which is Rule 4.421
(a)(2). I find that factor in aggravation. That justifies my imposition of the
upper term in this case.” The court further stated, “I thought I was clear in
my sentencing statements about why I reached the aggravating term. I’m
aware of his age. I would not exercise my discretion based on his age.” The
court also mentioned, “how these crimes were committed: “Two separate
211s, wherein one at least he followed the person, the sophistication, things
of that nature.”
When the parties were asked whether they had anything they wished
to say, Ware’s counsel stated, “my client . . . wants a Marsden,” at which
point the court responded, “Denied. He’s already been—this is on for re-
sentencing. This is just something that I have to do, that this court has to
take into consideration. So denied.” Ware did not object to the court’s
reliance on the jury’s finding he was armed with or used a weapon as a
justification for selecting the upper term on count 1.
This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
Ware raises two issues in this appeal. First, citing section 1170,
subdivision (b)(5), he argues the court abused its discretion by relying on the
jury finding that he was armed and used a weapon in the robberies to justify
selection of the upper term on count 1. Second, he argues he requested a
Marsden hearing at the resentencing proceeding, and the court erred by
denying the motion without giving him an opportunity to state his complaints
about his counsel’s representation. We address these issues in turn.
A. Penal Code Section 1170, Subdivision (b), Error
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(5) provides that “[t]he court shall set forth
on the record the facts and reasons for choosing the sentence imposed. The
court may not impose an upper term by using the fact of any enhancement
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upon which sentence is imposed under any provision of law.” Ware contends
the trial court violated this statute by imposing an upper term sentence for
count 1 based on an aggravator (he was armed with and used a firearm) that
also served as a sentencing enhancement. The Attorney General concedes
error, and we accept the concession. But he argues Ware forfeited the issue
on appeal by failing to raise it below, citing People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th
331.
Scott does not resolve the problem presented by the conceded section
1170, subdivision (b)(5) error on this record. We are not dealing simply with
how the trial court exercised its triad discretion or whether it provided an
adequate explanation of its discretionary sentencing choice. The court’s
intention to impose upper term sentences is clear, and, although its stated
reasons are somewhat general, its reasoning is evident. The problem,
instead, is whether the court had triad discretion to exercise at all.
As amended by Senate Bill 567, section 1170, subdivision (b)(2)
provides that “[t]he court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term
only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify
the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the
facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the
jury or by the judge in a court trial.”
In Ware I, we could not determine from the record of the original
sentencing whether the upper term sentence imposed for count 1 is
authorized by section 1170, subdivision (b)(2). From the record of the
resentencing, we still cannot discern whether there is a basis for upper term
sentencing eligibility. And if the court’s upper term sentencing choice was
unauthorized, the rule of forfeiture does not apply, which is an exception to
the forfeiture doctrine. (People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354.)
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The Attorney General argues in the alternative that any section 1170,
subdivision (b)(5) error was harmless. Given the trial court’s clearly
expressed intention to impose upper term sentences and Ware’s two admitted
prior convictions, the Attorney General argues, “there is no reasonable
probability . . . the court would have imposed a lesser sentence had it been
aware that it could not rely on appellant’s use of a weapon in connection with
the crime.”
In support of his harmless error argument, the Attorney General
makes only a generalized reference to aggravating factors in rule 4.421,
without specifying any particular portion of the rule. And he does not
address the particulars of the standard of review he urges us to apply.3
3 Faced with trial court error in imposing upper term sentences without
the requisite jury findings or stipulated admissions under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2), most courts have employed some type of harmless error
analysis. (See, e.g., People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 467, fn. 11;
People v. Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1113.) But courts have applied
varying standards of review. (Compare, e.g., People v. Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 467 & fn. 11 [when a reviewing court cannot conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman standard that a jury would have
found true all the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, it
must still ask whether it is reasonably probable the trial court would have
exercised its discretion to impose a sentence less than the upper term in the
absence of the unproved aggravating circumstances], with People v. Dunn
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394, 408–410, review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275655
[first Lopez harmless error step should employ a mix of both Chapman and
Watson standards and second step should employ only Watson standard]; see
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818.) The appropriate harmless error standard is now being considered by
the California Supreme Court. (See People v. Lynch (May 27, 2022, C094174)
[nonpub. opn.], review granted Aug. 10, 2022, S274942, argued May 9, 2024;
People v. Falcon (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 911, 938, review granted Sept. 13,
2023, S281242; People v. Butler (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 953, 959–960, review
granted May 31, 2023, S279633; People v. Ross (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1346,
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Drawing some inferences from the two stipulated prior convictions, at least
three aggravating factors listed in rule 4.421(b) might apply here. (See rule
4.421(b)(2) [prior convictions that are numerous or of increasing
seriousness], (b)(3) [service of prior prison sentence], (b)(5) [defendant’s prior
performance on probation was unsatisfactory].) But we decline to guess
which one the trial court would apply through the prism of harmless error
analysis.
Of these three provisions, rule 4.421(b)(2) strikes us as the
aggravating circumstance that seems to be most likely applicable, since the
two felony convictions Ware admitted, by their nature—and without
additional judicial “consideration” under section 1170, subdivision (b)(5)—
appear to be of “increasing seriousness.” But it is not our role on appeal to
identify and find record support for aggravating factors we think the trial
court probably would have relied upon had it appreciated the need to specify
section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) aggravation for count 1 sentencing, in
addition to the jury’s arming and use findings.
Because the trial court expressly relied on a single, invalid aggravating
factor to justify upper term eligibility on count 1, we will vacate the sentence
a second time. All we are prepared to say at this stage is that, following the
enactment of Senate Bill 567, the triad sentencing scheme now requires trial
courts to be especially attentive to making the requisite record at sentencing
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(5) [“The court shall set forth on the record the facts and
reasons for choosing the sentence imposed”]) and, with that in mind, the
record before us is insufficient for meaningful review. We need not delve into
harmless error since we must vacate the sentence to rectify a separate error
1354–1355, review granted Mar. 15, 2023, S278266; Dunn, at pp. 408–410,
rev. granted.)
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that we cannot deem harmless on this record, as explained below in Part II.B.
On remand, we will direct the trial court to comply fully with section 1170,
subdivision (b)(5), and to clarify exactly what rule 4.421 “[c]ircumstances in
aggravation” render Ware eligible for upper term sentencing under section
1170, subdivision (b)(2).
B. Marsden Error
Even if we were inclined to review the record on our own and attempt
to determine whether the record is adequate to support a determination that
one or more rule 4.421 factors would have been found true by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt on the facts presented, the second ground for Ware’s appeal
raises a separate problem—failure to hold a Marsden hearing despite a clear
request for one.
The applicable Marsden principles here are well-established. When a
defendant asks to replace his appointed attorney, the trial court is required to
“permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate
specific instances of inadequate performance.” (People v. Smith (2003)
30 Cal.4th 581, 604.) “A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly
shows that the appointed counsel is not providing adequate representation or
that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable
conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.” (Ibid.)
A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance does not
mean that he possesses the right to present a defense of his choosing. (See
People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1192; People v. Hamilton (1989)
48 Cal.3d 1142, 1162.) But it does violate the Sixth Amendment for the court
to look away where “ ‘to compel one charged with [a] grievous crime to
undergo a trial with the assistance of any attorney with whom he has become
embroiled in irreconcilable conflict is to deprive him of the effective
assistance of any counsel whatsoever.’ ” (Schell v. Witek (9th Cir. 2000)
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218 F.3d 1017, 1025.) The right to a Marsden hearing applies throughout a
criminal proceeding, prior to trial, at trial and in post-trial proceedings.
(People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 88).
“Whenever the motion is made, the inquiry is forward-looking in the
sense that counsel would be substituted in order to provide effective
assistance in the future. But the decision must always be based on what has
happened in the past.” (People v. Sanchez, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 88.) The
fact that a Marsden motion has been made and denied in the past does not
mean that another such motion may be denied summarily without affording
the defendant an opportunity to explain his reasons for making it, since
circumstances during criminal proceedings constantly change. (See, e.g.,
People v. Ng (2022) 13 Cal.5th 448, 481, 495–496, 498–499 [defendant made
37 Marsden motions, one of which, the twenty-third, the court granted].)
The denial of a Marsden motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 604.) But a trial court’s refusal “to
afford a defendant an opportunity to set forth the reasons underlying his
request for the substitution of appointed counsel constitutes an abuse of
discretion by the court.” (People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334, 346.) There
is no question Ware sought to make a Marsden motion here. Because the
record plainly shows that the trial court brushed aside Ware’s request for “a
Marden” aside without inquiring into the basis for it, we must consider
whether the error was prejudicial.
Where we determine the failure to hold a Marsden hearing was an
abuse of discretion, the error “does not establish a rule of per se reversible
error. [Citation.]” (People v. Washington (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 940, 944.)
Reversal is not required if the record shows beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to hold a
Marsden hearing. (See People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 600–601;
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People v. Reed (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1148; People v. Govea (2009)
175 Cal.App.4th 57, 61 (Govea).) The prejudice standard is the demanding
test of harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California,
supra, 386 U.S. 18.)
The Attorney General argues that to the extent the trial court erred in
failing to inquire into the basis for his Marsden motion at resentencing, the
error was harmless. In support of this argument, he relies on cases that
involved section 1368 mental competency issues. (E.g., People v. Taylor,
supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 600–601; Govea, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 61.) In
each one, a doubt was declared as to the defendant’s competency to stand
trial; the defendant made a Marsden motion before the competency hearing;
and only later, after the criminal proceedings were resumed following
restoration of competency, was a Marsden hearing held, at which point
counsel was replaced. Faced with those circumstances, the courts in Taylor
and Govea ruled that, since the defendant eventually received “everything he
sought” (Govea, at p. 62), any error in not holding a Marsden hearing more
promptly was harmless.
These cases are inapposite. The problem here is not simply a delayed
Marsden inquiry, but an outright failure to conduct any inquiry at all. Under
Chapman (or any other prejudice standard for that matter), we cannot simply
infer from the court’s willingness to entertain a previous complaint from
Ware about his counsel’s performance at trial that his later Marsden motion
at the resentencing proceeding would certainly have been denied. Obviously,
the array of issues defense counsel must handle at a trial on guilt or
innocence overlaps with sentencing issues, but counsel’s task at sentencing is
also quite different in many respects.
Whether Ware’s Marsden motion had any merit depends on the nature
of his dissatisfaction, which was never explored. The trial court failed to
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make a record about what Ware’s Marsden complaints were; whether those
complaints had anything to do with issues that were or could have been
raised at the resentencing proceeding; or whether the same complaints had
been raised previously. Because, on this record, we cannot say beyond a
reasonable doubt that Ware’s complaints about his counsel at his
resentencing hearing were simply tactical and would not have made a
difference to the sentencing outcome, we must remand so that Ware can be
afforded an opportunity to explain why he believes he is entitled to new
counsel at the further resentencing proceeding we are now ordering.
III. DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated and the cause is remanded for further
resentencing proceedings. The court is directed to afford Ware an
opportunity to explain the basis for his Marsden motion, and then to resolve
that motion after considering his stated reasons for making it. The court is
also directed to conduct further resentencing proceedings in full compliance
with section 1170, subdivision (b)(5), and in the course of those proceedings to
clarify exactly what rule 4.421 “[c]ircumstances in aggravation” it is relying
upon to trigger upper term sentencing eligibility on count 1.
STREETER, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOLDMAN, J.
HITE, J.*
* Judge of the Superior Court of California, City and County of San
Francisco, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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