CourtListener 9508586•People v. Melillo CA4/1
Texte intégral
Filed 5/29/24 P. v. Melillo CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082358
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE402675)
WILLIAM MICHAEL MELILLO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Albert T. Harutunian III, Judge. Affirmed.
Michael A. Taibi and Everett L. Skillman for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson, Elana W. Miller and Maxine Hart, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted William Michael Melillo of one count of lewd act upon
a child (Pen. Code,1 § 288, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced him to the
lower term of three years. Melillo appeals this judgment of conviction and
claims four assignments of error. We reorder his claims slightly as follows:
(1) his ex-wife’s testimony was inherently improbable; (2) the court erred in
admitting statements Melillo made to police; (3) the court improperly
excluded evidence Melillo considered exculpatory; and (4) there is not
substantial evidence to prove Melillo’s intent to sexually exploit a child. We
reject these claimed errors and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Melillo awoke on June 27, 2020 at around seven in the morning and
checked the baby monitor for his two-year-old child (Child). Melillo usually
let his wife sleep in. After waking, he went into the restroom to read cartoon
pornography and manually stimulate himself. He did not climax in the
bathroom because he takes a long time to reach completion. Melillo testified
that the act of manual stimulation, not the climax, is the satisfying part of
the act for him. He then got Child out of her bed and took her downstairs for
breakfast and to watch television. With his arm around Child on the couch,
Melillo put his hand in his pants with his erect penis. Melillo expressed a
desire to “cum,” before directing Child to open her mouth. Melillo explained
that he often had a hand in his pants because he’s “usually itchy,” and also
that he easily gets aroused and erect. Melillo explained that he directed
Child to open her mouth because he thought she might have something in her
mouth although he had not seen her put anything in her mouth while they
were on the couch.
1 Future undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
He told police he had previously become erect while cuddling with and
wrestling with Child; he attributed his arousal around Child to a lack of
intimacy with his wife. Melillo further explained that Child viewed his penis
as a toy and tried to grab and touch it multiple times. He described his penis
as “a monster and just randomly does things that [he doesn’t] want it to do.”
Nevertheless, Melillo asserts that he never touched Child inappropriately.
Melillo’s wife, V.M., awoke and heard Melillo moaning and Child
yelling. She got out of bed, opened the bedroom door, walked to an interior
balcony and saw Melillo masturbating with his right hand and holding
Child’s arm with his left. V.M. heard Child yelling and saw her trying to
escape Melillo’s grasp. She heard Melillo direct Child to open her mouth and
heard him say, “[l]et me cum in your mouth.” She also heard him say,
“[c]ome on, [Child]. I need this.” V.M. was uncertain whether she was
wearing her glasses when she observed the incident from a distance between
15 and 20 feet away from Melillo and Child, however, she had no difficulty
describing actions 17.5 feet away from the witness stand at trial, even
without her glasses. She confronted Melillo, then fainted. Melillo called for
emergency services. Paramedics responded and attended to her injuries;
when V.M. described what she witnessed, paramedics summoned the police.
Within twenty minutes of the incident, police officers arrived and began
talking with Melillo and his wife. They spoke with V.M. while she received
treatment in the ambulance and with Melillo as he sat on his lawn.
Following their conversation with Melillo, the police arrested him, took him
to the station, and advised him of his Miranda2 rights, twice. Initially
Melillo requested an attorney, then elected to continue speaking with police
before again invoking his right to counsel and ending the interview.
2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
3
DISCUSSION
1. His Wife’s Testimony Was Not Inherently Improbable
Although Melillo’s argument focuses largely on issues of credibility, the
crux of his claimed error hinges on whether his wife’s testimony was
inherently improbable. As Melillo correctly notes, a judgment must be
reversed if it is “based upon evidence inherently improbable.” (People v.
Pearson (1969) 70 Cal.2d 218, 221 (Pearson).) He functionally argues that his
(now) ex-wife’s testimony is “inherently improbable” because her view could
have been partially obstructed, she was not wearing her glasses, and the
television was on. He also points to her medication for depression and
fainting after the incident. However, he makes no argument for why her
depression medication or her fainting are relevant to the probability of her
testimony; accordingly, we see no need to discuss either. Melillo attacks
V.M.’s credibility by asserting she had a motive to fabricate because they
were headed towards a divorce. Finally, in his reply briefing Melillo argues,
for the first time, that his wife’s lack of testimony to the lasting effects of
child sexual abuse makes her testimony inherently improbable. We find
these arguments unavailing.
The law upon which Melillo relies, Pearson, supra, does not advance his
position. Pearson clarifies that “ ‘ “ ‘[c]onflicts and even testimony which is
subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it
is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility
of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination
depends.’ ” ’ ” (Pearson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 221, italics added.) Further,
“ ‘ “ ‘testimony which merely discloses unusual circumstances’ ” ’ ” does not
fall within the category of inherently improbable. (Ibid.) The jury was
instructed to consider the credibility of witnesses, and to evaluate conflicting
4
evidence; given their conviction, it’s clear they found V.M. more credible than
Melillo. In arguing a motive to fabricate, Melillo asks us to do away with the
jury’s determinations regarding V.M.’s credibility, which is not the proper
provenance of an appellate court such as ours.
While we cannot make determinations about his wife’s credibility, we
can evaluate whether her testimony was inherently improbable. We find
nothing improbable about V.M.’s testimony. The testimony she offered
aligned very closely with Melillo’s own admissions to the police officers and
on the stand. She observed Melillo’s masturbating with his right hand and
holding Child with his left; Melillo admitted his hand was inside his pants,
his penis was erect, and he was holding Child. She heard Melillo tell Child
he wanted to “cum” and directing her to open her mouth; Melillo admitted
stating “I wish I could cum” and to subsequently telling Child to open her
mouth. Melillo himself confirmed that his testimony lines up almost
identically to his wife’s. Melillo identifies the primary differences between
their accounts as: (1) whether he said, “[c]ome on, [Child]. I need this,” and
(2) whether he was masturbating. What Melillo cites as conditions that make
V.M.’s testimony inherently improbable—her glasses or lack thereof, the
thickness of the partially open curtains, and the sound of the television—do
not negate the extraordinary similarities between their testimony. His wife’s
silence on the lasting psychological effects of child sexual abuse has no
bearing on the inherent probability of what she observed and testified to.
Accordingly, we conclude V.M.’s testimony was not inherently
improbable.
2. Statements Melillo Made to the Police Were Properly Admitted
Melillo moved to exclude the statements he made to the police outside
his home and at the police station, asserting they were obtained in violation
5
of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Melillo argued that he should have
received his Miranda warnings at the time police developed probable cause to
arrest him and, following that logic, anything Melillo said after the officers
developed probable cause should be suppressed. The court below denied
Melillo’s suppression motion because the conversation outside his home was
“not a custodial interrogation.” The court took into account that Melillo was
not handcuffed, the officers were not physical with him, and the interaction
was casual. Melillo further argued that all of the statements he made at the
police station should be suppressed in spite of his Miranda waiver. The court
ruled the statements from the police station were admissible because he
exhibited “the complete ability to independently decide what he wanted to
do,” noted that he “did initially invoke briefly,” and that he was not “badgered
into backing away from the invocation.” Melillo renews these arguments
regarding his statements on appeal.
a. The Interview at Melillo’s Home and Custodial Interrogation
Melillo argues that the trial court erred in finding he was not subject to
custodial interrogation under Miranda while he spoke with police outside his
home. Whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes presents a
mixed question of law and fact. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings
when supported by substantial evidence and decide independently whether
Melillo was subject to custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.
(People v. Davidson (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 966, 970 (Davidson).)
If a defendant makes statements while under custodial interrogation
without being advised of his rights under Miranda, his statements cannot be
used as evidence to establish guilt. (Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S.
420, 429.) But an officer’s obligation to administer Miranda warnings
attaches only when the person questioned is in custody. (Stansbury v.
6
California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 322.) The relevant inquiry when considering
whether an interrogation was custodial is whether a “ ‘reasonable person
[would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation
and leave.’ ” (Howes v. Fields (2012) 565 U.S. 499, 509.) In making that
determination, courts consider the totality of the circumstances, including:
“ ‘(1) whether the suspect has been formally arrested; (2) absent formal
arrest, the length of the detention; (3) the location; (4) the ratio of officers to
suspects; and (5) the demeanor of the officer, including the nature of the
questioning.’ ” (Davidson, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 972.) Additional
factors include “whether the officer informed the person he or she was
considered a witness or suspect, whether there were restrictions on the
suspect’s freedom of movement, whether the police were aggressive,
confrontational, and/or accusatory, and whether the police used interrogation
techniques to pressure the suspect.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Bejasa (2012)
205 Cal.App.4th 26, 35-36.)
Melillo argues that he was in custody when he spoke to officers on his
lawn because a reasonable person in his position would not have felt free to
leave. He cites to his own suppression motion as evidence that police
instructed him to sit on the ground and that he was not free to leave. We
note, however, that such an instruction does not appear in either the
transcript of the interview police conducted with Melillo outside his home, or
the body worn camera footage of the interview.
Melillo summoned emergency services to his home to handle a medical
emergency after his wife fainted. During his interactions with police officers,
Melillo apparently felt sufficiently free to request to move their conversation
to the shade, which the officers agreed to. He was not in a patrol vehicle. He
was not inside a small room with officers blocking his exit; he was not
7
handcuffed or otherwise restrained. He was outside and was free to move to
a more comfortable area and position. He spoke with two officers while
sitting in the grass outside his home before one officer left to make a call.
The single remaining officer was not confrontational and asked him open
ended questions about what happened. Collectively, the police spoke to him
for approximately ten minutes before arresting him and ending the interview.
The nature of the interaction was so casual, in fact, that the arrest seems to
have taken Melillo by surprise; in response to the instruction from officers to
put his hands behind his back, Melillo asked, “I’m being arrested?” Given
these facts, we must conclude that the conversation in front of his home did
not constitute a custodial interrogation.
b. Melillo Waived His Miranda Rights at the Police Station
After the police officers arrested Melillo, they transported him to the
police station. The interrogating police officer advised Melillo of his Miranda
rights and Melillo invoked his right to counsel. Following his invocation, the
officer provided details to Melillo regarding his transfer to the downtown
facility to be booked:
“OFFICER 2: Will’s fine, ‘kay. Um, I’m just gonna read to
you verbatim, okay. William, you have the
right to remain silent, do you understand?
MELILLO: Yes.
OFFICER 2: Anything you say may be used in court; do
you understand?
MELILLO: Yes.
OFFICER 2: You have the right to the presence of an
attorney before and during any questioning,
do you understand?
MELILLO: Yes.
OFFICER 2: If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be
appointed for you free of charge before any
questioning if you want, do you understand?
MELILLO: Yes.
8
OFFICER 2: Okay. William, with that in mind, do you
wish to tell me what happened today, this
morning?
MELILLO: I would like to speak to an attorney first.
OFFICER 2: ‘Kay. Um, unfortunately if that’s the - if
that’s - again, your right. That’s what you
want to do, I can’t ask you anymore questions
about it, okay.
MELILLO: Okay.
OFFICER 2: Um, at that point, uh, you are gonna be
taken downtown where you’ll get booked in,
okay. And if at any point you change your
mind, you wish to, you know, discuss it with
me. But if you invoke your right to an
attorney which is your right.3
MELILLO: Can I, uh, at any time ask for one?
OFFICER 2: So, you - you -
MELILLO: I’ve never been arrested.
OFFICER 2: Right. So -
MELILLO: I just want this day to end. This nightmare
to end.
OFFICER 2: Okay.
MELILLO: This going on and on. I - I don’t want it.
Here’s my concern and I’m sorry if I’m -.
OFFICER 2: Okay. So, the only issue right is - is to
discuss kind of the case. To go about it,
right. There’s really not much that I can talk
to you about it. Other than telling you. Just
because you’re asking for an attorney, okay.
I am respecting your rights.
3 Melillo argues this statement was coercive and an attempt to get him to
change his mind about wanting counsel. He argues the implication is that “if
Melillo talked, he wouldn’t be taken ‘downtown’ or ‘booked.’ ” In contrast,
Melillo acknowledged below that the officer “kept trying to explain to him
what was going to happen to him.” The court found Melillo was not
“badgered into backing away from the invocation.” We do not reweigh
evidence or substitute our own factual findings in place of the trial court’s
and consequently reject Melillo’s argument that this description of the next
step in his arrest was impliedly coercive. (See People v. Brown (2014)
59 Cal.4th 86, 106.)
9
MELILLO: Yes.
OFFICER 2: Okay. I’m not trying to infringe on your
rights if that’s -
MELILLO: I understand that sir and I’m not - but, uh,
my question is - if we start talking and at
any time, I feel I need an attorney, can I say,
stop?
OFFICER 2: 100%.
MELILLO: Okay. Then for now, we’ll talk. . . .
OFFICER 2: Okay.
MELILLO: Um, so -.
OFFICER 2: So, let me just re-read you your rights just to
clarify that you’re not asking for an attorney
at this point.
MELILLO: [unintelligible]
OFFICER 2: Okay. I’ll read it to you again, okay.
William, you have the right to remain silent,
do you understand?
MELILLO: Yeah.
OFFICER 2: Okay, anything you say maybe [sic] used in
court, do you understand?
MELILLO: Yes.
OFFICER 2: You have the right to the presence of an
attorney before and during any questioning,
do you understand?
MELILLO: Yes.
OFFICER 2: If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be
appointed for you free of charge before any
questioning if you want. Do you understand?
MELILLO: Yes.
OFFICER 2: Okay. Um, with that in mind, okay, now that
you are waiving your right to an attorney.
You are saying that you do wish to speak to
me at this time?
MELILLO: I’ll speak to you at this time, yes.” (Italics
added.)
A defendant’s statements to police during a custodial interrogation are
inadmissible to establish his guilt unless the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived the rights to remain silent and to the presence and
10
assistance of counsel. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 475.) An interrogation
must end if the suspect indicates, in any manner, the desire to remain silent
or to consult an attorney, and any statement obtained thereafter may not be
admitted against the accused during trial. (Fare v. Michael C. (1979)
442 U.S. 707, 709.) “[A] suspect who desires to waive his Miranda rights and
submit to interrogation by law enforcement authorities need not do so with
any particular words or phrases. A valid waiver need not be of
predetermined form, but instead must reflect that the suspect in fact
knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda
decision.” (People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 667 (Cruz).) “A suspect’s
expressed willingness to answer questions after acknowledging an
understanding of his or her Miranda rights has itself been held sufficient to
constitute an implied waiver of such rights.” (Ibid.) “ ‘In general, if a
custodial suspect, having heard and understood a full explanation of his or
her Miranda rights, then makes an uncompelled and uncoerced decision to
talk, he or she has thereby knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived
them.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Parker (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1184, 1216 (Parker).)
After Melillo was properly admonished of his Miranda rights at the
station, he invoked his right to counsel. Then, he elected to continue
speaking with police and inquired if he could invoke later. Not only did the
interrogating officer remind Melillo that they could not continue speaking
about the case if he asked for an attorney, when Melillo expressed a desire to
continue the interrogation, the officer provided a second Miranda
advisement. Finally, the officer asked candidly if Melillo wished to continue
speaking with him having waived his Miranda rights. Melillo now argues
that he did not waive his right because he did not “ever say anything
remotely resembling, ‘I don’t want an attorney.’ ” While Melillo’s waiver was
11
not of some “predetermined form,” it was nevertheless a waiver. (Cruz,
supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 667.) He expressed a “willingness to answer questions
after acknowledging an understanding of his . . . Miranda rights.” (Ibid.) He
expressly elected to continue the interrogation and forgo his right to have
counsel present when he said, “for now we’ll talk.” Melillo heard two full
explanations of his Miranda rights and made an “ ‘uncompelled and
uncoerced decision to talk.’ ” (Parker, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1216.) We must
therefore conclude he “ ‘knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived’ ” his
Miranda rights. (Ibid.)
We conclude the trial court did not err in admitting the statements
Melillo made to police at the police station.
3. The Trial Court Properly Excluded Hearsay Statements
After the court denied his motion to suppress the statements Melillo
made to the police, he argued that additional excerpts should be included
because he believed the statements to be exculpatory. He asserts on appeal
that the court erred in denying his motion to include the excerpts. Below,
Melillo argued to include: (1) officers telling Melillo his “wife is saying one
thing” and asking for his “side of the story”; (2) Melillo’s statement that he
didn’t want to “say anything bad” about his wife; (3) protestations of
innocence and statements regarding his wife’s health and credibility; and
(4) additional protestations of innocence, desire to use the restroom,
empathetic statements from the officer, and an explanation for why his hands
were often in his pants.
Melillo argued for these out-of-court statements “to come in for [their]
truth.” He argued the hearsay statements should be admissible under a
“present state of mind” exception, the “past recollection recorded” exception,
or the official record exception. In the alternative, he argued that the
12
statements should come in under the rule of completeness, or through judicial
notice. The court excluded the statements, finding no hearsay exceptions
applied and the statements were not subject to the rule of completeness.
Now, Melillo asserts that the “trial court and the Deputy District
Attorney used an obscure and little-known offshoot of the hearsay rule to
exclude [him] from presenting to the jury the exculpatory portions of the
body-cam footage.” He centers his argument on whether the court properly
applied the evidentiary rule of completeness to evidence he believed to be
exculpatory.
“We review the trial court’s determination as to the admissibility of
evidence (including the application of the exceptions to the hearsay rule) for
abuse of discretion [citations] and the legal question whether admission of
the evidence was constitutional de novo [citation].” (People v. Mayo (2006)
140 Cal.App.4th 535, 553.)
Evidence Code section 356, “sometimes referred to as the statutory
version of the common law rule of completeness” (People v. Parrish (2007)
152 Cal.App.4th 263, 269, fn. 3), provides as follows: “Where part of an act,
declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the
whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an adverse party; when a
letter is read, the answer may be given; and when a detached act,
declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any other act,
declaration, conversation, or writing which is necessary to make it understood
may also be given in evidence.” (Evid. Code, § 356, italics added.)
“The purpose of [Evidence Code section 356] is to prevent the use of
selected aspects of a conversation, act, declaration, or writing, so as to create
a misleading impression on the subjects addressed. [Citation.] Thus, if a
party’s oral admissions have been introduced in evidence, he may show other
13
portions of the same interview or conversation, even if they are self-serving,
which ‘have some bearing upon, or connection with, the admission . . . in
evidence.’ ” (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 156; accord, People v.
Melendez (2016) 2 Cal.5th 1, 25.) Melillo made no argument below and
makes no argument here regarding how his protestations of innocence in the
body worn camera footage was necessary to make the remainder of the
footage understood or to correct any misleading impression. The court did
not err in refusing to admit Melillo’s self-serving hearsay statements when
they were not necessary to understand the footage or to correct any
misleading impression.
We turn, next, to the related argument Melillo makes regarding the
“little known offshoot of the hearsay rule.” The People introduced the
statements Melillo made pursuant to Evidence Code section 1220, which
provides: “Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay
rule when offered against the declarant in an action to which he is a
party . . . .” (Evid. Code, § 1220.) Melillo’s statements to the police were
admissible by the People as a statement offered against the declarant,
Melillo, in an action to which he is a party, his criminal trial. The remaining
statements, inclusive of his protestations of innocence, are not admissible
under the same rule when Melillo offers them himself. The statements
Melillo argues “should have been presented to the jury consisted of self-
serving hearsay not otherwise admissible at trial. (See Evid. Code, § 1220 [to
qualify as a party admission, a hearsay statement must be introduced
against the declarant].) Defendant was free to present this information by
taking the stand himself.” (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 605.)
Melillo did take the stand himself and, to that end, the statements Melillo
made in the footage were cumulative of testimony he gave at trial. Any
14
possible error from excluding Melillo’s additional statements to the police
would be “harmless, because the excluded evidence was merely cumulative of
properly admitted evidence.” (People v. Helton (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d, 1141,
1146.) Accordingly, we conclude there was no error in excluding the
statements.
4. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Implied Finding that Melillo
Touched Child with the Requisite Intent
Finally, Melillo argues that the record does not contain substantial
evidence that he touched Child with the requisite intent to arouse, appeal to
or gratify his lust, passions, or sexual desires.
On appeal, we presume the judgment is correct (People v. Giordano
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666) and Melillo, as the appellant, has the burden of
establishing reversible error. (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014)
60 Cal.4th 335, 364). When an appellant like Melillo challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘the power of an appellate court begins and ends
with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support [the
challenged findings], and when two or more inferences can reasonably be
deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its
deductions for those of the jury. It is of no consequence that the jury
believing other evidence, or drawing different inferences, might have reached
a contrary conclusion.’ ” (People v. Ghipriel (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 828, 832.)
To be considered “substantial” for purposes of appellate review, the evidence
“must be more than evidence which merely raises a strong suspicion . . . as
mere suspicion will not support an inference of fact.” (People v. Martin (1973)
9 Cal.3d 687, 695.) “ ‘A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor
15
reevaluates a witness’s credibility.’ ” (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47,
60 (Albillar).)
Under section 288, subdivision (a), any touching of a child under the
age of 14 is a felony offense only if the touching “is accompanied by the intent
to arouse or gratify the sexual desires of either the perpetrator or the victim.”
(People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 289; accord, People v. Panah (2005)
35 Cal.4th 395, 488; People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 442, 452.)
“ ‘Because intent for purposes of . . . section 288 can seldom be proven
by direct evidence, it may be inferred from the circumstances.’ ” (People v.
Villagran (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 880, 891.) Even though “ ‘[e]vidence of a
defendant’s state of mind is almost inevitably circumstantial,’ ” we are
mindful that “ ‘circumstantial evidence is as sufficient as direct evidence to
support a conviction.’ ” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1055.) To
determine whether Melillo acted with the requisite intent, “all the
circumstances are examined.” (In re R.C. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 741, 750.)
Here, V.M. awoke to the sounds of Melillo moaning and Child yelling.
She described Melillo masturbating with his right hand on his penis pulled
out of his pants, while grasping Child with his left hand. She heard him
talking about orgasming and directing their two-year-old daughter to open
her mouth while pulling her closer. She heard him tell Child that he really
needed this, and he explained that he’d failed to achieve orgasm earlier in the
morning. Melillo himself largely corroborated his wife’s account, though he
denied masturbating while touching Child. Further conversations with police
revealed that he’d developed erections while cuddling and playing with Child
before, which he seemed to blame on a lack of intimacy with his wife.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment this evidence, and
the reasonable inferences from this evidence, fully substantiates the finding
16
that, while Melillo grabbed Child while masturbating on the couch and spoke
of ejaculating into her mouth, he had the intent to arouse, appeal to, or
gratify his lust, passions, or sexual desires for purposes of section 288,
subdivision (a).
In his effort to demonstrate a lack of substantial evidence to support a
finding of the requisite intent, Melillo relies on evidence in the record that
potentially discredits, contradicts, or is inconsistent with the evidence
described above. In doing so, Melillo asks us to discredit admissible evidence,
weigh admissible evidence, and infer from admissible evidence facts that do
not support the judgment—which we may not do. (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th
at p. 60.)
For these reasons, Melillo did not meet his burden of establishing
reversible error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, J.
BUCHANAN, J.
17
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.