People v. Perdomo CA1/3

CourtListener 9507291Calctapp24 mai 2024

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Filed 5/24/24 P. v. Perdomo CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168231

v. (Alameda County
JUAN C. CARPIO PERDOMO, Super. Ct. No. 20CR002654)
Defendant and Appellant.

A jury convicted Juan C. Carpio Perdomo (Carpio)1 of three counts of
lewd acts upon a child, A. Doe, under Penal Code section 288,
subdivision (a).2 The trial court sentenced Carpio to 8 years in prison and
imposed a restitution fine of $7,200. Carpio contends the trial court erred by
giving jury instruction CALCRIM No. 1193. Carpio further contends the
court imposed a restitution fine of $7,200 in the mistaken belief that amount
was the minimum it could impose. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2005, Carpio started dating his girlfriend, known as “Neung.”
Neung worked as a live-in nanny for a married couple, caring for their

1 We refer to appellant as Carpio as that is his preference.
2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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daughter. Neung continued working for the family for several years,
including after their second child, A., was born in 2006. Neung and Carpio
grew close with the family and Carpio became A.’s godfather. In 2019, when
A. was 13 years old, A. disclosed to his family that Carpio had sexually
abused him when he was 6 years old. A.’s family then filed a police report.
In 2022, the district attorney filed an amended information charging
Carpio with three counts of lewd or lascivious act on a child under the age of
14 (§ 288, subd. (a)). The information further alleged that Carpio took
advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offenses (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(11)) and that the victim was “particularly
vulnerable” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3)). A jury trial took place in
May 2022.
Prosecution’s Case
The prosecution proffered the testimony of several witnesses, including
A., A.’s parents, and Dr. Blake Carmichael, an expert in child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). We briefly summarize their testimony
here, only as relevant to this appeal.
A. testified that one night when he was between the ages of six and
eight, Carpio went into A.’s bedroom and got into bed with him. A. knew he
was around those ages because of the pajamas he was wearing and the bed he
had at the time. Carpio pulled his pants down, exposing his penis, then
placed his penis on A.’s leg and rubbed it back and forth. He grabbed A.’s
wrist and moved his hand onto Carpio’s penis, forcing A.’s hand up and down
until Carpio ejaculated on A.’s body. A. went to the bathroom to try to clean
it off, but some of the residue and smell remained, which bothered him.
A. returned to his room and saw Carpio fully dressed. A. got back into
bed, and Carpio got into bed with him. Carpio again undressed and forced

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A.’s hand back and forth on Carpio’s penis. Carpio also pulled A.’s pants
down and touched A.’s penis. Carpio again ejaculated on A., after which
point Neung came in the room, startling Carpio and leading him to quickly
pull up his pants. Carpio then got dressed and told A. not to tell people what
happened.
Although A. had been confused at the time of the incident, he did not
realize it was “not okay” until he took sexual education in middle school. A.
ultimately disclosed the abuse to his family on a road trip when he was 13
years old after hearing a podcast story about sexual abuse.
On cross-examination, the defense sought to impeach A.’s credibility,
including by questioning why he did not disclose the sexual abuse at an
earlier age and highlighting inconsistencies in his accounts of the abuse over
time.
One of A.’s parents testified that, when A. was between the ages of five
and eight, she and the other parent noticed he became resistant to going to
bed and did not want to put on his pajamas. In that period of time, A. would
frequently wake up screaming. One night, they found a kitchen knife under
A.’s bed, which he said he needed “ ‘for when bad guys come in,’ ” and they
sometimes found other knives under his bed or pillow. She also described the
family road trip when A. disclosed the sexual abuse after hearing a radio
show about a woman who had been sexually abused as a child. On a
subsequent occasion, A. became upset by the smell of semen; he began to cry
and said it reminded him of what Carpio had done to him. A.’s other parent
offered testimony consistent with the above-described events.
CSAAS Testimony
Dr. Blake Carmichael, the CSAAS expert, had not reviewed any
information about this case and had never met with A. He testified only to

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explain CSAAS, an educational tool used to help understand the dynamics
and misconceptions of child sexual abuse and the way children may react to
and report such abuse. CSAAS is not a diagnostic tool to determine whether
a child was abused.
Dr. Carmichael discussed in detail the five principles of CSAAS:
secrecy; helplessness; entrapment or accommodation; delayed, unconvincing,
or conflicted disclosure; and retraction. He testified there is often a loving
relationship between an abuser and a victim, and it is normal for a child to
delay reporting the abuse for months or years, with even longer delays seen
in male victims. Children who were abused at an early age can experience a
change in perspective as they get older and learn about romance and sex,
informing their reflections on what happened when they were younger. It is
typical for a child to provide inconsistent or even conflicting details of the
abuse.
Defense Case
Carpio testified on his own behalf. He never helped Neung put the
children to bed. He did not understand why he had been arrested or accused
of these offenses, which he denied committing. He never touched A. with his
clothes off, exposed his penis to A., or climbed into A.’s bed.
Dr. Andrea Shelley testified that she had evaluated Carpio and opined
he did not have non-typical sexual interests, including an interest in children.
CALCRIM No. 1193 Instruction
At the request of both parties, the court instructed the jury with
CALCRIM No. 1193 as follows: “You have heard testimony from Blake
Carmichael regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. Blake
Carmichael’s testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is
not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes charged against

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him. You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not [A.]’s
conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who has been
molested, and in evaluating the believability of his testimony.” The standard
CALCRIM No. 1193 instruction in effect at the time of trial was not modified
in any way.3
Verdict and Sentencing
The jury returned a guilty verdict on all three counts. The trial court
also found true that Carpio took advantage of a position of trust or confidence
and that A. was particularly vulnerable. Probation recommended that
probation be denied and that the court impose a restitution fine of $10,000.
At sentencing, the court found Carpio was ineligible for probation
under section 1203.066 and sentenced Carpio to a total of eight years in
prison, noting the seriousness of the crime and the repercussions it caused for
A. and his family. The court found Carpio had the ability to pay fines and
fees. It imposed a $7,200 restitution fine, calculating the amount as follows:
“There’s a restitution fund fine under 1202.4(b)(1) in the amount of $7200,
which is the minimum. $300 times 8 times 3.” The court imposed, but
stayed, a parole revocation fine of $7,200 under section 1202.45. Carpio
appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Court Did Not Err in Providing CALCRIM No. 1193
Carpio contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury with the
portion of CALCRIM No. 1193 that provided the jury could consider Dr.
Carmichael’s testimony “in evaluating the believability of [A.’s] testimony.”
He asserts this language allowed the jury to misuse the testimony to bolster

3 The instruction was revised in September 2022. The two versions are
nearly identical for purposes of this appeal.

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A.’s credibility, which “tipped the scales” in favor of the prosecution and
lightened its burden of proof, in violation of his right to due process. We are
not persuaded.
As an initial matter, Carpio acknowledges he requested the CALCRIM
No. 1193 instruction below but asserts he did not forfeit this claim as the
alleged error affected his substantial rights. (§ 1259.) The Attorney General
argues the claim is forfeited and meritless. However, “[w]e need not decide
whether forfeiture applies in this case because the trial court did not err in
giving CALCRIM No. 1193.” (People v. Ramirez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 175,
219 (Ramirez).)
It is a longstanding principle that CSAAS evidence “is not admissible to
prove that the complaining witness has in fact been sexually abused; it is
admissible to rehabilitate such witness’s credibility when the defendant
suggests that the child’s conduct after the incident—e.g., a delay in
reporting—is inconsistent with his or her testimony claiming molestation.”
(People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300.)
However, and contrary to Carpio’s assertion, CALCRIM No. 1193 does
not result in a misuse of CSAAS evidence, particularly when viewed in the
context of Dr. Carmichael’s testimony that CSAAS is an educational tool used
to understand a child’s reactions to abuse, not a diagnostic tool to determine
whether a child was, in fact, abused. (See Ramirez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 219–220.) Indeed, as Carpio concedes, numerous courts have rejected
similar challenges to the instruction as the ones raised here. (See, e.g., id. at
220 [instruction does not violate defendant’s right to due process]; People v.
Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 175–176 [instruction accurately
instructs the jury on proper use and limitations of CSAAS evidence]; People v.
Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 504 [instruction does not lighten

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prosecution’s burden of proof or violate due process].) We join those courts in
concluding the CALCRIM No. 1193 instruction was proper and did not violate
Carpio’s right to due process.
Further, any error in giving the portion of the instruction challenged by
Carpio would not rise to the level of reversible error. (See Ramirez, supra, 98
Cal.App.5th at p. 220.) The challenged portion of the instruction was
preceded by the court’s statement that Dr. Carmichael’s testimony was not to
be used as evidence that Carpio committed the offenses. The court also
instructed the jury as to the prosecution’s burden of proof; witness credibility
evaluation; and to consider evidence that was admitted for a limited purpose
only for that purpose. It is not reasonably likely the jury misunderstood
these instructions as a whole. (See People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009,
1016–1017.) And, in light of the significant inculpatory evidence admitted at
trial, including A.’s detailed testimony of the sexual abuse and his parents’
corroborating accounts, we conclude Carpio “would have been convicted of the
same offenses regardless of any alleged error in the instruction.” (See
Ramirez, at p. 220.)
II. The Court Did Not Err in Imposing the Restitution Fine
Carpio argues the trial court’s imposition of a $7,200 restitution fine
was premised on the court’s mistaken belief that amount was the statutory
minimum, rather than the applicable statutory minimum of $300.
We find Carpio forfeited this claim by failing to raise it to the
sentencing court; he neither objected to the amount nor sought clarification of
how the court reached that sum. (See People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680,
729 [failure to raise challenge below to trial court’s discretionary
determination of restitution fine forfeits argument on appeal].)

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And we reject Carpio’s assertion that the issue is not forfeited on the
basis that counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing raise the issue
below.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must
demonstrate both that “counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms,” and resulting prejudice. (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.)
Reversal for ineffective assistance of counsel is warranted “only if (1) the
record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the
challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to
provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (Ibid.)
Carpio fails to make such a showing.
“Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court knew
and applied the governing law.” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354,
1390.) Section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(1) provides that a restitution fine of
not less than $300 and not more than $10,000 “shall be set at the discretion
of the court and commensurate with the seriousness of the offense.”
(§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1).) Subdivision (b)(2) sets out a formula the court “may”
use to determine the fine as “the product of the minimum fine pursuant to
paragraph (1) multiplied by the number of years of imprisonment the
defendant is ordered to serve, multiplied by the number of felony counts of
which the defendant is convicted.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(2).)
The parties agree the court’s calculation of “$300 times 8 times 3”
referred to the $300 statutory minimum, the 8-year sentence imposed, and
the three counts of conviction, reflecting the formula in section 1202.4,
subdivision (b)(2). According to Carpio, the court’s statement that there was
“ ‘a restitution fund fine under 1202.4(b)(1) in the amount of $7200, which is

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the minimum. $300 times 8 times 3’ ” can only be read to mean the court
believed it did not have the discretion to impose a fine of less than $7,200.
However, that is not the only logical reading as the court could have been
saying that “it was the minimum of $300” times the other factors. Absent
any indication that the court was confused about its authority or somehow
thought $7,200 was the minimum, there is indeed no sound reason to believe
the court was not aware of its authority. (See People v. Gutierrez, supra, 58
Cal.4th at p. 1390.)
We also decline to read that statement in isolation. The trial court
emphasized the serious nature of the offenses both before and after imposing
the restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, which allows a fine up to
$10,000, the amount recommend by probation. (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1) [fine is
to be set “at the discretion of the court and commensurate with the
seriousness of the offense.”].) Given the court’s emphasis on the seriousness
of the offense, it is unlikely it would have opted for $7,200 if it indeed
believed that to be the minimum fine. In these circumstances, it is readily
apparent why counsel may not have objected.
Accordingly, we conclude both that the issue was forfeited and that
there was no ineffective assistance in failing to object to the fine.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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_________________________
Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P. J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

A168231/People v. Carpio Perdomo

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