CourtListener 9507109•People v. Dingman CA4/1
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Filed 5/24/24 P. v. Dingman CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083081
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. FVI1501086)
LUCAS DINGMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Tony Raphael, Judge. Affirmed.
Alex Coolman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A.
Natasha Cortina, Stephanie A. Mitchell and Elizabeth Sulaiman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Lucas Dingman of the second degree murder of his
young son, B.D. In this direct appeal, he raises only a single claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the appellate record does not
enable us to conclude that his trial counsel’s performance was
constitutionally deficient, we reject his claim.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Eleven-month-old B.D. was badly burned when his crib caught fire on
the morning of May 20, 2011. Although a neighbor was able to put out the
fire with a fire extinguisher, B.D. succumbed to his injuries and died the next
day.
B.D. lived with his parents, Dingman and Alicia B., in a two-bedroom
apartment in Apple Valley. At the time of the fire, Tailor T. and her her two-
and-half-year-old toddler, C.W., were staying in the apartment. Dingman,
Alicia, and Tailor were habitual methamphetamine users.
After the fire, drug paraphernalia as well as two BIC lighters were
found in the master bedroom where Dingman and Alicia slept. One torch-
style lighter1 was found on the floor of the living room, where Tailor and
C.W. slept.
At the trial in 2022, the only question was who started the fire. The
prosecution claimed it was Dingman and had charged him with the murder of
B.D. The defense claimed the fire was started by C.W. Other than a
purported confession that Dingman made to neighbors after the fire—which
1 The prosecution’s arson expert explained that a BIC lighter had “a
dancing flame like it would be on a candle” whereas with a torch lighter, “the
fire actually comes out almost like a blow-torch style, like a very . . . fine
point . . . kind of a forced fuel situation.”
2
the defense argued was a sarcastic comment and not a confession2—the only
evidence of who started the fire was circumstantial.
One of the critical pieces of evidence offered by the prosecution at trial
was a test conducted by Detective Scott Cannon. Dingman had told Cannon
during an interview that he thought C.W. set the fire, although he also stated
he did not believe C.W. was capable of operating a lighter. On June 14, 2011,
Cannon decided to test C.W. with a torch-style lighter similar to the one
recovered from the apartment, except that it had been emptied of fuel. The
test was videotaped, and the video was shown to the jury as part of the
prosecution’s case.
The video showed Tailor and C.W. enter an interview room, followed by
Detective Cannon and a second law enforcement officer. As Tailor sat in an
interview chair with C.W. in her lap, Cannon showed her the test lighter and
told her it was similar to the torch lighter recovered from the apartment.
Cannon displayed the lighter and demonstrated how it worked, depressing
the ignition button repeatedly to confirm that it was out of fuel. As Cannon
did this, C.W. reached for the lighter several times. Cannon then handed the
lighter to C.W. C.W. put down a stuffed animal he had been clutching and
held the lighter in both hands while turning it over and staring at it intently.
Cannon adjusted the lighter in C.W.’s hands while saying “this way”
(apparently helping C.W. hold the lighter correctly). Cannon took the lighter
2 During an argument with a neighbor after the fire in which the
neighbor accused Dingman of killing B.D., Dingman told the neighbor, “Yeah,
I know, and I’m gonna get away with it.” Alicia and her mother testified that
Dingman was being sarcastic, whereas the neighbor and her former boyfriend
testified Dingman’s tone was calm and not sarcastic.
3
back, concluding C.W. was unable to light it. The entire transaction took
place in about 2 minutes and 2 seconds.3
After taking the lighter from C.W., Detective Cannon said to Tailor
while showing her the lighter, “we saw him pushing on this thing but he
couldn’t manipulate it.” Cannon explained that he believed the force
required to operate the lighter was “a lot . . . for a little kid.”
In his closing arguments to the jury, defense counsel argued that C.W.
unintentionally started the fire that killed B.D. and that it was “a tragic
accident.” He called Detective Cannon’s test a “Mickey Mouse test” and
suggested it failed to demonstrate C.W.’s inability to operate a lighter. At the
same time, he urged the jury to replay the video during its deliberations and
argued: It would show “how [C.W.] wants that torch lighter. . . . He can’t
wait to get his hands on it. That tells me he’s been around lighters plenty of
times. He’s had lighters in his hands plenty of times. Now granted, again, he
did not light it. But he only had it for 15 seconds before the detective took it
from him.” Counsel told the jurors, “I’m pretty certain that if he was given
the time, he’d be able to do it.”
The prosecutor, on the other hand, argued the fire was deliberately set.
He relied on the testimony of the prosecution’s arson expert, who opined that
the fire had been started intentionally by someone who used a heat source (a
lighter or a match) to burn three separate holes on the underside of the crib
mattress before successfully lighting a flammable blanket inside the crib, and
3 We have reviewed the videotape in deciding this appeal. According to
the time stamp on the videotape, which used a 24-hour format, the meeting
with Tailor and C.W. began at 13:08:14 (1:08 p.m. and 14 seconds) and
concluded with Detective Cannon taking the lighter from C.W. at 13:10:16
(1:10 p.m. and 16 seconds).
4
that it would have taken up to 30 seconds to create each of the three holes.
The prosecutor told the jury it was unreasonable to posit that C.W. started
the fire because he physically could not operate the torch lighter or start the
fire in the manner described by its expert. The prosecutor asserted that
Alicia and Tailor had not set fire to the crib, and that the only reasonable
culprit was Dingman, including because Dingman’s statements and behavior
tended to demonstrate his guilt.4
On the afternoon of its fourth day of deliberations, shortly after
reviewing the video of Detective Cannon’s lighter test, the jury returned a
verdict finding Dingman not guilty of first degree murder and guilty of second
degree murder. The trial court sentenced Dingman to 15 years to life.
DISCUSSION
Dingman’s sole claim on appeal is that his trial counsel provided him
with ineffective assistance of counsel. To succeed, Dingman bears the burden
of demonstrating both deficient performance and prejudice. (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) The standard for
assessing defense counsel’s performance is “highly deferential.” (Id. at
4 For example, a law enforcement witness testified that during an
interview about the fire and B.D.’s death, Dingman and Alicia appeared to be
“work[ing] through” what they were going to say, and that Dingman had
referred to B.D. as “that fucking kid” and had “chuckled” when discussing
with the detective “how hot the fire was burning inside the crib.”
Additionally, neighbors testified that Dingman would get frustrated with
B.D. and that they took care of B.D. the “majority of the time,” so often that
he had taken his first steps with them and they felt like he was their child.
Relying on this evidence, the prosecutor argued, among other things, that
Dingman did not have a close relationship with B.D., and that his behavior
during the interview was suspicious and was circumstantial evidence of his
guilt.
5
p. 689.) The defendant must establish that the course of action taken by his
trial counsel “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms.” (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198
(Mickel) [cleaned up].) “Moreover, we begin with the presumption that
counsel’s actions fall within the broad range of reasonableness, and afford
‘great deference to counsel’s tactical decisions.’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, we deal with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct
appeal. “Certain practical constraints make it more difficult to address
ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal rather than in the context of a
habeas corpus proceeding. The record on appeal may not explain why
counsel chose to act as he or she did. Under those circumstances, a reviewing
court has no basis on which to determine whether counsel had a legitimate
reason for making a particular decision, or whether counsel’s actions or
failure to take certain actions were objectively unreasonable.” (Mickel, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 198 [cleaned up].)
Therefore, “[o]n direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for
ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had
no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel
was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be
no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.)
“[W]here the appellate record does not reveal whether counsel had a
legitimate reason for a litigation choice, we generally reserve consideration of
any ineffective assistance claim for possible proceedings on petition for writ of
habeas corpus.” (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 95.)
Dingman contends that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient in
three respects: (1) counsel was ineffective for failing to present expert
testimony of the rigorousness with which children’s ability to perform
6
mechanical tasks can be studied; (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to
request a limiting instruction as to the jury’s use of the lighter test; and
(3) counsel was ineffective for failing to present expert testimony about
purported statistical evidence on children causing fires. We conclude the
record on appeal fails to substantiate any of these contentions.
1. Dingman Fails To Establish That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for
Not Presenting Expert Testimony of the Rigorousness With Which
Children’s Ability To Perform Mechanical Tasks Can Be Studied
Dingman acknowledges that his trial counsel had a legitimate tactical
reason for wanting the jury to view the video. He claims, however, that his
counsel was ineffective because he failed to present evidence demonstrating
“that the test could not be trusted substantively.” Specifically, he contends
his counsel should have introduced expert testimony demonstrating that the
ability of a child’s hand to carry out a mechanical process with a specific
device “is a subject that can be, and is, rigorously studied,” rather than
evaluated in the informal manner employed by Detective Cannon. He bases
this contention solely on a case⎯Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th
1283, 1307⎯in which the appellate court observed that “[t]he hand size and
[firearm] grip strength of children are readily measurable.”
We reject this claim because the record before us fails to affirmatively
establish that Dingman’s trial counsel lacked a legitimate tactical reason for
the omission. The record is silent on the reasons why trial counsel did not
present such expert testimony. However, the record does show that defense
counsel conducted a cross-examination of Detective Cannon during which he
succeeded in getting Cannon to admit that he allowed C.W. to hold the torch
lighter for only a short period of time and that a longer period would have
been appropriate; that Cannon did not use the actual subject torch lighter to
conduct the test but instead obtained a new torch lighter from an unknown
7
source; and that Cannon did not have the subject torch lighter tested to
determine the pounds per square inch of force required to depress the subject
torch lighter’s ignition button, even though Cannon knew it was possible to
procure such a measurement because his own Glock firearm had previously
been tested to determine the pounds per square inch required to pull the
gun’s trigger. Thus, although defense counsel did not present expert
testimony demonstrating that children’s mechanical abilities can be studied
with more rigor than Cannon employed, it is not the case that counsel failed
to elicit evidence of the test’s deficiencies.
We agree with the Attorney General that defense counsel may have
reasonably concluded his cross-examination sufficiently established to the
jury that Detective Cannon’s test was substantively flawed, making
additional evidence of the test’s substantive deficiencies superfluous.
Dingman may now believe it would have been preferable for his counsel to
further challenge the validity of the test by introducing expert testimony
about the possibility of conducting a more rigorous study, but on this record
we cannot conclude his counsel lacked a rational tactical reason for
proceeding as he did.5 (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689 [“Judicial
scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too
tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance . . . , and it is
all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved
5 We note, for example, that after the prosecution’s arson expert testified,
defense counsel elected not to call the defense’s retained arson expert for
strategic reasons. He explained that the defense expert’s testimony would
have undermined the defense case because the defense expert would have
had to change his opinions in order to account for new testimony provided by
the prosecution’s arson expert.
8
unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was
unreasonable.”]; People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 926 [where counsel’s
trial tactics “for challenged decisions do not appear on the record, we will not
find ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal unless there could be no
conceivable reason for counsel’s acts or omissions”].)
2. Dingman Fails To Establish That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for
Not Seeking a Limiting Instruction Circumscribing the Jury’s Use of the
Lighter Test
Dingman contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue
in limine that the video of Detective Cannon’s lighter test “should not be used
by the jury to evaluate C[.W.]’s ability to ignite the fire” because the
foundational showing for “this sort of experimental evidence” was missing.
He argues there were substantial dissimilarities between the test torch
lighter and the torch lighter actually recovered from the apartment, and that
these dissimilarities would have supported a limiting instruction to
circumscribe the purposes for which the jury could use the video of Cannon’s
lighter test. According to Dingman, his counsel was therefore ineffective for
failing to request such a limiting instruction.
The record, however, does not support Dingman’s premise of the
substantial dissimilarities between the test torch lighter and the recovered
torch lighter. He argues the recovered torch lighter lacked a child safety
control, whereas it was “unclear” how the lighter used in Detective Cannon’s
test was configured. This fails, however, to establish that the lighters were,
in fact, materially different.6 And although Dingman also asserts that the
6 The record also does not bear out the contention that the torch lighter
lacked a child safety control. The prosecution elicited testimony from the
neighbor who put out the fire with a fire extinguisher that some torch
lighters come with visible child safety tabs that can be removed, while others
9
test lighter had no fuel in it, it is not apparent on the record before us why
this difference, on its own, was serious enough to undermine the validity of
the test. Further, although Dingman contends his counsel should have
sought a limiting instruction, he does not provide us with the content of the
proposed instruction.
We are unable to conclude that Dingman’s counsel was ineffective for
failing to seek an unidentified limiting instruction based on a factual premise
the soundness of which is not affirmatively established by the appellate
record. A decision not to pursue futile or frivolous motions does not make an
attorney ineffective. (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 122 [counsel
was not ineffective for failing to move to exclude evidence as irrelevant where
the trial record refuted the underlying premise that the evidence was
irrelevant].)
Moreover, “deciding whether to object is inherently tactical, and the
failure to object will rarely establish ineffective assistance” (People v.
Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 985 [cleaned up]), and counsel may, in the
exercise of his or her professional judgment, determine that an objection
would not result in a more favorable determination for his or her client
(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 690; accord, People v. Barrett (2012) 54
Cal.4th 1081, 1105). Here, Dingman acknowledges that his counsel had
legitimate tactical reasons for wanting the jury to see the video. On this
are made child safe by “rely[ing] on just . . . pressure.” The neighbor was
shown the recovered torch lighter, and testified that while it did not have a
visible safety, it did not appear to have been tampered with, suggesting it
was of the latter variety. The prosecution’s arson expert similarly testified
that the safety mechanism on torch lighters like the recovered torch lighter
“is the . . . fact that it’s hard to press down on it” which was “how they’re able
to sell those [as] child proof.”
10
record, we cannot rule out the possibility that defense counsel made a
rational strategic decision not to challenge the prosecution’s ability to present
the video as evidence of C.W.’s inability to ignite the fire out of concern the
same argument might be turned against the defense and result in a ruling
precluding defense counsel from relying on what he believed to be valuable
evidence of C.W.’s interest in and likely ability to operate the lighter if given
sufficient time. In short, the record does not demonstrate that counsel’s
omission lacked a rational tactical purpose or satisfactory explanation. It is
therefore inadequate for us to resolve Dingman’s ineffectiveness claim on
direct appeal.
3. Dingman Fails To Establish That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for
Failing To Present Expert Testimony About Statistical Evidence
Dingman’s third contention is based not on Detective Cannon’s lighter
test but on certain assertions defense counsel made in his closing arguments
to the jury. Defense counsel told the jury, “there are numerous fires caused
[by children] between the ages of two and five” and “the majority of fires are
caused by children between two and five.” The prosecutor objected to this
statement as lacking a foundation in evidence, and the trial court sustained
the objection and instructed the jury to disregard it. Later, defense counsel
again asserted that “kids two and above, they start a lot of fires.” This
statement, too, was stricken at the prosecutor’s request on the ground it
lacked foundation. Defense counsel separately argued that the prosecution’s
arson expert “kn[e]w that two year olds start fires,” an argument that drew
no objection and which the jury was permitted to consider.
Dingman argues his trial counsel was ineffective because he was aware
of “clinical research” bearing directly on the point he was trying to make in
closing argument (i.e., the propensity of children ages two and above to “start
a lot of fires”), and “expert testimony [on this point] could have been[, but was
11
not,] presented.” He contends his counsel should not have attempted to
present statistical arguments to the jury “without actually putting on the
relevant evidence for the jury to consider.”
We reject this contention too because we are unable to conclude on the
record before us that Dingman’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
take the course of action he identifies. To begin with, we are not persuaded
by Dingman’s claim that the record establishes his counsel’s awareness of
“clinical research” that contained admissible statistical evidence supportive of
counsel’s closing arguments. Dingman’s assertion that his counsel was aware
of such evidence is based on an article (the Harpur article7) that defense
counsel attached to his trial brief in support of an argument related to third-
party culpability. We have examined the Harpur article and are unable to
conclude it reflects “clinical research” or contains valid or admissible
statistical evidence supporting defense counsel’s assertions. The data in the
article was not the product of a study conducted in a clinical setting; rather, it
was extracted from “coronial reports” (presumably, reports prepared by a
coroner) of accidental dwelling fire fatalities in Northern Ireland for an 11-
year period (January 1999 to December 2009). Further, the article is a study
of young fatalities, not young fire-starters. Specifically, it is an examination
of risk factors that led young children ages five and under to be at an
increased risk of dying in accidental dwelling fires. During the 11-year
period examined by the authors, there were a total of 132 accidental dwelling
fires in Northern Ireland, 12 of which resulted in the deaths of 14 young
7 Harpur, et al., An Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding
Fatal Dwelling Fires Involving Very Young Children (2013) volume 61, Fire
Safety J., pages 72–82.
12
children ages five and under. The article examined only the 12 fires and the
14 young fatalities. The authors expressly acknowledged this sample was
comprised of “insufficient cases . . . to carry out detailed statistical analysis.”
Further still, the record contains only an incomplete copy of the article,
and the data set forth in the portion of the article that appears in the record
fails to support the points defense counsel attempted to make in his closing
arguments. Although there is a table in the article summarizing “[f]atality
and incident data,” it reflected that of the 14 young fatalities the authors
identified, only three were “[i]nvolved with ignition.” Of this subset, one of
the fatalities was five years old, one was four years old, and one was two
years old. This information did not have a tendency in reason to substantiate
the assertions in defense counsel’s closing argument that “there are
numerous fires caused between the ages of two and five”; “the majority of
fires are caused by children between two and five”; or “kids two and above,
. . . start a lot of fires.” (See Evid. Code, § 210 [“ ‘Relevant evidence’ means
evidence . . . having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.”].)
And while Dingman quotes a later passage from the article stating in
part that seven children “used their parent’s [sic] lighters/ matches to start
the fire,” the four pages of the article that preceded this passage are missing.
We cannot determine the ages of the seven children either from the passage
quoted by Dingman (which does not provide their ages) or from the context in
which it appeared (since that context is not in the record). Thus, the record
fails to establish Dingman’s contention that defense counsel, by virtue of his
awareness of the Harpur article, was aware of admissible statistical data that
could have been used to support defense counsel’s arguments that young
13
children are disproportionately involved in starting fires, and that defense
counsel was deficient in failing to elicit those statistics from an expert.
Aside from challenging defense counsel’s asserted failure to present
statistical evidence purportedly reflected in the Harpur article, Dingman also
appears to argue that his counsel should have presented expert testimony on
some of the article’s other assertions about “fire-play,” such as that “[a]n
interest in fire and fire-play is common among very young children, typically
beginning around the age of 2-3,” and that “[p]laying with fire is a factor in a
small percentage of fatal fires overall but it is a factor in a large percentage of
fires involving young child fatalities.”
We reject Dingman’s argument because it is underdeveloped, as is the
record of his counsel’s reasons for not presenting such expert testimony. The
record does not reveal whether counsel investigated the possibility of
presenting expert testimony on the assertions in the article or why counsel
did not put on an expert to testify to such assertions. And Dingman does not
identify the discipline of the expert he claims his counsel should have called
or what counsel would have learned had he interviewed experts in that field.
Nor does he attempt to demonstrate that such expert testimony would have
been admissible under California law or that the failure to call any such
expert caused counsel’s performance to fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness. It is not our role to develop such arguments for him. (In re
Adrian L. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 342, 344, fn. 1.) Further, the portions of the
Harpur article that appear in the record do not state that the article was peer
reviewed. Without the aid of an appropriate expert declaration, we are
unable to independently determine whether the assertions in the lone study
of dwelling fires in Northern Ireland reflected the existing and relevant state
of scientific knowledge in the field. Given the limitations of the appellate
14
record, we cannot rule out the possibility that defense counsel interviewed
experts and elected not to call an expert to testify about the information in
the article for valid strategic reasons—including, for example, a desire not to
reveal to the jury the relative infrequency with which two-year-olds were
determined in the article’s study to succeed in starting fires.
It is telling that the cases on which Dingman relies to establish his
counsel’s ineffectiveness are all habeas corpus cases in which the defendant
submitted evidence outside the trial record, such as declarations from expert
witnesses establishing the insufficiency of the defense attorney’s litigation
strategy. (See In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247, 1259–1261 [defense counsel
ineffective for failing to present expert testimony on PCP ingestion]; In re
Hill (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1026 [defense counsel ineffective for failing
to request colposcopic images or obtain assistance of independent medical
expert to present medical defenses to sexual offenses]; Lindstadt v. Keane (2d
Cir. 2001) 239 F.3d 191, 201–204 [defense counsel ineffective based on
cumulative trial errors, including failure to challenge prosecution expert’s
vague references to medical studies purportedly supporting inculpatory
opinions].) Unlike these cases, here we have only the trial record, which
provides us with an insufficient basis for finding that Dingman’s trial
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
(See e.g. In re Long (2020) 10 Cal.5th 764, 773 [to succeed on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show his counsel’s
omission “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in light of the
professional norms prevailing when the representation took place” (cleaned
up)]; Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 198 [practical constraints of a direct
appeal may leave the reviewing court with “no basis on which to determine
whether counsel had a legitimate reason for making a particular decision, or
15
whether counsel’s actions or failure to take certain actions were objectively
unreasonable”].)
In sum, we are unable to conclude on the basis of the appellate record
that defense counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. Although
it may be that further investigation will reveal additional evidence
substantiating Dingman’s ineffectiveness claims, the facts necessary to
support such claims do not presently appear in the record before us.
Consequently, we reject Dingman’s ineffective assistance claims “without
prejudice to any rights [he] may have to relief by way of a petition for writ of
habeas corpus.” (People v. Garrido (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 359, 367.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DO, J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, Acting P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
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