CourtListener 9506825•People v. Pina CA6
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Filed 5/23/24 P. v. Pina CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H050931
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 93070)
v.
PABLO PINA,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 1986, defendant Pablo Pina was convicted by a jury of first degree murder.
In 2022, Pina petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, requesting
that the trial court vacate his conviction because he could not presently be convicted of
murder due to recent changes to the law.1 The trial court declined to issue an order to
show cause after determining that the trial evidence showed that Pina was ineligible for
relief. On appeal, Pina argues that the trial court’s reliance on “uncontroverted” trial
evidence amounted to fact-finding impermissible at the prima facie stage of a
section 1172.6 resentencing proceeding. We conclude that although the trial evidence
1
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. We note that in 2022, the
Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 without substantive change to
the text of the statute. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10, eff. June 30, 2022.) Although Pina’s
petition references section 1170.95, we refer to the current version of the statute for
clarity.
was part of Pina’s record of conviction, the trial court erred by considering the weight
and credibility of the evidence and reverse the trial court’s order denying the petition for
resentencing.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Pina’s Convictions
In 1986, Pina was convicted of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and first
degree burglary (§ 459). As to both offenses, the jury found true the allegation that Pina
personally used a firearm. The trial court sentenced Pina to 25 years to life consecutive
to 13 years as to the murder conviction and imposed an eight-year sentence for burglary
that was stayed under section 654.
B. The Petition for Resentencing
In August 2022, Pina, representing himself, petitioned for resentencing alleging
that he could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder under current
law. Pina attached no exhibits to his petition and made no specific factual allegations.
The People opposed Pina’s petition, arguing that he was ineligible for relief
because he was the direct perpetrator of the felony murder. Attached to the People’s
opposition were the abstract of judgment for Pina’s convictions, the jury’s verdict forms,
the jury instructions, this court’s opinion in Pina’s direct appeal (People v. Pina (Sept. 21,
1988, H001869) [nonpub. opn.]), and the reporter’s transcript of the trial.
C. Evidence from the Trial Transcript
In 1984, Henrietta Cruz owed someone $120, which she had used to buy PCP she
later smoked with John Mendoza. To repay the debt, Cruz and Mendoza agreed that
Mendoza would buy more PCP, this time with Cruz selling some and taking the rest as
commission.
Carol Oswald, Pina’s ex-girlfriend, agreed to help Cruz. After selling the PCP,
Cruz and Oswald went to Mendoza’s apartment to give him the proceeds. The two
women left Mendoza’s apartment but returned, this time with Pina and Ronnie Garcia, to
2
collect Cruz’s commission. According to Oswald, Garcia had said that he would bring a
gun to scare Mendoza if he did not give Cruz her share.
Cruz and Oswald went in to speak with Mendoza, who told them to leave. As
Cruz and Oswald left, Cruz saw Pina standing near the doorway with a gun in his hand.
Cruz heard a gunshot but was unable to see what had happened. Before the gunshot,
Oswald saw Mendoza lying on the steps with Pina on top of him with the gun. None of
the witnesses testified that they saw Pina fire the gun.
Asked if he had shot Mendoza, Pina told Cruz and Oswald yes. Cruz later heard
Pina say to someone over the phone that he had “ ‘hit him in the head.’ ”
D. The Jury Instructions and Closing Argument
Based on the jury instructions as given, the prosecution’s sole theory of murder
was felony murder. The jury was instructed that “[t]he crime of murder is the unlawful
killing of a human being which occurs during the commission or attempt to commit a
felony inherently dangerous to human life.” And that “[i]n order to prove the
commission of the crime of murder, each of the following elements must be proved: one,
that a human being was killed; two, that the killing was unlawful; and, three, that the
killing occurred during the commission or attempt to commit a felony inherently
dangerous to human life. Burglary and robbery are felonies inherently dangerous to
human life.” The jury was further instructed that “[t]he unlawful killing of a human
being, whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs as a result of the
commission of or attempt to commit the crime of burglary or robbery and where there
was in the mind of the perpetrator the specific intent to commit such crime, is murder of
the first degree.”
As to the personal use enhancement, the jury was instructed that “[t]he defendant
may be found to have personally used a firearm during the commission of such [a] felony
only if the proof shows beyond a reasonable doubt that such defendant personally used a
firearm at such time.” The jury was told that “used a firearm” means “to display a
3
firearm in a menacing manner, intentionally to fire it or intentionally to strike or hit a
human being with it.”
In closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the jury was not required to find
that Pina had an intent to kill and should find him guilty of first degree murder under the
felony murder rule. The prosecutor also argued that “[i]t does not matter if this was a
totally accidental killing. If you find—and I think you will—that based upon the
evidence there was a burglary and a robbery that was intended by Mr. Pina that
night . . . then you should find him guilty of first degree murder because that is what it
was.”
Pina’s counsel conceded, “There was an unlawful killing. . . . The issue for you
to decide is going to be what was in the mind of Pablo Pina on the night of February 21st,
1984. Did he have the intent to steal, to deprive John Mendoza of property that belonged
to Mendoza and was he going to take that way with no basis for doing so?” According to
Pina’s counsel, Mendoza was the one who jumped Pina, there was “a violent struggle, the
gun would go off and they would leave, Pina would leave,” and nothing in the house was
taken. Pina’s counsel argued that “nobody committed a burglary and nobody committed
a robbery, whether it be Cruz, whether it be Oswald, whether it be Garcia, whether it be
Pina.”
Pina’s counsel then urged the jury to use its own judgment to determine what was
in Pina’s mind “when he brandished the weapon at Mr. Mendoza and then was jumped
and violently got into a wrestling match and the gun went off.” Pina’s counsel later
argued that “it has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Pina brandished the
firearm and as a result of that Mr. Mendoza died,” warranting conviction only for
involuntary manslaughter because there was insufficient evidence that Pina intended to
steal from Mendoza.
4
E. The Hearing and the Trial Court’s Order Denying the Petition
In March 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the section 1172.6 petition. In
part, the People argued that even the arguments of defense counsel during closing
argument made it “abundantly clear” that Pina was the actual killer and that the trial court
was not limited to examining only the jury verdicts and closing arguments and was
entitled to consider the entire trial record. Pina argued that defense counsel may have
made a strategic decision “not to argue the actual killer question, [and] simply to attack
what the underlying felony crime was” when the only theory presented to the jury was of
felony murder. Thus, Pina argued that defense counsel’s arguments did not necessarily
concede that he was the actual killer.
In a written order, the trial court declined to issue an order to show cause and
denied the petition after concluding that the record of conviction, including the trial
evidence, established that Pina was the sole and actual perpetrator of murder rendering
him ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Pina timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Pina argues that the trial court erred by denying his section 1172.6
petition at the prima facie stage by improperly considering evidence adduced at his trial
to determine that he was the actual killer and thus ineligible for relief. We agree that
reversal is required. Although there was trial evidence that Pina was the shooter, the trial
court’s conclusion that he was the actual killer involved weighing that trial evidence
against Pina’s facially sufficient petition and was impermissible at the prima facie stage.
(People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13 (Lopez); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 972 (Lewis).)
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
On September 30, 2018, the Governor signed Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) into law, which amended the Penal Code to modify accomplice liability for
murder and the felony murder rule. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.) Senate Bill No. 1437
5
amended the Penal Code “as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was
not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § l(f), p. 6674.) Thus, section 189, subdivision (a)
now provides that a murder that is “committed in the perpetration of” certain listed
felonies, including robbery and burglary, “is murder of the first degree.” Subdivision (e)
of section 189, the new felony murder rule, further specifies that “[a] participant in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of a [robbery or burglary] in which a death occurs
is liable for murder only if” certain elements are proven, including that “[t]he person was
the actual killer” (id., subd. (e)(1)).2
Under section 1172.6, subdivision (a), a defendant convicted of either felony
murder or murder based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine can now
bring a petition for resentencing if he or she could not be convicted of murder under the
current version of the law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957; People v. Gentile (2020)
10 Cal.5th 830, 843, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Hola
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 362, 370.) “Upon receiving a petition in which the information
required by this subdivision is set forth or a petition where any missing information can
readily be ascertained by the court, if the petitioner has requested counsel, the court shall
appoint counsel to represent the petitioner.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).)
2
Section 189, subdivision (e) also provides that a participant may be liable for
murder if he was “not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree” (id., subd. (e)(2)), or if “[t]he person was a
major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2” (id., subd. (e)(3)). The parties do
not otherwise argue that any of these other theories of felony murder are applicable to
this case.
6
After counsel has been appointed to represent a defendant who has filed a facially
sufficient petition, a trial court must next determine whether the defendant has made a
prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)–(c).) When
making the prima facie determination, the trial court may rely on “ ‘the record [of
conviction], including [its] own documents, “contain[ing] facts refuting the allegations
made in the petition . . . .” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.)
At the prima facie stage, “a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving
the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 972.) “ ‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility
grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 971.)
But where the record of conviction “ ‘ “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in
the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to
the petitioner.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “[W]e may look to the jury’s verdicts, and the factual findings
they necessarily reflect,” to determine what the record of conviction refutes. (People v.
Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 465, italics added (Curiel).) On appeal, “[w]e
independently review the trial court’s determination that the petitioner failed to make a
prima facie showing for relief.” (People v. Pickett (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 982, 989,
review granted Oct. 11, 2023, S281643 (Pickett).)
B. The Record of Conviction
We first address Pina’s assertion that the evidence adduced at his original trial in
his trial transcript cannot be considered at the prima facie stage. Courts have held that
the record of conviction may include the appellate opinion, “the trial evidence, the jury
instructions, and closing arguments of counsel. [Citation.]” (Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13; People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 102 [record of
conviction includes admissible trial evidence]; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972 [record
of conviction includes the appellate record]; see also People v. Myers (1993) 5 Cal.4th
7
1193, 1201 [when considering whether foreign conviction is a serious felony, court is
entitled to look at “evidence found within the entire record of the foreign conviction”].)3
But “the ‘prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very low.’ ” (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) And although the record of conviction does include the trial
record, neither we nor the trial court may engage in fact-finding at the prima facie stage.
(Ibid.) At this stage, we do not adopt the truth of facts derived from the trial evidence,
unless the jury necessarily found those facts to be true: even our own factual summary in
an opinion affirming the judgment on direct appeal, though a part of the record of
conviction and based on the trial evidence, cannot be relied upon in the prima facie stage.
(People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 988.) In other words, if there is a conflict
between even undisputed trial evidence and the petitioner’s factual allegations, unless the
evidentiary facts in the trial record were necessarily found true by the jury or admitted by
the defendant, the trial court cannot reject the petitioner’s factual allegations without
conducting an evidentiary hearing, as the trial court cannot make credibility
determinations in the first instance. (See Lewis, at pp. 971–972; Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 465 [“[i]f the jury has made a factual finding, and it is issue preclusive under the
principles described above, a court must give effect to that finding” and doing so is not
impermissible factfinding]; People v. Elder (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 123, 133–134
[stipulation is binding if not illegal or contrary to public policy].)
With this framework in mind, we turn to the merits of Pina’s claims.
3
Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) permits the court to consider “the procedural
history of the case recited in any prior appellate opinion” at an evidentiary hearing. In
People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706, 714, the Fourth District held that “when an
appellate opinion is admitted at an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, without
objection, it is substantial evidence that the trial court can consider.” We note that in this
case, we are considering the denial of Pina’s petition for resentencing at the prima facie
stage, and although this court’s prior opinion was before the trial court at the time, it
appears that the court primarily relied on the trial transcripts that were before it.
8
C. Eligibility for Relief
As stated, the felony murder rule remains a viable theory of first degree murder if
the defendant is the actual killer. (§ 189, subd. (e)(1).) One Court of Appeal has
determined that the term “actual killer” is “intended to limit liability for felony
murder . . . to the actual perpetrator of the killing, i.e., the person (or persons) who
personally committed the homicidal act.” (People v. Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 64,
88.) In other words, “criminal culpability is restricted to deaths directly caused by the
defendant or an accomplice, as distinguished from the ‘proximate cause’ theory of felony
murder, under which a defendant is responsible for any death that proximately results
from the unlawful activity.” (Ibid.)
As there is no dispute that the prosecutor proceeded on the sole theory of felony
murder and that felony murder was the only theory on which the jury was instructed,
Pina’s eligibility for relief hinges on whether the record of conviction conclusively
establishes that he may still be convicted of felony murder under the current law. Based
on our review of the record, we conclude that he has made a prima facie showing for
relief.
First, we agree with Pina that the jury’s finding that he personally used a firearm is
not determinative. Standing alone, a finding that a defendant personally used a firearm
does not conclusively establish a defendant to be the actual killer. (People v. Jones
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1120.) If two robbers display guns to intimidate robbery victims,
both robbers personally used a firearm during the commission of the robbery, even if
only one later fires. (Ibid.) And here, the jury was specifically instructed that personal
use of a firearm included displaying the weapon in a menacing manner; the jury’s true
finding thus does not establish that it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Pina fired the
gun.
Second, the jury’s verdict and the underlying factual findings the jury must have
made to reach that verdict do not conclusively negate the allegations in Pina’s petition
9
that he is eligible for relief. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) As the jury here was
only instructed on the elements of the former felony murder rule, the verdict here reflects
that the jury found that a “human being was killed,” the “killing was unlawful,” and that
the killing occurred during the commission of a burglary or robbery. To convict Pina of
murder, the jury was not required to find that Pina himself was the one who personally
committed the homicidal act, killing Mendoza. And given the instructions, the jury could
have found only that Mendoza was killed during the commission of a burglary or robbery
during which Pina brandished a weapon. Without weighing the trial evidence to reach
conclusions the jury’s verdicts did not require, we cannot determine whether Pina was the
actual killer. (Cf. People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 59–60 [trial court
properly denied section 1172.6 petition at prima facie stage because language in jury
instructions, including “kills” and “actually killed” and “personally inflicted great bodily
injury on [the victim]” established that the jury found the defendant killed the victim].)
Below, the trial court believed that it could rely on uncontroverted trial evidence to
determine that Pina was the actual killer. Although the trial court correctly surmised that
the eyewitness testimony at trial pointed to Pina as both the individual who fought with
Mendoza and as the only one at the scene believed to have a gun, accepting trial evidence
as true and drawing inferences from that evidence goes beyond what is permitted at the
prima facie stage. At the prima facie stage, “we may look to the jury’s verdicts, and the
factual findings they necessarily reflect, to determine whether the record of conviction
refutes the factual allegations in [Pina’s] petition.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th 433, 465,
italics added.) By crediting the eyewitness’ accounts of what happened, the trial court
was no longer “ ‘distinguish[ing] petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly
meritless’ based on findings already made by the jury”—the court was instead
substituting its own determination of the facts. (Ibid.)
Even if the jury would have been entitled to view as overwhelming the evidence
that Pina was the shooter, the record of conviction reflects neither that Pina admitted that
10
he shot and killed Mendoza nor that the jury verdict was necessarily based on such a
finding,4 and Pina implicitly disputed actual-killer liability by proceeding to trial and by
his resentencing petition. (See People v. Walker (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 782, 796
[noting that “a defendant [who] pleads not guilty . . . places all issues in dispute”].)
Indeed, under the former felony murder rule, Pina would have had little incentive at trial
to contest being the shooter, as he would have been liable for the killing as a participant
nonshooter “if a victim was killed during an underlying ‘predicate’ felony.” (People v.
Prado (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 480, 486, fn. omitted.) Although the trial court may
properly judge the trial witnesses to be more credible than Pina at an evidentiary hearing
under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), it may not do so at the prima facie stage, when
nothing in the instructions, nor the law, required the jury to accept even uncontroverted
testimony. (See People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1231–1232 [jury is free to
disbelieve uncontroverted expert testimony].) It may well be that the record following an
order to show cause under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) will differ little from the
evidence that the trial court improvidently weighed at the prima facie stage. We hold
only that Pina may proceed to such a hearing, irrespective of any skepticism based solely
on the weight of the trial evidence.
In arguing to the contrary, the Attorney General relies on Pickett, where the Court
of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s summary denial of a section 1172.6 petition at the
prima facie stage after determining that uncontradicted evidence, including testimony
from the preliminary hearing, showed that the defendant acted alone in killing. (Pickett,
4
Although Pina’s counsel argued for the lesser offense of involuntary
manslaughter on the theory that Pina had “brandished the firearm and as a result of that
Mr. Mendoza died,” Pina’s counsel stopped short of conceding Pina to be the shooter,
and regardless, though we may consider counsel’s argument, it is not evidence and Pina
is not bound by it. (See People v. Kiney (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 807, 815 [“statements of
counsel in argument are not deemed judicial admissions unless they have the formality of
an admission or a stipulation”].)
11
supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 989–994, review granted.)5 The Attorney General
analogizes Pina’s petition, which laid out no underlying factual allegations, to the petition
filed in Pickett because the Pickett petition was likewise “devoid of factual allegations
concerning the killing of” the victim, and the Pickett defendant neither denied he was the
actual killer nor asserted that another person fired the shot. (Id. at p. 989, review
granted.) But the Attorney General reads Pickett too broadly.
In Pickett, the reviewing court narrowly affirmed denial of the resentencing
petition at the prima facie stage, “where the defendant alleges no facts concerning the
murder to which he pleaded guilty, the People introduce without objection
uncontroverted evidence from the preliminary hearing transcript showing that the
defendant acted alone in killing the victim, and the defendant does not put forth, by way
of briefing or oral argument, any factual or legal theory in support of his petition.”
(Pickett, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 990, review granted.) Likewise, in People v. Mares
(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158, review granted May 1, 2024, S284232 (Mares), the Court of
Appeal held that “where a petitioner pled guilty to resolve a murder charge based on the
People’s uncontradicted evidence that they were the actual killer, a court properly rejects
a conclusory assertion that the person could not be guilty today ‘because of the changes
to Section 188 or 189.’ ” (Mares, at p. 1169.) In both Pickett and Mares, the petitioners
had elected to plead guilty following a preliminary hearing where the evidence uniformly
indicated that each acted alone in killing. (Pickett, at p. 990; Mares, at pp. 1162–1163.)
And neither petitioner made any reply—no objection, no evidence, no argument for an
alternative theory of liability—to the prosecution’s argument that, as established by the
5
We deny Pina’s request for judicial notice of the petition for review that was
filed in Pickett, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th 982, review granted. Pina argues that the petition
for review is relevant to the issues raised in his appeal because it explains why Pickett
was wrongly decided, but the arguments in the petition for review have no precedential
value to this case, were not before the trial court, and ultimately are not pertinent to our
analysis of the issues.
12
preliminary hearing transcript, the basis for the defendant’s prior guilty plea was liability
as an actual killer. (Pickett, at p. 990; Mares, at pp. 1167–1168.)
Here, however, Pina has never admitted liability nor agreed that the evidence
presented at trial had any legal effect contrary to his not guilty plea and petition. And
unlike the petitioners in Pickett and Mares, Pina disputed the factual inferences the
prosecution sought to draw from the trial record at the prima facie stage. (See Pickett,
supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 987, review granted [defense counsel submitted on petition
and did not reply to district attorney’s response]; Mares, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th 1158,
1163, review granted [defense counsel did not file reply to district attorney’s opposition
and counsel submitted without argument at hearing].) We have no basis to read either
Pickett or Mares as extending to section 1172.6 petitioners who disputed guilt at trial,
rather than as discerning the content of a defendant’s admission of guilty.
We acknowledge that in its written order, the trial court cited and relied on several
cases in which our high court and other Courts of Appeal have considered the record of
conviction to determine that the defendant was the actual killer, including People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
956 (Garcia), and People v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887 (Hurtado). But the
cases relied upon by the trial court do not conclusively hold that a trial court does not
engage in factfinding when considering the trial transcript at the prima facie stage of
section 1172.6 resentencing.
First, Garcia is distinguishable as the trial court there denied the petition after an
evidentiary hearing. (Garcia, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 966.) Second, in Delgadillo,
our high court concluded that the “record . . . makes clear” that Delgadillo was the actual
killer and the only participant in the crime but did not otherwise discuss what portions of
the record of conviction it relied on. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233.) The
defense in Delgadillo also conceded that Delgadillo had been driving on the wrong side
of the road at the time of the fatal accident, and the jury convicted him of second degree
13
murder under an actual implied malice theory rather than a theory where malice was
imputed to the defendant. (Id. at pp. 223, 233.) And third, as in Delgadillo, the Hurtado
court did not disclose which portion of the record of conviction it relied on to make this
determination, nor was the propriety of relying on the trial transcripts raised by any party.
(Hurtado, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 893.) It is axiomatic that cases are not authority
for propositions not considered. (People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 243.)6
Without resorting to fact-finding, we cannot ascertain whether Pina was the actual
killer based solely on the jury’s findings and the factual findings necessarily reflected by
the verdict. Because we cannot make a credibility determination adverse to Pina’s
allegations, we must conclude that the trial court erred by denying his petition at the
prima facie stage. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying Pina’s petition for resentencing is reversed and the trial court is
directed to issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing.
6
We note that in People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, a different panel
from this court in part relied on the evidence at trial to determine that the defendant was
ineligible for relief at the prima facie stage of a section 1172.6 resentencing petition as
the actual killer. (Bodely, at p. 1201.) This court noted that “[t]he evidence at trial
revealed no indication of any accomplice.” (Ibid.) But the issues raised in Bodely were
whether the Bodely defendant could be the actual killer if the death was accidental and
whether “ ‘an instruction on producing a death via the “natural and probable
consequences” of other acts encouraged the jury to treat the question of causation in the
broadest possible terms,’ ” suggesting that the defendant may not have been the actual
killer. (Id. at p. 1199.) The parties in Bodely did not dispute the reliance on the trial
transcript at the prima facie stage, and the issue was not discussed or analyzed in this
court’s opinion.
14
_____________________________________
LIE, J.
WE CONCUR:
_____________________________________
GREENWOOD, P. J.
_____________________________________
GROVER, J.
People v. Pina
H050931
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