People v. Tallman CA2/1

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Filed 5/23/24 P. v. Tallman CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B332008

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA082799)
v.

MYLES TALLMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Sophia A.
Lecky, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________
In 2015, appellant Myles Tallman was convicted of felony
residential burglary. In 2023, after Tallman was convicted of two
counts of evading a peace officer while driving recklessly, and one
count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the trial court
sentenced him to seven years and four months. The sentence
consisted of three years for one count of evading a peace officer—
doubled to six years because Tallman had a prior “strike”1—eight
months for the second count of evading a peace officer, and eight
months for being a felon in possession of a firearm. While
Tallman had made a motion under People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 to dismiss the prior strike as to
all counts, the court granted the motion only as to one of the
counts of evading a peace officer and as to the count of being a
felon in possession of a firearm.
On appeal, Tallman contends the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to dismiss the prior strike as to the other
count of evading a peace officer because the refusal to dismiss the
strike “was not based on any articulated grounds;” because the
prior strike was eight years old and Tallman’s criminal history
was “related almost exclusively to controlled substance use”; and
because the facts of the current conviction were “not egregious.”
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion and therefore
affirm.

1 “We use the term ‘strike’ to describe a prior felony

conviction that qualifies a defendant for the increased
punishment specified in the Three Strikes law.” (People v.
Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 932, fn. 2.)

2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

A. Tallman’s Prior Criminal History
In February 2013, Tallman was convicted of misdemeanor
possession of a dangerous weapon and sentenced to three years of
probation. In April 2013, he was charged with being under the
influence of a controlled substance, and in June 2013, he was
charged with possession of a controlled substance for sale. He
was convicted on both charges in June 2013 and sentenced to a
total of 110 days in jail and three years of probation.
In April 2015, Tallman was charged with violating Penal
Code section 459 (residential burglary). He was convicted in
October 2015, sentenced to five years in prison, and paroled in
August 2017.
In February 2019, Tallman was charged with evading a
peace officer, violating parole, and misdemeanor driving under
the influence. He was convicted and sentenced to 180 days in
jail. He was released to Postrelease Community Supervision in
July 2020 and discharged in July 2021.

B. Tallman Is Charged
In March 2022, Tallman was charged by felony complaint
with one count of assaulting a peace officer (count 1), two counts
of fleeing a pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle while driving
recklessly (counts 2 and 3), one count of possession of a firearm
by a felon (count 4), and one count of false imprisonment (count

2 We limit our summary to the facts and procedural history

relevant to the issues raised on appeal.

3
5).3 It was further alleged that, in June 2013, Tallman was
convicted of the felony of violating Health and Safety Code
section 11351 (possession or purchase of controlled substance for
sale); in October 2015, he was convicted of the felony of violating
Penal Code section 459 (residential burglary); and in March 2019,
he was convicted of the felony of violating Vehicle Code section
2800.4 (fleeing a peace officer by driving on the wrong side of a
highway).4 Tallman pleaded not guilty. A preliminary hearing
was held in April 2022, Tallman was held to answer on all
counts, and an information was filed two weeks later in May
2022, alleging the same counts. In April 2023, an amended
information was filed, alleging the same counts, but also alleging
circumstances in aggravation as set forth in California Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), and (b)(5).5 Tallman again
pleaded not guilty and denied all special allegations.

3 On the second day of trial, the prosecution dismissed

count 5.
4 It was also alleged that the felony conviction for violating

Penal Code section 459 was for a “serious and/or violent” felony
that made Tallman subject to the “Three Strikes” law.
5 California Rules of Court, rule 4.421 [“Circumstances in

aggravation include factors relating to the crime and factors
relating to the defendant. [¶] . . . [¶] (b) [¶] . . . [¶] Factors
relating to the defendant include that: [¶] (1) The defendant has
engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to
society; [¶] (2) The defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or
sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are
numerous or of increasing seriousness; [¶] (3) The defendant has
served a prior term in prison or county jail under section 1170(h);
[¶] . . . [¶] (5) The defendant’s prior performance on probation,
(Fn. is continued on the next page.)

4
C. Trial
During pretrial motions, the court granted a request to
bifurcate both the circumstances in aggravation as well as the
strike allegation. Tallman also agreed to admit to a felony
conviction for purposes of count 4 (possession of a firearm by a
felon). Several witnesses testified at trial for the prosecution;
none for the defense.

1. Samuel Goldstein
Goldstein testified that, in March 2022, he had been a
sheriff’s deputy at Lancaster Station for six years. He had been
asked to assist in a “sting” operation for catalytic converter
thefts. As part of that task, he was on duty the morning of March
3, 2022, wearing a uniform, and in a marked police car, when he
attempted to pull over a silver pickup truck in a parking lot in
the city of Lancaster. Instead of stopping, the pickup truck drove
away from Goldstein, then made an “abrupt U-turn” without
slowing, and accelerated directly toward Goldstein’s vehicle, even
though it did not need to come near Goldstein to exit the parking
lot. The pickup truck swerved away within two or three feet of
Goldstein’s vehicle, missing it, and then proceeded to exit the
parking lot. As the vehicle passed, Goldstein was able to see the
driver—in court, he identified him as Tallman. The pickup truck
fled from Goldstein at a high rate of speed, failing to stop while
driving through four stop signs, and driving on the wrong side of
the road at times. The chase proceeded through both commercial
and residential areas. At one point, the pickup truck “jumped the

mandatory supervision, postrelease community supervision, or
parole was unsatisfactory.”

5
curb,” drove through a desert field, returned to a paved street; it
was eventually able to escape from Goldstein.
Goldstein was again on patrol in uniform in a marked
police car the night of March 7, when he caught sight of the same
silver pickup truck that had eluded him on March 3, again being
driven by Tallman. Goldstein followed the vehicle, requesting
that two vehicles be dispatched to assist him before he attempted
to pull it over. After one police vehicle had arrived, the pickup
truck “swerved into lanes of traffic and began accelerating very
rapidly.” Goldstein gave chase and the pickup truck weaved in
and out of traffic, including into the bike lane, at speeds of up to
70 miles per hour on city streets; the pickup truck then shut off
its lights. Because Goldstein needed to account for the safety of
the other cars on the road and did not want to drive into
oncoming traffic or down the center median, the pickup truck was
able to pull farther away from him. At one point, the pickup
truck approached a red light driving at approximately 70 miles
per hour and, although it was “kind of a blind intersection,” the
pickup truck “did not stop or slow down” but “continued straight
through without stopping.” The pickup truck was again able to
escape Goldstein, and he ceased his pursuit.
Later that night, Goldstein received a call regarding a
crashed vehicle—the silver pickup truck. Goldstein found a
handgun on the floorboard of the driver’s side of the vehicle.

2. Aaron Tanner
Tanner testified that, in March 2022, he was a sheriff’s
deputy assigned to a task force targeting catalytic converter
theft. On the morning of March 3, he was inside a furniture
warehouse. Based on previous thefts at the location, Tanner
suspected there could be an attempt to steal the catalytic

6
converter from the store owner’s truck parked outside. Around
5:30 a.m.—several hours before the business was open—Tanner
saw a black sedan and a silver pickup truck park next to the
owner’s truck. The occupant of the black sedan exited his vehicle,
went to speak with the driver of the silver pickup, opened the
back of the store owner’s truck, and then returned to converse
again with the driver of the silver pickup truck, who was about to
park his pickup next to the store owner’s truck. Tanner’s partner
notified patrol units in the area to stop both cars. The black
sedan stopped but the silver pickup truck sped off.
Tanner and his partner later drove in an unmarked vehicle
around a neighborhood where they suspected the pickup truck
might be. After spotting it, Tanner followed the truck to a
residence and requested additional units to the scene; Goldstein
was one of the units requested. While watching the car, Tanner
saw Tallman go in and out of the car several times. After a few
hours, Tanner saw Tallman get in the pickup truck and drive
away. Over his police radio, Tanner heard that Goldstein was in
pursuit of the vehicle but then the pursuit ended. Approximately
20 minutes later, Tanner was called to another location where he
saw the pickup truck in a ditch.

3. Trevor Kirk
Trevor Kirk testified that, on March 7, 2022, he was a
sheriff’s deputy and was called to a location and saw an
“abandoned truck with an outstanding suspect.” Inside the truck
was a pink firearm. Kirk later determined it was a functional
firearm.

7
D. Conviction and Sentencing
After the jury had retired to deliberate, Tallman waived his
right to a jury trial on his prior conviction as well as the alleged
factors in aggravation. The jury deliberated for one and a half
days before finding Tallman not guilty on count 1 (assault on a
peace officer), but guilty on counts 2 and 3 (fleeing a pursuing
peace officer’s motor vehicle while driving recklessly). The court
accepted the jury’s statement that it was hopelessly deadlocked
on count 4 and declared a mistrial as to that count.6 Two months
after the prosecution indicated it intended to retry count 4,
Tallman pleaded no contest to the count.7
In a June 2023 court trial, the court found the prosecution
had proven the truth of the prior strike conviction—that Tallman
had been convicted of violating Penal Code section 459 in August
2015—as well as all four circumstances in aggravation.
Turning to sentencing, the prosecution requested the court
sentence Tallman to seven years and four months, consisting of
the high-term of three years for count 2—doubled to six years due
to the prior strike—and an additional 16 months (one-third of the

6 After the mistrial was declared, it was revealed that the

jury deadlocked 11 to 1 in favor of conviction.
7 As part of accepting Tallman’s plea, the court explained to

him that he could be sentenced to eight months for count 4, which
could potentially be doubled under the Three Strikes law. The
court also explained to Tallman that it was “aware of caselaw
that allows your attorney to argue that the court should either
strike the strike as to all of the counts, or as to some.” The court
informed Tallman that it would consider such an argument.

8
midterm for either count 3 or 4).8 The prosecution added that if
the court was disinclined to sentence Tallman to the high term
for count 2, it would request instead that the court sentence
Tallman to the midterm for both counts 3 and 4, to be served
consecutively. Acknowledging that the prior strike conviction
occurred in 2015, the prosecution argued that since that time,
Tallman “has spent basically the last 7 years . . . either
incarcerated or committing crimes within the community.”
Tallman’s counsel asked the court to dismiss the prior
strike conviction given its age, and to sentence Tallman to the
midterm on count 2, the midterm on count 3, and one-third of the
midterm on count 4, for a total of four years and eight months.
The court sentenced Tallman to the high term of three
years for the conviction on count 2—doubled to six years because
of the prior strike—finding that Tallman was a “serious danger to
society” because he had “prior convictions that are numerous and
of increasing seriousness” that were of “repetitive conduct that
puts society at risk,” and because he had “served a prior prison
term and did not perform successfully on probation and parole in
the past.”
As to counts 3 and 4, the court indicated that it had
discretion to dismiss the prior strike as to those counts, and that
“[e]ven if the court feels that it’s appropriate to double the term of
the base term, it’s not necessarily required to double the
consecutive terms that follow.” The court subsequently granted

8 The midterm for both counts 3 and 4 is two years. One-
third of two years is 8 months. We presume when the
prosecution asserted that 16 months was one-third of the
midterm for either count 3 or 4, she was including the doubling
required under the Three Strikes law.

9
Tallman’s request to dismiss the prior strike for counts 3 and 4
and sentenced him to eight months for each count, to be served
consecutively. Tallman’s aggregate sentence totaled seven years
and four months. Tallman timely appealed.
DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law
“ ‘[A] trial court may strike or vacate an allegation or
finding under the Three Strikes law that a defendant has
previously been convicted of a serious and/or violent felony . . . “in
furtherance of justice” pursuant to . . . [Penal Code] section
1385(a).’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373.) “[I]n
ruling whether to strike or vacate a prior serious and/or violent
felony conviction allegation or finding under the Three Strikes
law, . . . the court in question must consider whether, in light of
the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior
serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of
his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be
deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence
should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted
of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v.
Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
“[A] trial court’s refusal or failure to dismiss or strike a
prior conviction allegation under [Penal Code] section 1385 is
subject to review for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 375.) “In reviewing for abuse of discretion,
we are guided by two fundamental precepts. First, ‘ “[t]he burden
is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the
sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the
absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have
acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its

10
discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will
not be set aside on review.” ’ [Citation.] Second, a ‘ “decision will
not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree.
‘An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in
substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’ ” ’
[Citation.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial
court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with
it.” (Id. at pp. 376–377.)

B. Tallman Fails to Demonstrate Error
The trial court refused to dismiss Tallman’s prior strike as
to count 2. Tallman contends this was an abuse of discretion
because: (1) the court’s failure to articulate the grounds for
denying the motion meant the denial “was not supported by
informed discretion”; (2) the prior strike was eight years old, and
Tallman’s criminal history was “related almost exclusively to
controlled substance use”; and (3) the facts of the current
conviction were “not egregious.” We conclude the court acted
within the bounds of reason.

1. The Court Was Aware of Its Discretion
We reject Tallman’s contention that the court’s failure to
articulate why it was refusing to dismiss the strike as to count 2
indicated the refusal was unsupported by informed discretion.
Penal Code section 1385 “does not require a court to ‘explain its
decision not to exercise its power to dismiss or strike’ ” a prior
strike. (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 376; People v.
Gillispie (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 429, 433 [“The trial court is not
required to state reasons for declining to exercise its discretion
under section 1385”].) Tallman cannot demonstrate the trial

11
court was unaware of its discretion by complaining the court did
not do something it was not required to do.
Moreover, the record indicates the court was aware of its
discretion to dismiss the prior strike. When it discussed with
Tallman the consequences of his no-contest plea to count 4, and
the fact that the sentence could be doubled under the Three
Strikes law, it also explained that Tallman’s attorney would be
permitted to argue that the court should dismiss the prior strike,
and that the court would entertain that argument. Additionally,
it exercised its discretion to dismiss the prior strike as to counts 3
and 4.9 Thus, it is clear that the court acted with informed
discretion. (See People v. Langevin (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 520,
524 [“Where the Legislature establishes a sentencing norm and
requires the court explicitly to justify a departure therefrom, and

9 Tallman argues that the court’s decision to strike the

strike as to counts 3 and 4, but not as to count 2, “indicate[d] that
the court may not have been fully aware of the scope of its
sentencing authority on which count or counts it was exercising
its discretion.” But our high court has expressly stated that “[a]
trial judge, applying the factors we enumerated in Romero and
Williams, may find adequate justification for striking one or more
prior conviction allegations, but may deem appropriate the
sentence that results from striking the prior conviction
allegations as to only some counts. When a proper basis exists
for a court to strike prior conviction allegations as to at least one
current conviction, the law does not require the court to treat
other current convictions with perfect symmetry if symmetrical
treatment would result in an unjust sentence.” (People v. Garcia
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 500.) Thus, that the trial court dismissed
the prior strike as to counts 3 and 4, but not count 2, does not
indicate that the court was unaware of the scope of its sentencing
authority.

12
the court sentences in conformity with the legislative standard,
all that is required on the appellate record is a showing that the
court was aware of its discretion to select an alternate
disposition”].)10

2. The Age of Tallman’s Previous Conviction
Is Not Dispositive
While the age of the prior strike is a factor for the court to
consider, it is not dispositive. “In determining whether a prior
conviction is remote, the trial court should not simply consult the

10 Tallman contends in his reply brief that, because the

court stated it would grant Tallman’s Romero motion “as to
Count 2 and Count 3 in this case”—when the motion was actually
granted as to counts 3 and 4—this meant “the trial court may not
have actually fully understood the scope of its discretionary
sentencing powers and the consequences of its exercise of those
powers.”
This argument is forfeited because Tallman failed to raise
it in his opening brief. (People v. Gonzalez (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th
960, 978 [it is “well established that arguments may not
ordinarily be raised on appeal for the first time in a reply brief”].)
In any case, Tallman’s contention lacks merit. Immediately prior
to this statement, the court indicated it was sentencing Tallman
to the high-term of three years for “count 2,” and that this term
would be “doubled, pursuant to Penal Code sections 1170.12 and
667 subdivisions (b) through (j).” Then, after stating it was
granting the Romero motion as to counts 2 and 3, the court
proceeded to sentence Tallman on counts 3 and 4, and stated that
“those subordinate terms will not be doubled.” On this record, it
is clear the court simply misspoke when it stated it was granting
the Romero motions as to “counts 2 and 3” instead of “counts 3
and 4.” Indeed, Tallman made the same mistake in his opening
brief.

13
Gregorian calendar with blinders on. To be sure, a prior
conviction may be stricken if it is remote in time. In criminal law
parlance, this is sometimes referred to as ‘washing out.’
[Citations.] The phrase is apt because it carries the connotation
of a crime-free cleansing period of rehabilitation after a
defendant has had the opportunity to reflect upon the error of his
or her ways. Where, as here, the defendant has led a continuous
life of crime after the prior, there has been no ‘washing out’ and
there is simply nothing mitigating about a 20-year-old prior.”
(People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813.)
Tallman was convicted of possession of a dangerous weapon
in February 2013 and sentenced to three years of probation.
Two months later—i.e., while still on probation—he was
charged with being under the influence of a controlled substance.
Two months after that—i.e., with a charge pending and while
still on probation—he was charged with possession of a controlled
substance for sale. He was sentenced to 110 days in jail and
three years of probation.
In April 2015—i.e., while still on probation from the drug
charges—Tallman was charged with felony residential burglary.
He was convicted, sentenced to five years in prison, and paroled
in August 2017.
Eighteen months later, in February 2019—i.e., while still
on parole—Tallman was charged with evading a peace officer,
violating parole, and misdemeanor driving under the influence.
He was convicted and sentenced to jail, released to Postrelease
Community Supervision in July 2020, and discharged in July
2021.

14
Eight months later, the current charges were brought.
They again included evading a peace officer and illegally
possessing a dangerous weapon.
While the court did not explicitly state its reason for
declining to dismiss the strike for count 2, immediately prior to
doubling the sentence for count 2, the court reviewed the
circumstances in aggravation and found that, in looking at
Tallman’s criminal record, he was a “serious danger to society”;
that he had “prior convictions that are numerous and of
increasing seriousness,” which seemed to be of “repetitive conduct
that puts society at risk”; and that he “did not perform
successfully on probation and parole.”
Tallman argues that People v. Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th
490 (Garcia) supports his contention that the trial court abused
its discretion in refusing to dismiss the strike. Garcia is
inapposite. There, our Supreme Court was asked to consider
whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing a prior
strike and concluded that it did not. (Id. at p. 503.) But, as our
high court also established, “a trial court does not abuse its
discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376–377.) Thus, a holding that the trial
court in Garcia did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a strike
in no way indicates that the trial court would have abused its
discretion in declining to dismiss the strike.
Nor do we find the facts of the cases comparable. In
Garcia, there was evidence that the defendant “grew up in foster
homes and was addicted to heroin by age 12” and “had a history
of burglarizing homes and then trading stolen property for
drugs.” (Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 494.) Moreover, the trial

15
court in Garcia “noted that all defendant’s prior serious felony
convictions arose from a single period of aberrant behavior for
which he served a single prison term. The court commented that
defendant had cooperated with police both in 1991 and when they
arrested him for the current offenses.” (Ibid.) Here, there is no
evidence that Tallman was addicted to drugs by a young age, that
he committed crimes to support a drug habit, or that he suffered
only a “single period of aberrant behavior.”11 Further, rather
than cooperating with the police, he twice led them on a
dangerous, high-speed chase.
On this record, the trial court acted well within the bounds
of reason in concluding the age of Tallman’s felony conviction was
insufficient to overcome the more-or-less continuous criminal
activity he exhibited.

3. The Facts of the Current Convictions Did
Not Require the Court to Strike the Strike
Finally, we reject Tallman’s contention that his current
convictions were not “egregious” because they did not result in an
accident or injury. Tallman led the police on two separate high-
speed chases, running through multiple stop signs, driving on the
wrong side of the road, driving in traffic without lights at night,

11 While Tallman contends his criminal history “was related

almost exclusively to controlled substance use,” the only support
in the record for this claim is the speculation of the probation
officer in his report that “the multiple arrests and convictions for
narcotics-related charges indicate that the defendant may have a
substance abuse problem.” There is no other evidence of such a
problem in the record and, in particular, there is no evidence that
Tallman’s felony conviction for residential burglary—the strike
he wanted dismissed—had anything to do with substance abuse.

16
and plowing through a blind intersection at 70 miles per hour
when the light was red. While no one appeared to have been
injured by Tallman’s actions, his behavior demonstrated a callous
disregard for the safety of others.
We conclude the trial court did not exceed the bounds of
reason in declining to dismiss the prior strike as to count 2.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.

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