People v. Quesada CA2/7

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Filed 5/22/24 P. v. Quesada CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B330376

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA163991)
v.
ORDER MODIFYING
ALVARO QUESADA, OPINION AND DENYING
REHEARING
Defendant and Appellant. (NO CHANGE IN THE
APPELLATE JUDGMENT)

THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on May 3, 2024 be
modified as follows:
1. On page 7, the citation to People v. Argeta (2012)
210 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1482 is deleted so the paragraph ends:

People v. Abundio (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1221 [life
without the possibility of parole for an 18-year-old
defendant was “not cruel and/or unusual”].)
2. On page 8, footnote 4 the citation to People v. Argeta
(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th at page 1482 is changed to:

People v. Argeta (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1482.
There is no change in the appellate judgment. Appellant’s
petition for rehearing is denied.

____________________________________________________________
MARTINEZ, P. J. SEGAL, J. FEUER, J.

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Filed 5/3/24 P. v. Quesada CA2/7 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B330376

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA163991)
v.

ALVARO QUESADA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lisa B. Lench, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

Alvaro Quesada, convicted of special-circumstances murder
for a crime he committed when he was 24 years old, appeals from
the superior court’s order denying his motion for a hearing under
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 to make a record of
mitigating youth-related evidence for a future youth offender
parole hearing. Quesada argues Penal Code section 3051, the
statute governing youth offender parole hearings, violates his
right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the
California Constitution by excluding from parole consideration
18- to 25-year-old young adults sentenced to life in prison without
the possibility of parole. Quesada also argues a sentence of life
without the possibility of parole for an offender under the age
of 26 is cruel or unusual punishment under article I, section 17 of
the California Constitution. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2000 a jury convicted Quesada on one count of first
degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 and one count of
conspiracy to commit murder (§§ 182, 187, subd. (a)) for killing
his cousin’s husband. The jury found true special-circumstance
allegations Quesada intentionally committed the murder for
financial gain (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)) and by means of lying in wait
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)). The jury also found a principal was
armed with a firearm within the meaning of section 12022,

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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subdivision (a)(1). The trial court sentenced Quesada to life in
prison without the possibility of parole on the murder conviction,
plus one year for the firearm enhancement. The court stayed
under section 654 imposition of the sentence on the conspiracy
conviction. We affirmed the judgment. (People v. Cleland (May
27, 2003, B143757) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2022 Quesada filed a motion under section 1203.01 for a
hearing under People v. Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261 to make
a record of information relevant to a future youth offender parole
hearing under section 3051, even though he was sentenced to
prison for life without the possibility of parole. Quesada argued
section 3051, subdivision (h), violated the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because it denied youth offender
parole hearings for individuals who, like him, were sentenced to
life in prison without the possibility of parole for crimes
committed between the ages of 18 and 25, while authorizing
youth offender parole hearings for individuals younger than
18 years old who committed special-circumstance murder and
were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole and for
individuals between the ages of 18 and 25 who committed first
degree murder without special-circumstance findings and who
were serving prison sentences of 25 years to life.
The superior court denied Quesada’s request for a Franklin
hearing. The court ruled that Quesada was not eligible for a
youth offender parole hearing under section 3051 and that the
court was “not going to find the statute is unconstitutional.”
Quesada timely appealed.

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DISCUSSION

A. Denying Young Adults Sentenced to Life Without
Parole a Youth Offender Parole Hearing Does Not
Violate Equal Protection
Section 3051 “offers opportunities for early release to
certain persons who are incarcerated for crimes they committed
at a young age.” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 838
(Hardin).) “Under the current version of the statute, most
persons incarcerated for a crime committed between ages 18 and
25 are entitled to a parole hearing during the 15th, 20th, or
25th year of their incarceration. [Citation.] But not all youthful
offenders are eligible for parole hearings. The statute excludes,
among others, offenders who are serving sentences of life in
prison without the possibility of parole for a crime committed
after the age of 18.” (Id. at pp. 838-839.) In his opening brief
Quesada argued, as he did in the superior court, section 3051
violates equal protection by denying parole hearings to young
adult offenders sentenced to life without the possibility of parole,
but authorizing hearings for two other groups of individuals:
(1) juveniles (i.e., offenders under the age of 18) convicted of
special-circumstance murder and sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole and (2) young adult offenders sentenced to
parole-eligible indeterminate life terms.2
While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court in
Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th 834 rejected the argument Quesada
makes here. The Supreme Court held the “exclusion of young

2 We review this argument de novo. (People v. Laird (2018)
27 Cal.App.5th 458, 469 [“We review an equal protection claim
de novo.”].)

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adult offenders sentenced to life without parole” in section 3051 is
not “constitutionally invalid under a rational basis standard,
either on its face or as applied to [the defendant] and other
individuals who are serving life without parole sentences for
special circumstance murder.” (Hardin, at p. 839.) In his
supplemental brief Quesada concedes Hardin precludes his
argument there is no rational basis for providing parole hearings
to young adults sentenced to parole-eligible life terms but
denying those hearings to young adults sentenced to life without
the possibility of parole.
Quesada argues, however, the Supreme Court in Hardin
did not decide whether there is a rational basis to distinguish
between young adults sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole and juveniles sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole. While Quesada is correct the Supreme Court in Hardin
did not decide that precise issue, California courts have
uniformly rejected the argument. (See People v. Sands (2021)
70 Cal.App.5th 193, 204 [section 3051, subdivision (h), did not
violate a 24-year-old offender’s right to equal protection because
the “Legislature had a rational basis to distinguish between
offenders with the same sentence (life without parole) based on
their age”]; People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 326, 327
[“the line drawn at 18 is a rational one”]; People v. Jackson (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 189, 196-197 [“both the United States Supreme
Court and [the California Supreme Court] have repeatedly found
the bright-line drawn between juveniles and nonjuveniles to be a
rational one when it comes to criminal sentencing”]; People v.
Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 780 [“The Legislature . . . had
a constitutionally sufficient basis for distinguishing juvenile [life-
without-the-possibility-of-parole] offenders from young adult [life-

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without-the-possibility-of-parole] offenders.”].) We agree with
these decisions.

B. Quesada’s Sentence Is Not Cruel or Unusual Under
Article I, Section 17 of the California Constitution
Quesada argues sentencing an offender under the age of 26
to life in prison without the possibility of parole is cruel or
unusual punishment under article I, section 17 of the California
Constitution. Because Quesada did not make this argument in
the superior court, he forfeited it. (See People v. Alexander (2010)
49 Cal.4th 846, 880, fn. 14 [defendant forfeited his constitutional
claim by not raising it in the trial court].)
But even if not forfeited, the argument lacks merit.3 The
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
“cruel and unusual punishments.” Similarly, article I, section 17
of the California Constitution prohibits “[c]ruel or unusual
punishment.” In Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 the
United States Supreme Court held “the Eighth Amendment
forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without
possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” (Id. at p. 479.)
Quesada argues that, in light of the Legislature’s recent
“recognition of the reduced culpability” of offenders under the age
of 26, the Supreme Court’s rationale in Miller should be extended
to young adult offenders. California courts, however, have
uniformly rejected the argument sentencing a young adult to life
without the possibility of parole violates the prohibition against

3 Our review is de novo here too. (See People v. Wilson
(2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 128, 166-167 [‘“[w]hether a punishment is
cruel and/or unusual is a question of law subject to our
independent review’”].)

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cruel and unusual punishment. (See People v. Acosta, supra,
60 Cal.App.5th at p. 781 [life without the possibility of parole for
a 21-year-old offender on the autism spectrum did not violate the
Eighth Amendment]; People v. Windfield (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th
496, 525-526 [despite scientific literature showing the features of
juveniles extend to 18 year olds, “we are bound by precedent and
there is no precedent for us to declare that Miller applies to
18 year olds”]; People v. Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1016,
1032 [life without the possibility of parole for an 18-year-old
offender did not violate the Eighth Amendment]; People v.
Abundio (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1221 [life without the
possibility of parole for an 18-year-old defendant was “not cruel
and/or unusual”]; People v. Argeta (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1478,
1482 [the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of
parole for an 18-year-old defendant was not cruel and/or unusual
under the Eighth Amendment or the California Constitution].)
Indeed, the California Supreme Court has held even the
death penalty for 18- to 21-year-olds is not cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. (See People v. Flores
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 429 [the United States Supreme Court has
“recognized that the ‘“qualities that distinguish juveniles from
adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18,”’ but
nonetheless held that the ‘“age of 18 is the point where society
draws the line for many purposes between childhood and
adulthood”’ and is ‘“the age at which the line for death eligibility
ought to rest”’”].) And “[i]f the Eighth Amendment does not
prohibit a sentence of death for 21 year olds, then most assuredly,
it does not prohibit the lesser” sentence of life without the
possibility of parole. (In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427,
439.)

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Quesada argues most of the cases concluding life in prison
without the possibility of parole for young adults is not cruel and
unusual punishment rely on the Eighth Amendment, which
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, not article I, section 17
of the California Constitution, which prohibits cruel or unusual
punishment. But Quesada does not provide any authority or
rationale compelling a different result under the California
Constitution. “There is considerable overlap in the state and
federal approaches. ‘Although articulated slightly differently,
both standards prohibit punishment that is “grossly
disproportionate” to the crime or the individual culpability of the
defendant.’” (People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 733;
compare id. at p. 723 [“A punishment is cruel or unusual in
violation of the California Constitution ‘if, although not cruel or
unusual in its method, it is so disproportionate to the crime for
which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends
fundamental notions of human dignity.’”] with People v. Perez
(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 612, 616 [“absent gross disproportionality in
the defendant’s sentence, no Eighth Amendment violation will be
found”].)4

4 People v. Abundio, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th 1211 at
page 1221 and People v. Argeta, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at
page 1482 relied on the Eighth Amendment and article I,
section 17 of the California Constitution. Quesada contends
those cases are distinguishable because they were decided several
years before the Legislature amended section 3051 to apply to
(some) offenders as old as 25. Quesada contends the line between
childhood and adulthood (which, according to Argeta, was at 18)
“has been redrawn, by the Legislature, at 26 years of age.” That
argument ignores that the Legislature left the line at 18 for

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“Because it is the Legislature’s function to define crimes
and prescribe punishments, the judiciary should not interfere
‘unless a statute prescribes a penalty “out of all proportion to the
offense.”’” (People v. Baker, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 723.) For
the same reasons, a sentence of life without the possibility of
parole for a young adult convicted of special-circumstance murder
is not so disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment,
it does not violate the California Constitution’s ban on cruel or
unusual punishment.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Quesada’s motion for judicial notice
is denied as unnecessary.

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J. MARTINEZ, J.

defendants, like Quesada, sentenced to life without the possibility
of parole.

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