People v. Lofton CA4/1

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Filed 5/22/24 P. v. Lofton CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083313

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. BAF2100606)

BRYAN KEITH LOFTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Rene Navarro, Judge. Affirmed.
Stephanie M. Adraktas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and James H. Flaherty III, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bryan Keith Lofton appeals his second degree robbery conviction.
Lofton contends that the jury lacked substantial evidence to find he used
force or fear to commit the offense and that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel. He also argues the trial court erred in allowing the People to
amend the information late in the trial, that the court committed reversable
error by failing to give the jury a unanimity instruction, and the court abused
its discretion when declining to dismiss Lofton’s prior strike. Finding no
merit to any of these claims, we affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
In May 2021, Lofton entered a convenience store in Riverside County,
armed with a screwdriver in his pocket. He walked the aisles, grabbed items
off shelves, and stuffed them in his waistband underneath his shirt. He also
removed cleaning products from shelves, pouring their contents into a bottle.
The assistant store manager, T.A., watched Lofton on the store’s
surveillance cameras from a back office. When Lofton made his way to the
employee rest area, T.A. came out of the office and asked Lofton what he was
doing, which appeared to startle Lofton. As the two stood four to five feet
apart, Lofton pulled out of his pocket a screwdriver, which had an orange
handle and was seven or eight inches long. He held the screwdriver down at
his side for 10 to 15 seconds before putting it back in his pocket.
T.A. believed Lofton pulled out the weapon to stab him, which made
T.A. fear for his life. Though he looked calmly at Lofton, T.A. remained
afraid while the screwdriver was displayed. His eyes never left Lofton’s face
as he continued to assess the situation and prepared to protect himself. He
told Lofton to leave the store.

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Lofton then walked down the aisles while T.A. walked to the front of
the store continuing to observe Lofton. Lofton removed at least some of the
items from his waistband and placed them on the floor. He then took some
candy, put it in his pocket, and walked out of the store. T.A. was about 15
feet away when Lofton took the candy, and he did not confront Lofton. T.A.
called the police after Lofton left.
Only one to two minutes elapsed from the time T.A. asked Lofton to
leave the store until Lofton exited the premises. Lofton was arrested a couple
of blocks away with small, yellow candies on the ground near him.
B. Procedural Background
1. Charges and Preliminary Hearing
The Office of the Riverside County District Attorney charged Lofton

with one count of robbery (Pen. Code,1 § 211), and an enhancement for
personal use of a deadly and dangerous weapon, which prosecutors identified
as a knife (§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)). At the preliminary
hearing, T.A. identified Lofton’s weapon as a screwdriver, or an icepick, with
an orange handle. The prosecutor and Lofton’s counsel followed suit,
repeatedly referring to the weapon as a screwdriver, and occasionally as an
icepick. Responding officer and lead investigator, Deputy Sheriff David Solis,
testified that officers found Lofton with an orange knife.
T.A. also testified that he was not afraid and that he laughed in
response to Lofton’s production of the screwdriver. But after refreshing his
memory with a police report, T.A. acknowledged telling Deputy Solis that he
was afraid. T.A. later testified that he interpreted Lofton’s actions as a

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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threat, he was scared, and he feared that in order to escape Lofton would use
the weapon to hurt T.A.
2. Trial
In his trial testimony, T.A. identified Lofton and explained to the jury
how he feared for his life when Lofton displayed the screwdriver. The
prosecutor showed T.A. a screwdriver with an orange handle, and T.A.

confirmed it was the weapon Lofton used.2 T.A. also testified that he was
unable to identify the type of candy or any other product that Lofton took,
and he did not inventory the store’s products after the incident.
Deputy Solis also testified at trial. He described seeing yellow candy in
the area where law enforcement personnel apprehended Lofton, Deputy Solis
identified the candy as miscellaneous in his police report, but photographing
and collecting the candy “slipped [his] mind.” Deputy Solis also confirmed
that he booked into evidence the bag from which the orange-handled
screwdriver was produced at trial. However, Deputy Solis did not document
the screwdriver because Deputy Solis forgot to check the bag’s contents, and
he did not recall seeing a screwdriver on the date of the incident. He was
only aware that the evidence bag contained two knives with red handles,
which were found near Lofton when deputies apprehended Lofton. In his
police report, Deputy Solis identified the weapon used by Lofton as a knife
with an orange handle. Although T.A. told him the weapon was a

2 The contents of the evidence bag containing the screwdriver remained
unknown to the parties until the first day of trial. The parties stipulated to
its chain of custody, and the deputy opened the bag for the first time just
prior to court proceedings commencing. Although the only item reported as
booked into evidence was a knife, the bag contained several other items,
including the screwdriver and two knives with red handles.
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screwdriver or icepick, Deputy Solis presumed in his report that T.A.
misidentified the weapon.
After the close of evidence, the People moved to amend the information
by replacing “knife” with “screwdriver” in the deadly and dangerous weapon
allegation. Over Lofton’s objection, the trial court allowed the amendment
finding no prejudice to Lofton based on the evidence received both during
trial and the preliminary hearing.
In her motion for acquittal under section 1118.1 and in her closing
argument, Lofton’s counsel did not contest his presence in the store, nor did
she challenge the force or fear element of robbery. Instead, she argued the
People failed to prove any theft, asserting there was no evidence of what
Lofton possessed prior to entering the store, what product was taken from the
store, and whether the store sold the candies found with Lofton’s property.
Lofton’s counsel also criticized Deputy Solis’s collection and reporting of
evidence.
Ultimately, the jury found Lofton guilty of second degree robbery
(§ 211). It further found that he used a screwdriver in the commission of the
offense, which qualified as a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)).
3. Sentencing
Lofton admitted a prior robbery conviction from 2014, which
constituted both a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)) and a strike prior (§§ 667,
subds. (c) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)). He filed a motion seeking dismissal of
the prior strike and weapon enhancement, as well as a stay of the serious
felony prior.
In denying the motion, the trial court reviewed the circumstances of the
current offense, finding Lofton posed a greater degree of danger to society

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because he used a weapon to rob a small amount of merchandise and he took
as much as he could. The court also analyzed Lofton’s criminal history,
which involved 17 misdemeanors, two felonies, and many probation and
parole violations over the previous 13 years. Lofton’s prior offenses included
burglaries, assault, driving under the influence, driving with a suspended
license, vandalism, petty theft, disturbing the peace, and possession of a stun
gun. Based on this background, the court found Lofton extremely likely to
reoffend, with poor prospects of employment.

However, on its own motion3, the court struck the serious felony prior
because although it involved Lofton forcibly breaking free from a robbery
victim’s grasp after taking her phone charger, Lofton did not use threats or a
weapon, and he did not injure the victim.
The court then imposed the low term of two years for the current
robbery, doubled to four years due to the prior strike. It imposed an
additional year for using a deadly and dangerous weapon, resulting in a total
sentence of five years. Lofton’s timely appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
Lofton seeks reversal on five grounds: (A) insufficiency of the evidence
to support a robbery conviction; (B) ineffective assistance of counsel; (C) the
effect of amending the information after the close of the evidence; (D) the lack
of a unanimity instruction for the act supporting robbery; and (E) the trial
court’s refusal to dismiss his prior strike. After examining Lofton’s
arguments, we affirm the trial court.

3 While Lofton moved the court to stay punishment on his serious felony
prior, the court instead exercised its discretion pursuant to section 1385 and
dismissed it.
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A. Robbery
Focusing on the force or fear element of robbery, Lofton claims his
conviction was not supported by substantial evidence. He argues no credible
proof supported that he threatened T.A. with the screwdriver, that T.A. was
actually afraid, or that he used force or fear to take the candy or accomplish
his exit from the store.
“Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession
of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will,
accomplished by means of force or fear.” (§ 211.) “ ‘[F]ear is sufficient if it
facilitated the defendant’s taking of the property. Thus, any intimidation,
even without threats, may be sufficient.’ ” (People v. Montalvo (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 597, 612.)
In commercial settings the law recognizes that employees exercise
constructive control over their employer’s property. (People v. Estes (1983)
147 Cal.App.3d 23, 26.) Therefore, a robbery may occur where force or fear is
used on an employee who tries to maintain control over those items. (Ibid.)
Robbery “is a continuing offense that begins from the original taking
until the robber reaches a place of relative safety.” (People v. Estes, supra,
147 Cal.App.3d at p. 28.) “[T]here is no single ‘temporal point at which the
elements [of robbery] must come together’ in order to constitute the offense of
robbery; . . . ‘no artificial parsing is required as to the precise moment or
order in which the elements are satisfied.’ ” (People v. Hodges (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 531, 540, italics added.)
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
a conviction, “ ‘ “we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a

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reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th
719, 780.) We do “ ‘ “not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.” ’ ” (People v. Helzer (2024)
15 Cal.5th 622, 646.) Unless it is clearly shown that “ ‘on no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict’ ” we
will not reverse. (People v. Zaun (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1174.)
Here, Lofton took items from shelves and when confronted displayed a
screwdriver. T.A. feared for his life as a result, believing Lofton intended to
stab him. There was some evidence that this fear dissipated because T.A.
testified that he was afraid until he determined Lofton was not going to use
the screwdriver. However, the jury heard that testimony, saw T.A.’s
demeanor as he described the events, heard his tone of voice, and drew an
opposite conclusion. We do not reweigh that evidence here. (See, People v.
Collins (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 333, 344–345 [a victim’s repeated assertions
that he felt no fear during store robbery is not binding on jury but merely
creates inconsistency for trier of fact to resolve].)
The jury’s conclusion was also corroborated by T.A.’s testimony that he
did not closely follow Lofton after the initial confrontation or prevent him
from leaving with the stolen property. Instead, T.A. went to the front of the
store and waited for Lofton to leave, and despite confronting Lofton prior to
Lofton pulling out the screwdriver, T.A. did not confront Lofton again when

8
Lofton grabbed the candy or left the store.4 When we draw all inferences in
favor of the judgment, substantial evidence supports that the fear Lofton
instilled in T.A. by producing the screwdriver not only remained until Lofton
exited the store, but also facilitated that exit and Lofton’s additional taking of
candy.
Further, we see no reason to separate the crime into separate, distinct
acts. Inside of a few minutes, Lofton took some items, hid them from view in
his waistband, drew a screwdriver when confronted by T.A. causing fear in
T.A., left some of the originally taken store property but took other products,
and then exited the store. Which items Lofton took prior to or after
displaying a weapon and instilling fear in T.A. is inconsequential here. The
robbery started when Lofton began taking products off the shelves and ended
when he left the store.
Under these circumstances, there was sufficient evidence that Lofton
used fear to obtain the store’s merchandise elevating the theft to a robbery.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Lofton makes three arguments to show his trial counsel was ineffective.
First, Lofton contends his counsel failed to cross-examine T.A. with T.A.’s
preliminary hearing testimony in which T.A. stated he was not afraid
during his interaction with Lofton. Second, Lofton claims Deputy Solis’s
testimony contained hearsay and an improper opinion of guilt, to which trial

4 The existence of a store policy against confronting shoplifters, and the
significance of that fact to whether T.A.’s actions reflected fear or not, is also
a jury’s decision. (People v. Collins, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 345 [“Were
we to treat the simple existence of a store policy mandating that shoplifters
not be confronted as dispositive, there could never be a robbery inside stores
with such a policy”].)
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counsel did not object. Finally, Lofton asserts his counsel failed to object
during closing argument to prosecutorial misconduct.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Lofton must show (1) that
his counsel’s representation “ ‘fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,’ ” and (2) a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s failings, the result would have been more
favorable to him. (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 958.) In determining
whether the requisite showing has been made, “ ‘ “trial counsel’s tactical
decisions are accorded substantial deference.” ’ ” (People v. Rices (2017)
4 Cal.5th 49, 80.) “On direct appeal, a finding of deficient performance is
warranted where ‘(1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was
asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation.’ ” (People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1165.)
Starting with T.A.’s preliminary hearing testimony, although he
initially denied fear, after being confronted with Deputy Solis’s police report,
T.A. confirmed he was afraid Lofton would use the weapon to hurt him. As
such, that testimony is not exculpating. Additionally, the record shows that
instead of focusing on whether Lofton used force or fear during the
confrontation with T.A., defense counsel at trial made a tactical decision to
target the lack of evidence of stolen property and the competence of
Deputy Solis’s investigation. We find defense counsel’s strategic choices
reasonable based on T.A.’s preliminary hearing and trial testimony reflecting
he experienced fear, the absence of direct evidence of what was taken from
the store, and the way in which Deputy Solis documented the stolen property
and weapons.

10
Next, Lofton complains his attorney failed to stop admission of
Deputy Solis’s hearsay testimony. Specifically, Lofton claims Deputy Solis
gave hearsay evidence when he said that by the time he arrived at the scene,
other deputies had detained an individual matching the description given to
dispatch by store employees who witnessed what occurred. Further,
Deputy Solis testified another deputy discovered knives within arm’s reach of
Lofton, and another deputy put the screwdriver into an evidence bag.
However, no out-of-court statements were elicited during this challenged
testimony, so the hearsay rule does not apply. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).)
Also, Lofton’s counsel did not dispute Lofton’s involvement in the incident,
which is the relevance of this evidence, and we find that strategy reasonable
given that T.A. identified Lofton, as did Deputy Solis after watching the
surveillance footage of the incident.
Deputy Solis also testified that T.A. admitted being in fear of Lofton,
which is hearsay. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) But as discussed above,
Lofton’s counsel made a tactical decision to focus both on the absence of
evidence regarding what was taken and the police investigation rather than
highlight the fear component in this case. The attorney’s reasonable
approach sufficiently justifies the lack of an objection.
Lofton further claims his counsel should have objected when
Deputy Solis improperly opined that Lofton was guilty of robbery. Lofton
bases this claim on Deputy Solis’s testimony that he “responded to a robbery
that occurred”; he was dispatched for a robbery; T.A. “g[a]ve [him] an
indication that a robbery had occurred” and identified Lofton as the person
who committed the robbery; and “small robbery crimes like this” often do not
require the same evidence collection as more complex crimes. This testimony
falls short of an express opinion of guilt. This is supported by Lofton’s

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counsel undermining Deputy Solis’s reliability and assessment of the incident
by questioning Deputy Solis’s failure to collect or report any stolen property
and his misreporting of the weapons involved. Focusing on the perceived
flaws in Deputy Solis’s capabilities and investigation, instead of objecting to
his few general references to the term robbery, was not objectively
unreasonable.
Additionally, Lofton argues that his counsel should have objected to the
prosecutor’s misconduct, which involved misstatements of the facts and
evidence during closing argument. Lofton points to alleged inaccuracies in
the prosecutor’s statements that T.A. “didn’t go after” Lofton and T.A.
“backed up” when Lofton produced the screwdriver. He also claims the
prosecutor misstated the order of events by saying “[Lofton’s] holding the
screwdriver because [T.A.] told him to put the stuff back and he got mad.” At
best, these are slight mistakes. Further, the trial court instructed the jury
that “[n]othing that the attorneys say is evidence,” and we presume the jury
understood and followed that instruction. (See, People v. Wilson (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1014.) The trial court also overruled counsel’s objection
to other alleged factual misstatements by the prosecutor because the court
properly instructed the jury on this issue. Given these circumstances, it is
unlikely an objection would have been successful. The attorney showed
reasonable tactical decisions by not drawing attention to these minor
statements by objecting.
Finally, Lofton contends the prosecutor misstated the law by saying it
did not matter that Lofton held the screwdriver down by his side or that he
did not have the screwdriver out when he pulled the candy off the shelf.
Lofton ignores the prosecutor’s additional statements that “the fear was
already instilled into [T.A.’s] mind at the time [Lofton] took the candy,” and

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that “[w]hat matters is [Lofton’s] still displaying the weapon in a way that
says, yeah, this is a threat.” Based on these additional statements, we find
no misstatement of the law (see, § 211; People v. Montalvo, supra,
36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 611–612) to which Lofton’s defense counsel needed to
object.
In sum, Lofton has failed to establish that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel.
C. Amendment of the Information
Lofton argues the trial court improperly allowed the information to be
amended after the close of evidence. He contends that ruling violated his due
process rights. By leaving the knife description on the information through
trial, Lofton’s attorney could not object to the knife evidence coming before
the jury. According to Lofton, this meant that once the court allowed the
amendment, the knife evidence prejudiced Lofton because it portrayed him as
a dangerous person who would threaten someone with a weapon.
“Due process requires that ‘an accused be advised of the charges
against him so that he has a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present
his defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at his trial.’ ”
(People v. Graff (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 345, 360.) “Thus, it is the rule that ‘a
defendant may not be prosecuted for an offense not shown by the evidence at
the preliminary hearing or arising out of the transaction upon which the
commitment was based.’ ” (Ibid.)
Consistent with that rule, section 1009 allows amendment of an
information “at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including the close of
trial,” as long as there would be no prejudice to the defendant and the
amended charge is shown by the evidence at the preliminary hearing.
(People v. Graff, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at pp. 361–362; § 1009.) A trial

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court’s allowance of an amendment under section 1009 “ ‘will not be
disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.’ ” (People v. Hamernik
(2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 412, 424.)
Here, the only change in the amended information was the replacement
of “knife” with “screwdriver” in the deadly and dangerous weapon allegation.
At the preliminary hearing, T.A. identified Lofton’s weapon as a screwdriver
or icepick, and after refreshing his recollection with a police report, he
confirmed describing to Deputy Solis a screwdriver with an orange handle.
While questioning both T.A. and Deputy Solis during the preliminary hearing
both the prosecutor and Lofton’s counsel repeatedly referred to Lofton using a
screwdriver, which both witnesses affirmed. Both attorneys also referred to
Lofton using a screwdriver in their closing arguments at the preliminary
hearing. As such, the evidence at the preliminary hearing supported that
Lofton used a screwdriver in his commission of the offense. Lofton was
therefore sufficiently apprised of the amended charge to prepare and present
a defense at trial. We see no due process violation.
As for the claimed prejudice, Lofton cites People v. Riser (1956)
47 Cal.2d 566, 577 (overruled on other grounds in People v. Chapman (1959)
52 Cal.2d 95; and People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631), which held that
“[w]hen the prosecution relies . . . on a specific type of weapon, it is error to
admit evidence that other weapons were found in [the defendant’s]
possession, for such evidence tends to show not that defendant committed the
crime, but . . . that [the defendant] is the sort of person who carries deadly
weapons.” However, despite the rule in Riser, other weapons evidence may
be admissible for different purposes. (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th
581, 613 [allowing other weapons evidence to show defendant’s state of
mind]; People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1047–1048 [finding

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tactical decision by defense counsel to allow admission of other weapons
evidence to challenge a witness’s credibility].)
The evidence regarding the knives was relevant to Deputy Solis’s
credibility as well as his proficiency in reporting and collecting evidence from
the crime scene. Indeed, much of the knife evidence was elicited by Lofton’s
counsel, and she used that evidence to undermine Deputy Solis’s
investigation and support Lofton’s defense that no theft had occurred. That
strategy outweighed any potential improper inferences from Lofton’s
possession of the knives, and we find it unlikely that Lofton’s counsel would
have sought exclusion of the knife evidence if the People amended the
information earlier. We therefore reject the premise of Lofton’s prejudice
argument and find no error in allowing the amendment.
D. Unanimity Instruction
According to Lofton, the robbery charge was based on two separate
acts: his taking of items before being confronted by T.A., and his taking of
candy on his way out of the store. He therefore contends the trial court erred
by not instructing the jury that it must unanimously agree on the act
supporting its verdict.
“As a general rule, when violation of a criminal statute is charged and
the evidence establishes several acts, any one of which could constitute the
crime charged, either the state must select the particular act upon which it
relied for the allegation of the information, or the jury must be instructed
that it must agree unanimously upon which act to base a verdict of guilty.”
(People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 679.) However, “no unanimity
instruction is required if the case falls within the continuous-course-of-
conduct exception, which arises ‘when the acts are so closely connected in
time as to form part of one transaction.’ ” (Ibid.)

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Lofton’s actions in the store occurred over only a few minutes and
focused on a single objective: to deprive the store of merchandise without
paying. It is immaterial that in the crime’s short duration Lofton took some
items, used fear to keep them, and then exchanged them for other items as he
left the store. As stated above, the robbery started when Lofton began taking
products off the shelves and ended when he left the store. Lofton’s actions
took place very quickly and are therefore not divisible. His continued course
of conduct formed a single robbery. Accordingly, a unanimity instruction was
not required.
E. Dismissal of the Prior Strike
Lofton argues the trial court abused its discretion in declining to
dismiss his prior strike. He claims the prior conviction was remote in time,
both the prior strike and current offense were far less serious than a typical
robbery, the trial court should have considered his apparent mental health
challenges, and the trial court erroneously assumed his employment
prospects were poor.
The “Three Strikes” law restricts a court’s discretion in sentencing
repeat offenders. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) It
“ ‘establishes a sentencing requirement to be applied in every case where the
defendant has at least one qualifying strike, unless the sentencing court
“conclud[es] that an exception to the scheme should be made.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In
making that determination, “ ‘the court in question must consider whether, in
light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious
and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s
spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not

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previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.’ ”
(Ibid.)
“[A] court’s failure to dismiss or strike a prior conviction allegation is
subject to review under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.” (People
v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 374.) Under that standard, reversal is
not warranted unless the “decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377.)
Turning to Lofton’s arguments, his prior 2014 robbery was not remote.
He was in and out of custody in the intervening years, continuing to reoffend
each time he was released. (See, e.g., People v. Vasquez (2021)
72 Cal.App.5th 374, 390 [a prior strike is not remote if defendant continues to
reoffend in the interim, and the court should consider whether incarceration
limited the opportunity to commit additional crimes].) We also disagree the
court failed to consider his “apparent mental health challenges.” No such
challenges were raised in Lofton’s motion or oral argument at sentencing.
Additionally, the court noted that Lofton denied any mental health issues
except ADHD, for which he was taking medication at the time of the offense.
As for the seriousness of the current and prior robberies and Lofton’s
employment prospects, considering his extensive criminal history and the use
of a deadly weapon in the current offense, Lofton has failed to show that no
reasonable person could agree with the trial court’s decision. The seriousness
of the current and prior offenses was also accounted for when the court
imposed the low term for the current robbery and struck the serious felony
prior.
In sum, Lofton has not shown the trial court abused its discretion in
declining to dismiss the prior strike.

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IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

RUBIN, J.

I CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

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DO, J., Dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. In my view, there is not substantial evidence to
support the finding that Bryan Keith Lofton’s taking of candy from a
convenience store was accomplished by force or fear so as to elevate a petty
theft to robbery.
I.
The Assistant Store Manager’s Testimony
“ ‘Substantial evidence’ means that evidence which, when viewed in
light of the entire record, is of solid probative value, maintains its credibility
and inspires confidence that the ultimate fact it addresses has been justly
determined.” (People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 149 (Conner), italics
added.) To explain why I conclude there is insufficient evidence to sustain a
robbery conviction, I provide additional detail about the testimony of T.A.,
the assistant store manager. He testified as follows.
The manager was at the front of the convenience store when Lofton
entered. Lofton started talking to himself while walking around the store
“grabbing items” and “pouring something into a cup or a bottle.” The liquids
Lofton was taking looked like cleaning fluid. The manager thought to
himself, “It was weird.”
Store policy prohibited the manager from confronting or interacting
with shoplifters in this type of situation. The manager refrained from
approaching Lofton. He decided instead to watch Lofton on the store’s
surveillance cameras from a back office behind a closed door. Lofton
continued “pouring stuff in bottles,” and the manager saw him pull items
from the aisle shelves and put them in his waistband.
Lofton began to walk to the back of the store towards the employee
break room and the back office where the manager was located. When Lofton
reached the “foyer entry” to the employee-only area, the manager became
concerned that Lofton might steal personal items from his employees’ lockers.
He decided to confront Lofton.
The manager surprised Lofton by suddenly opening the back office
door, which was a few feet away from where Lofton was standing in the foyer.
After opening the door, the manager said to Lofton, “What the F you doing?”
The manager “startled” Lofton, who “[j]umped back.” Lofton dropped
the bottle he had been using to collect various liquids, and he then pulled
something out of his pocket. “It looked like a screwdriver or [an] ice pick.”
The manager quickly determined it was a screwdriver with a four- to five-
inch “metal part.” Lofton held the screwdriver “for a couple of seconds at
best” or “no more than 10, 15 seconds”⎯down at waist level⎯and then put it
back in his pocket. He did not wave or swing the screwdriver, or lunge with
it at the manager.
When the prosecutor asked what was going through his mind “at the
time” he saw the screwdriver, the manager said: “I seen he wasn’t going to
use it.” The prosecutor then asked, “Were you afraid he was going to use
it[?]” He answered, “initially, yes.” (Italics added.) Asked what he was
afraid of, he said, “Lose my life,” meaning “[g]etting stabbed in the wrong
place.” The manager said he was afraid until he concluded, Lofton “just
pulled it out as a scare tactic.” Lofton put the screwdriver back in his pocket,
the manager said, “when he noticed it didn’t really affect me.” (Italics added.)
Lofton did not display the screwdriver again.
Asked what he did next, the manager testified: “Escorted him out. It’s
time to go. Followed behind him, make sure he left.” The manager told

2
Lofton to leave the restricted area, return the items he had taken, and leave
the store. Lofton immediately began to comply.
As they both started walking down the aisles, they “broke away” from
each other. Lofton went down the aisles, and started removing the “stuff” he
had put in his waistband and put the items down or threw them on the floor.
The manager walked to the front of the store. Lofton then began to walk to
the front. But as he passed “the candy aisle that’s directly in line with the
[front] door,” he grabbed some candy and put it in his pocket right before
walking out. The manager thought, “it didn’t make sense to me.”
After Lofton left, the manager called the police “[b]ecause it was what
we have to do,” according to store policy.
II.
There Was Insufficient Evidence That the Candy Taking Was Accomplished
by Force or Fear
Lofton contends his robbery conviction cannot stand because the
prosecution failed to establish sufficient evidence of a “nexus between the use
of force or fear and the act of obtaining or retaining property from the store.”
I agree.
A.
Robbery is “the felonious taking of personal property in the possession
of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will,
accomplished by means of force or fear.” (Penal Code, § 211, italics added.)
“Theft by larceny may be committed without force or the threat of violence
and may be completed without the victim ever being present. (See § 484,
subd. (a).) To elevate larceny to robbery, the taking must be accomplished by
force or fear and the property must be taken from the victim or in his

3
presence.” (People v. Gomez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249, 254 (Gomez), italics
added.)
The taking element of robbery consists of both “a caption”⎯achieving
possession of the property, and “an asportation”⎯carrying the property away.
(Gomez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 255, 256.) Because asportation is the final
element of robbery, and it is “ ‘not confined to a fixed point in time’ ” but
rather continues “ ‘as long as the loot is being carried away to a place of
temporary safety’ ” (id. at pp. 256⎯257), the crime of robbery “is a continuing
offense that begins from the time of the original taking until the robber
reaches a place of relative safety” (People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23,
28).
Although all the elements of robbery must be satisfied before the crime
is completed, because it is a continuing offense, “no artificial parsing is
required as to the precise moment or order in which the elements are
satisfied.” (Gomez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 254.) It is for this reason that
“ ‘mere theft becomes robbery if the perpetrator, having gained possession of
the property without use of force or fear, resorts to force or fear while
carrying away the loot.’ ” (Id. at p. 257.) It is robbery whether a perpetrator
relies on force or fear to gain possession or to maintain possession. (Id. at
p. 265.)
However, as our Supreme Court has stated, “In order to support a
robbery conviction, the taking, either the gaining possession or the carrying
away, must be accomplished by force or fear.” (Gomez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at
p. 257.) Put another way, while there is no precise moment in which force or
fear must arise before the final element of asportation is complete, there still
must be a causal link between the force or fear and the taking: “The ‘force’ or

4
‘fear’ must be the means by which the taking was accomplished.” (People v.
Prieto (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 210, 215.)
B.
The prosecutor in closing argument told the jury: “The defendant stole
candy from the Family Dollar . . . , and he did this by instilling fear in [the
store manager] when he pulled this screwdriver out and held it at him.
Because of that, the defendant has been charged with robbery with the use of
a deadly weapon, the screwdriver.”
Thus the prosecutor did not contend, nor was any evidence presented,
that Lofton committed robbery by the use of force.
It is also clear why the prosecutor elected to base the robbery count
solely on the candy. A robbery could not be based on the items Lofton had
removed from his waistband and abandoned, even if initially taken by use of
fear. (Cf. People v. Etheridge (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 800, 804 (Etheridge)
[evidence was insufficient to support robbery conviction where defendant
abandoned a stolen steak by throwing it away before he used force on guards;
he did not use force or fear to gain or maintain possession]; People v. Hodges
(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 531, 537, 541−543 [reversing robbery conviction
where trial court rejected defense request for jury instruction that a
defendant is guilty of theft but not robbery where he abandoned property
before using force].)
It is also questionable whether the prosecutor had proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that Lofton had left the store with anything he initially put
under his waistband. The manager testified he did not see what items Lofton
put in his waistband and he was not certain whether Lofton “put everything
that was in his waistband back down on the floor.” When asked, he was “not

5
able to say a specific item that . . . Lofton stole.” Other than the candy, the

prosecutor failed to present proof of what if anything else Lofton had taken.1
C.
Given the prosecutor’s election that the taking of candy constituted the
robbery⎯and no evidence was presented to establish anything else was
taken⎯I focus on whether there is substantial evidence the candy was taken
by force or fear. (See Etheridge, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 804 [rejecting
“ ‘the Attorney General’s claim that [defendant’s] robbery conviction can rest
upon the taking of the beer, given the prosecutor’s concession at trial the
evidence created a reasonable doubt regarding theft of the beer and the
prosecutor’s election that the taking of the steak, and not the beer, was the
crux of the robbery’ ”].) In my view, there is not.
Again, “ ‘[s]ubstantial evidence’ means that evidence which, when
viewed in light of the entire record, is of solid probative value, maintains its
credibility and inspires confidence that the ultimate fact it addresses has
been justly determined.” (Conner, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 149.) It
“does not mean any evidence, or a mere scintilla of evidence.” (In re
Alexander L. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 605, 614; In re Albert T. (2006) 144
Cal.App.4th 207, 216−217.) “ ‘A decision supported by a mere scintilla of
evidence need not be affirmed on appeal.’ ” (In re Albert T., at pp. 216−217.)
Further, “while substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such
inferences must be a product of logic and reason and must rest on the
evidence.” (Id. at p. 217 [cleaned up].)

1 At most, the prosecutor could have⎯but did not⎯charge Lofton with
attempted robbery based on the abandoned property.

6
For a robbery, fear means “ ‘sufficient fear to cause the victim to comply
with the unlawful demand for his property.’ ” (People v. Morehead (2011) 191
Cal.App.4th 765, 774.) Although the defendant need not cause “extreme”
fear, the People must prove “the victim was in fact afraid,” and “that such
fear allowed the crime to be accomplished.” (Id. at pp. 772, 775, italics added
[cleaned up].)
I agree with the majority there is sufficient evidence to support a
finding the store manager experienced fear during his encounter with Lofton.
He testified he was initially afraid of getting stabbed when Lofton removed
the screwdriver from his pocket. The jury moreover necessarily found that
Lofton displayed the screwdriver “in a menacing manner” when it found true
the weapon enhancement under Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (b)(1).
But I do not agree there is substantial evidence⎯when viewing the
evidence in light of the whole record⎯that Lofton took the candy by means of
fear. The manager’s testimony established the fear he experienced was
fleeting and momentary, and had ceased before Lofton swiped the candy on
his way out of the store. He testified he was “initially” afraid when Lofton
displayed the screwdriver but quickly concluded Lofton was not going to use
it. Even Lofton himself “noticed it didn’t really affect” the manager. The
manager’s fear lasted for “a couple of seconds at best” or “no more than 10, 15
seconds,” the duration of time Lofton held the screwdriver. After Lofton put
the screwdriver back in his pocket, the manager resumed his confrontation by
instructing Lofton to put back the items taken, “[e]scort[ing] him out” and
“ma[king] sure he left.” There is no testimony by the manager he continued
to feel fear or re-experienced fear, at any time thereafter.
The majority acknowledges the manager’s testimony⎯“that he was
afraid until he determined Lofton was not going to use the

7
screwdriver”⎯established his fear had “dissipated” by the time Lofton took
the candy. (Maj. opn., at p. 8.) It rejects this aspect of his testimony by
surmising the jury’s guilty verdict shows it must not have believed the
manager, perhaps because of his demeanor and tone of voice, and drew an
opposite conclusion. (Maj. opn., at p. 8.) But mere disbelief of a witness is
not affirmative evidence of a contrary conclusion. (See e.g. Ayon v. Esquire
Deposition Solutions, LLC (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 487, 498; Beck Development
Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1160,
1204−1205 (Beck).) “The rejection of a witness’s testimony by the trier of fact
has only the effect of removing that testimony from the evidentiary mix.
Without more, the disregard or disbelief of the testimony of a witness is not
affirmative evidence of a contrary conclusion.” (Beck, at pp. 1204−1205;
accord People v. Amador (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 788, 791 [“ ‘Of course, as has
been pointed out many times, disbelief of evidence is not the equivalent
of affirmative evidence to the contrary.’ ”].)
Thus if we reject the manager’s testimony that he was not afraid after
the screwdriver was put away, this still begs the question whether fear was
the means by which Lofton accomplished the candy theft. The majority infers
it was, based only on the fact the manager “did not confront Lofton again
when Lofton grabbed the candy or left the store.” (Maj. opn., at pp. 8–9.) In
my view, this ignores the fact the manager continued to confront Lofton
about the items in his waistband even after Lofton returned the screwdriver
to his pocket, showing he was comfortable enough to confront Lofton at this
point in time despite any purported lingering concern about the screwdriver.
In other words, the manager’s immediate response to Lofton’s display of the
screwdriver demonstrated the brandishing did not generate sufficient fear in
the manager to prevent him from confronting Lofton. Between this initial

8
encounter and the moment Lofton snatched the candy, there was no evidence
of additional interactions between Lofton and the manager that would
support the conclusion the manager’s fear of Lofton increased during the
interim.
The majority’s conclusion that the manager’s failure to confront Lofton
about the candy theft was the product of the fear generated by the initial
brandishing fails the substantial evidence test because it ignores other
relevant evidence bearing upon that same issue—i.e., the earlier evidence
that very same act of brandishing did not cause the manager to become too
afraid to confront Lofton. It is therefore illogical and unreasonable to infer
the manager⎯just a few minutes later⎯was too afraid of Lofton to confront
him about the candy. (See Beck, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1204 [“an
inference cannot stand if it is unreasonable when viewed in light of the whole
record”].) An unreasonable inference is not substantial evidence sufficient to
support a criminal conviction.
D.
For these reasons, I would conclude the evidence was insufficient to
establish the theft of the candy was accomplished by means of force or fear. I
would reverse Lofton’s second-degree robbery conviction and direct the trial
court to modify the judgment to reflect a conviction for misdemeanor petty
theft in violation of Penal Code section 484. (§§ 1181, subd. (6), 1260.)

DO, J.

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