CourtListener 9505384•In re Ma.M. CA2/6
Texte intégral
Filed 5/20/24 In re Ma.M. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re Ma.M. et al., Persons 2d Juv. No. B327501
Coming Under the Juvenile Cons. w/B331793
Court Law. (Super. Ct. No. 22JV00200,
22JV00201)
(Santa Barbara County)
SANTA BARBARA COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
H.M. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
H.M. (mother) and C.O. (father) appeal the juvenile court’s
order terminating parental rights as to their son and daughter.
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)1 Mother contends the court erred
when it declined to apply the parental-benefit exception and
selected adoption as the children’s permanent plan. (Id., subd.
(c)(1)(B)(i).) Both contend Child Welfare Services (CWS) failed to
conduct a proper inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C., § 1901 et seq.). We will affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Three-month old Mi.M. arrived at Lompoc Valley Medical
Center in May of 2022 with a spiral fracture of the left humerus.
Imaging revealed past fractures of the tibia and two ribs on her
left side as well. The parents said Mi.M.’s two-year-old brother,
Ma.M., might have injured her arm while jumping on the bed.
The treating physician suspected physical abuse and reported the
injuries to CWS.
The juvenile court issued a protective warrant for the
children. CWS alleged Mi.M. suffered her injuries while in the
care of father, an active fentanyl user with a history of domestic
violence and other crimes. The court detained the children under
section 300, subdivision (b)(1) as to father only and placed them
in mother’s home pending the jurisdiction and disposition
hearing. It ordered four hours of supervised visitation for father
per week and directed him to undergo random drug testing. It
found no reason to believe ICWA applied.
The initial jurisdiction and disposition hearing took place
on July 21, 2022. The court continued the hearing date so father
could enroll in a drug treatment program. It admonished him on
the record that “[f]entanyl is a very dangerous addictive drug.
You want to get off of it. Between now and next week it would
1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
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help your situation to get back into detox.” Father responded
that he was scheduled to see a physician about Suboxone
treatment the next day.
Parents submitted as to jurisdiction and disposition at the
continued hearing. The court adopted CWS’s recommendation to
remove the children from father’s custody and provide the mother
with family maintenance services and the father family
enhancement services. It scheduled an oral interim hearing for
September 8, 2022 and a six-month review hearing for January
26, 2023.
CWS reported at the oral interim hearing that mother was
participating in services regularly. Father admitted to relapsing
on fentanyl in August but continued to attend his drug treatment
program. The court encouraged him to “please continue [his]
efforts” and congratulated mother for “doing very well” in therapy
and domestic violence education.
Paramedics were called to mother’s home on December 24,
2022. They found Mi.M. in respiratory distress. She arrived at
the emergency room unconscious and did not respond to painful
stimuli. Physicians intubated her. She showed “marked
improvement in arousal and movement” after they administered
Narcan. Mother and father denied Mi.M. was exposed to opiates.
Mother initially denied father was in her home at the time of the
incident. Mi.M.’s blood tests, however, were positive for fentanyl.
Mother admitted she allowed father to visit the children that day.
She said “father should not have been in the home but that she
did not have any other family or support.”
The juvenile court again issued protective custody warrants
for the children. CWS removed them from mother’s home and
placed them with a confidential resource family. CWS filed a
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supplemental petition recommending they remain with the
resource family going forward. (§ 387.) The juvenile court
vacated the upcoming six month review and set a jurisdiction and
disposition hearing for February of 2023. Mother and father
received four hours of weekly supervised visitation in the interim.
CWS’s jurisdiction and disposition report recommended
bypassing reunification services for both parents. The juvenile
court granted the supplemental petition. It stated: “I can’t take
any chances, Counsel. I do not think that it will ever be possible
for these children to be back in their parents’ care, but the
window is not closed. They can certainly get their acts together
and come back with a 388 petition in the future and see if there’s
still a possibility to reunite.” The court adopted CWS’s
recommendation to bypass services and scheduled a selection and
implementation hearing. (§ 366.26.) It again found ICWA did
not apply.
CWS’s section 366.26 report recommended terminating
parental rights and selecting adoption as the permanent plan for
the children. Mother contested the recommendation and
requested the juvenile court change the previous order bypassing
reunification services. (§ 388.) Her section 388 petition described
efforts “to remove herself and her children from [father]” since
the last hearing, such as obtaining a three-year protective order
against him. She submitted evidence showing she had completed
a six-week course in domestic violence, finished her therapy, and
enrolled in a weekly parenting class. Mother also contested
termination pursuant to the parental-benefit exception to
adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
The juvenile court held the contested section 388 and
selection and implementation hearing on August 31, 2023 and
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September 6, 2023. The court denied the mother’s request to
change court orders finding no change of circumstances and that
it would not be in the children’s best interest to offer the mother
reunification services. The parties stipulated the children were
adoptable and that regular visitation had occurred. The juvenile
court found that parents had not proven the parental-benefit
exception applied. It terminated both mother’s and father’s
parental rights. It reaffirmed ICWA did not apply. We
consolidated their separate appeals for oral argument and
decision.2
DISCUSSION
The Parental-Benefit Exception
Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it found the
parental-benefit exception to adoption did not apply. She
requests we vacate the order terminating parental rights and
remand the case with instructions to enter “a lesser permanent
plan of guardianship or long-term foster care.”
“‘“At a permanency plan hearing, the [juvenile] court may
order one of three alternatives: adoption, guardianship or long-
term foster care. [Citation.] If the dependent child is adoptable,
there is a strong preference for adoption over the alternative
permanency plans.” [Citation.]’” (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 303, 316, quoting In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th
1218, 1224.) If the juvenile court finds the child adoptable it
must terminate parental rights unless one of six statutory
exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) The parental-
benefit exception is among these. It allows the court to consider a
plan other than adoption if it “finds a compelling reason for
determining that termination would be detrimental to the child”
2 See Order dated April 12, 2024.
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because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and
contact with the child and the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship.” (Id., subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
A parent invoking the exception must establish three
elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) “regular
visitation and contact” between the parent and child; (2) “a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the
kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship”; and (3) “terminating that
attachment would be detrimental to the child even when
balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive
home.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636 (Caden C.).)
The parties stipulated mother satisfied the first element by
maintaining regular visitation and contact. The juvenile court
then found mother established the second element—but not the
third. We review the latter finding for abuse of discretion. (See
id. at pp. 640 [“the ultimate decision—whether termination of
parental rights would be detrimental to the child due to the
child's relationship with his parent—is discretionary and
properly reviewed for abuse of discretion”].)
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion
when it found the children would suffer “no detriment” if the
court ended their relationship with her. She describes this
finding as conflicting with the court’s previous finding that the
children had a “substantial, positive emotional attachment” to
her. Mother argues the court focused inappropriately on the
benefits of living with their resource family and had “zero
evidence” the children would not suffer harm if mother’s parental
rights were terminated. We conclude otherwise.
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“When [the juvenile court] weighs whether termination
would be detrimental, . . . the question is just whether losing the
relationship with the parent would harm the child to an extent
not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new, adoptive
home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) “[T]he court faces
the complex task of disentangling the consequences of removing
those burdens along with the benefits of the relationship.” (Ibid.)
Such “disentangling” was required here. The court acknowledged
the children might suffer some detriment in the future if their
relationship with mother were severed. This possibility,
however, did not outweigh the benefits of providing them with a
permanent, adoptive home. It stated: “Do I see any evidence of
detriment? No, I see children who are attached in a positive way
to their resource parents and have attachment to their parents as
well. It’s clear they love their parents and they love them, but
they are very young children and I think at this time there’s no
question that the benefits of adoption greatly outweigh any risk
of detriment that may exist to the children by terminating
parental rights.” The court noted the children’s positive
development in the resource home and saw “absolutely no
evidence of being preoccupied or suffering from emotional
instability” since they were removed from mother’s care. While
mother disagrees with how the court balanced the benefits and
harm of terminating her parental rights, we see nothing in the
record indicating the court abused its discretion when it found
the scales tipped in favor of adoption.
ICWA Compliance
Father and mother contend CWS’s ICWA inquiry was
inadequate because it did not contact all extended relatives that
parents mentioned during their social study interviews. We
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generally review ICWA findings for substantial evidence. (In re
J.K. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 498, 504.) “Because the material facts
at issue here are undisputed, “‘we review independently whether
ICWA requirements have been satisfied.”’” (Ibid.) We conclude
CWS conducted an adequate injury and the juvenile court
properly found ICWA did not apply here.
ICWA defines an “‘Indian child’” as “any unmarried person
who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an
Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe
and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25
U.S.C.S. § 1903(4) & (8); § 224.1, subd. (a).) The juvenile court
and county welfare department have an affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire whether a child subject to dependency
proceedings is or may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a); Cal.
Rules of Court, rules 5.481(a) & 5.668(c).)
“‘The continuing duty to inquire whether a child is or may
be an Indian child “can be divided into three phases: the initial
duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the duty to
provide formal ICWA notice.”’” (In re Antonio R. (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 421, 429.) The duty to inquire begins with the initial
contact and obligates the juvenile court and the child services
agency to ask the child, parents, extended family members, and
others who have an interest in the child, whether the child is, or
may be, an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subds. (a)-(c).)
The duty of further inquiry is triggered if the child services
agency or the juvenile court has “reason to believe that an Indian
child is involved in a proceeding.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) The
Legislature defined “reason to believe” as having “information
suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a
member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.”
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Id., subd. (e)(1).) When the “reason to believe” threshold is
reached, the requisite further inquiry includes interviewing the
parents and extended family members, contacting the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) and State Department of Social Services
(SDSS) for assistance in identifying the tribes in which the child
may be a member or eligible for membership, and contacting the
tribes and any other person that may reasonably be expected to
have information regarding the child’s membership status or
eligibility. (Id., subd. (e)(2)(A)-(C).)
The juvenile court had no reason to believe Ma.M. and
Mi.M. fell within ICWA. Even if it did, CWS satisfied its duty of
inquiry. Mother and father denied Native American ancestry in
the ICWA-020 forms they filed on June 15, 2022. They denied
ancestry again at the June 16, 2022 detention hearing. Mother
told CWS in July of 2022 that she was born and raised in Mexico
until age 12. Her entire family still lives in Mexico except for a
brother in New Jersey. She gave no contact information for her
relatives and did not suggest CWS contact them about her
ancestry.
Father told CWS that paternal grandmother, aunt, and
uncle live in California but likewise did not suggest contacting
them about ancestry. Paternal grandmother and aunt denied
Indian ancestry when CWS spoke to them about placement.
Paternal grandmother declined to place CWS in touch with
paternal uncle but later relayed to a case worker that he too
denied knowledge of such ancestry.3 Father had no relationship
3 We grant CWS’s motion to augment the record to include
an ICWA Compliance Report filed in the juvenile court on
February 13, 2024. Paternal uncle’s denial of Indian ancestry is
described in this report. (See In re A.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th
9
with paternal grandfather and also did not provide contact
information regarding other relatives. “Where . . . a parent
largely fails . . . to provide names and contact information for
extended family members, [CWS’s] ability to conduct an
exhaustive ICWA inquiry necessarily is constrained.” (In re Q.M.
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1082, interpreting § 224.2, subd. (b).)
“[W]e cannot ask [CWS] to intuit the names of unidentified
family members or to interview individuals for whom no contact
information has been provided.” (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment (order terminating parental rights and
selecting adoption as the permanent plan) is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
832, 841, 843 [augmentation appropriate when “a limited
reversal and remand for compliance with the ICWA inquiry
requirement . . . would serve no purpose other than delay”].)
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Denise De Bellefeuille, Judge
Gustavo E. Lavayen, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Richard L. Knight, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for appellant, H.M.
Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal for appellant, C.O.
Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Lisa A. Rothstein,
Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent Santa Barbara
County Department of Social Services.
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