People v. Gilbertson CA2/6

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Filed 5/14/24 P. v. Gilbertson CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B324361
(Super. Ct. No. 21F-05777)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)

v.

ANDREW WILLIAM
GILBERTSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

Andrew William Gilbertson appeals his conviction, by
jury, of attempted second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.)1
The trial court sentenced appellant as a third-strike offender, to a
total term in state prison of 25 years to life. Appellant contends
the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior robbery
conviction (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b)) and in denying his

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless

otherwise stated.
motion to strike one or both of his “strikes” in the interests of
justice. (§ 1385.) We affirm.
Facts
Appellant, who suffers from mental illness, was
homeless and living in Paso Robles when he entered a Chase
Bank branch at about 4 p.m. Appellant’s clothes were dirty and
he spent some time fiddling with the hand sanitizer, bank
envelopes and pens. When appellant reached the teller’s window,
he said he wanted to exchange a $20 bill and two $10 bills for
other currency. The bills were crumpled, dirty, slightly ripped,
wet and smelled of alcohol.
The teller, Tristen Arendas, told appellant that she
could not accept the bills because of their condition. He replied,
“‘Please, I need money. That’s all I have.’” Appellant explained
that he tried to use them at another place but that place also
would not accept them. Arendas checked with a coworker about
the bills. He agreed that they could not be accepted. Arendas
told appellant she was sorry but she couldn’t help him. He
seemed upset, started begging her and then slid a bank envelope
toward her on which was written: “Give me all the money.” The
teller then heard appellant say, “‘I have a gun. Who do I need to
shoot?’”
Appellant was holding a white cloth bag. Although it
does not appear on the surveillance video, the teller thought she
saw what could have been the end of the barrel of a gun poking
against the fabric bag. She pushed the silent alarm button and
told appellant that her cash drawer was locked and she would
have to go to the vault to help him. Arendas went to the back of
the bank. Appellant waited for a few moments and then left the
bank.

2
That same afternoon, appellant went into a
convenience store across the street from the bank and used dirty,
crumpled up $10 bills to purchase a couple of items. As he left
the convenience store, appellant dropped a piece of paper. The
clerk picked it up and noticed that it was a Chase Bank deposit
envelope with the words, “give me all your money” written on it.
He gave the envelope to the police.
Later that evening, a police officer located appellant
sitting alone near the convenience store, about 250 yards from
the bank. Scattered around him were shopping bags and articles
of clothing. The officer recognized some of the clothes as items
appellant was wearing in surveillance video from the bank.
Appellant did not have a gun. The arresting officer, however,
found a dark, circular pipe about 10 feet away from where
appellant was sitting. The pipe seemed to be part of a broom
handle and the officer thought it could have been mistaken for a
gun barrel. Although the officer collected the pipe as evidence, it
was not checked for fingerprints.
In an interview with police, appellant explained that
he had tried to use some bills at a nearby Chevron station, but
the cashier wouldn’t take his money because it was dirty. He
went to the bank to exchange the bills for clean money.
Appellant said he never intended to rob the bank, only to
exchange his dirty bills for clean ones. He wrote the note because
he had laryngitis and thought the teller might not be able to hear
him. When the teller rudely refused to help him, appellant left
the bank.
At trial, appellant testified it was not his intention to
rob the bank; he only wanted to exchange his bills for new money.
He denied saying that he had a gun. Appellant did not have a

3
gun or any other sort of weapon while he was in the bank.
Appellant also denied having a metal pipe and had never seen
the one police found near him before his arrest.
The trial court admitted evidence that, in 2013,
appellant robbed a Bank of America branch in San Luis Obispo.
In that incident, appellant presented the teller with a bank
deposit slip on which he had written, “‘give me the money.’”
Under the note was a hand drawn peace sign. The teller handed
appellant a bundle of around $1,200 in cash. She triggered the
silent alarm and grabbed a second stack of bills that had a GPS
tracker in it. Before she could hand the second bundle to
appellant, he picked up his note and the first bundle of cash and
walked out of the bank without saying anything.
Appellant was arrested a few hours later outside an
Atascadero barber shop. A car registered to his parents was
parked nearby. In the car, officers found several hundred dollars,
the clothing worn by the suspect during the bank robbery, a
shopping bag carried by the robber and the note used in the
robbery.
Appellant’s jury convicted him of the current offense,
attempted second degree robbery. (§§ 211, 664.) The trial court
found he had suffered two prior “strike” convictions within the
meaning of the “Three Strikes” law. (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i),
1170.12, subd. (a)-(d).) Appellant waived jury trial on the alleged
aggravating factors. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421, subds.
(a)(1), (a)(2) & (b)(1)-(5).) The trial court found those factors to be
true.
Appellant moved to strike one or both of his prior
“strike” convictions under section 1385 and People v. Superior
Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. He contended that the

4
court should consider his history of mental illness as a mitigating
factor under recent amendments to section 1385. The trial court
declined to dismiss either of the prior strikes, but it did rely on
appellant’s history of mental illness in dismissing two five-year
prior serious felony enhancements. (§ 667, subd. (a)(1).) It
sentenced appellant to a term in state prison of 25 years to life.
Discussion
Evidence of Uncharged Offense. Appellant contends
the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the 2013 bank
robbery to prove his intent because it was cumulative of the
prosecution’s other evidence on that issue. We review the trial
court’s decision to admit evidence of uncharged offenses for abuse
of discretion and find none. (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th
569, 597 (Leon).)
As People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414 (Balcom),
explained, “Pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, evidence
that the defendant in a criminal prosecution committed an
uncharged offense may be admitted if relevant to prove some
relevant fact other than the defendant’s character – such as
intent or identity, or that the defendant acted pursuant to a
common design or plan.” (Id. at p. 422.) Because evidence of
uncharged offenses is inherently prejudicial, that evidence is
admissible only if it has “‘“substantial probative value.” . . .’”
(Ibid., quoting People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 404
(Ewoldt).) Consequently, where the prosecution’s evidence, if
believed by the jury, would leave “no reasonable dispute” that the
defendant “harbored the requisite criminal intent,” evidence of
the defendant’s “uncharged similar offenses would be merely
cumulative on this issue.” (Balcom, supra, at pp. 422-423.)
Under those circumstances, evidence of the uncharged offenses

5
should be excluded because its “limited probative value . . . to
prove intent, is outweighed by [its] substantial prejudicial
effect . . . .” (Id. at p. 423.)
The relevance of an uncharged offense is determined,
in part, by its degree of similarity to the current charge. (Leon,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 598.) “The least degree of similarity . . . is
required in order to prove intent. . . . In order to be admissible to
prove intent, the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently
similar to support the inference that the defendant ‘“probably
harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance.” . . .’” (Ewoldt,
supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402.)
Appellant acknowledges that the two incidents share
common features. Both robberies occurred in San Luis Obispo
County. In each incident, appellant entered a bank during
business hours, wrote a note on a deposit slip or envelope and
handed it to the teller. The notes used similar wording, with the
first saying “give me the money,” and the second saying “give me
all the money.” In both incidents, appellant left the bank before
law enforcement responded. Appellant left the bank with a
bundle of cash after the first robbery, supporting a reasonable
inference that he intended to do the same in the second incident.
Here, the bank teller testified that appellant said, “I
have a gun. Who do I need to shoot?” In his trial testimony,
appellant denied saying he had a gun, threatening to shoot or
intending to rob the bank. However, he admitted entering the
bank and handing the note to the teller. Appellant testified that
he meant for his note to ask the teller to give him new bills in
exchange for all of his old, crumpled money.
Appellant contends evidence of the first robbery was
cumulative and therefore inadmissible to prove intent because no

6
reasonable juror could believe the teller and factually find that
appellant threatened to shoot without also finding that he
intended to rob the bank. (See, e.g., Balcom, supra, 7 Cal.4th at
p. 423.)2 But the evidence here was not as starkly divergent as
appellant suggests. Unlike Balcom, the victim’s credibility here
was not dispositive. A reasonable juror could have found that
appellant intended to rob the bank by passing the note, but that
he did not say anything about a gun or shooting. Jurors could
have found the teller misunderstood appellant or mistakenly
recalled that part of the incident.
Evidence of the prior uncharged robbery was
therefore relevant and not cumulative to prove appellant’s intent
in passing the note. In the first robbery, appellant’s note caused
the teller to give him a bundle of cash. The jury could reasonably
infer that he intended to achieve the same result by passing a
note in the second robbery.
Nor was the probative value of the evidence
substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. (Evid.
Code, § 352.) Evidence is unduly prejudicial within the meaning
of Evidence Code section 352 when “‘it is of such nature as to

2 The defendant in Balcom was charged with rape; his
defense was consent. The victim testified that he held a gun to
her head while having intercourse with her. Our Supreme Court
held evidence of a second, uncharged armed rape was cumulative
and therefore inadmissible to prove intent because no reasonable
juror “could have concluded that defendant committed the acts
alleged by the complaining witness, but lacked the requisite
intent to commit rape.” (Balcom, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 422.) It
also held, however, that the evidence was admissible to prove the
defendant acted pursuant to a common design or plan. (Id. at p.
423.)

7
inflame the emotions of the jury, motivating them to use the
information, not to logically evaluate the point upon which it is
relevant, but to reward or punish one side because of the jurors’
emotional reaction. In such a circumstance, the evidence is
unduly prejudicial because of the substantial likelihood the jury
will use it for an illegitimate purpose.’” (People v. Doolin (2009)
45 Cal.4th 390, 439 (Doolin), quoting Vorse v. Sarasy (1997) 53
Cal.App.4th 998, 1009-1009.)
The trial court here instructed the jurors that they
could consider evidence of the uncharged offense only “for the
limited purpose of the defendant’s identity, intent, motive or lack
of mistake. [¶] Do not conclude from this evidence that the
defendant has a bad character or is disposed to commit crime.”
We assume the jurors understood and followed this instruction.
(People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 821.)
Nothing about the prior offense is so inflammatory, when
compared to the charge offense, that it would evoke an emotional
reaction or motivate jurors to use the evidence for an illegitimate
purpose. (Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 439.) Under these
circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting evidence of the prior robbery.
Sentencing Issues. The trial court found appellant
had suffered two prior serious felony convictions: a conviction of
robbery in 2013 (§ 211), and a conviction of arson of property in
2021. (§ 451, subd. (d).) The trial court further found that each
prior conviction qualified as a strike for purposes of the Three
Strikes law and a prior serious felony conviction for purposes of
the section 667, subdivision (a)(1) five-year enhancement.
Appellant filed a Romero3 motion to strike one or both of his

3 People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th 497.

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“strikes” under section 1385, citing his long history of mental
illness as a mitigating factor.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that
it had “taken a very hard and close look at the defendant’s
criminal history.” It noted that he had multiple prior convictions
and parole violations, beginning more than 20 years ago, some for
crimes of violence. It also noted that it had “considered all of the
factors in mitigation, there are many factors. The defendant
clearly suffers from mental illness. He clearly has limited
resources and he struggles being on the street. When I weigh all
of it together, I cannot say that he falls outside the spirit of the
statute,” especially after considering his lengthy criminal record
and the threats made to victims in this case. The trial court
acknowledged its “sympathy” for appellant based on his history of
mental illness, but concluded “that my struggle is more related to
my sympathy . . . for [appellant] as opposed to the factors that the
[trial] [c]ourt is supposed to consider.” For those reasons, it
denied the Romero motion to strike appellant’s prior strike
convictions.
Appellant contends the trial court erred because
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) required it to “consider and afford
great weight” to evidence that this offense was connected to his
mental illness. Alternatively, appellant contends the matter
should be remanded for resentencing because the trial court
misunderstood its discretion to dismiss the strikes based on his
mental illness. We review the trial court’s denial of the Romero
motion for abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33
Cal.4th 367, 377-378.) There was no abuse.
Amendments to section 1385 which took effect on
January 1, 2022, provide guidance regarding the exercise of the

9
trial court’s discretion to dismiss sentence enhancements in the
furtherance of justice. (People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
237, 242-243 (Burke).) Subdivision (c) of section 1385 now
provides, “(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do
so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any
initiative statute. [¶] (2) In exercising its discretion under this
subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to
evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the
mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present.
Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances
weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless
the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would
endanger public safety.” (Ibid.) One of the enumerated
mitigating circumstances is, “The current offense is connected to
mental illness.” (Id., subd. (c)(2)(D).)
Appellant contends the trial court should have
dismissed one or both of his prior strikes because it is undisputed
that the current offense is connected to his mental illness. We
disagree. Subdivision (c) of section 1385 expressly applies to the
dismissal of an enhancement in furtherance of justice. The Three
Strikes law is an alternate sentencing scheme, not an
enhancement. (People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13
Cal.4th at p. 527; People v. Williams (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 733,
744.) Subdivision (c) of section 1385 does not apply to the
dismissal of appellant’s strikes.
As the court explained in Burke, supra, 89
Cal.App.5th 237, “We presume the Legislature was aware of, and
acquiesced in, both this established judicial definition of
enhancement and the distinction between an enhancement and

10
an alternative sentencing scheme such as the Three Strikes law.
[Citation.] The Legislature did not otherwise define the word
‘enhancement’ in section 1385. Because the statutory language is
clear and unambiguous, we follow its plain meaning . . . . The
plain language of subdivision (c) of section 1385 applies only to an
‘enhancement,’ and the Three Strikes law is not an enhancement.
We therefore conclude that section 1385, subdivision (c)’s
provisions regarding enhancements do not apply to the Three
Strikes law.” (Id. at pp. 243-244.)
Appellant urges us to apply section 1385, subdivision
(c) to his Three Strikes sentence because the Legislature
intended to expand the trial court’s discretion to extend leniency
and impose a lower sentence. Applying the statute to
enhancements but not strikes would, he contends, be an “absurd
result” that we should avoid. (See, e.g., People v. Bell (2015) 241
Cal.App.4th 315, 351-352; Arden Carmichael, Inc. v. County of
Sacramento (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1075-1076.)
We reject the contention that this result is absurd.
The Legislature amended section 1385 against the backdrop of
settled precedent defining the terms “enhancement” and “strike.”
Yet it expressly limited its amendment of subdivision (c) to
enhancements, without including any reference to strikes. We
presume the Legislature was aware of the legal context in which
it was operating and that it “acquiesced in the previous judicial
construction” of those terms. (People v. Blakeley (2000) 23
Cal.4th 82, 89.) Consequently, our result is not absurd; it honors
the plain meaning of the statute enacted by the Legislature.
Appellant’s final contention is that, even if section
1385 subdivision (c) does not apply to his Romero motion, the
matter should be remanded for resentencing because the trial

11
court misunderstood the scope of its discretion to consider his
mental illness as a mitigating circumstance. We are not
persuaded. The trial court stated that it had considered and
given weight to appellant’s mental illness as well as his “limited
resources” and “struggles being on the street.” Even taking those
factors into account, however, it concluded appellant did not
“fall[] outside the spirit of the [Three Strikes] statute.” These
comments demonstrate that the trial court understood its
discretion under section 1385 and concluded it would not be in
the furtherance of justice to dismiss his prior strikes. (See, e.g.,
Burke, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 242-243.) This
determination was not an abuse of discretion.
Conclusion
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

BALTODANO, J.

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Timothy S. Covello, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Law Offices of John Derrick and John Derrick, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Gabriel Bradley, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.

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