CourtListener 9502539•People v. Gomez CA6
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Filed 5/13/24 P. v. Gomez CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H050814
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C1650718)
v.
RICARDO GOMEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Ricardo Gomez pleaded guilty to murder and other crimes arising from
charges that, while intoxicated, he sped through a red light and struck and killed a
pedestrian. He is currently serving a sentence of 15 years to life consecutive to three
years. Gomez appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1170.95 (now Pen. Code, § 1172.6)1. Gomez argues the trial court
improperly denied his petition at the prima facie stage by relying on preliminary hearing
evidence. For the reasons stated here, we will affirm the order.
I. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
We derive the following factual summary from the unpublished opinion filed in
2020 granting Gomez’s request for remand for resentencing (case No. H046937). On our
own motion, we take judicial notice of the record in case No. H046937 because our
1
In 2022 the Legislature renumbered Penal Code section 1170.95 to Penal Code
section 1172.6 without substantive change to the text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10, eff.
June 30, 2022.) Although the petition references Penal Code section 1170.95, we
primarily refer to the current statute for clarity. Unspecified statutory references are to
the Penal Code.
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analysis here relies on the preliminary hearing transcript rather than the factual summary
contained in our prior opinion. (Accord People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276,
293.)
At approximately 4:30 p.m. on November 10, 2016, Gomez ran a red light in
downtown San Jose. Gomez’s truck entered an intersection nearly three seconds after the
light had changed to red at an approximate speed of 49 miles per hour. Gomez’s truck
collided with another vehicle in the intersection, hit a pedestrian, and then crashed into a
parked news van. The pedestrian was killed and two occupants of the news van suffered
injuries. Gomez’s blood alcohol content was 0.25 percent approximately 90 minutes
after the collision.
Gomez had three prior DUI convictions: two for driving under the influence of
alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) and one for driving with blood alcohol content of
0.08 percent or higher (id., subd. (b)).
The Santa Clara County District Attorney charged Gomez with murder (Pen.
Code, § 187); driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153,
subd. (a)); and driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent or higher causing
injury (id., § 23153, subd. (b)).
At the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor presented three witnesses who
identified Gomez as the driver of the truck, including one of the news van’s occupants;
Gomez’s cousin; and a San Jose police sergeant who apprehended Gomez as he walked
away from his truck. The prosecutor also introduced surveillance video of the accident
showing Gomez getting out of his truck and being stopped by the police sergeant.
The prosecutor explained that the theory of murder was implied malice while
driving drunk, as set forth in People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290 (Watson), known
colloquially as “Watson murder.” The prosecutor submitted certified records of Gomez’s
prior DUI convictions to establish Gomez’s “knowledge of the dangers of drinking and
driving” and “the implied malice requirement.”
2
Gomez’s counsel conceded that the preliminary hearing testimony and evidence
demonstrated that Gomez “ran a red light at a high speed, and that as a result of that a
pedestrian was killed,” that “his blood alcohol was .25, which is more than three times
the legal limit” and that “he has three prior DUI convictions.” Gomez was held to answer
on the charges and allegations.
Gomez entered into an open plea, whereby he pleaded guilty to all counts and
admitted all allegations. The prosecutor and defense counsel stipulated to a factual basis
for the plea based on the “offense reports.” Gomez also signed an “Advisement of
Rights, Waiver and Plea Form” (plea form) in which his counsel stipulated to the factual
basis for his plea based on the investigative reports, the preliminary hearing transcript and
other materials within the trial court’s file. The trial court orally confirmed with Gomez
that he had reviewed the plea form with his counsel and understood its terms. After
finding a factual basis for the pleas based on the offense reports, preliminary hearing
transcript, and the stipulation of counsel, the trial court accepted Gomez’s pleas and
admissions.
Representing himself, Gomez petitioned under former section 1170.95 to vacate
his murder conviction and for resentencing. Gomez alleged his conviction was based on
a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
or other theory of imputed malice and that he could not now be convicted of murder due
to changes made to section 188.
The trial court appointed counsel for Gomez. The district attorney filed written
opposition to the petition based on percipient witness testimony from the preliminary
hearing. The district attorney argued that, as “the driver of the car that crashed and
killed” the victim, “the only conceivable theory of his guilty plea was that he was a direct
perpetrator” and “even if he could have been convicted of felony murder, as an actual
killer, he would also still be ineligible as a matter of law.”
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At the hearing on the petition, Gomez’s counsel stated he had not filed any
supporting papers, did not dispute the prosecution’s characterization of the preliminary
hearing, and did not have anything to add to Gomez’s form petition. Counsel
acknowledged that the plea form stipulated to “the preliminary hearing, the police report
and other evidence as providing the factual basis in this case.”
The trial court denied the petition without issuing an order to show cause. In its
written order it found Gomez “ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law
because he was the actual killer.” The trial court noted the stipulated factual basis
included the preliminary hearing transcript, and the “evidence at the preliminary hearing
(without considering any section 872(b) hearsay) established that defendant knowingly
ran a red light in a car causing a collision that killed a pedestrian.” The court stated the
petition “ignore[s] there was no accomplice to impute malice to him and that felony
murder is simply unavailable for murders of this type.” It concluded that, “[a]s the driver
of the car that crashed and killed [the victim] the only conceivable theory of his plea was
that he was a direct perpetrator.”
II. DISCUSSION
A. PRIMA FACIE ELIGIBILITY UNDER SECTION 1172.6
A person convicted of “felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person's participation in a crime,” or “attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine,” may petition under section 1172.6 to have those
convictions vacated when certain conditions are satisfied. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) An
order to show cause must issue if a petitioner makes a prima facie case for relief.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The “parties can, and should, use the record of conviction to aid the
trial court in reliably assessing whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case.”
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972 (Lewis).) Where a conviction results from a
guilty plea, the record of conviction can include the preliminary hearing and change of
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plea transcripts. (People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 223; People v. Pickett (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 982, 988 (Pickett), rev. granted Oct. 11, 2023, S281643) [record of
conviction may include preliminary hearing transcript]; People v. Sohal (1997)
53 Cal.App.4th 911, 915 [reporter’s transcript of plea is considered part of record of
conviction].) Although at the prima facie stage, the trial court must accept a petition’s
factual allegations as true and determine whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief
if those factual allegations were proved, if the record of conviction contains facts refuting
the allegations in the petition, the court must deny the petition. (Lewis, at p. 971.) We
independently review the question of whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
B. GOMEZ HAS NOT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE
Based on our independent review, we conclude that Gomez is not entitled to relief
under section 1172.6. The uncontradicted facts in the record of conviction demonstrate
that he was the sole perpetrator and actual killer. (People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216, 233 (Delgadillo) [affirming summary dismissal at prima facie stage
where record was clear that petitioner “was the actual killer and the only participant in
the killing” resulting from what Delgadillo conceded at trial was his driving on wrong
side of road while intoxicated].) Gomez offers no alternative scenario in which he is not
the sole perpetrator and actual killer, nor any suggestion that he could have been
prosecuted under a now-invalid theory. Where “defendant alleges no facts concerning
the murder to which he pleaded guilty,” and the Attorney General has introduced
“without objection uncontroverted evidence from the preliminary hearing transcript
showing that the defendant acted alone in killing the victim, and the defendant does not
put forth, by way of briefing or oral argument, any factual or legal theory in support of
his petition, the defendant has failed to make a prima facie showing for relief under
section 1172.6.” (Pickett, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 990, rev. granted.)
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Gomez’s record of conviction demonstrates that he was prosecuted and pleaded
guilty to vehicular homicide under a still valid theory of implied malice. Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2) amended sections 188 and
189 to “eliminate[] natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to
aiding and abetting, and [to] limit[ ] the scope of the felony-murder rule.” (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 957.) But the legislation “ ‘did nothing to remove implied malice as a
basis for a second degree murder conviction’ ” and “ ‘maintained the viability of murder
convictions based on implied malice, and the definition of implied malice remains
unchanged.’ ” (People v. Carr (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 136, 144 (Carr).)
Gomez argues that the trial court made impermissible inferences against him
based on the preliminary hearing transcript. Appellate courts are divided regarding the
circumstances in which the trial court may deny a petition at the prima facie stage based
on the preliminary hearing transcript, and the issue is currently pending before the
California Supreme Court. (People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, rev. granted
June 28, 2023, S279670 [affirming denial of petition at prima facie stage based on
preliminary hearing transcript].)
Gomez cites two decisions reversing summary denial of a petition at the prima
facie stage: People v. Davenport (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476 (Davenport) and People v.
Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217 (Rivera). He argues under Davenport that the trial
court was not permitted to rely on evidence from the preliminary hearing that Gomez did
not stipulate to or admit as the factual basis for his guilty plea. Gomez relies on Rivera to
argue in the alternative that even if he stipulated to using the preliminary hearing
transcript, his stipulation does not preclude issuing an order to show cause.
Gomez’s reliance on Davenport is misplaced because, unlike Davenport, Gomez
stipulated via the plea form to using the preliminary hearing transcript as the factual basis
for his plea. As a result, the trial court’s reliance on facts from the preliminary hearing
transcript was not “ ‘impermissible factfinding’ at the prima facie stage,” as the
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Davenport trial court had done. (Davenport, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 482.) In both
Davenport and Rivera, the courts were confronted with the “essential difficulty of
interpreting the meaning of a plea to a generic murder in the absence of a stipulation to
the exact factual basis for the plea.” (Id. at p. 484.) Because “Davenport did not stipulate
that the preliminary hearing transcript provided the factual basis for his no contest plea,
the transcript does not conclusively ‘refute’ his allegations” that he had been tried under
now invalid theories. (Id. at p. 483.)
The Rivera court concluded that although Rivera had stipulated to the grand jury
transcript as the factual basis for his plea, “given that the allegation that a murder was
committed ‘willfully, unlawfully, and with malice aforethought’ is a generic charge
permitting the prosecution to proceed on any theory of murder,” the record was not
conclusive “that by admitting to the murder as charged Rivera admitted that he acted with
actual malice, not just that the element of malice was satisfied.” (Id. at p. 234.) The
grand jury transcript reflected that Rivera’s accomplice was the shooter, and it was
undisputed that Rivera was not. (Id. at pp. 224, 226.) The trial court in Rivera was found
to have properly declined to rely on the grand jury transcript because, “absent an
indication that a defendant admitted the truth of particular facts, the stipulation to a
factual basis for the plea does not ‘constitute[ ] a binding admission for all purposes.’ ”
(Id. at p. 235.)
There is no similar ambiguity here. Gomez was prosecuted for Watson murder,
i.e., vehicular homicide in which “implied malice can be inferred, in an appropriate case,
when the defendant unintentionally killed someone while driving while intoxicated.”
(Carr, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 143.) Consistent with the Watson implied malice
theory, the prosecutor introduced evidence regarding the accident, Gomez’s intoxication,
and his prior DUI convictions necessary to establish implied malice based on his
subjective understanding of and conscious disregard for the risk to life posed by driving
7
while intoxicated. (See, e.g., People v. Marlin (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 559, 572 [prior
DUI convictions established implied malice].)
Citing Rivera, Gomez contends that stipulating to the preliminary hearing
transcript as the factual basis for his guilty plea does not preclude relief under
section 1172.6 because his stipulation did not establish all the evidence, disputes, and
defenses that might have been asserted or proven at trial. But unlike Gomez, Rivera’s
petition identified a specific alternative “theory under which the evidence presented to the
grand jury was consistent with [the defendant’s] guilt of murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, based upon an intent to participate in a target offense of
assault.” (Rivera, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 239.) Rivera’s petition also emphasized
that his co-defendant was undisputedly the actual killer and highlighted the lack of
evidence that he shared or knew of his co-defendant’s intent, that his co-defendant
possessed a gun, or that he had assisted his co-defendant in any way except by driving the
car. (Id. at p. 226.) Given these combined factors, the Rivera court held that “a
defendant who stipulated to a grand jury transcript as the factual basis of the plea may
make a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief by identifying a scenario under which
he or she was guilty of murder only under a now-invalid theory, even if the record of
conviction does not demonstrate that the indictment rested on that scenario.” (Id. at
p. 224, italics added.) Gomez offers no such scenario here.
Finally, Gomez contends that the amendments to former section 1170.95 now
prohibit the trial court from relying on the preliminary hearing transcript at the prima
facie stage. Senate Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2) deleted
language in former section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(3) that provided, according to
Gomez’s interpretation, “the court could rely on the record of conviction.” But the
deleted text did not address what evidence the trial court could consider at the prima facie
stage, stating only that the “prosecutor and the petitioner may rely on the record of
conviction or offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens” at the
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evidentiary stage. (Ibid.) Indeed, the Legislature’s amendment explicitly codified the
holding in Lewis “regarding the standard for determining the existence of a prima facie
case.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1(b).) There the California Supreme Court explained that
the “record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry
under section 1170.95, allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit
from those that are clearly meritless. This is consistent with the statute’s overall purpose:
to ensure that murder culpability is commensurate with a person’s actions, while also
ensuring that clearly meritless petitions can be efficiently addressed as part of a single-
step prima facie review process.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) As the
preliminary hearing transcript is part of Gomez’s record of conviction, the trial court was
entitled to rely on the transcript to assess at the prima facie stage Gomez’s eligibility for
resentencing relief. (Pickett, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 988, rev. granted.)
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying the Penal Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing is
affirmed.
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____________________________________
Grover, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
____________________________
Lie, J.
H050814
People v Gomez
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