CourtListener 9502536•People v. Juarez CA2/5
Texte intégral
Filed 5/14/24 P. v. Juarez CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B329445
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA112098)
v.
HENRY DOMINGUEZ JUAREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Lisa S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed as
modified.
Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________
Defendant Henry Dominguez Juarez appeals from the trial
court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.6 (former 1170.95).1 Defendant’s appointed
counsel found no arguable issues and filed a brief under People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), and defendant then
filed a letter brief. Finding none of his arguments meritorious,
we affirm. We modify the abstract of judgment to show that
defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree.
In 2009, Javier Gonzalez and his girlfriend drove to pick up
a large amount of methamphetamine that Gonzalez and
defendant intended to sell.2 Gonzalez was a gang member. After
picking up the drugs, he and his girlfriend were driving to her
house when they saw several men standing around in a territory
claimed by a rival gang. Gonzalez called defendant and asked
him if he “wanted to play.” Gonzalez and his girlfriend picked
defendant up from his house, and the three drove to where the
group of men remained standing around. Gonzalez told his
girlfriend he was going to “bang on those fools,” and he and
defendant got out of the car and sprinted to the corner. A
shootout ensued. No one in the group of men standing on the
corner was injured, but Gonzalez was hit by a bullet. He and
defendant returned to the car driven by Gonzalez’s girlfriend,
where Gonzalez said to defendant, “You fucking shot me, dick.”
Defendant responded, “No, no, no. They shot back.” The
girlfriend took Gonzalez to the hospital, where he later died.
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We draw this factual summary from the opinion addressing
defendant’s direct appeal. (People v. Juarez (Oct. 1, 2012,
B234578) [nonpub. opn.].)
2
In 2011, a jury convicted defendant of a second degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), three attempted murders (§§ 664, 187,
subd. (a)), being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd.
(a)(1)), and, as to all counts, found allegations true that
defendant personally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53) and
committed the crimes in furtherance of a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22). The trial court sentenced defendant to a total of 70
years to life in state prison.
The judgment of conviction against defendant was affirmed
on direct appeal. (People v. Juarez, supra, B234578.)
In 2021, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 on his own behalf. The trial court appointed
counsel for defendant, and the People filed a response to the
petition, to which it attached the opinion on direct appeal and the
jury instructions.
In 2023, the trial court convened the prima facie hearing,
at which it denied the petition, finding defendant ineligible for
resentencing because “the jury was not instructed on felony
murder or natural [and] probable consequences, and no theories
were used that would impute liability on a co-perpetrator.”
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
Defendant’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to
Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pages 231-232 raising no issues.
On January 17, 2024, defendant filed a handwritten letter brief.
We limit our consideration to the issues raised in defendant’s
brief. (Delgadillo, at p. 232.)
DISCUSSION
In 2018, our Legislature amended the definition of
“murder” to preclude a jury from “imput[ing]” the “malice”
element “based solely on [a defendant’s] participation in a crime.”
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(§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) The purpose of this amendment was to
ensure that “[a] person’s culpability for murder [is] premised
upon that person’s own actions and subjective mens rea.” (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 1(g).) As amended, liability for murder is
generally limited to those who (1) are the actual killer, (2) aided
or abetted the actual killer in the murder, or (3) were a major
participant in the underlying felony that resulted in the killing,
but only if they also acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e).) Section 1172.6 is the
procedural vehicle by which those convicted can seek to vacate
convictions that do not satisfy the definition of “murder” as
amended.
Defendant first argues that the jury was improperly
instructed on transferred intent even though that doctrine does
not apply to attempted murder. Defendant appears to be raising
the same argument he raised on direct appeal, that “the trial
court erred in failing to restrict the use of the transferred intent
instruction . . . to the murder allegation,” which this court
rejected because the instruction “correctly state[d] the law with
respect to transferred intent.” Transferred intent falls outside
the purview of section 1172.6. (People v. Lopez (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 1242, 1249 [“Nothing in the language of [Senate
Bill No. 1437] demonstrates or even reasonably suggests that,
when eliminating the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, the Legislature also intended to abolish the doctrine of
transferred intent”]; see also People v. Burns (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 862, 865 [“Section 1172.6 does not create a right
to a second appeal”].)
Second, defendant refers to a “pro[voc]ative act argument,”
but does not articulate what the argument is. (See People v.
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Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 846, fn. 9 [a court may “ ‘ “pass
. . . without consideration” ’ ” a defendant’s “fleeting reference”
made without “any argument”].) Defendant cites People v. Lee
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1163 (Lee) as “updat[ing]” the
“pro[voc]ative act argument.” In that case, the court of appeal
reversed an order denying a section 1172.6 conviction at the
prima facie stage because the defendant’s 1994 conviction
preceded People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653 (Concha), in
which our Supreme Court for the first time expressed that a
defendant must personally harbor malice to be convicted of
provocative act murder. (Lee, at pp. 1180-1182.) Although the
jury here did receive provocative act instructions, Lee does not
aid defendant who was convicted in 2011, after Concha had been
decided. (E.g., People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1173
(Flores).)
Finally, defendant suggests that his conviction might rest
on the now defunct natural and probable consequences doctrine
because the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 3.40,
concerning causation, that Gonzalez’s cause of death “is an act
that sets in motion a chain of events that produces as a direct,
natural and probable consequence . . . the death.” This precise
argument has been repeatedly rejected, including in People v.
Carney (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130, 1147, in which our Supreme
Court stated that “the reference to ‘direct, natural and probable
consequence’ in [CALJIC No. 3.40], which deals with the actus
reus of murder, does not implicate concerns regarding imputed
mens rea and vicarious liability identified in . . . Senate Bill No.
1437.” (Accord People v. Carr (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 136, 146.)
The abstract and amended abstracts of judgment reflect
defendant’s murder conviction as one in the first degree, but the
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opinion from the direct appeal (People v. Juarez, supra, B234578)
indicates that defendant was convicted for second degree murder,
which the People concede is correct. The trial court also stated at
the sentencing hearing that “the jury found . . . defendant not
guilty of first degree murder but guilty of murder in the second
degree” and sentenced him accordingly.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying defendant’s section 1172.6
petition and modify the abstract of judgment to reflect
defendant's conviction for second degree murder.
LEE, J.*
WE CONCUR:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
MOOR, J.
* Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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