People v. Silva CA2/5

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Filed 5/14/24 P. v. Silva CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B328753

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA087038)
v.

RAFAEL FIGUEROA SILVA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Sean D. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
Edward H. Schulman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Rafael Figueroa Silva appeals from an order
denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.6.1 We affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Underlying Criminal Conviction

On May 5, 2008, the Los Angeles County District Attorney
(District Attorney) filed an amended information alleging among
other things that defendant and codefendant Eudaldo Delatorre
committed the attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated
murder of David Folger (§§ 187, 664; count 1) and shot from a
motor vehicle at David Folger (§ 12034, subd. (c); count 3).2 For
each count, the District Attorney also alleged that a principal
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm which caused
great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) and (e)(1)), a
principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (id.,
subds. (c) and (e)(1)), a principal personally used a firearm (id.,
subds. (b) and (e)(1)), and the crime was committed for the

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise indicated.
The Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 as section
1172.6 effective June 30, 2022. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For
clarity, we will refer to section 1172.6 throughout this opinion.

2 For count 2, the District Attorney alleged defendant
committed the attempted murder of Darrell Folger. The jury
found defendant not guilty of this count.

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benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subds. (b)(1)(C)). As to
codefendant Delatorre only, the District Attorney further alleged
that he personally and intentionally discharged and used a
firearm.
On May 15, 2008, a jury convicted defendant of counts 1
and 3. The jury also found true the firearm allegations, and that
the crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang.
On June 10, 2008, the trial court sentenced defendant to 39
years to life for count 1, consisting of 14 years to life, plus a
consecutive 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement
pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The court stayed
the sentence on count 3 pursuant to section 654.3 This court
affirmed the judgment on appeal. (People v. Silva
(Sept. 18, 2009, B209044) [nonpub. opn.].)

B. Section 1172.6 Petition

On April 19, 2022, defendant filed a section 1172.6 petition
for resentencing. On April 25, 2022, the trial court appointed
counsel for defendant.4

3 The Attorney General requests that this court treat the
factual recitation in the respondent’s brief as errata and
“incorporat[e] this Court’s factual summary from its underlying
opinion by reference.” We take judicial notice of our prior opinion
(Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)) but observe that the factual
summary in that opinion is not evidence that may be considered
at the prima facie stage. (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
974, 988.)

4 On May 31, 2022, defendant filed a second petition for
resentencing, which was identical to the first, except that it

3
On December 16, 2022, the District Attorney filed a
response and attached as exhibits this court’s prior opinion, the
jury instructions, and the verdict forms. As relevant here, at
trial, the trial court instructed the jury with: CALCRIM Nos. 400
and 401, aiding and abetting; CALCRIM No. 600, attempted
murder; and CALCRIM No. 601, deliberation and premeditation
for attempted murder. The court did not instruct the jury on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.5
On January 24, 2023, the trial court found that because the
jury was never instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, defendant was ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. Defendant timely appealed.

III. DISCUSSION

Section 1172.6 “creates a procedure for convicted murderers
[and attempted murderers] who could not be convicted under the
law as amended to retroactively seek relief.” (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis); People v. Drayton (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 965, 973 (Drayton), abrogated by Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 963.) “If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing
that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an
order to show cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)

included a notice of service to the District Attorney’s Office. The
trial court, after noting that the petition was duplicative of the
first, took no further action on it.

5 Nor did the trial court instruct the jury on the felony
murder theory.

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“While the trial court may look at the record of conviction
after the appointment of counsel to determine whether a
petitioner has made a prima facie case for section [1172.6] relief,
the prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited. Like the
analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘“the
court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a
preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would
be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.
If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.”’ (Drayton,
supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 978, quoting Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.551(c)(1).) ‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s factual
allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an
evidentiary hearing.’ (Drayton, [supra, 47 Cal.App.5th] at p. 978,
fn. omitted . . . .) ‘However, if the record, including the court’s
own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in
the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.”’ (Drayton, [supra, 47
Cal.App.5th] at p. 979 . . . .)
“. . . In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at
this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in
‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’ (Drayton, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 980.) . . . [T]he
‘prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very low.’”
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971–972.)
Defendant contends that the aiding and abetting and
premeditation instructions permitted the jury to “impute” to him
the mental state of premeditation and deliberation. In
defendant’s view, he therefore satisfied his prima facie burden
under section 1172.6, subdivision (c). We review de novo
defendant’s contention that the trial court did not conduct a

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proper inquiry at the prima facie stage. (People v. Coley (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 539, 545 (Coley).)
The trial court instructed the jury on premeditation, in
part, as follows: “The attempted murder was done willfully and
with deliberation and premeditation if either Rafael Silva or
Eudaldo Delatorre or both of them acted with that state of mind.”
(See CALCRIM No. 601.) According to defendant, the use of the
disjunctive allowed the jury to impute Delatorre’s state of mind to
him. Defendant’s argument is inapposite for purposes of his
entitlement to relief under section 1172.6. Regardless of the
relative merits of defendant’s challenge to the jury instruction
regarding the jury’s deliberation and premeditation finding,
defendant does not dispute that he was convicted of attempted
murder under a direct aiding and abetting theory predicated on a
finding of specific intent to kill, a finding that renders him
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. (Cf.
People v. Gonzalez (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 869, 880 [rejecting
defendants’ argument that § 1172.6 “requires a trial court to
reduce a first degree murder conviction to second degree murder
if it did not find the defendant committed the murder with
deliberation and premeditation. . . . Section 1172.6’s plain
language does not contain a mechanism for a trial court to reduce
a first degree murder conviction to second degree murder”].)
Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part:
“A person convicted of felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter
may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to

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have the petitioner’s murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any
remaining counts . . . .” (Italics added.)
“Section [1172.6] applies by its terms only to attempted
murders based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. [Citation.] The jurors in this case were not instructed
on that doctrine. They were given CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401,
on the theory of direct aiding and abetting, as well as CALCRIM
No. 600, which advised them that an attempted murder
conviction required a finding that ‘the defendants intended to kill
[the victim].’ Direct aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of
attempted murder after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 775.
(People v. Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 191, 197.)” (Coley,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548.) Defendant seeks to distinguish
Coley on the grounds that the jury in that case did not find that
defendant committed the attempted murder with premeditation.
That procedural distinction, however, does not require a different
result here as the statutory language controls. “‘“‘As in any case
involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is
to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s
purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s words,
giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.’”’” (People v.
Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.) We therefore reject
defendant’s argument.

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IV. DISPOSITION

The order denying the section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM, J.

We concur:

MOOR, Acting P. J.

LEE, J.

 Judge of the San Bernardino Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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