CourtListener 9502523•Petties v. Ackerman CA2/5
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Filed 5/14/24 Petties v. Ackerman CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
AKISHA PETTIES, B328526
Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22CHRO01914)
ANDREW ACKERMAN,
Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Laura Streimer, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Christian Contreras and Christian
Contreras for Appellant.
Akisha Petties, in pro. per., for Respondent.
________________________
Appellant Andrew Ackerman appeals from an order
denying a motion to quash service of process and a restraining
order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA; Fam.
Code, § 6200 et seq.) for the protection of his former girlfriend,
respondent Akisha Petties. Ackerman, who is a resident of
Texas, contends that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction
over him and the order constitutes a prior restraint on speech.
We conclude the appellate record is inadequate for review
because it does not contain a reporter’s transcript of the initial
hearing on Ackerman’s motion to quash service of process at
which the trial court heard evidence from the parties. Even were
we to find the record adequate for review, however, it contains
ample evidence supporting the trial court’s finding of personal
jurisdiction. The order does not violate Ackerman’s
constitutional free speech rights, and therefore, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Request for DVRO
On October 12, 2022, Petties filed a request for a domestic
violence restraining order (DVRO) against former boyfriend
Ackerman. She provided a mailing address in Austin, Texas.
She alleged Ackerman harassed her online for 11 months using
different accounts, created a website about her, posted pictures of
her without her consent, contacted her friends and followers to
lure them to his website, and continued to make disparaging
comments to her and about her on social media platforms.
Ackerman’s comments were causing her anxiety and fear that
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she would be viewed negatively by her employers, inhibiting her
ability to secure work in her field.
That day, the trial court granted a temporary restraining
order. Ackerman’s address was listed in Plano, Texas.
Ackerman was ordered to stay at least 100 yards from Petties,
her home, her job, and her car.
Motion to Quash Service of Process
Ackerman filed a motion to quash service of process. He
asserted that there was no basis for California to exercise
personal jurisdiction over him, as he is a Texas resident, has no
contacts with California, did not take any actions targeted at
California, and had not purposefully availed himself of the forum.
Ackerman submitted his declaration in support of the
motion to quash. For the past eight years, he has been a resident
of Texas. He has never been a resident of California and has no
assets in California. He met Petties in 2015 in Texas, and all of
their interactions in person were in Texas. Petties attended high
school in Texas. She travels frequently, so Ackerman was not
certain where she was physically located when they
communicated.
A hearing was held on the motion to quash on
December 20, 2022. No reporter’s transcript of the hearing has
been made part of the appellate record. Petties represented
herself and Ackerman was represented by counsel. At a
subsequent hearing, the court mentioned Ackerman’s testimony
was taken on December 20, 2022, and there was testimony that
Petties lived in California when the parties’ relationship ended.
The trial court continued the motion to quash to January 4, 2023.
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On December 30, 2022, Petties filed a request for
temporary emergency orders specifying the conduct that she
wanted to cease and providing evidence to support finding
minimum contacts with California.
On January 4, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the
motion to quash and the ex parte application. The court
ultimately sustained objections to the documentary evidence
presented in the ex parte application.
Petties testified that Ackerman was ruining her reputation
and her business as an entertainment professional. After the
prior court hearing, Ackerman registered her name as a domain
and added her followers to another fake Instagram web page
luring them to the website. His comments suggest that she
doesn’t believe in doctors, is a gold digger, has sugar daddies, and
has sexually transmitted diseases. Many people have asked her
about the social media pages. Petties is adversely affected
emotionally, and her reputation has been adversely affected.
Petties also testified that Ackerman sent her multiple,
repetitive harassing texts saying he cannot stop himself. She
asked him multiple times to stop contacting her. He has
impersonated her by creating fake web pages in her name and
amassed a network of her friends and followers. He told her to
stop blocking contact with him or he would continue creating
accounts and posting in her name and about her.
The trial court found that the alleged harassing texts and
conduct directed at Petties through the internet, including
exposing her image and threatening to defame her, were targeted
at her in California. It was conduct that would indisputably
disturb her peace of mind within the meaning of the DVPA and
could be the basis for a restraining order. The court found there
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was personal jurisdiction to hear the matter in the California
court and denied the motion to quash service.
Trial
A trial was held on January 25 and March 8, 2023. Petties
testified that she and Ackerman dated off and on after meeting in
2015. She moved to California in October 2020. They became
engaged in January 2021, but could not agree whether Ackerman
would move to California or Petties would move back to Texas.
Petties broke off the relationship in February 2021. In
September 2021, Petties married another individual.
In December 2021, a female friend received a comment on
her TikTok account from an account under the name Beige
Active, which is a variation of the name of Petties’ business. The
comment implied Petties and her friend were in an intimate
relationship. Ackerman later admitted writing the comment.
Petties described several additional negative comments that
Ackerman posted under various account names on her Instagram
page and her friends’ pages about her.
In January 2022, Petties sent Ackerman a text asking him
to stop stalking her online and to leave her alone or she would
obtain a restraining order. He claimed that he was not stalking
her, but simply viewing and commenting on her public page.
When Petties blocked his account, he created a new anonymous
account and left additional comments.
On January 24, 2022, Petties posted a photo on her
Instagram account with the caption “Angles,” referring to
modeling angles. Ackerman sent a direct message to Petties from
an Instagram account with the username Good.People.Don’t.Lie
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that said, “If you ever think you’re not a bad person, it’s a lie.
Liars lie to themselves the most. You should never associate
yourself with the word ‘angel.’ ” He also left a public comment on
her photo from Good. People.Don’t.Lie2 referring to plastic
surgery. Petties felt very disturbed that he was still contacting
her, and plastic surgery was not information that she wanted to
be made public. She felt violated and extremely embarrassed,
because her followers would see her personal information. She
had recently won a competition at an international model and
talent association. As a result, she had several new followers.
She was extremely embarrassed for her new followers, many of
whom were young girls, to see his comments.
Petties texted him privately to tell him that he was
harassing her and to ask what he hoped to achieve by continuing
to post on her pictures. He responded in pertinent part, “I want
you to accept that every time you look into [the] mirror you see a
bad person and every time you look into a camera that everyone
back is looking at a bad person.” Petties did not respond.
In September 2022, Petties contacted the police and
provided screenshots of the accounts and comments. The case
was sent to law enforcement in Texas.
Later that month, Ackerman purchased the domain name
www.akisha-petties.com and created a public website. The
website states at the top, “Get to know Akisha Petties.”
Ackerman described their relationship and posted private
pictures that she had sent him without her permission. He
accused her of receiving payments for sex. He insinuated that
she had a sexually transmitted disease and issues with drug use.
Petties’ TikTok page is under the account name AK723. In
October 2022, Ackerman used an account named AK.lies to make
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comments about Petties on her friend’s TikTok page. When the
friend deleted the comments, Ackerman used a new account
AK.is.lying to leave more comments about Petties. On the
AK.lies page, Ackerman posted a video of her with the caption,
“The face of a liar @AK723,” tagging Petties to obtain her
attention.
In November 2022, Petties saw an Instagram account that
Ackerman created with the username not.Akisha.Petties and six
photos of Petties. Some of the photos were from her public social
media accounts. He added her coworkers, friends, and family
members. Among other comments, he posted, “Pic 1 real; pic 2
implants and filler. Outside is now as fake as inside.” Ackerman
admitted that he made the account. Some of the photos of Petties
posted on the account were pictures that only Ackerman had.
In December 2022, Petties discovered an Instagram
account Ackerman created under the username
akisha.petties.and.me. He posted a photo of them to the account
in December 2022 that no one else had. He wrote “Check the link
and bio for more” and used a hyperlink to direct people to the
website that he created, www.akisha-petties.com. He followed
Pettis’ followers, including her employers, coworkers, and her
agent.
In addition, in December 2022, after the restraining order
was entered, Ackerman posted “Akisha is a lying whore” on the
website www.akisha-petties.com.
Ackerman used a variation of the name of Petties’ business
for his YouTube channel. He posted innocuous videos of her with
comments advising people to go to the Instagram page
akisha.petties.and.me and to the website.
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Petties felt compelled to set her social media accounts to
private, which limits her ability to reach new followers and
generate interest in her posts as a model and a singer.
Ackerman testified that he bought airline tickets in
December 2020 for Petties to fly from California to Texas for a
Valentine’s weekend in February 2021. He believed she lied to
him about not being able to come see him because she was sick.
Ackerman stated that he created the website www.akisha-
petties.com because he learned Petties wanted to be a role model
for young actresses, and social media has a negative influence on
young women, so he felt it was necessary to let people know who
Petties really was.
He has not created additional Instagram accounts or posted
additional comments because one account is sufficient to direct
people to the website so they have accurate information about
who Akisha Petties really is. Although Petties tried to have the
Instagram account removed, Instagram reinstated the account
after Ackerman provided additional information showing that he
was not violating Instagram’s terms of service.
Trial Court Ruling
On March 8, 2023, the trial court issued its ruling. The
court stated that between December 2021 and December 2022,
Ackerman created at least seven accounts on various social media
platforms about Petties that included her name or initials in the
account name. “Though he may not have been outright
impersonating [Petties] so much as journalling his own unhappy
experiences with her, the use and dissemination of her name and
images disturbed her peace. [¶] These accounts further implied
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or accused her of having an STD and men paid her for sex. He
labeled her as a liar, suggested she was gay, and referred to her
enlistment of [sugar] daddies.”
Ackerman’s conduct distressed Petties. She spent
considerable time monitoring the internet for his activities,
speaking with law enforcement, speaking with administrators of
social media sites, speaking with her employer when Ackerman’s
conduct had an impact on her at work, and ultimately filing the
request for a restraining order. She is depressed and anxious as
a result of Ackerman’s conduct. Ackerman’s attempts to malign
and defame Petties have interfered with her ability to promote
herself in an industry where social media acts as a professional
resume. She has had to set her accounts to private, which limits
people that she can connect with to those that she has specifically
invited to her page.
The trial court found Petties was not the kind of public
figure that could or should expect criticism or abuse by followers.
She was just getting started in the entertainment industry.
Ackerman’s communications were very focused and directed at
Petties. His conduct arose from their prior domestic relationship
and that he believes he is entitled to the return of gifts or money.
His communications were intended to bully Petties, tarnish her
image, and interfere with her ability to move forward in her life.
“The court finds that [Ackerman’s] conduct is deplorable,
perhaps motivated by the fact that the relationship ended or that
he believes she owed him money or things. He is engaged in
harassing outreach designed to interfere with [Petties’] goal and
her life. The comments and posts are belittling and potentially
defamatory and slanderous. He has reached out to her followers
to spread what he thinks is critical messaging about her. Those
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followers included her employers, her coworkers, an agent, her
acting coach. She has been so embarrassed by his conduct that
she has considered not reporting to work. [¶] The court finds
that whether she is overly sensitive or not, [Ackerman’s] conduct
will disturb the peace of any reasonable person.” The court
concluded that Petties was entitled to immediate relief.
The court added, “And I finally just want to say a word
about direct communications. While the bulk of [Ackerman’s]
conduct has taken place on the internet behind the safety of his
computer out of the state of California, there have been direct
communications long after she testified she’d asked him to leave
her alone. The court saw a text in June of 2022, in which she
very specifically advised [Ackerman] to stop communicating with
her or about her, that the following month he posted a photo of
her on a hiking trail on the ‘Akisha Petties_’ site. [¶] In sum, the
court finds [Ackerman’s] relentless conduct, which includes the
creation of sites using [Petties’] name and images without her
consent along with the kind of running commentary that [Petties]
fears will tarnish her reputation, to be exactly the kind of conduct
that the Domestic Violence Protection Act was designed to protect
victims from enduring. [¶] This conduct was intended to hurt
her, to get back at her, and to destroy her reputation. It’s also
clear to the court that the conduct only stopped because the court
issued a temporary restraining order. . . . Further, the court
doesn’t believe that he will leave her alone absent a restraining
order. He was still in contact with her and posting about her
many months after the relationship ended.” The court found
Petties met her burden by a preponderance of the evidence and
granted the request for a restraining order.
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The court issued a restraining order for two years.
Ackerman is not to have any contact with Petties in any form,
whether direct, indirect, through social media, through her
friends, through her employer, or through anyone. The court
directed him to move his life forward as if Petties did not exist.
The court also instructed him to stay 100 yards away from her,
her home, her job, and her car. The court admonished Ackerman
not to try to violate the order through a workaround, and ordered
that he was not to comment on Petties’ social media platforms
about her or to her under his own or any other name. The court
ordered him to remove all sites on the internet that included her
name and/or image. The court explained that he was free to
engage on social media, but that he could not post any images of
Petties, use her name, or post content about her.
The trial court entered a restraining order that same day.
Ackerman filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Personal Jurisdiction
Ackerman contends there is no substantial evidence to
support the trial court’s finding of personal jurisdiction. We
conclude that the record is inadequate for appellate review of this
issue, but even on the limited record presented, there is clearly
substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings.
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A. General Principles
California courts “may exercise jurisdiction on any basis
not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the
United States.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) The federal
Constitution permits a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over
an out-of-state defendant “if the defendant has such minimum
contacts with the state that the assertion of jurisdiction does not
violate “ ‘ “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” ’ ” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14
Cal.4th 434, 444.) Personal jurisdiction may be general or
specific. (Thomson v. Anderson (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 258, 265–
266 (Thomson).) The sole issue in this case is whether Ackerman
is subject to specific jurisdiction.
A defendant may be subject to specific jurisdiction when (1)
the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of
forum benefits; (2) the controversy at issue arises from or is
related to the defendant’s forum-related contact; and (3) assertion
of jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice.
(Thomson, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 265; Pavlovich v.
Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 269 (Pavlovich).)
B. Relevant Case Law Illustrating Purposeful
Availment
The first step of the jurisdiction inquiry depends on the
nature of the claim. (Casey v. Hill (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1143,
1170 (Casey).) In tort claims, courts use a “ ‘ “purposeful
direction” ’ ” test and consider whether there is evidence that the
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defendant directed actions at the forum, even if the actions were
taken outside of the forum. (Ibid.) The purposeful direction test
requires evidence of intentional conduct that deliberately targets
the forum state along with the defendant’s knowledge that the
conduct would cause harm in the forum. (Ibid.)
It is the defendant’s intentional and allegedly tortious
conduct directed at the forum that creates the necessary contacts
to assert personal jurisdiction. (Casey, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1171; Rivelli v. Hemm (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 380, 395–396
(Rivelli).) “Applying these principles, numerous courts have
found the purposeful direction requirement met where the
nonresident defendant purposefully sent tortious communications
into a forum and thereby injured its residents.” (Casey, at
p. 1171.)
The United States Supreme Court introduced the “effects”
test in Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783 (Calder). In Calder,
an actress who lived and worked in California filed a libel action
in California against a reporter and an editor working in Florida
based on an article about her in a nationally-syndicated
newspaper. (Id. at pp. 784–786.) The defendants moved to quash
service on the ground that California lacked personal jurisdiction
over them as Florida residents. (Id. at pp. 785–786, 789.) The
Calder court disagreed, concluding the defendants had relied on
California sources, wrote an article about the California activities
of a California resident, knew the article would have a potentially
devastating impact on the plaintiff, and knew the harm from
emotional distress and reputational injury would be suffered in
California, where the newspaper had its largest circulation. (Id.
at pp. 788–790.) “In sum, California [was] the focal point both of
the story and of the harm suffered. Jurisdiction over [the
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defendants was] proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of their
Florida conduct in California.” (Id. at p. 789.) “An individual
injured in California need not go to Florida to seek redress from
persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause the
injury in California.” (Id. at p. 790.)
In Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277 (Walden), the
United States Supreme Court explained that the analysis focuses
on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation. (Id. at pp. 283–284.) The defendant’s conduct must
create contacts with the forum state that are the basis for
jurisdiction, not merely contacts with people who reside in the
state. (Id. at pp. 285–286.) Of course, the defendant’s contacts
with the forum state may be intertwined with his interactions
with the plaintiff, but the defendant’s relationship to the plaintiff
alone is insufficient for jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 286.)
Courts have found no basis to exercise jurisdiction when a
defendant did not direct allegedly tortious activity at California,
even if the plaintiff experienced injury in California. For
example, in Pavlovich, supra, the California Supreme Court
applied the effects test to conclude that a nonresident defendant
who merely posted a California plaintiff's proprietary information
on a website accessible to the general public did not expressly
aim his tortious conduct at or intentionally target California. (Id.
at pp. 273–279.)
Similarly, in Burdick v. Superior Court (2015) 233
Cal.App.4th 8 (Burdick), an employee living in Illinois made a
public social media post suggesting a group of bloggers had
criminal histories. (Id. at pp. 14–15.) The bloggers filed an
action in California against the employee. (Id. at p. 16.) The
Burdick court concluded that merely posting an allegedly
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defamatory statement on social media while knowing the
plaintiffs were in California, which was the suit-related conduct
in that case, did not create a “substantial connection” between
the defendant and California. (Id. at pp. 25–26.) There was no
evidence that the social media page had a California audience
through the defendant’s social media connections or
advertisements on the page. (Ibid.) Simply posting on a public
social media page, knowing the plaintiff was in California, was
insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the defendant.
In contrast, in Zehia v. Superior Court (2020) 45
Cal.App.5th 543, 554 (Zehia), the court found it had jurisdiction
based on limited effects in California. A defendant located in
Michigan sent direct messages to a plaintiff in California and
created fake messages impersonating the plaintiff, which the
defendant sent to a third party in California. (Id. at p. 556.) The
Zehia court found the defendant’s messages were targeted
exclusively at a California audience (the plaintiff and the third
party). The defendant’s contacts with California were not
random, fortuitous, or attenuated, and did not result from
unilateral activities of the plaintiff. (Id. at p. 557.) In addition,
the alleged reputational injury occurred when the defamatory
statements were received by the California residents, which
connected the defendant’s conduct to California. (Ibid.) Based on
these factors, the Zehia court concluded the defendant’s suit-
related conduct established a substantial connection with
California. (Id. at p. 558.) By sending messages and
conversations directly to California residents for the alleged
purpose of interfering with their relationship and causing
reputational injury in California, the court found the defendant
purposefully reached beyond his state and into California, such
15
that he should reasonably anticipate being required to respond in
a California court. (Ibid.)
Courts have found jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff
suffered injury in California and the defendant’s alleged tortious
conduct directed at California implicated an important interest of
the forum as expressed by state statute. In Hogue v. Hogue
(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 833 (Hogue), a wife living in California
sought a restraining order against her estranged husband living
in Georgia. The husband did not deny sending a video message
to her on social media pretending to shoot himself in the mouth.
(Id. at p. 838.) The Hogue court concluded that the DVPA reflects
California’s concern with an exceptional type of conduct that it
subjects to special regulation. (Id. at p. 839.) The court further
stated, “The act of purposefully sending a video of a mock suicide
to plaintiff in California (particularly in the context of alleged
domestic violence taking place in Georgia) is indisputably
conduct that would disturb plaintiff’s peace of mind within the
meaning of the act and be the basis for granting a restraining
order. [Citations.] As a result, this was sufficient to vest
personal jurisdiction in the courts of this state over defendant to
enjoin any further such conduct.” (Id. at p. 839.)
C. Standard of Review
“The existence of personal jurisdiction will often present a
mixed question of law and fact. [Citation.] To the extent that
there are factual conflicts, the trial court resolves those disputes
and the substantial evidence standard governs our review.
[Citation.] The ultimate question whether jurisdiction is fair and
reasonable under all of the circumstances, based on the facts
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which are undisputed and those resolved by the court in favor of
the prevailing party, is a legal determination warranting our
independent review. [Citations.]” (Integral Development Corp. v.
Weissenbach (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 576, 585.)
D. Evidence Supporting Specific Jurisdiction
Ackerman contends there is no substantial evidence to
support the trial court’s finding of specific jurisdiction. It is well-
settled that the trial court order is presumed to be correct, all
inferences and presumptions are drawn in support of the trial
court’s order, and the appellant must affirmatively show error.
(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is the
appellant’s burden on appeal to provide a record which overcomes
the presumption of correctness. (Webman v. Little Co. of Mary
Hospital (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 592, 595.) In the present case,
Ackerman did not provide a reporter’s transcript of the initial
hearing on the motion to quash service of process. This court is
unable to review the evidence presented at that hearing and
must assume the parties presented evidence from which the trial
court properly concluded it could exercise personal jurisdiction
over Ackerman.
There is ample evidence in the appellate record that has
been provided, however, to support finding that Ackerman is
subject to specific jurisdiction in California because he
purposefully directed conduct at California to disturb Petties’
peace of mind. The evidence showed Ackerman knew Petties
moved to California in October 2020. He purchased plane tickets
for Petties to fly from California to visit him in Texas. During
their relationship, they could not agree whether Ackerman would
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move to California or Petties would move back to Texas. He
knew she worked and was establishing a career in California.
The suit-related conduct was creating a web site and social
media profiles that incorporated Petties’ name, and using these
accounts to post embarrassing and derogatory information about
Petties without her permission. Knowing Petties was a resident
of California, his conduct was targeted at California to disturb
her peace of mind. By contacting her friends, family, employer,
agent, and coworkers to view the embarrassing and derogatory
material posted on his accounts, he also targeted several other
individuals living in California. His suit-related conduct was
directed at a California audience, allowing California to exercise
specific jurisdiction over Ackerman in this case. The trial court
properly denied the motion to quash service of the complaint.
Prior Restraint on Speech
Ackerman also contends the restraining order is an
improper prior restraint of his right to free speech under the
federal constitution. He has not challenged the scope of the trial
court’s order, as he expressly conceded at oral argument, but
rather the court’s imposition of any restraint on his speech. We
disagree with his analysis. Ackerman’s ability to engage in
activity that has been determined to constitute abuse is not the
type of “speech” that is afforded constitutional protection.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides: “ ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .’ ” “This fundamental right to free speech
applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process clause.” (Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999)
18
21 Cal.4th 121, 133–134 (plur. opn. of George, C.J.) (Aguilar).)
“ ‘[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most
serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights.’ [Citation.] ‘The term prior restraint is used “to describe
administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain
communications when issued in advance of the time that such
communications are to occur.” [Citation.] . . . . [P]ermanent
injunctions—i.e., court orders that actually forbid speech
activities—are classic examples of prior restraints.’ ” (DVD Copy
Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner (2003) 31 Cal.4th 864, 886, italics
omitted.)
“Although stated in broad terms, the right to free speech is
not absolute.” (Aguilar, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 134.) Categories
of communication to which First Amendment protection does not
extend include libelous speech (Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v.
Lemen (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141, 1147 (Lemen)), and words that
constitute employment discrimination (Aguilar, supra, 21 Cal.4th
at pp. 134–135, 141–142).
In In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney (2015) 237
Cal.App.4th 1416, 1428 (Evilsizor), the appellate court concluded
a DVRO prohibiting husband from disseminating the contents of
wife’s phone was not a prohibited prior restraint on protected
speech because husband’s conduct constituted “abuse” under the
DVPA. (Ibid.)
The trial court in the present case, after a contested
hearing, found Ackerman’s conduct amounted to abuse under the
DVPA. As the court noted in Evilsizor, “[t]his distinguishes the
present case from those in which trial courts enjoined speech
before a determination was made that the speech was
unprotected. For example, in Evans v. Evans (2008) 162
19
Cal.App.4th 1157[,] the appellate court reversed the issuance of a
preliminary injunction that prohibited a party from publishing
certain statements about her former husband, because the
injunction was overbroad and amounted to an invalid prior
restraint before trial. [Citations.] The Evans court emphasized,
however, that a court may prohibit a party from repeating
statements determined at trial to be defamatory, because
defamatory statements are not subject to protection under the
First Amendment.” (Evilsizor, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1429.) In the instant case, the trial court entered an order
after a contested hearing where it determined Ackerman
committed abuse under the DVPA.
As stated in Evilsizor, “This approach is consistent with
well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence. ‘[A]n injunctive
order prohibiting the repetition of expression that ha[s] been
judicially determined to be unlawful d[oes] not constitute a
prohibited prior restraint of speech.’ (Lemen, supra, 40 Cal.4th at
p. 1153.) For example, following a court trial in Lemen, the trial
court determined that the defendant had defamed a restaurant
and bar, and it entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the
defendant from repeating the defamatory statements. (Id. at
pp. 1144–1146.) The Supreme Court held that ‘an injunction
issued following a trial that determined that the defendant
defamed the plaintiff that does no more than prohibit the
defendant from repeating the defamation, is not a prior restraint
and does not offend the First Amendment.’ (Id. at p. 1148.)
‘ “Once specified expressional acts are properly determined to be
unprotected by the first amendment, there can be no objection to
their subsequent suppression or prosecution.” ’ (Id. at p. 1156.)
Likewise in Aguilar, supra, 21 Cal.4th 121, the Supreme Court
20
held that where there has been a judicial determination that the
use of racial epithets constitutes employment discrimination, an
injunction prohibiting the continued use of those slurs does not
violate the right to freedom of speech and does not amount to a
prohibited prior restraint of speech. [Citation.]” (Evilsizor,
supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1429–1430.)
Under the circumstances, the court’s protective order does
not violate Ackerman’s right to free speech.
DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion to quash and the restraining
order are affirmed. Respondent Akisha Petties is awarded her
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, Acting, P. J.
We concur:
KIM, J.
LEE, J.
Judge of the San Bernardino Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
21
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