People v. Uriostegui

CourtListener 9502465Calctapp5 avr. 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 4/5/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B325200
(Super. Ct. No. 22CR04156)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)

v.

ISRAEL MARCIAL
URIOSTEGUI,

Defendant and Appellant.

More than eight decades ago, our high court declared that
“ ‘one who is on trial for an alleged crime is entitled to a jury from
which individuals of [their] own race who are otherwise qualified
as jurors in the particular case . . . have not been arbitrarily
excluded merely because of their nationality, race or color.’ ”
(People v. Hines (1939) 12 Cal.2d 535, 539.) Our Legislature
recently enacted Code of Civil Procedure1 section 231.7 to help
eradicate the improper removal of jurors based on their actual or
perceived race, ethnicity, gender, or membership in another

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
specified protected group. Now, certain reasons for removing a
juror are presumptively invalid unless the reasons articulated
“bear on the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in
the case” and the trial court makes such a finding. (§ 231.7,
subds. (e), (f).) Certain demeanor-based justifications are also
presumptively invalid unless the demeanor “matters to the case
to be tried” and the justification is independently confirmed by
the trial court. (Id., subd. (g)(2).)
But what if a facially neutral reason given by a party to
remove a juror—such as “lack of life experience”—is based on a
presumptively invalid reason, such as lack of employment or
demeanor? Absent reasons articulated by the party exercising
the peremptory challenge that bear on the prospective juror’s
ability to be fair and impartial and concern the case to be tried,
and without corresponding express findings by the trial court, we
hold that such a practice violates section 231.7.
Israel Marcial Uriostegui appeals from the judgment after a
jury convicted him of first degree residential burglary.2 (Pen.
Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a).) The trial court suspended
imposition of sentence and placed Uriostegui on two years of
formal probation. Uriostegui contends the trial court erred when
it denied his objection pursuant to section 231.7. We agree, and
reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Jury selection
Uriostegui’s jury trial commenced in November 2022.
During voir dire, the trial court asked prospective juror T.N. to
provide “basic information.” T.N. provided her name, which had

2 The facts underlying defendant’s offenses are not
necessary to the issues on appeal.

2
a Spanish surname. She said, “I work at Taco Bell” but “I am not
currently working because of an injury.” She also said she had no
military service or prior jury service. She added that she “ha[d]
two family members that ha[d] been convicted of a crime, but
[was] not close with them.”
In response to questioning by Uriostegui’s counsel, T.N.
stated she would not need the defense “to prove anything,” she
did not need the defendant to testify to find him not guilty, and it
was “perfectly fine” for the defendant to use an interpreter. The
prosecutor did not ask T.N. any questions about these issues.
Outside the presence of the other jurors, T.N. disclosed that
her mother was convicted of a crime and her father was sent to
prison. These convictions occurred about eight years earlier.
T.N. told the court that having close family members convicted of
crimes would “absolutely not” affect her ability to serve as a juror
in this case.
During questioning by the prosecutor, T.N. said she was
not close with her biological parents, had been in foster care, and
had no feelings about incarceration. What happened to her
parents was “definitely” fair under the circumstances. The
prosecutor said he had no further questions.
Uriostegui’s counsel objected when the prosecutor exercised
a peremptory challenge against T.N. Referencing section 231.7,
Uriostegui’s counsel said the basis for excusing T.N.—“having a
close relationship with family members . . . convicted of crimes”—
was presumptively invalid (§ 231.7, subd. (e)(3)) and that T.N.
“appears to be Hispanic.” When asked by the court to explain the
basis for excusing T.N., the prosecutor stated:

“[T.N.] told us that . . . she works at Taco Bell. That
she has an [a]ssociates degree in Arts. No military

3
service. That she is not currently working. That she
has a significant other but no kids, no prior jury
service. I think that People’s peremptory was based
in a lack of life experience. So the fact that she has
no children, seems to—seems very young in—or
rather very inexperienced in her presentation of
herself. Perhaps appears even younger than she
actually is. I think that is attributable to life
experience, and to limited ties to the community. I
would also note that she appeared very malleable in
terms of her answers to questions. That she was
agreeable to all of the lines of questioning presented
by the Defense, then was equally agreeable to all the
lines of questioning presented by the Prosecution. So
she appeared kind of reluctant, timid, malleable. Not
the kind of person who would independently make a
judgment about the facts in a case, come to her own
conclusions and not be swayed by her fellow jurors.
Her soft-spokeness [sic], reluctance and timidity, I
think, were apparent to everybody.”

The prosecutor also said he had “concerns” about T.N.’s “ability to
fully understand” the questions asked during voir dire.
Uriostegui’s counsel countered that the prosecutor’s
demeanor-based objections were presumptively invalid. He
added that T.N. “seemed intelligent and to be paying attention,
and her answers were logical.”
The trial court acknowledged that T.N. “[c]ertainly has
potentially a Hispanic last name,” but denied the objection
because “in light of the totality of circumstances” there was “not a
substantial likelihood” that T.N.’s actual or perceived
membership in a protected class was a factor in the use of the
peremptory challenge. It reasoned, “[W]hile I think there was
certainly more questions that could have been asked by both

4
sides, [T.N.] did, based on the questions and based on [the
prosecutor’s] explanation as to why he exercised the preemptory
[sic], I don’t believe it was a socio-economic one.” The court noted
T.N.’s age and concluded that “it is reasonable that her . . . lack of
life experience is unrelated to conscious or unconscious bias as to
that specific juror. I don’t believe that his reason for peremptory
had anything to do with the fact that she may be Hispanic.”
DISCUSSION
Uriostegui contends the trial court erred when it denied his
objection pursuant to section 231.7 because the prosecutor
excused T.N. on the ground that “she appear[ed] to be Hispanic.”
The Attorney General maintains the prosecutor properly excused
T.N. because of her “ ‘lack of life experience,’ ” which is not a
presumptively improper reason under section 231.7. Uriostegui
counters that the prosecutor’s specific reasons supporting T.N.’s
alleged “lack of life experience” are presumptively invalid. We
agree with Uriostegui.
Section 231.7
Prior to January 1, 2022, trial courts examined peremptory
challenges under the three-step inquiry established by Batson v.
Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22
Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler), overruled in part by Johnson v. California
(2005) 545 U.S. 162. Unlike challenges for cause based on a
juror’s incapacity, relationship to the parties, bias, or prejudice
(see §§ 228, 229), peremptory challenges to excuse potential
jurors were “designed to be used ‘for any reason, or no reason at
all.’ ” (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 387.) Under the
prior three-step inquiry, the party objecting to a peremptory
challenge had to first demonstrate a prima facie case of
discriminatory purpose. (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39

5
Cal.4th 970, 1008-1009.) The burden then shifted to the party
exercising the peremptory challenge to provide a permissible,
nondiscriminatory explanation. (Id. at p. 1008.) The third step
required the trial court to decide if “purposeful” discrimination
motivated the peremptory challenge. (Id. at pp. 1008-1009.)
Appellate courts reviewing rulings on these objections presumed
that prosecutors properly used peremptory challenges. (People v.
Gonzales (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 620, 627.)
While the prior Batson/Wheeler inquiry helped eliminate
overt intentional discrimination, it “plainly fail[ed] to protect
against—and likely facilitate[d]—implicit bias. Implicit bias is
increasingly accepted as pervasive throughout the criminal
justice system, and it is particularly pernicious in the context of
peremptory challenges.” (People v. Bryant (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th
525, 545 (conc. opn. of Humes, P. J.).) Recognizing this, “the
Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 3070 (2019-2020 Reg.
Sess.) . . . to add . . . section 231.7, which creates new procedures
for identifying unlawful discrimination in the use of peremptory
challenges.” (People v. Jaime (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 941, 943, fn.
omitted (Jaime).)
In enacting section 231.7, the Legislature acknowledged
the impact of cognitive implicit bias on the use of peremptory
challenges. (See, e.g., Assem. Conc. Sen. Amends. to Assem. Bill
No. 3070 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 21, 2020, p. 4
[“Instead of permitting any ‘facially neutral’ reason for a
peremptory challenge, this bill disallows reasons that are
commonly associated with racial and ethnic groups and women,
unless they can be shown to be unrelated to the prospective
juror’s identity groups”].) It also noted “that it can be difficult
and often impossible for the trial judge to determine whether the

6
lawyer making the challenge actually intended to discriminate.
Trial courts rarely even require attorneys to present their
reasons for excluding a juror, and when reasons are given, judges
must rely on a subjective test that requires the court to attempt
to determine the actual motivation of the attorney challenging a
potential juror. Thus, even when judges require lawyers to
provide reasons for a challenge, both the trial courts and the
reviewing courts have been strongly inclined to accept whatever
justifications are offered.” (See Sen. Com. on Public Safety,
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3070 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) July 28,
2020, p. 7.)
Now, trial courts “need not find purposeful discrimination”
to sustain an objection to a peremptory challenge. (§ 231.7, subd.
(d)(1).) “Instead, ‘upon objection to the exercise of a peremptory
challenge pursuant to [section 231.7],’ the party exercising the
peremptory challenge must state the reasons for exercising the
challenge. (§ 231.7, subd. (c).) Also, certain reasons for a
peremptory challenge are presumptively invalid under section
231.7 unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that they
are unrelated to the prospective juror’s perceived membership in
a protected group and . . . bear on the juror’s ability to be fair and
impartial. (§ 231.7, subd. (e).)” (Jaime, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at
p. 943.) The trial court “shall” also find that presumptively
invalid reasons “bear on [the] juror’s ability to be fair and
impartial in the case.” (§ 231.7, subd. (f).)
Presumptively invalid reasons include the prospective
juror’s “[l]ack of employment or underemployment.” (§ 231.7,
subd. (e)(11).) Certain demeanor-based reasons for excusing
jurors are also now presumptively invalid unless independently
confirmed by the trial court and the demeanor “matters to the

7
case to be tried.” (§ 231.7, subd. (g)(2); People v. Ortiz (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 768, 794 (Ortiz).) These reasons include the
“prospective juror exhibit[ing] either a lack of rapport or
problematic attitude, body language, or demeanor.” (§ 231.7,
subd. (g)(1)(B).)
We review de novo the trial court’s denial of an objection
under section 231.7, and its express factual findings for
substantial evidence. (§ 231.7, subd. (j).) But in the absence of
express factual findings, including those regarding a prospective
juror’s demeanor, we cannot impute any findings to the trial
court. (Ibid.) If we conclude that the court erred in overruling an
objection under section 231.7, “the statute precludes a finding of
harmless error.” (Ortiz, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 795.) An
erroneously denied objection “shall be deemed prejudicial, the
judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new
trial.” (§ 231.7, subd. (j).)
Analysis
At the outset, we reject the Attorney General’s claim of no
error because it was unclear whether T.N. was Hispanic.
Uriostegui’s counsel objected because T.N. “appears to be
Hispanic.” Section 231.7 prohibits removal of jurors based on
their perceived ethnic membership. (§ 231.7, subd. (a).)
Moreover, T.N. has a Spanish surname. Our Supreme Court has
held that Hispanics “are members of a cognizable class for
purposes of Batson/Wheeler motions,” and exclusion of persons
based on a Spanish surname may be impermissible based on
association with a cognizable group. (People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2
Cal.5th 1150, 1156, fn. 2 (Gutierrez).)
We also reject the argument that Uriostegui, as the party
objecting to the peremptory, must show the number of empaneled

8
jurors who are Hispanic. Under section 231.7, Uriostegui was not
required to make a “comparative analysis argument.” (§ 231.7,
subd. (j).) It is relevant that Uriostegui is also Hispanic.
(§ 237.1, subd. (d)(3)(A)(i).)
The prosecutor here exercised a peremptory challenge
against T.N. based on her “lack of life experience,” reasoning that
T.N. was young, worked at Taco Bell, and was not currently
employed. But the trial court did not make any finding that
T.N.’s employment status bore on her “ability to be fair and
impartial in the case.” (§ 231.7, subd. (f).) And we cannot
“impute to the trial court any findings . . . that [it] did not
expressly state on the record.” (§ 231.7, subd. (j).) To allow a
party to bury presumptively invalid reasons under an
overarching facially neutral reason, such as “lack of life
experience,” without the required findings under section 231.7,
subdivision (f), would render section 231.7, subdivision (e)
ineffective.
We also disagree with the Attorney General’s blanket
claim that “lack of life experience” is not a presumptively invalid
reason for excusing a prospective juror. Here, because T.N.’s
alleged lack of life experience was based in part on the
presumptively invalid reason of “lack of employment or
underemployment,” section 231.7, subdivisions (e) and (f)
required the prosecutor to show that it is “highly probable” that
an objectively reasonable person aware of implicit bias (§ 231.7,
subd. (d)(2)(A)) would view this reason as unrelated to T.N.’s
perceived ethnicity. No such showing was made. Nor did the
prosecution meet its burden to show that T.N.’s lack of
employment bore on her “ability to be fair and impartial.”
(§ 231.7, subd. (e); People v. Jimenez (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 534,

9
544, fn. 3.)
In conjunction with the “lack of life experience”
explanation, the prosecutor claimed that T.N.’s demeanor was
problematic because she was too “malleable” by agreeing with
questions posed by both the defense and the prosecutor. We
respectfully disagree. Our review of the record shows that the
prosecutor only asked T.N. questions about her family members’
convictions, her feelings about their incarceration, and whether
she felt comfortable being a juror. And with respect to her
responses to questions posed by the defense, T.N. stated that she
would not need the defense “to prove anything,” the defendant
did not need to testify, and it was fine for the defendant to use an
interpreter. T.N.’s responses show only that she would follow the
law.
The prosecutor also claimed that T.N. was reluctant, timid,
and soft-spoken. But these demeanor-based reasons for excusing
T.N. are now presumptively invalid because they “have
historically been associated with improper discrimination in jury
selection.” (§ 231.7, subd. (g)(1).) And these reasons were not
independently confirmed by the trial court, in violation of section
231.7, subdivision (g)(2).
The prosecutor additionally claimed that T.N. had limited
ties to the community. But it is significant that the prosecutor
did not question T.N. regarding this issue, which raises an
inference of discrimination. (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(3)(C)(i), (ii);
Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280-281.)
Finally, the prosecutor claimed that T.N. did not fully
understand the questions being asked. The Attorney General
does not offer, and we do not find, a single example in the record
to support this claim. On the contrary, T.N. appropriately

10
answered all the questions posed to her. Moreover, the trial
court made no findings to confirm the prosecutor’s claim about
T.N.’s purported inability to respond to questioning.
Ortiz, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th 768, on which the Attorney
General relies, is not to the contrary. Ortiz held “that the
substantial evidence standard applies where . . . the trial court
has made explicit findings in the confirmation stage.” (Ortiz, at
p. 801.) Because the trial court here did not make any findings
regarding T.N.’s alleged inability to understand the questions,
there are no factual findings to review for substantial evidence.
(§ 231.7, subd. (j).)
Under section 231.7, a trial court may overrule an objection
to the exercise of a peremptory challenge based on presumptively
invalid reasons only if it explicitly makes specific findings. Here,
the prosecutor’s reasons and the judicial findings did not
overcome the presumption of invalidity. The court therefore
erred in denying Uriostegui’s objection under section 231.7.
In reaching this conclusion, we need not, and do not,
determine whether the prosecutor was motivated by bias. The
Legislature intended section 231.7 to “be broadly construed to
further the purpose of eliminating the use of group stereotypes
and discrimination, whether based on conscious or unconscious
bias, in the exercise of peremptory challenges.” (Stats. 2020, ch.
318, § 1(c).) And in enacting section 231.7, the Legislature found
“that requiring proof of intentional bias renders the procedure
ineffective and that many of the reasons routinely advanced to
justify the exclusion of jurors from protected groups are in fact
associated with stereotypes about those groups or otherwise
based on unlawful discrimination.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 318, § 1(b).)
The legislation seeks to remedy not only “purposeful

11
discrimination” but implicit unconscious bias as well. (§ 231.7,
subd. (d)(1), (2)(A) & (C).)
Conclusion
“[D]ecision-making by racial stereotype . . . should be
anathema in our courts.” (People v. Johnson (1978) 22 Cal.3d
296, 299.) “It is not only litigants who are harmed when the right
to trial by impartial jury is abridged. Taints of discriminatory
bias in jury selection—actual or perceived—erode confidence in
the adjudicative process, undermining the public’s trust in
courts.” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1154.) It is therefore
imperative that trial courts heed section 231.7’s new mandates to
root out discriminatory uses of peremptory challenges.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for a
new trial.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

BALTODANO, J.

I concur:

CODY, J.

12
GILBERT, P. J.
I respectfully dissent.
When patent racial prejudice occurs in any form in our
judicial system, the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 requires
reversal, even when guilt has been established beyond “beyond a
reasonable doubt.” In People v. Simmons (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
323, this court reversed a criminal conviction of a Black
defendant despite overwhelming evidence of his guilt. The
prosecutor’s cross-examination and comments during oral
argument regarding defendant’s skin color compelled reversal
under the act.
We reasoned the Legislature’s concern that racial prejudice
in a court proceeding so infects and pollutes our judicial system
that its presence adversely affects a finding of guilt. This, despite
the cogent argument raised by Justice Yegan in his dissent in
Simmons that the Racial Justice Act violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. (See People v. Simmons, supra, 96
Cal.App.5th 323 (dis. opn. of Yegan, J.); Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
I applaud the Legislature’s recognition that implicit bias –
an unconscious trait we all carry within us whatever our race,
background, or life experience – has no place in our judicial
system. (See Godsil & Richardson, Racial Anxiety (2017) 102
Iowa L.Rev. 2235-2263.) Members of the judiciary and the bar
attend courses to raise awareness of these biases. Yet I seriously
doubt the majority’s literal interpretation of Code of Civil
Procedure section 231.7 requires reversal here.1

1 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Uriostegui was caught on a home security camera entering
the garage of the victim’s residence. He was apprehended close
to the residence when police arrived a short time later. He
matched the description of the individual captured on the
security camera and was found in possession of a knife stored in
the victim’s garage.
At the sidebar proceeding concerning the prosecution’s
request to exercise a peremptory challenge to the juror in
question here (T.N.), defense counsel said, “She appears to be a
member – she appears to be Hispanic. I am concerned it is a
presumptively invalid reason.” The prosecutor responded that
the People’s peremptory challenge was based in part on a lack of
life experience. Defense counsel countered that the prosecution’s
concerns are “socio-economic,” a presumptively invalid reason
under section 231.7, subdivision (e)(11).
Although the prosecution relied on a number of reasons for
the peremptory challenge, the trial court denied the defense
objection solely on the lack of life experience. The court found
there was no “substantial likelihood” that “an objectively
reasonable person” would believe “race, ethnicity, gender, gender
identity, sexual orientation, national orientation, national origin,
or religious affiliation or perceived membership in any of those
groups is a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.”
The trial court went on to expressly find that the
prosecutor did not exercise his peremptory challenge for the
presumptively invalid reason of T.N.’s “socio-economic”
circumstances of being unemployed. The court concluded: “I
think it is reasonable that her lack of, or [the prosecutor’s]
reasoning for challenge is a lack of life experience is unrelated to

2
conscious or unconscious bias as to that juror. I don’t believe that
his reason for [the] peremptory had anything to do with the fact
that she may be Hispanic . . . but the court is satisfied that the
reason for the peremptory is not invalid pursuant to
[section]231.7.”
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, in finding that the
peremptory challenge was not based on T.N.’s socio-economic
status, the trial court necessarily concluded the prosecutor was
not using the facially neutral reason of “lack of life experience” to
conceal a presumptively invalid reason. (See People v. Hamilton
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 907 [lack of life experience is a
nondiscriminatory and legitimate reason to disqualify a juror].)
This trial judge was aware of the statute and implicit bias.
Yet the majority reverses because the judge did not repeat
verbatim the words of the statute, i.e., the trial court did not
expressly add that the reasons articulated by the prosecution
“bear on the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in
the case.” (§ 231.7, subd. (e).) This is taking literalism into the
realm of the absurd. The majority’s reading of the statute
permits a judge to avoid what the statute intends to prevent by
saying the talismanic phrase “I find by clear and convincing
evidence the reasons of the prosecutor for the peremptory
challenge bear on the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and
impartial in the case.” It escapes me how this statute succeeds in
what it seeks to prevent.
While the facts underlying Uriostegui’s conviction are not
relevant to the issue raised on appeal, they do show
overwhelming evidence of guilt. All parties in litigation are
entitled to a fair trial. This includes the prosecution. The

3
majority’s rote application of section 231.7 defeats this goal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

GILBERT, P. J.

4
Von Deroian, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Andrea Keith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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