People v. Porter CA2/1

CourtListener 9463048Calctapp18 janv. 2024

Texte intégral

Filed 1/18/24 P. v. Porter CA2/1
Opinion following rehearing
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B318879

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A968974)
v.

JOHN JAY PORTER et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Stephen A. Marcus, Judge. Affirmed as to defendant and
appellant John Jay Porter. Affirmed and remanded with
instructions as to defendant and appellant Dayon Darren Lively.
Johanna Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant John Jay Porter.
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Dayon Darren Lively.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________

This is an appeal from the denial of petitioners John Jay
Porter’s and Dayon Darren1 Lively’s petitions for sentencing
relief pursuant to former Penal Code section 1170.95, now
section 1172.6.2 We affirm.
A jury convicted Porter and Lively of the first degree
murder of Latonjyia Stover (count 9) and second degree murder of
Jamee Finney (count 10). The same jury convicted petitioners’
confederates Lyndell Tyrone Jackson, Vincent Burks, and
Deautri Cosslolo Denard of murdering Stover and Finney. The
murders occurred after petitioners and their confederates sought
revenge for a drug transaction in which the drug dealer, Buford
“B.J.” Bates, substituted flour for cocaine.
The resentencing court3 found, and petitioners do not
dispute, this case involved mistaken identity. Specifically, the
resentencing court found Lively participated “on this mission to
kill Nina Bates . . . . the sister of Buford Bates . . . who sold the
phony cocaine.” The resentencing court also found that Porter
“had the intent to kill Nina Bates, the sister of Buford Bates, and

1 The record contains various spellings of Mr. Lively’s
middle name. We use the spelling contained in the abstract of
judgment.
2 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
3 Different judicial officers presided over petitioners’ trial
and the order to show cause hearings on their petitions for
sentencing relief. We refer to the court presiding over the latter
hearings as the “resentencing court.”

2
any member of her family or any person connected to Nina
Bates.” The murder victims—Stover and Finney—were not
connected to the drug transaction.
With respect to the first degree murder of Stover,
petitioners argue the resentencing court erred in finding they
failed to establish a prima facie case of eligibility for
resentencing. We conclude petitioners cannot establish a prima
facie case as a matter of law. Given the trial court’s instructions
and the jury’s verdict, the jury necessarily found true all
elements of murder under current law.
With respect to the second degree murder of Finney, Porter
argues the resentencing court applied the wrong standard of
proof at his order to show cause hearing. To the contrary, the
record demonstrates the court considered whether the
prosecution demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that Porter
was guilty of murder under the current definition of murder.
Lively, who had a separate order to show cause hearing,
argues the resentencing court erred in proceeding in his absence.
Lively was not absent from the hearing. He participated
remotely via Webex,4 a procedure he asked the resentencing
court to use. Lively does not demonstrate either error in
proceeding remotely or prejudice from doing so.
The parties argue, and we agree, that the trial court
committed clerical error in the Lively judgment when it
transposed the names of certain counts comprising his
convictions. Upon remand, the resentencing court is instructed
to correct that clerical error and to forward a certified copy of the

4 The parties do not dispute that Webex is a
videoconferencing platform.

3
amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In addition to the kidnapping of Kelly Timmons (also
known as Kelly Davis) for ransom and other crimes, a jury
convicted Porter and Lively of first degree murder (Stover) and
second degree murder (Finney). (People v. Denard et al. (Oct. 12,
1995, B066109) [nonpub. opn.].) With respect to the first degree
murder, the jury found two special circumstances true—murder
in the course of kidnapping and multiple murder.
On direct appeal, in 1995, this court affirmed the
judgments of conviction. (People v. Denard et al., supra,
B066109.)
In 2019, petitioners filed petitions for resentencing
pursuant to former Penal Code section 1170.95, now section
1172.6. The resentencing court appointed counsel for petitioners.
Lively substituted counsel after the resentencing court
denied his petition as to count 9 at the prima facie stage. His
new counsel filed a “Pre-Hearing Memorandum.” (Boldface &
some capitalization omitted.) The memorandum discussed a
declaration made by Deautri Denard, in which he took
responsibility for the “heinous crimes” and indicated Lively
was not responsible.
Also according to Lively, Porter issued a declaration
providing: “On May 9, 1988, I John Porter was involved in the
murder of (Lato[njyia] Stover and Jam[e]e Finney) and the
kidnapping for ransom of (Kelly Timmons) . . . . I John Porter
shot and kill (Laton[jyia] Stover and Jam[e]e Finney), with a
nine-millimeter, I shot numerous times into the little red car on
the corner of Vernon and St. Andrews Street. At the time, I shot

4
into the car, I was thinking that it was (Nina Bates) the sister of
(Buford Bates) that (Kelly Timmons) gave the money to and got a
five pound bag of flour, that should have been a kilo of cocaine for
fourteen thousand, five hundred dollars. I had to kidnap (Kelly
Timmons) to make her tell me ware (Buford Bates—aka—B.J.)
drug house and ware he hanged out. I declare that (Dayton
Lively, Vincent Burks, and Lyndell Jackson) had no involvement
of the murders of (Laton[jyia] Stover and Jam[e]e Finney). I shot
and kill both (Stover and Finney) on my own, I pull the trigger
until there was no movement in the car.” In his “Pre-Hearing
Memorandum,” Lively reserved the right to testify.
With respect to the Stover murder, the resentencing court
found petitioners failed to present a prima facie case. The court
relied on the absence of a first degree felony murder instruction
(because at the time of trial, kidnapping was not a qualifying
offense for first degree felony murder). The court noted “in-
camera hearings” of a recorded conversation by Denard
indicating Denard and Porter were the shooters. The court also
noted that at trial, the People did not rely on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine with respect to the Stover
murder. The court found petitioners failed to establish a prima
facie case for resentencing relief because they directly aided and
abetted murder with intent to kill—a valid murder theory under
current law.
With respect to the murder of Finney, the resentencing
court issued an order to show cause. Lively’s hearing was held
separately in order to secure Lively’s presence. After the
hearings and considering over 100 volumes of reporter’s trial
transcripts, the resentencing court denied the petitions.
Petitioners timely appealed. We filed an opinion November 15,

5
2023 and later vacated that opinion to reconsider the appeal in
light of the Supreme Court’s November 27, 2023 decision People
v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433 (Curiel). We also allowed
supplemental briefing to give the parties an opportunity to
address Curiel.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On appeal, Porter and Lively rely exclusively on the factual
background from our opinion in their direct appeals. We
recognize that opinion is not admissible to establish the facts in
an order to show cause hearing under section 1172.6. (People v.
Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706, 712–713 (Vance).) By relying
exclusively on the factual background in our prior appellate
opinion and failing to summarize the evidence before the
resentencing court, Porter and Lively have forfeited any objection
to the inadmissibility of the prior opinion. (Id. at p. 713.) We
thus quote our prior opinion, the only factual summary
petitioners provide on appeal. (People v. Denard, supra,
B066109.)
“On May 9, 1988, Porter telephoned Roland Timmons and
asked if Timmons knew where Porter could buy cocaine for
Denard. Timmons, who previously had sold drugs with Porter,
asked his sister, Kelly Timmons, if she could set up the
transaction. Ms. Timmons arranged for Porter and Denard to
give $14,000 to B.J. Bates, a drug supplier, in exchange for a kilo
of cocaine, with herself as go-between. Ms. Timmons drove to
Porter’s house, met Porter and Denard, and received the money.
After counting the money, Timmons met Bates’ underling at the
agreed meeting place, gave him the money, and received a plastic
bag containing white powder. Ms. Timmons drove back to
Porter’s house and gave the bag to Porter and Denard. As

6
Ms. Timmons was leaving, Porter and Denard ran outside,
shouting that she had given them flour instead of cocaine, and
forced her inside the house at gunpoint.
“Ms. Timmons, who had not known the powder was flour,
unsuccessfully tried to telephone Bates. She made a series of
calls to her brother in which she told him Porter and Denard
wanted their money or the cocaine and would kill her if Timmons
did not comply. During the calls, Porter and Denard repeatedly
told Timmons they would kill his sister if their demands went
unmet. During one of these calls, Timmons heard Denard blame
Porter for the situation and threaten to kill Porter. Porter
sounded scared in the initial calls, but never asked for help.
“Denard telephoned Lively. Shortly thereafter, Lively and
Burks arrived in a beige jeep. Lively and Denard forced
Ms. Timmons into the jeep at gunpoint, and Ms. Timmons,
Burks, Denard, Lively, and Porter drove a circuitous route to an
apartment. En route, Denard called [Meridith Yulonda] Carter[5]
on a cellular telephone and told her to bring guns to the
apartment. The men also called Timmons again and repeated
their threats to kill Ms. Timmons unless they received the
cocaine or money.
“Jackson arrived at the apartment shortly after the beige
jeep, as did another man named Moe. Carter and a woman
named Red arrived a little later. After Denard told Carter what
had happened, Carter pointed a gun at Ms. Timmons and said
Carter should kill her.

5 The jury did not convict another co-defendant, Meredith
Yulonda Carter, of murder but only of false imprisonment.

7
Lively and Denard forced Ms. Timmons to give them
information about Bates, his sister, family, address, and cars.
Lively said the men should retaliate against Bates. Porter and
Denard, in a series of telephone calls to Timmons, repeated their
death threats against Timmons and his family. They also
telephoned such a threat to Timmons’ mother. Meanwhile,
Timmons called the police, who came to his house and placed a
telephone trap on Timmons’ line to determine the threatening
calls’ origin.
“Denard sent Burks and Porter to get ammunition. They
returned with it. Denard and Lively said they were going to
retaliate against Bates. At Denard’s request, Carter supplied a
box of surgical gloves and a bag containing a dark sweatshirt, ski
masks, and gloves. Burks, Lively, and Porter donned surgical
gloves and wiped off several guns. Denard distributed masks to
Burks, Lively, and Porter. Denard and Lively put gloves in their
pockets. Denard announced they were going to find and kill
Bates and told Carter and Jackson to stand guard over
Ms. Timmons. Burks, Denard, Lively, and Porter, all armed, left
together, leaving Carter, Jackson, Moe, and Red to guard
Ms. Timmons.
“While the 4 men were gone, Carter and Jackson tied up
Ms. Timmons. At one point, Ms. Timmons called out a window to
a passerby. Jackson and Carter threw Ms. Timmons into a door
and onto the floor, and repeatedly kicked, punched and beat her.
“Meanwhile, several witnesses, some of whom knew the
four men, saw a blue jeep driven by Denard and a beige Jeep
occupied by Lively, each with other men inside, approach a red
Pontiac parked near 45th Street and St. Andrews. The men wore
masks and dark clothes. Latonjyia Stover and Jamee Finney,

8
two women unconnected to these events, were inside the Pontiac,
talking to a pedestrian. When Stover and Finney saw the two
jeeps drive by, they drove off, telling the pedestrian they feared a
shooting was about to happen. The two jeeps followed.
“Witnesses heard gunshots and saw the jeeps stop near the
Pontiac and drive off. Stover and Finney each died of multiple
gunshot wounds. Shortly thereafter, Robert [N.] heard gunshots
and went outside. Witnesses saw the beige Jeep occupants twice
fire shots at [Robert N.]’s house, and once at another nearby
house. [Robert N.] saw the beige jeep occupants firing at people
in the street. [Robert N.] saw Lively, who[m] he knew, in the
rear of the beige jeep pointing a gun. [Robert N.] ran. The beige
jeep stopped and its occupants fired shots at [Robert N.]
Witnesses placed Lively and Porter inside the beige jeep when
these shots were fired.
“Burks, Denard, Lively, and Porter returned to the
apartment where Ms. Timmons was being held. Denard, Lively,
and Porter all boasted of the killings. During another telephone
call to Timmons, Denard told Timmons the defendants wanted
their money.
“Meanwhile, Los Angeles Police Detective Mark Arneson
learned from the telephone company that the calls from the
defendants to Timmons had come from 13132 South Vermont
Ave., apartment 6. The police set up a command post nearby and
began surveilling the apartment. Porter left the apartment and
drove off in a yellow Toyota. Denard told Carter to go and warn
his mother to leave her house because of potential retaliation
from Bates. Carter left. When a police helicopter arrived
overhead, Denard walked down the apartment hallway, went
outside, and was arrested by police.

9
“When the remaining occupants saw Denard’s arrest,
Burks and Lively each telephoned their mothers and told them of
the killings and to leave their homes to avoid retaliation. Lively
then ordered Ms. Timmons to leave the apartment first, so if the
police fired on them as they left, Ms. Timmons would be hit.
Ms. Timmons, Lively, Jackson, and Burks then left the
apartment, and police arrested the 3 men. Shortly thereafter,
Carter returned in a white Hyundai owned by Denard.
Ms. Timmons identified Carter and police arrested her. The
police traced Porter to another house and arrested him the next
day.
“Much circumstantial evidence also linked the defendants
to the crimes. Police found the beige jeep parked behind the
apartment. The jeep contained a bullet hole, bullet crease,
powder burns, and an expended bullet. Lively, Porter, and Burks
left fingerprints on the jeep, and Denard left a fingerprint on a
plastic bag found inside it. Inside the apartment, police found
ammunition, sunglasses, caps, and gloves. Some of the gloves
contained gunshot residue.
“In the late afternoon of May 9, Porter telephoned Erik
Taylor and asked Taylor to put 3 guns Taylor had under his
mattress in a bag. Taylor did so. Porter arrived shortly
thereafter and the 2 men drove to a nearby house. Porter took
the bag inside the garage, then drove Taylor home. The next day,
the police interviewed Taylor, who took them to the garage.
Inside, the police found 2 guns and ammunition.
“At the murder scene, police recovered numerous shell
casings and bullet fragments of similar caliber ammunition as
used by the types of guns recovered in the garage and which
witnesses described Burks, Denard, Lively, and Porter carrying

10
during the crimes. Police also recovered a black cap near the
dwellings which had been fired on. A hair found inside the cap
was similar to Lively’s hair.
“Bates’ sister Nina Bates, a prosecution witness, received
telephone calls from Lively between Thanksgiving and Christmas
1988. Lively told Ms. Bates he had not committed the crimes, but
he knew what she looked like, where she lived, and could get her
if he chose to.” (People v. Denard, supra, B066109.)

DISCUSSION

A. The Resentencing Law
Prior to 2019, a jury could convict a defendant of murder
under the felony-murder rule and natural and probable
consequences doctrine without finding malice. Under the felony-
murder rule as it existed before 2019, malice was imputed if the
defendant intended to commit the underlying qualifying felony.
(People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1184 [“ ‘The felony-
murder rule imputes the requisite malice for a murder conviction
to those who commit a homicide during the perpetration of a
felony inherently dangerous to human life.’ ”].) Under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it existed before
2019, an aider and abettor could be held liable for any offense
that was the natural and probable consequence of the crime aided
and abetted. (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 158
[describing former law].)
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2–4) modified the law
relating to accomplice liability for murder, eliminating the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a murder theory
(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843) and more

11
narrowly defining felony murder. (People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 703 (Strong); §§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189,
subd. (e)(3)). With respect to the former modification, “to amend
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, Senate Bill 1437
added section 188, subdivision (a)(3) (section 188(a)(3)): ‘Except
[for felony-murder liability] as stated in subdivision (e) of Section
189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime
shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed
to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’
[Citation.]” (Gentile, at pp. 842–843.) Senate Bill No. 1437 also
added former section 1170.95 providing the procedure for a
defendant convicted of felony murder or murder based on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine to request
resentencing relief. (Gentile, at p. 843.)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 775) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2)
amended section 1170.95. In addition to convictions based on the
natural consequences and felony murder doctrines, persons
convicted on a “theory under which malice is imputed to a person
based solely on that person’s participation in a crime” are eligible
for resentencing relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see also former
§ 1170.95, subd. (a).) The bill clarified that persons convicted of
attempted murder or manslaughter also may petition for
resentencing. (People v. Whitson (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 22, 30.)
It further clarified that the burden of proof applicable in the
evidentiary hearing is beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.
Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1020–1021.) The Legislature
then renumbered former section 1170.95 to section 1172.6
without substantive change. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708,
fn. 2, citing Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

12
Section 1172.6 describes a multipart process for
resentencing petitions. The first step is making a prima facie
case for relief. “When the trial court receives a petition
containing the necessary declaration and other required
information, the court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’
[Citation.] If the petition and record in the case establish
conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial
court may dismiss the petition.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 708.) When evaluating a petition, the resentencing court may
consider the record of conviction. (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 972.)
If the petitioner makes a prima facie case for relief, the
court must issue an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) “If
there has been ‘a prior finding by a court or jury that the
petitioner did not act with reckless indifference to human life or
was not a major participant in the felony, the court shall vacate
the petitioner’s conviction and resentence the petitioner.’
[Citation.] Additionally, the parties may stipulate that the
petitioner is eligible for resentencing. [Citation.] Otherwise, the
court must hold an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution
bears the burden of proving, ‘beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder’ under state
law as amended by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)”
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 708–709.)
In Curiel, the Supreme Court held with respect to an aider
and abettor, that a jury’s finding of intent to kill, by itself,
does not establish ineligibility for relief at the prima facie stage.
(Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 441.) “[A] petitioner who alleges
that he or she could not currently be convicted of a homicide

13
offense ‘because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019’ (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)) puts at issue all elements
of the offense under a valid theory.” (Curiel, at p. 462.) The
allegation “is not refuted by the record unless the record
conclusively establishes every element of the offense. If only one
element of the offense is established by the record, the petitioner
could still be correct that he or she could not currently be
convicted of the relevant offense based on the absence of other
elements.” (Id. at p. 463.)
“ ‘[U]nder direct aiding and abetting principles, an
accomplice is guilty of an offense perpetrated by another [e.g.,
murder] if the accomplice aids the commission of that offense
with “knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and
[with] an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends.” ’
[Citation.]” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463.) “Similarly, to be
liable for murder under a theory of implied malice, an aider and
abettor must aid in the commission of a life-endangering act,
with ‘ “knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the
act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act,
knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in
conscious disregard for human life.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
“ ‘Thus, proof of aider and abettor liability requires proof in
three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a
crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and
abettor’s mens rea’—which here includes knowledge that the
direct perpetrator intends to commit the crime or
life-endangering act, ‘and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus—
conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the
achievement of the crime.’ [Citation.]” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 467.)

14
In Curiel, the court found the petitioner was not ineligible
for resentencing as a matter of law because, notwithstanding the
gang-murder special circumstance instruction in that case, the
jury did not find the mens rea that either (1) the aider and
abettor with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator intended to commit or encourage or facilitate the
offense or (2) the aider and abettor with knowledge the
perpetrator intended to commit a life-endangering act, intended
to aid the perpetrator in the commission of that act, knowing the
act was dangerous to human life, and in conscious disregard for
human life.6 (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 468.) Curiel
cautioned that its holding was limited to the jury instructions

6 The gang murder special instruction in Curiel provided:
“ ‘To prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must
prove that: [1] the defendant intended to kill; [2] at the time of
the killing the defendant was a member in a criminal street gang;
and [3] the murder was carried out to further the activities of the
criminal street gang.’ ” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 447.) The
Curiel court also noted that the trial court instructed the jury:
“ ‘To prove that the defendant is guilty of murder under the
theory of aiding and abetting [based on] natural and probable
consequences, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that [1] the defendant is guilty of disturbing the peace or of
carrying a concealed firearm by a gang member; [2] during the
commission of the crime of disturbing the peace or of the crime of
carrying a concealed firearm by a gang member the crime of
murder was committed; and [3] under all the circumstances a
reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have known
that the commission of murder was a natural and probable
consequence of the commission of the crime of disturbing the
peace or of the crime of carrying a concealed firearm by a gang
member.’ ” (Id. at p. 446.) As detailed in our Discussion, Part B.,
post, the instructions in the case before us were different.

15
given in that specific case and “does not necessarily apply to
other cases where the jury found intent to kill, or even other
cases where the jury found true the gang-murder special
circumstance.” (Id. at p. 471.)

B. The Trial Court’s Instructions On Murder, Aiding
and Abetting, the Special Circumstances Allegations,
Conspiracy, and the Natural and Probable
Consequences Doctrine
The court instructed the jury that “[a] person aids and
abets the commission or attempted commission of a crime when
he or she, [¶] (1) with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator and [¶] (2) with the intent or purpose of committing,
encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the crime, by act or
advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of
the crime.”
The court further instructed the jury: “Merely assenting to
or aiding or assisting in the commission of a crime without
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and
without the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging or
facilitating the commission of the crime is not criminal. Thus a
person who assents to, or aids, or assists in, the commission of a
crime without such knowledge and without such intent or
purpose is not an aider and abettor in the commission of such
crime.”
The court instructed the jury on natural and probable
consequences as follows: “One who aids and abets is not only
guilty of the particular crime that to his or her knowledge his or
her confederates are contemplating committing, but he or she is
also liable for the natural and probable consequences of any
criminal act that he or she knowingly and intentionally aided and

16
abetted. You must determine whether the defendant is guilty of
the crime originally contemplated, and, if so, whether the crimes
charged were a natural and probable consequence of such
originally contemplated crime.”
The jury instruction on conspiracy provided in pertinent
part: “A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more
persons with the specific intent to agree to commit a public
offense, and with the further specific intent to commit such
offense, followed by an overt act . . . for the purpose of
accomplishing the object of the agreement. Conspiracy is a crime,
but is not charged as an offense in the information in this case.”
Also relevant to conspiracy, the trial court told the jury: “A
member of a conspiracy is not only guilty of the particular crime
that to his or her knowledge his or her confederates are
contemplating committing, but is also liable for the natural and
probable consequences of any act of a co-conspirator to further
the object of the conspiracy, even though such act was not
intended as a part of the original plan and even though he or she
was not present at the time of the commission of such act.
As to the crime of murder, the court instructed murder
requires proof that: “1. A human being was killed. [¶] 2. The
killing was unlawful, and [¶] 3. The killing was done with
malice aforethought.” The court also instructed the jury on
express and implied malice.
For first degree murder, the jury was instructed on
deliberate and premeditated murder.
With respect to second degree murder, the court instructed
the jury on “unpremeditated murder of the second degree,”
“second degree murder [based on a] killing resulting from [an]
unlawful act dangerous to life,” second degree murder based on a

17
conspiracy “to commit a felony inherently dangerous to human
life,” and second degree felony murder based on several
underlying felonies including kidnapping. (Boldface &
capitalization omitted.)
Significantly, the trial court instructed the jury on three
special circumstances—murder for financial gain, murder while
kidnapping or kidnapping for ransom, and multiple murder
convictions. By way of introduction to these special
circumstances, the court told the jury: “If you find a defendant in
this case guilty of murder of the first degree, you must then
determine if one or more of the following special circumstances
are true or not true: [¶] 1. The murder was committed for
financial gain; [¶] 2. The murder was committed while the
defendant was engaged in the commission of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom or Kidnapping; and [¶] 3. Multiple
murder convictions.”
The introductory instruction also provided: “If you find
that a defendant was not the actual killer of a human being, or if
you are unable to decide whether the defendant was the actual
killer or an aider and abettor or co-conspirator, you cannot find
the special circumstance to be true as to that defendant unless
you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such defendant
with the intent to kill aided and abetted, any actor in the
commission of the murder in the first degree.”
The court further instructed the jury that the jury “must
decide separately each special circumstance alleged in this case
as to each defendant” and “must agree unanimously.” Thus, the
multiple murder special circumstance and murder while
kidnapping special circumstance instructions required the jury to
find the defendant was either the “actual killer” or “with the

18
intent to kill, aided and abetted any actor in the commission of
murder in the first degree.”

C. Neither Porter Nor Lively Made a Prima Facie Case
for Resentencing on the Murder of Stover (Count 9)
We review de novo the legal question whether petitioners
are ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (People v. Bodely
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200.)
As part of a prima facie case, petitioners must show they
“could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder
because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Here, the record of
conviction shows as a matter of law that petitioners were
convicted of the Stover murder under currently valid murder law.
The jury found true a kidnapping and multiple murder
special circumstance. These findings, along with the trial court’s
above instructions, demonstrate that either the jury found Porter
and/or Lively were the actual killers or the jury found true all the
Curiel elements of aiding and abetting murder, that is, “ ‘a crime
committed by the direct perpetrator’ ” (the perpetrator’s actus
reus), “ ‘the aider and abettor’s mens rea,’ ” including
“ ‘knowledge that the direct perpetrator intends to commit the
crime or life-endangering act,’ ” and “ ‘the aider and abettor’s
actus reus—conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists
the achievement of the crime.’ [Citation.]” (See Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 467.)
Specifically, to find the multiple murder special
circumstance and murder while kidnapping special circumstance
allegations true, the trial court’s instructions required the jury to
find the defendant was either the “actual killer” or “with the
intent to kill, aided and abetted any actor in the commission of

19
the murder in the first degree.” (Italics added.) The jury’s true
finding on the special circumstances satisfies the elements that
Porter and Lively intended to kill Stover and aided and abetted
the perpetrator in the murder of Stover, not some other crime.
Under the trial court’s instructions, the jury’s true finding shows
that the jury also found Porter and Lively had knowledge of the
direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent. The instructions and the
jury’s verdict also demonstrate that the jury found Porter and
Lively committed an act assisting in achievement of the murder.
Because the jury necessarily found all of the requirements for
murder under current law, Porter and Lively are ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law.7
The instruction on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine does not undermine this conclusion. The instruction
did not identify any target offense8 and as noted above, by finding
the kidnapping and multiple murder special circumstances true,
the jury necessarily found that petitioners aided and abetted the
murder of Stover, not some other crime. We reject Porter’s
hypothesis that the jury could have found he aided and abetted a
crime other than murder. The special circumstance instructions

7 In the alternative, under the special circumstance
instructions, the jury could have concluded that Porter and Lively
were actual shooters. The actual shooter is not eligible for
resentencing. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14;
People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 745.)
8 Lively states that the jury could have found his “act and
intent in aiding and abetting a lesser target offense did
ultimately in fact aid the shooter in the shooter’s commission of
first degree murder.” Lively does not cite to the record for
support and we find no support for his assertion.

20
required the jury to find Porter (and Lively) aided and abetted
murder in order for the jury to find the special circumstance
allegations true. (People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 30 [court
presumes jury followed jury instructions].)
Porter notes that the instruction on conspiracy referred to a
public offense. As explained above, however, the jury verdict,
read in light of the other instructions—particularly the
instruction on the special circumstances—shows the jury
necessarily found true all elements of murder. Put differently,
under the given instructions, the jury could not have found the
special circumstances true by finding Porter committed a public
offense other than murder.
Porter contends the prosecutor argued Porter’s
participation in the underlying kidnapping for ransom allowed
the jury to convict him of first degree murder. The record does
not support the argument. The prosecutor argued that the
special circumstance required the prosecution to show the
defendant “shared that intent to kill.” The prosecutor argued:
“Again, there has to be an intent to kill on the part of basically all
the defendants . . . .” Additionally, the trial court instructed the
jury, “Ladies and gentlemen, with respect to my instructions, I
want to remind you anything stated differently by the attorneys
than I stated, you are to follow my instructions . . . .” Even
assuming that Porter correctly characterizes the prosecutor’s
argument, the jury verdict nevertheless shows that the jury
found all elements of murder under current law.
Finally, Porter and Lively argue the resentencing court
incorrectly weighed the evidence. We do not address this issue
because we have considered petitioner’s eligibility for sentencing

21
relief de novo and conclude, without weighing any evidence, that
as a matter of law, petitioners are ineligible.

D. The Court Applied the Correct Standard of Proof at
Porter’s Order To Show Cause Hearing
At Porter’s order to show cause hearing, the resentencing
court found Porter harbored intent to kill and aided and abetted
the murder of Finney by purchasing bullets. The resentencing
court also concluded Porter could be convicted of felony murder
based on the underlying kidnapping and that Porter was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
The court further stated Porter and his confederates could be
convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. Porter does not
dispute any of the resentencing court’s findings. Porter, however,
argues the resentencing court applied the incorrect standard of
proof. The record reveals otherwise.
Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) requires the prosecution
to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty
of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended
by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1,
2019.” It expressly rejects substantial evidence as the applicable
burden: “A finding that there is substantial evidence to support a
conviction for murder . . . is insufficient to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
Contrary to Porter’s argument, the record unequivocally
reflects that the resentencing court applied the correct burden of
proof and acted as an independent factfinder. The resentencing
court evaluated the evidence and found it overwhelming. The
court stated it was basing its decision on “the evidence presented
at trial.” The court referred to the witnesses at trial and found

22
Timmons’s (also known as Davis’s) testimony credible. The court
comprehensively summarized the evidence as presented at trial
and highlighted the evidence the court believed supported its
findings. As if this were not enough, the court stated it was
applying a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and rejecting the
different standard in People v. Duke (2020) 269 Cal.Rptr.3d 264
that in Senate Bill No. 775, the Legislature also subsequently
rejected.
Porter emphasizes that the resentencing court referred to
People v. Rodriguez (2021) 272 Cal.Rptr.3d 342, which has been
depublished. Rodriguez held that the resentencing court was
required to act as an independent factfinder and apply a beyond-
a-reasonable-doubt standard. (Id. at p. 355.) That is the same
standard Porter argues the resentencing court should have
applied. There is no merit to Porter’s argument that the
resentencing court’s reference to the Rodriguez standard of proof
shows that it misunderstood the applicable standard.
Porter also states the resentencing court erred in relying on
People v. Hernandez (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 94. But just like
Rodriguez, Hernandez relied on the same beyond a-reasonable-
doubt standard of proof that Porter advocates. Put simply, the
resentencing court’s reference to those cases does not show the
court applied an incorrect standard of proof.
Porter is correct that a resentencing court cannot rely on
the facts recited in an appellate opinion and must be an
independent factfinder. (Vance, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 713.)
The record demonstrates that the resentencing court was an
independent factfinder, Porter’s misunderstanding of the court’s
remarks notwithstanding. The resentencing court did not rely on
facts recited in our prior opinion but instead, agreed with those

23
facts in stating the “language” of the appellate opinion is the
same as the facts the court “read [in] the trial transcript.” The
court expressly indicated, the “appellate opinion” was not a “bible
on what the facts are . . . .” The fact that the trial court
commented that its view of the evidence was consistent with the
facts recited in our prior opinion does not demonstrate the court
failed to act as an independent factfinder.
Porter also takes out of context the resentencing court’s
reference to “could be convicted” either during colloquy with
co-defendant Jackson’s counsel or in explaining its reasoning.
For example, in responding to counsel for Jackson’s argument
that Jackson could not be convicted of second degree felony
murder, the court stated, “The question is whether a valid
murder theory exists today based on the facts in the case that
your client could be convicted . . . .” The resentencing court
stated, “[The] evidence in this particular case is overwhelming
that they could still be convicted, under any of these theories, of
Ms. Finney’s murder under current law.” The court stated that
all petitioners (including Porter as well as his confederates
Jackson and Burks) “could be convicted today of a valid theory of
murder . . . .” The court found that Porter could be convicted of
felony murder because felony murder now includes kidnapping.
In making these statements, the resentencing court was merely
considering murder theories viable under current law, that is,
theories of which Porter “could” still be convicted
notwithstanding the changes to sections 188 and 189.
Finally, Porter hypothesizes that “the court may not have
been entirely clear” on then “very recent statutory changes
effected through Senate Bill 775” because in discussing the
Stover murder (count 9), the court considered what the jury

24
found. The analysis for a prima facie case of eligibility is not the
same as the standard of proof applied at an order to show cause
hearing. The former addresses whether as a matter of law, the
record of conviction demonstrates “conclusively” that the
petitioner was convicted based on a currently valid murder
theory. The latter requires a finding that the petitioner is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt under a still valid murder theory. The
resentencing court’s analysis of whether Porter made a prima
facie case of eligibility with respect to the murder of Stover is
thus not informative as to whether the court applied the correct
standard at the order to show cause hearing.
Porter argues that the court abused its discretion in
applying an incorrect legal standard and that this purported
error prejudiced him. Because we conclude there was no such
error, we do not consider Porter’s prejudice claim further.

E. Lively Was Present at the Order To Show Cause
Hearing and Lively Demonstrates No Error in the
Court’s Granting His Motion To Appear Via Webex
Lively argues he was not present at the resentencing
hearing and that we thus must reverse the denial of his petition
for resentencing on count 10 (Finney murder). We first provide
additional background and then discuss his argument. We
conclude his argument is based on the incorrect premise that he
was not present at the hearing. Lively was present via Webex,
which he requested based on emergency rules in effect at the
time of Lively’s order to show cause hearing.

1. Additional background
On October 15, 2021, prior to the order to show cause
hearing, Lively’s counsel filed the “Pre-Hearing Memorandum”

25
stating that at the order to show cause hearing: “Petitioner
reserves the right to testify, to call witnesses, or to present any
documentary evidence following the prosecution’s case in chief at
the hearing. This includes, but is not limited to, potentially
asserting that [the detective who investigated the case]
committed misconduct during the course of this case and that his
actions and omissions caused Petitioner, who is legally, factually,
and actually, innocent, to be convicted.”
On January 6, 2022, the resentencing court continued
Lively’s order to show cause hearing because Lively could not be
transported from prison. The court indicated it would ask the
supervising judge “to give this special treatment so that this
person [Lively] can be transported.” Lively’s counsel stated, “In
the alternative, could we do it by Webex?” The court agreed to
proceed via Webex but only if Lively’s counsel was able to make
arrangements with prison officials.
On March 14, 2022, counsel for Lively filed a motion
requesting that Lively appear “via video from High Desert State
Prison.” Counsel based the motion on the following grounds:
“California Judicial Counsel’s [sic] Emergency Rules Related to
COVID-19 and good cause appearing because Petitioner has
waived his appearance in-person at the hearing and requests to
appear via video from High Desert State Prison Housing.”
The motion further indicated: “Petitioner has the right to
be present at the evidentiary hearing . . . Petitioner waives his
personal appearance and requests to attend the . . . hearing via
video from High Desert State Prison housing.” Counsel stated:
Lively “does not wish to be transported to personally appear for
the March hearing. Petitioner waives his personal appearance.
To protect the health and safety of the public, including court

26
users, both in custody and out of custody defendants, witnesses,
court personnel, judicial officers, and Petitioner, this Court
should order the warden of High Desert State Prison to produce
Petitioner via video for the March 24, 2022 hearing.” Counsel
declared under penalty of perjury that Lively “waives his
personal appearance at the hearing and requests to attend via
video from State Prison.”
The resentencing court found good cause and ordered
Lively to appear via Webex.
Lively appeared at the March 24, 2022 order to show cause
hearing via Webex. The court asked Lively if he could hear and
Lively responded, “ Yeah. I barely can hear you.” The court
stated, “I’m using a microphone, so it’s not going to get much
better than this.” The court asked Lively to raise his hand and
Lively raised his hand.
At the order to show cause hearing, the resentencing court
stated, “[T]he prosecution has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
each element of a first or second degree murder under current
law to establish a petitioner’s ineligibility for relief under the
statute. In order to meet this burden, the prosecution may rely
on the record of conviction and/or offer new or additional evidence
to support the claim that the petitioner is ineligible.” The court
“emphasize[d]” it was acting “as an independent fact finder.”
Neither side offered new evidence. Counsel for Lively
argued Lively was not in the Jeep from which the shots were
fired. Counsel argued Lively was “innocent of the murder” and
“did not know about the murder during the shooting in the case.”
The resentencing court found statements by Porter and
Denard indicating they were the shooters were “unreliable
because each of them has a motive to lie and help their friend

27
Lively get out of jail . . . .” The court indicated Lively also could
have been a shooter.
The court found Lively aided and abetted the murder.
Lively was “all in” on the plan to kill Bates’s family members
because B.J. Bates cheated Porter and Denard. The court also
found “most of the testimony” at trial showed Lively was in the
beige Jeep with Burks. The beige Jeep and the blue Jeep were in
the vicinity of the Pontiac (driven by Stover in which Finney was
a passenger) at the time of the shooting. The court observed that
Lively’s statements reflected his intent to kill when Lively said,
“ ‘It is all about killing. We dangerous people. That is our
money.’ ” The court also stated Lively could be convicted under a
valid felony-murder theory with kidnapping as the underlying
offense.
At the conclusion of the hearing, Lively’s counsel pointed
out Lively’s video had disconnected a few seconds earlier. The
court stated, “He is off. I was going to conclude my decision
anyway. [¶] When did he go off?” Counsel responded, “Just a
couple seconds ago.” The court then stated, “Well, I have to
indicate, I don’t know how he left, if he left on his own, or
whatever, but I don’t really have anything else to say. That is my
decision; I’m denying 1170.95 motion on behalf of Mr. Lively.”

2. Lively was present at the order to show cause
hearing and he demonstrates no error or
prejudice in appearing remotely
The parties do not dispute that a criminal defendant has a
constitutional and statutory right to be present at critical
proceedings. (People v. Whitmore (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 116, 124
(Whitmore).) Lively claims he was not present. As set forth

28
above, the record reveals he was present and appeared by Webex
at his request.
Lively relies principally on one case to argue we
nevertheless must remand for a new evidentiary hearing on
count 10—People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 46, 56–60. In
Basler, however, the petitioner was not present either in person
or remotely. (Id. at p. 57.) The same is true in People v. Quan
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 524, 530. These facts produced appellate
rulings that the petitioner’s complete absence was constitutional
error because the order to show cause hearing constitutes a
critical stage of criminal proceedings. (Basler, at pp. 57–58;
Quan, at pp. 532–534.) Neither Basler nor Quan considered
whether a petitioner’s remote appearance at an order to show
cause hearing is constitutionally infirm, and thus neither
supports remand for a new hearing on Lively’s petition. (B.B. v.
County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 11 [“ ‘ “[C]ases are not
authority for propositions not considered.” ’ ”].)
The resentencing court granted Lively’s motion to appear
via Webex. Lively based his motion on former emergency rule 3.
That rule was a response to the global COVID pandemic9 and
provided for remote appearance in “any criminal proceeding” as
long as the defendant consented.10 Although this rule has

9 (See Whitmore, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 125.)
10 Emergency rule 3(a)(2), provided in part: “In criminal
proceedings, courts must receive the consent of the defendant to
conduct the proceeding remotely and otherwise comply with
emergency rule 5. Notwithstanding Penal Code sections 865 and
977 or any other law, the court may conduct any criminal
proceeding remotely. As used in this rule, ‘consent of the
defendant’ means that the consent of the defendant is required
only for the waiver of the defendant’s appearance as provided in

29
sunsetted, it was in effect at the time of Lively’s hearing. (Rycz v.
Superior Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 824, 838, fn. 9.) Even
though he relied on this former rule below to secure Webex
appearance, Lively does not mention it on appeal. A fortiori,
Lively does not argue that his counsel’s declaration was
insufficient to support his consent to Webex appearance under
former emergency rule 3.
Even assuming arguendo that the resentencing court erred
in allowing Lively to appear remotely, Lively demonstrates no
prejudice.
In Whitmore, the court rejected a due process challenge to
requiring the defendant there to appear remotely without his
consent but held it was a violation of state law to have required
the defendant to appear remotely at sentencing and other
proceedings without his consent. (Whitmore, supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 125–126.) Accordingly, the error would be
reviewed for prejudice under the Watson11 standard. (Whitmore,
at pp. 125–127.) Under that standard, we “analyze whether it is
reasonably probable [petitioner] would have received a more
favorable result had he been physically present in the
courtroom.” (Id. at p. 127, fn. 6.)
Lively does not argue that it is reasonably probable he
would have received a more favorable result had he been
physically present in the courtroom rather than appearing
remotely via Webex. Lively does not show anything would have
been different had he been in the courtroom. We thus conclude

emergency rule 5.” (Cal. Rules of Court, appen. I, former
emergency rule 3.)
11 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.

30
he suffered no prejudice from appearing remotely instead of in
person.12

F. The Parties Agree and the Record Shows Clerical
Error in Lively’s Sentence
The court sentenced Lively to a term of 15 years to life for
count 9 (the first degree murder of Stover) and life without the
possibility of parole for both count 1 (the kidnapping for ransom)
and count 10 (the second degree murder) of Finney. We agree
with the parties that the trial court transposed counts 9 and 10 in
its judgment. More specifically, the trial court imposed a first
degree murder sentence for the second degree murder and a
second degree murder sentence for the first degree murder. As
Lively argues in his reply brief, “it appears the trial court simply
committed a clerical error in transposing the appropriate and
mandatory sentences for Counts Nine and Ten, and it is
undisputed that such clerical errors in a defendant’s sentence can
be corrected at any time.” We agree. (See People v. Mitchell
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [trial court has inherent power to
correct clerical errors at any time].)

12 Although we recognize Lively was absent for a few
seconds at the end of the proceeding, that absence was harmless
under any standard of prejudice. On appeal, Lively does not
argue otherwise.

31
DISPOSITION
The orders denying John Jay Porter’s and Dayon Darren
Lively’s petitions for resentencing are affirmed. Lively’s case is
remanded to the resentencing court to correct the judgment.
Specifically, the term of life without parole shall be imposed for
count 9 and for kidnapping for ransom (count 1) and the term of
15 years to life shall be imposed for count 10. The resentencing
court shall send a certified copy of the amended abstract of
judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

WEINGART, J.

32

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.