CourtListener 9452345•Tabb v. Wood CA2/5
Texte intégral
Filed 12/14/23 Tabb v. Wood CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
CHRIS DAVID TABB, B322931
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STPB07970)
v.
MALEE WOOD, as Trustee, etc.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gus T. May, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of R. Chris Lim and R. Chris Lim for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Matthew C. Brown for Defendant and Respondent.
When a trust becomes irrevocable, Probate Code section
16061.7 requires the trustee to serve a notice advising, among
other things, that any contest to the trust must be filed within
120 days.1 Plaintiff and appellant Chris David Tabb (Tabb) filed
a petition contesting the Jerald Leroy Tabb Living Trust dated
October 1, 2020, (the Trust) well beyond that deadline. When
confronted with the timeliness problem, he argued the petition
was not time barred because the trustee’s section 16061.7 notice
was invalid because it did not include the trustee’s telephone
number. The trial court rejected this argument and granted a
demurrer to the contest petition without leave to amend. We
consider the correctness of this ruling, which includes the trial
court’s finding that Tabb had not been prejudiced by the asserted
deficiency in the section 16061.7 notice.
I. BACKGROUND
Tabb’s father, Jerald Tabb (Jerald), created the Trust in
2020. The terms of the trust provided that, at Jerald’s death, the
entirety of the Trust property would be distributed to defendant
and respondent Malee Wood (Wood)—Jerald’s ex-wife and the
person named as the successor trustee of the trust. Jerald died in
January 2021.
The following month, Wood’s attorney served Tabb with a
section 16061.7 notice. The one-page document included the
name of the settlor and the date the trust was executed, the
name of the trustee (Wood) and her mailing address (her lawyer’s
law office), and the address of the principal place of
1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Probate Code.
2
administration of the Trust. The notice did not include Wood’s
telephone number. The notice did include the following warning
in a paragraph printed in all capital letters (without bold
typeface but with the underscoring shown): “WARNING: YOU
MAY NOT BRING AN ACTION TO CONTEST THE TRUST
MORE THAN 120 DAYS FROM THE DATE THIS
NOTIFICATION BY THE TRUSTEE IS SERVED UPON YOU
OR 60 DAYS FROM THE DAY ON WHICH A COPY OF THE
TERMS OF THE TRUST IS MAILED OR PERSONALLY
DELIVERED TO YOU DURING THAT 120-DAY PERIOD,
WHICHEVER IS LATER.”
Nearly six months later, in August 2021, Tabb filed a
petition contesting the Trust arguing Jerald lacked capacity and
was subject to undue influence. Tabb asserted his petition was
timely—notwithstanding the 120-day period provided by statute
and referenced in the section 16061.7 notice—because Wood’s
notice was defective and she did not serve a signed copy of the
trust on the known heirs of the estate. Attached to the petition
as exhibits were the section 16061.7 notice, the trust document,
and an email exchange between Tabb’s lawyer and Wood’s lawyer
in March 2021.
Wood demurred to Tabb’s contest petition and argued it
was untimely because any petition to contest the trust had to be
filed no later than June 25, 2021 (the final day of the 120-day
period). Wood also argued the exchange of emails between
counsel confirmed Tabb had a signed copy of the trust as of
March 5, 2021—which would mean the trust contest petition was
still untimely even if measured from 60 days from receipt of a
copy of the trust document.
3
Tabb opposed the demurrer and contended, in pertinent
part, that the petition was not time barred because Wood’s
section 16061.7 notice was legally insufficient for not including
Wood’s telephone number.2 Tabb cited Harustak v. Wilkins
(2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 208, a case that holds a trust contest
petition was not time barred because the section 16061.7 notice
was defective for not conspicuously formatting the required
statutory warning concerning the time to file a contest petition.
(Id. at 215, 219.)
2
In relevant part, section 16061.7 provides: “(g) The
notification by trustee shall contain the following information: [¶]
(1) The identity of the settlor or settlors of the trust and the date
of execution of the trust instrument. [¶] (2) The name, address,
and telephone number of each trustee of the trust. [¶] (3) The
address of the physical location where the principal place of
administration of the trust is located, pursuant to Section 17002.
[¶] (4) Any additional information that may be expressly required
by the terms of the trust instrument. [¶] (5) A notification that
the recipient is entitled, upon reasonable request to the trustee,
to receive from the trustee a true and complete copy of the terms
of the trust. [¶] (h) If the notification by the trustee is served
because a revocable trust or any portion of it has become
irrevocable because of the death of one or more settlors of the
trust . . . , the notification by the trustee shall also include a
warning, set out in a separate paragraph in not less than 10-
point boldface type, or a reasonable equivalent thereof, that
states as follows: [¶] ‘You may not bring an action to contest the
trust more than 120 days from the date this notification by the
trustee is served upon you or 60 days from the date on which a
copy of the terms of the trust is delivered to you during that 120-
day period, whichever is later.’” (§ 16061.7, subds. (g)-(h).)
4
In reply, Wood cited Germino v. Hillyer (2003) 107
Cal.App.4th 951, a case that rejected an argument that a trust
contest petition could be filed beyond the 120-day timeframe
because the section 16061.7 notice omitted one of the pieces of
information specified in subdivision (g) of the statue (the
advisement that the recipient could request a copy of the trust).
(Id. at 955-956.) The Germino court held that compliance with
the 120-day timeframe can be excused only if the notice recipient
can demonstrate he or she was prejudiced by the failure to
include the information required by subdivision (g)—which
Hillyer could not do. (Id. at 956-957.)
The trial court heard argument on the demurrer at a
hearing in June 2022. During the hearing, the trial court
remarked that the missing phone number defect was more like
the Germino case and Tabb had made no showing of prejudice.
Tabb’s attorney responded, “Well, your honor, there was no bold
face type either and I would request an opportunity to challenge
[Wood’s reply memorandum].” The trial court denied that
request.
After the hearing, the trial court issued a minute order
adopting, with modifications, its tentative ruling sustaining
Wood’s demurrer to the contest petition without leave to amend.
Citing Germino as “the more factually analogous case[,]” the trial
court rejected Tabb’s argument that the section 16061.7 notice
was deficient and thereby excused compliance with the 120-day
deadline because the court found Tabb did not and could not
show prejudice from the omitted phone number.
5
II. DISCUSSION
The only issue properly presented for decision is whether
Tabb’s trust contest should be deemed timely because Wood’s
section 16061.7 notice did not include her phone number. The
additional argument that Tabb appears to make now—that the
notice was also defective because the statutory warning
concerning the time to file a contest was not in bold typeface—is
forfeited for failure to adequately raise it below. (See, e.g.,
Zahnleuter v. Mueller (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1294, 1308, fn. 5.)
For reasons we explain, we reject the sole ground for reversal
before us; Tabb has not shown he was prejudiced by the absence
of a telephone number for Wood in the notice.
To reiterate part of what we earlier reproduced in the
margin, subdivision (g) of section 16061.7 requires a notice sent
pursuant to the terms of that section to include “[t]he name,
address, and telephone number of each trustee of the trust.”
Germino observes that “[s]ection 16061.7, subdivision (g)—unlike
subdivision (h)—requires neither a statement in particular terms
nor a statement in a particular format.” (Germino, supra, 107
Cal.App.4th at 956.) Germino accordingly holds that
noncompliance with subdivision (g) falls into the class of cases
where a “statute does not require a particular form of notice”
such that the “cases consistently hold that courts will look to the
issue of prejudice when a party seeks to excuse its own
failings . . . based on a defect in statutory notice provided by the
other party—such as the claimed omission from the trustee’s
notice in this case.” (Ibid.)
We follow Germino’s approach here and conclude reversal
is unwarranted. Tabb has not explained how he was prejudiced
by the absence of Wood’s phone number from the section 16061.7
6
notice—and we cannot fathom how he would have been
prejudiced under the circumstances. Tabb’s attorney was
communicating with Wood’s attorney at least as early as March
5, 2021. Tabb’s attorney had also secured a signed copy of the
trust instrument as of that date and was already representing
that his client intended to sue. With a ready means of contacting
Wood (through her attorney) before expiration of the 120-day
period,3 the absence of Wood’s telephone number in the section
16061.7 notice was necessarily harmless.
3
No one disputes that the trust contest petition would have
been timely if filed at any time before June 25, 2021. It was not
filed until almost two months later, in August 2021.
7
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. Wood is awarded costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
RUBIN, P. J.
KIM, J.
8
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