In re Casey

CourtListener 9428959Calctapp28 sept. 2023

Texte intégral

Filed 9/28/23
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

2d Crim. No. B321709
In re ROYCE CASEY, (Super. Ct. No. 21HC-0167)
(San Luis Obispo County)
on Habeas Corpus.

Royce Casey is serving a life term for the brutal murder of
a 15-year-old girl. After Casey served 23 years three months, the
parole board granted him parole. The Governor reversed the
parole board’s decision and denied Casey parole on the ground
that Casey lacks insight into his crime. The superior court
granted Casey’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The People
appeal from the court’s order granting the petition. We reverse
and remand.
FACTS
Underlying Offense
In 1995, when Casey was 17 years old, he was infatuated
with “death metal” music. He started using drugs. He discussed
with Jacob Delashmutt, 17 years old, and Joe Fiorella, 15 years
old, sacrificing a virgin as part of a devil-worshipping ritual. The
three crime partners planned the murder for several months.
Elyse Pahler, 15 years old, attended the same high school
as the three partners. On the evening of July 22, 1995,
Delashmutt and Fiorella told Casey that they had lured Pahler
into joining them at a remote location in Arroyo Grande. They
told her they were going to use drugs with her. Later that
evening, Pahler joined them at the remote location to smoke
marijuana.
After 15 to 20 minutes, Delashmutt pulled off his belt and
began to strangle Pahler. Fiorella pulled out a hunting knife and
stabbed her four to six times in her neck. Delashmutt took the
knife next and stabbed her four or five more times in her neck.
Finally, Casey took the knife and stabbed her four times in her
back. As Pahler moaned on the ground, Casey stomped on the
back of her neck.
After it was clear Pahler was dead, Delashmutt started to
pull off her pants. The boys had discussed having sex with her
after she was dead. Instead, Casey said that they should leave.
They buried Pahler in a shallow grave and left the area.
About eight months later, with the crime still unsolved,
Casey confessed his commission of the crime to a clergyman. The
clergyman contacted law enforcement. Casey described the
murder to the authorities and led them to Pahler’s body.
Parole Proceedings
On March 17, 2021, the parole board found Casey suitable
for parole. At the time Casey had served 23 years three months
of a life sentence. Previously he was denied parole by the board
in July 2016 and July 2019.
Governor’s Reversal
In reversing the grant of parole, the Governor stated in
part: “I have carefully examined the record for evidence that Mr.

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Casey’s insight and self-awareness have developed sufficiently to
minimize his risk factors, including associating with negative
peers, being swayed by violent and antisocial ideologies, and
rationalizing brutal conduct for self-serving purposes. Mr.
Casey’s discussion of the causative factors for his involvement in
the crime are concerningly lacking. At his parole hearing, Mr.
Casey discussed his fear of judgement and need to be accepted
saying, ‘I’ve tried to please people to protect myself from
perceptions of when I was a little kid and being hurt and not
having the ability to communicate or to express or to ask… for
help from people that can help me.’ I have determined that Mr.
Casey must do additional work to deepen his insight into the
causative factors of his crime and coping skills before he can be
safely released on parole.” The Governor’s insight and reason for
denying parole more than meets the standard of “some evidence”
in In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181.
Superior Court
The superior court granted Casey’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. The court found that the Governor’s decision is
not supported by the evidence. The court granted the People a
stay for this appeal.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
The power to grant or deny parole is vested exclusively in
the executive branch. (Cal. Const., art. V, § 8, subd. (b); Pen.
Code, § 3041.2.) The Governor is authorized to identify and
weigh all factors relevant to predicting “‘whether the inmate will
be able to live in society without committing additional antisocial
acts.’” (In re Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1205-1206.) The
Governor’s review of the parole board’s decision is de novo and

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may be more stringent or cautious in determining whether a
defendant poses an unreasonable risk to public safety. (In re
Prather (2010) 50 Cal.4th 238, 257, fn. 12.) Our review of the
Governor’s parole denial is limited to whether “some evidence”
supports his conclusion that the inmate currently poses an
unreasonable risk to the public. (In re Lawrence, supra, 44
Cal.4th at pp. 1190-1191.)
Governor’s Denial Supported by Some Evidence
The Governor may rely on the aggravated circumstances of
the commitment offense as a basis for his decision to deny parole,
but the aggravated circumstance do not in themselves provide
some evidence of current dangerousness. (In re Lawrence, supra,
44 Cal.4th at p. 1214.) There must be something in the prisoner’s
history or his current demeanor and mental state that connects
the aggravated circumstances of the offense with a finding of a
continuing threat to public safety. (Ibid.) The failure to gain
insight into the cause for the crime is a factor that shows a
continuing threat to public safety. (In re Shaputis (2011) 53
Cal.4th 192, 218.)
Here there can be no dispute that the circumstances of the
murder were aggravated. Casey and his companions brutally
murdered a 15 year old girl. The Governor found that Casey
remains a current risk to the safety of society because he lacks
insight to the cause of the crime.
Casey explained that at the time he committed the murder
he was hurt and angry. He thought that violence against
someone who could not hurt him was an appropriate response.
But hurt and anger do not explain what Casey did. Nor
does not being able to express himself and pleasing others even
begin to account for his act. Almost everyone feels hurt and

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anger at some point in their lives. Yet they do not plot for
months to kill an innocent person and then execute the plan in a
particularly brutal manner. Hurt and anger, a fascination with
death metal music, the use of marijuana, all seem typical of many
teenagers. Nothing Casey said explains the brutal murder of a
15-year-old girl. The Governor could reasonably conclude that
Casey lacks insight into his crime.
Casey’s reliance on In re Van Houten (2023) 92
Cal.App.5th 1 is misplaced. In 1971, a jury convicted Van
Houten of two counts of first degree murder and one count of
conspiracy to commit murder. The convictions arose from a
series of brutal murders Van Houten participated in as a member
of the Manson Family. The trial court imposed concurrent life
sentences with the possibility of parole. Since her conviction,
Van Houten has been a model prisoner, participating in 50 years
of therapy, self-help programming, and reflection. She earned
bachelor’s and master’s degrees and assisted other inmates in
various ways, including as a tutor. The parole board found Van
Houten suitable for parole on three previous occasions. On each
occasion, the Governor denied her parole. In 2020, the parole
board again found Van Houten suitable for parole. The Governor
again reversed the board.
The Governor found Van Houten’s explanation of what
made her vulnerable to Manson’s influence unsatisfactory. The
Governor also stated that Van Houten’s characterization of her
participation in the double murder causes concern. The Governor
concluded: “Given the extreme nature of the crime in which she
was involved, I do not believe she has sufficiently demonstrated
that she has come to terms with the totality of the factors that led
her to participate in the vicious Manson Family killings. Before

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she can be safely released, Ms. Van Houten must do more to
develop her understanding of the factors that caused her to seek
acceptance from such a negative, violent influence, and
perpetrate extreme acts of wanton violence.” (In re Van Houten,
supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 28.)
The trial court denied Van Houten’s petition for writ of
habeas corpus. The Court of Appeal reversed. The Court of
Appeal conducted an exhaustive review of Van Houten’s personal
history and various assessments showing her successful
transformation while in custody. The Court of Appeal concluded
there is no evidence to support the Governor’s decision to deny
Van Houten parole and that “[t]he Governor’s refusal to accept
Van Houten’s explanation amounts to unsupported intuition.”
(In re Van Houten, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 7.)
Van Houten is easily distinguished. At the time of her final
parole hearing, Van Houten was over 70 years old. She had
spent 50 years in prison participating in therapy, self-help
programming, and reflection. She had three prior hearings at
which she was found suitable for parole. Finally, Van Houten
committed her crimes under the influence of cult leader Charles
Manson, who is now deceased.
In contrast, Casey is 45 years old and, as far as the record
shows, suffers from no psychological disabilities. He has not
spent 50 years in therapy, self-help programming, and reflection.
In fact, at the time of his parole hearing, Casey had not even
served the minimum 25 year term. He did not have three prior
parole hearings at which the board found him suitable for parole.
Casey had two prior hearings in which he was denied parole.
Finally, when Casey committed his crime, he was not acting
under the influence of a cult leader. He acted fully of his own

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accord to commit a brutal murder that he had planned for many
months.
The dissent states that the Governor ignored evidence of
Casey’s insight. The dissent points to a 46 page statement made
by Casey, 10 pages of which discussed the factors that led Casey
to participate in murdering Pahler.
But the dissent fails to point to anywhere in the record that
shows that the Governor ignored Casey’s statement, or for that
matter, ignored any relevant evidence. The Governor simply did
not find such evidence convincing. “It is irrelevant that a court
might determine that evidence in the record tending to establish
suitability for parole far outweighs evidence demonstrating
unsuitability for parole.” (In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th
616, 677.)
The dissent’s reliance on In re Ryner (2011) 196
Cal.App.4th 533, 549 is misplaced. There in 1981, Ryner, while
intoxicated, got into a dispute with a woman in a bar. The bar’s
security removed him from the bar. Shortly thereafter, Ryner
fired shots into the bar and escaped in a car. Three victims were
hit. One died from her wounds. In a previous incident in 1980, a
man made negative comments about Ryner’s mother. Ryner
stabbed the man and stabbed another man who tried to
intervene. Ryner was intoxicated at the time.
In 2009, the parole board found Ryner suitable for parole.
The board found that Ryner’s probability of recidivism had been
reduced because of maturation, personal growth, increased
understanding, and advanced age. The Governor reversed the
board’s findings on the ground that Ryner had not fully examined
the causative factors underlying his crime. (In re Ryner, supra,
196 Cal.App.4th at p. 541.) The trial court granted Ryner’s

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petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeal affirmed
stating: “Where, as here, undisputed evidence shows that the
inmate has acknowledged the material aspects of his or her
conduct and offense, shown an understanding of its causes, and
demonstrated remorse, the Governor’s mere refusal to accept
such evidence is not itself a rational or sufficient basis upon
which to conclude that the inmate lacks insight, let alone that he
or she remains currently dangerous.” (In re Ryner, supra, 196
Cal.App.4th at p. 549.) The statement may be true enough as
applied to Ryner’s case. But each case must be decided on its
own facts.
The murder Ryner committed was the result of an
impulsive act. The murder Casey committed was done after
months of planning. Moreover, Casey’s actions reveal a level of
depravity not seen even in most murders. We are aware that
aggravated circumstances of the crime are not alone sufficient to
deny parole. (In re Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1214.) But
aggravated circumstances coupled with what the Governor could
reasonably conclude is inadequate insight justify denial in this
case.
The dissent states that the Governor has failed to explain
the causal connection between Casey’s lack of insight and his
current public safety risk. But the connection is obvious. Casey
is relatively young and is physically capable of more violent
crimes. Without insight he also remains mentally capable of
more violence.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment (order) is reversed and the matter is
remanded to the superior court with directions to deny Casey’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

GILBERT, P. J.

I concur:

YEGAN, J.

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BALTODANO, J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
When reviewing a parole-suitability determination made by
the Governor, we evaluate whether “ ‘some evidence’ ” supports
the conclusion that a life prisoner is unsuitable for parole because
they currently pose a risk to public safety. (In re Lawrence (2008)
44 Cal.4th 1181, 1191 (Lawrence).) “[T]he presence or absence of
insight is a significant factor in determining whether” a prisoner
poses such a risk. (In re Shaputis (2011) 53 Cal.4th 192, 218
(Shaputis).) “ ‘[O]nly a modicum of evidence is required’ ” to
uphold the Governor’s determination that the prisoner does.
(Id. at p. 210.)
Here, however, there is no evidence to support the
Governor’s conclusion that Casey lacks insight into why he
murdered Elyse Pahler. In referencing Casey’s “fear of
judgement [sic]” and “need to be accepted” as the reasons for
concluding Casey lacks adequate insight, the Governor relied on
Casey’s response to a question posed at his parole board hearing.
The board asked Casey about the “people-pleasing” mentality
that contributed to his criminal behavior. Casey explained:

“[O]ne of the biggest fears I learned about myself is
the fear of judgment. And, if I’m tied in that, and I’m
more concerned about one, what someone thinks of
me, in my past, I’ve tried to please people to protect
myself from perceptions of when I was a little kid and
being hurt and not having the ability to communicate
or to express or to ask what I—for help from people
that can help me. So being able to accept myself for
who I am and that I have value as a person helps me
to value others, because it helps me to see other
people in the same light—as people. So I don’t have
to prove I’m worthy of not being hurt. So I don’t have
this need to protect myself. And, then ultimately
what it led to for me was a desire to hurt others
because I blamed [them] for my pain, but it allows me
to avoid that downward spiral. So self-acceptance—
not accepting what I’ve done in the past, as far as the
horrible things I’ve done—but accepting myself as a
person. It stops me from having to prove to
everybody I’m someone I’m not.” (Italicized portion
quoted by the Governor.)

This statement—“ ‘made in the course of [Casey] condemning
[his] own behavior’ ”—should not be held against him.
(Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1222.)
The Governor also ignored other evidence of Casey’s
insight. Prior to his hearing Casey submitted a 46-page
statement to the parole board, 10 pages of which discussed the
factors that led him to murder Pahler. During the hearing Casey
again discussed these factors—multiple times—and explained
how he has learned to recognize when he is attempting to please
people. His evaluating psychologists commended these insights
and said that Casey is “well prepared” to manage his historical
risks. So did the board tasked with determining Casey’s parole
suitability and assessing his demeanor, attitude toward his life
crime, and remorse. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2281, subds. (b) &
(d).) “Where, as here, undisputed evidence shows that [a
prisoner] has acknowledged the material aspects of [their]
conduct and offense, shown an understanding of its causes, and
demonstrated remorse, the Governor’s mere refusal to accept
such evidence is not itself a rational or sufficient basis upon
which to conclude that the [prisoner] lacks insight, let alone that

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[they] remain[] currently dangerous.” (In re Ryner (2011) 196
Cal.App.4th 533, 549.)
Moreover, even if Casey lacks insight, the Governor has not
explained any causal connection to a current public safety risk.
(Cf. In re Morganti (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 904, 925 [pertinent
inquiry is “whether there is any connection between any lack of
insight . . . and the conclusion that [a prisoner] is currently
dangerous”].) This nexus is required if we are to uphold a parole
unsuitability determination. (Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp.
1210, 1221.) Because one has not been shown to exist here, and
because “the evidence reflecting [Casey’s] present risk to public
safety leads to but one conclusion,” I would affirm the trial court’s
order upholding the parole board’s grant of parole. (Shaputis,
supra, 53 Cal.4th at 211.)
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

BALTODANO, J.

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Craig B. Van Rooyen, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Phillip J. Lindsay,
Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Malone and Jennifer
O. Cano, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant.
Charles Carbone, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Respondent.

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