CourtListener 4577514•People v. Vasquez
Texte intégral
Filed 12/27/18; Opinion following rehearing
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B281178
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA432561
v.
TYSHAUN VASQUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Bernie C. LaForteza, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
Emry J. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Under California law, the trial judge in a criminal case
must instruct the jury on all lesser-included offenses supported
by substantial evidence. Here, defense counsel requested an
instruction on the lesser-included offense of involuntary
manslaughter—an unlawful killing without malice. Counsel
conceded that defendant Tyshaun Vasquez administered a
beating that killed Eddie Ray Smith, Jr., but argued that
defendant was not subjectively aware his actions could be deadly
because Smith had a hidden spinal injury (metal rods had been
placed in his neck in a prior surgery), the fatal injury was
immediately adjacent to the metal rods, and the victim’s other
injuries were relatively minor. Defendant contends that the trial
court should have granted his instructional request because there
was substantial evidence to support the instruction and that the
error was prejudicial. We agree and reverse the judgment.1
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
By information filed January 6, 2016, defendant and
codefendant Jordan E. were each charged with one count of
special-circumstance first degree murder (Pen. Code,2 §§ 187,
subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17); count 1) and one count of
attempted second degree robbery (§ 664/211; count 2). Count 2
further alleged that Jordan personally used a deadly weapon (a
trash can) in the commission of the offense (§ 12022,
1 Because we reverse on this basis, we do not reach defendant’s
additional arguments.
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
subd. (b)(1)).3 Defendant pled not guilty and denied the special
circumstance.
Trial was by jury. Defendant did not testify. The court
denied his request to instruct on involuntary manslaughter as a
lesser-included offense of murder but granted his request to
instruct on second degree murder. The jury convicted defendant
of second degree murder. It acquitted him of first degree murder
and attempted robbery and found the special-circumstance
allegation not true.
Defendant moved for a new trial, again arguing that the
court should have instructed the jury on involuntary
manslaughter. The court denied the motion and sentenced
defendant to 15 years to life in state prison for count 1. The court
awarded him 793 days actual custody credit and 0 days local
conduct credit.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On November 30, 2014, at around 12:30 a.m., defendant
and Jordan were hanging out in the skate area of Rancho La
Cienega Park in Los Angeles. There, they encountered Smith.
According to Angel T., the sole eyewitness at trial, when
defendant and Jordan saw Smith, defendant said, “let’s go get
that guy. Let’s see if he got money or jewelry or anything like
that stuff.” The 43-year-old Smith was “skinny”: 5 feet 10 inches
tall and 129 pounds. In contrast, defendant was 19 and “notably”
taller and heavier than Smith.
3 Jordan’s case was subsequently transferred to juvenile court. He is
not a party to this appeal.
3
Defendant and Jordan approached Smith and grabbed him.
Defendant dug around in Smith’s pockets. It is unclear whether
he took anything. Jordan and defendant then punched Smith
about 15 times, knocking him to the ground. While Smith was on
the ground, defendant stomped on his head “and like his whole
body pretty much” approximately 20 times. Smith, meanwhile,
was yelling for help. As defendant stomped on Smith, Jordan
picked up a nearby metal trash can and threw it at Smith, hitting
him in the right side of the hip. Eventually, defendant and
Jordan left the scene.
Soon after the incident, Joel Williams, then a firefighter
with the Los Angeles Fire Department, responded to the scene
after being flagged down by a woman in the park. Williams saw
that the man on the ground, whom he later identified as Smith,
needed medical attention. Williams moved the trash can he found
on Smith’s body and after performing a standard examination,
determined that Smith was dead.
Kevin Young, a medical examiner for the Los Angeles
County Department of Medical Examiner-Coroner, performed the
autopsy. Young noted a variety of external injuries to Smith’s
body: trauma on both sides of his head; abrasions on his forehead,
temple, and cheek; lacerations on the side of his eye; a swollen
right ear with a hematoma and blood and abrasions in front of
and behind it; and other injuries. Each of these injuries,
considered alone, was nonlethal. All were premortem.
Young also found one significant internal injury: a neck
fracture in the C2-C3 vertebrae, just below the jawline. This
injury, which can be fatal because it restricts breathing, was
likely caused by impact wounds to Smith’s head: blunt force
trauma was determined to be a “substantial contributing factor”
4
to Smith’s death. Young noted that during a prior orthopedic
surgery, metal rods had been inserted into Smith’s neck directly
adjacent to the fracture. That surgery and the rods compromised
Smith’s neck strength and made him more susceptible to a neck
injury in the area. Indeed, because the break occurred right at
the edge of the metal rod, the rod could have acted as a fulcrum
and contributed to the break.
Still, it would take a high-impact event to cause a serious
injury to Smith’s neck. Getting punched in the neck would
“probably not” be enough. In addition, falling or getting punched
in the face likely would not have created a high enough impact to
fracture Smith’s neck. But getting stomped in the head—either
once or repeatedly—or being hit with a metal trash can could be
enough to cause a fracture. The location of the impact would have
affected the severity of the injury, since the rods made Smith’s
neck weaker in some areas, such as at the C2-C3 vertebrae, but
did not weaken his neck as much in other areas. And Young
testified that Smith did not have any other serious head or neck
injuries, such as a fractured skull, tooth damage, intracranial
bleeding, or brain bruises.
In the examination, Young also inventoried Smith’s
personal effects. Smith had 12 cents, a wallet, a social security
card, multiple credit cards, and a cell phone, but no jewelry.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court’s refusal to instruct on
involuntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense to murder
was erroneous and prejudicial. The People argue the instruction
was not supported by substantial evidence and overwhelming
evidence rendered any error harmless. We conclude there was
substantial evidence that defendant acted without malice and
5
there is a reasonable probability that he would have obtained a
more favorable outcome if the involuntary manslaughter
instruction had been given.
1. Instructional Duty and Standard of Review
“California law requires a trial court, sua sponte, to
instruct fully on all lesser necessarily included offenses supported
by the evidence.” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142,
148–149, 154–155, 162 (Breverman).) The requirement applies
when there is substantial evidence that the defendant committed
the lesser offense instead of the greater offense. (Id. at pp. 162,
177.)
“In deciding whether evidence is ‘substantial’ in this
context, a court determines only its bare legal sufficiency, not its
weight.” (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 177.) Thus, “courts
should not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, a task for the
jury” (id. at p. 162), and uncertainty about whether the evidence
is sufficient to warrant instructions should be resolved in favor of
the accused (People v. Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 944). Even
evidence that is unconvincing or subject to justifiable suspicion
may constitute substantial evidence and may trigger the lesser-
included-offense requirement. (People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d
668, 690.)
When the defense requests the instruction, the refusal to
instruct on a lesser-included offense may also violate the federal
constitution’s requirement that the courts afford every criminal
defendant “ ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense.’ ” (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690; People v.
Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 868, fn. 16.) As part of this right, a
defendant is “ ‘entitled to adequate instructions on the defense
theory of the case’ if supported by the law and evidence [citation]
6
and ‘ “has a constitutional right to have the jury determine every
material issue presented by the evidence …” ’ [citation].” (People
v. Eid (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 859, 879; People v. Cash (2002) 28
Cal.4th 703, 736 [“Defendants have a constitutional right to have
the jury determine every material issue presented by the
evidence, and a trial court’s failure to instruct on lesser included
offenses denies them that right.”].)
We review de novo the trial court’s failure or refusal to
instruct on a lesser-included offense. (People v. Cook (2006) 39
Cal.4th 566, 596.)
2. Involuntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense
of murder.
Murder is “the unlawful killing of a human being, or a
fetus, with malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).)4 Malice may
be express or implied. (§ 188.) Express malice is the intent to kill,
whereas implied malice exists “where the defendant … acted with
conscious disregard that the natural and probable consequences
of [his] act or actions were dangerous to human life. [Citation.]”
(People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 197.)
Implied malice has both objective and subjective
components. The objective test requires “ ‘ “an act, the natural
consequences of which are dangerous to life … .” ’ ” (People v.
Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143.) This means the act must
carry “ ‘a high degree of probability that it will result in death.’ ”
(Id. at p. 152.) The subjective test requires that the act be
4 While felony murder does not require malice, the jury in this case
rejected that theory when it acquitted defendant of both first degree
murder and attempted robbery and found the robbery-murder special
circumstance not true. (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 654.)
7
performed “ ‘ “by a person who knows that his conduct endangers
the life of another … .” ’ ” (Id. at p. 143.) “In short, implied malice
requires a defendant’s awareness of engaging in conduct that
endangers the life of another—no more, and no less.” (Ibid.)
An unlawful killing without malice is involuntary
manslaughter. (§ 192; see, e.g., People v. Blakeley (2000) 23
Cal.4th 82, 91; People v. Butler (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 998,
1008–1009 [addressing the difference between implied malice
murder and involuntary manslaughter]; CALCRIM No. 580.)5
“Generally, involuntary manslaughter is a lesser offense included
within the offense of murder.” (People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28
Cal.4th 1083, 1145.) Accordingly, an instruction on involuntary
manslaughter is required whenever there is substantial evidence
indicating the defendant acted without conscious disregard for
human life and did not form the intent to kill.6
3. The court denied defendant’s requests for an
instruction on involuntary manslaughter.
After the prosecution rested, the court held a hearing to
discuss jury instructions. Defense counsel asked the court to
instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter based on a lack of
malice. Counsel’s theory was that if the jury rejected Angel’s
testimony, it would have to acquit defendant of attempted
robbery, felony murder, and the special circumstance. At that
5 Voluntary manslaughter is not at issue in this case.
6 An unlawful killing may also amount to involuntary manslaughter
under a misdemeanor-manslaughter theory (§ 192, subd. (b)), but that
rule is not at issue here. (See, e.g., People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47,
60–61 [court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on misdemeanor-
manslaughter theory of involuntary manslaughter].)
8
point, the only contested issue would be defendant’s intent—that
is, whether he acted with malice.
Defense counsel explained that in light of “the coroner’s
testimony that none of the [other] blows were fatal and given the
fulcrum of where the neck was broken, there was no intent to
kill.” Though defendant committed an unlawful act, it was “a
freak thing.” “Beating someone badly, but not inflicting deadly
blows, not knowing that the person had prior … cervical surgery
before, how would anybody know? Again, there’s no intent to kill.
It’s a terrible thing that happened, but if the jury rejects—again,
rejects count 2 [attempted robbery] and the permutations of it,
you know, we’re left with regular murder or manslaughter. And,
again, that’s a question of fact for the jury to decide, the intent
aspect. If there’s no intent to kill, it can be nothing but
involuntary manslaughter.”
The prosecutor responded that “if this were a fistfight, I
totally get where counsel is coming from. But someone lying on
the ground being stomped on 20 times is evidence that—I don’t
see how a person is not aware that that behavior can result in
death and disregard it, the likelihood of someone dying from that
behavior.”
The following day, the court issued a written statement of
decision denying counsel’s request for an involuntary
manslaughter instruction. The court made various factual
findings, including that “defendant stomped approximately 20
times [on] the victim’s head and body in a forceful manner.” The
court then concluded the evidence did not support the instruction
because “defendant did not simply start a fistfight in which an
unlucky blow resulted in the victim’s death. He savagely beat and
stomped the victim to death.” Because this was felonious conduct,
9
the court declined to give the instruction. (See Breverman, supra,
19 Cal.4th at pp. 162, 177 [court may not weigh the evidence or
evaluate witness credibility when deciding whether substantial
evidence supports an instruction on lesser-included offense].)
Defense counsel urged the court to reconsider its decision.
While the court might not have been required to give the
instruction sua sponte, counsel argued, it was required to give it
upon request. Counsel explained that Smith’s broken neck was
an anomaly, and “given the facts that none of the injuries,
internal or external, described by Dr. Young were fatal or life-
threatening, [ ] the perpetrator would not know the natural and
probable consequences would be” dangerous to human life. The
significance of this evidence was “for the trier of fact to make the
determination with regards to malice, to intent.”
Indeed, counsel revealed that if the court did give the
involuntary manslaughter instruction, he would not even ask the
jury to acquit; he would instead ask the jury to convict defendant
of involuntary manslaughter. “My client should be held
responsible for what he did,” counsel explained. “But to say that
the jury should not even consider [involuntary manslaughter]
because of the nature of the beating, that someone should know
that the natural consequences would be dangerous to human life,
I don’t think that’s the situation given the type of injuries and
based on the coroner’s testimony.”
Finally, counsel emphasized that “the court is precluding
me from arguing a defense that I laid out at the very beginning,
during voir dire. I was that confident, given the nature of the
injuries.”
After hearing further argument, the court again denied
counsel’s request for the instruction.
10
4. There was substantial evidence from which the jury
could conclude defendant acted without malice.
As discussed, a defendant acts without implied malice if he
lacks a subjective awareness that his conduct carries “ ‘a high
degree of probability that it will result in death.’ ” (People v.
Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152.) When viewed in the light
most favorable to defendant, there was substantial evidence in
this case from which a reasonable juror could conclude defendant
was not subjectively aware that his actions could kill Smith.
(People v. Millbrook (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1137
[sufficiency of the evidence supporting lesser-included offense
instruction viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant].)
California courts have long recognized that not all beatings
are life-threatening. “Normally, hitting a person with the hands
or feet does not constitute murder in any degree. [Citations.] But
if death … is a reasonable or probable consequence of the beating
the offense may be murder. [Citation.] Thus, to constitute murder
there has to be either an intent to kill or such wanton and brutal
use of the hands [or feet] without provocation as to indicate that
they would cause death … .” (People v. Teixeira (1955) 136
Cal.App.2d 136, 150, italics added; accord, People v. Cravens
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508 [“This state has long recognized ‘that
[while] an assault with the fist … may be made in such a manner
and under such circumstances as to make the killing murder’
[citation] … ‘if the blows causing death are inflicted with the fist,
and there are no aggravating circumstances, the law will not
raise the implication of malice aforethought, which must exist to
make the crime murder.’ [Citation.]”].)
Here, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury
could have reasonably concluded that the beating defendant
11
administered to Smith was not so wanton and brutal as to
demonstrate a conscious disregard for human life. Young, the
medical examiner, testified that almost all of Smith’s injuries—
taken alone—were nonlethal. Smith did not suffer a fractured
skull, tooth damage, intracranial bleeding, or brain bruises,
which might be expected from multiple high-impact blows to the
head. As to Smith’s neck specifically, a prior surgery had inserted
metal rods into his neck and spine, making Smith vulnerable to a
serious neck injury in the precise spot where the break occurred.
The weakness of Smith’s neck was not visible externally. And
Young agreed that since Smith’s neck snapped at a point
immediately adjacent to the end of the metal rod, the rod could
have acted as a fulcrum, thereby increasing the force on that
area. A reasonable juror could have inferred from this evidence
that the blows were not particularly severe and further inferred
that defendant believed beating up Smith would injure him but
not kill him.
The People cite two cases in support of their claim that no
substantial evidence supported an involuntary manslaughter
instruction here. Both are inapt.
In Guillen, the manner and circumstances of a jail assault
on a murder victim provided sufficient evidence, under an aiding
and abetting theory, to support the jury’s conclusion that each
defendant inmate was subjectively aware that the natural and
probable consequences of his conduct were dangerous to life.
(People v. Guillen (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 934, 982–992 (Guillen).)
In that case, the victim, a child molester, was escorted to one of
the only places in the jail where deputies could not see an attack.
(Id. at pp. 985–986.) Between 30 and 50 inmates assaulted the
victim—by hitting him, kicking him, stomping on him, spanking
12
him, spitting on him, urinating on him, spilling hot coffee on him,
stripping off his clothes, and putting foreign items in his
rectum—and the victim’s injuries, which included 21 broken ribs,
a punctured lung, and a hemorrhagic back, were consistent with
a high-velocity car accident or a fall from multiple stories. (Ibid.)
The court concluded a reasonable person would have understood
that this type of vicious group assault could be fatal. (Id. at
pp. 988–989.)
Unlike in Guillen, in which the court assessed whether the
evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, we must decide
whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant an instruction
on a lesser-included offense. Thus, whereas Guillen viewed the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defense.
(People v. Millbrook, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1137.) And
while the Guillen victim’s premortem injuries were consistent
with a fall from a tall building, here, other than the blow to the
neck, all of Smith’s injuries were nonlethal. Finally, unlike in
Guillen, the prosecution here did not argue—and the jury was not
instructed—that defendant acted in concert with or aided and
abetted Jordan.
In Evers, the other case cited by the People, the court
concluded there was no error in failing to instruct on involuntary
manslaughter where the child victim suffered severe injuries, and
evidence of the defendant’s prior child abuse established he was
aware of the risk of his actions. (People v. Evers (1992) 10
Cal.App.4th 588.) In that case, there was undisputed evidence
the deceased child suffered physical injuries equivalent to those
that would result from a 10-to-30-foot fall. (Id. at p. 597.) The
record established the defendant had used violent force against
13
the child in the past, and he, therefore, must have been aware of
the risk of death. (Id. at p. 598.) There was no similar evidence
here.
In sum, because there was substantial evidence in this case
from which a reasonable juror could have doubted that defendant
was subjectively aware the beating could kill Smith, the court
was required to instruct on the lesser-included offense of
involuntary manslaughter.
5. The error was prejudicial.
In a non-capital case, the erroneous failure to instruct on a
lesser-included offense is typically an error of state law. (People v.
Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 867–868.)7 Thus, we must
reverse if there is a reasonable probability that the defendant
would have obtained a more favorable outcome if the instruction
had been given. (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 178; People v.
Soojian (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 491, 520–521 [a hung jury is a
more favorable result than a guilty verdict].) A reasonable
probability “does not mean more likely than not, but merely a
reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility. [Citations.]”
(College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704,
715.) An error is prejudicial whenever the defendant can
“ ‘undermine confidence’ ” in the result achieved at trial. (Ibid.,
quoting People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837.) “In
assessing prejudice, we consider both the magnitude of the error
and the closeness of the case.” (People v. Vasquez (2017) 14
Cal.App.5th 1019, 1041.)
7 Because we conclude the error here was prejudicial under state law,
we do not address whether it also violated defendant’s federal
constitutional rights.
14
The rationale for requiring courts to instruct on lesser-
included offenses is to avoid forcing the jury into an
“ ‘unwarranted all-or-nothing choice’ ” that creates the risk the
jury will convict on the charged offense even though one of the
elements remains in doubt because “ ‘the defendant is plainly
guilty of some offense.’ ” (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287,
365; accord, People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 410 [“One of
the primary reasons for requiring instructions on lesser included
offenses is … to eliminate ‘ “the risk that the jury will convict ...
simply to avoid setting the defendant free.” ’ [Citation.]”]; People
v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 196, 203 [“ ‘Our courts are not
gambling halls but forums for the discovery of truth.’ ” The “jury’s
truth-ascertainment function” is impaired unless it is provided
with “the opportunity to decide whether the defendant is guilty of
a lesser included offense established by the evidence”].)
Under the instructions given in this case, the jury was
forced to choose between convicting defendant of second degree
murder and acquitting him entirely. As we shall explain, there is
a reasonable probability that the jury chose second degree
murder to avoid the more implausible alternative that defendant
was not guilty of any crime. Put another way, we hold there is a
reasonable probability that at least one juror would have voted to
convict defendant of involuntary manslaughter if given the
chance.
5.1. The instruction embodied the defense theory of
the case.
The failure to instruct on a lesser-included offense is more
likely to be prejudicial where it strikes at the heart of the
defense. (People v. Neidinger (2006) 40 Cal.4th 67, 79; see People
v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 376 [“An error that impairs
15
the jury’s determination of an issue that is both critical and
closely balanced will rarely be harmless.”].)
Here, counsel structured the entire defense around one
element: malice. In his opening statement, counsel explained that
defendant, “right or wrong, has a penchant for getting into stupid
fights. Okay? Nothing to do with attempted robberies or—just
getting into fights all the time.” Counsel acknowledged Smith
was beaten. But most of Smith’s injuries were nonlethal. And,
counsel explained, Smith had prior injuries that had
compromised the vertebrae in the very spot in which his neck
broke. Counsel, therefore, concluded his opening statement by
telling the jury, “I would suggest to you that at the end of the day
that you’re going to find … that this is in fact an involuntary
manslaughter.”
The cross-examination of the medical examiner was also
structured around malice. For example, counsel asked Young
about each of Smith’s injuries and confirmed that none of them
was potentially fatal. He confirmed Smith’s teeth were intact,
that his skull was not fractured, and that there was no trauma to
his brain. Then, counsel spent the bulk of cross-examination
asking Young about the relationship between Smith’s prior neck
injury and his death. Counsel elicited testimony that the break
itself was right on the edge of the metal rods, and those rods
could have acted as a fulcrum that helped cause the break. As he
explained when he requested the instruction, this was the
foundation of counsel’s theory that defendant acted without
conscious disregard for human life.
Yet after asking the jury in his opening statement to
convict of involuntary manslaughter, in his closing argument,
counsel asked them to acquit entirely. He still conceded the other
16
elements: “There’s no issue whether Tyshaun Vasquez was
involved in this case. … That’s not an issue here. The issue is a
question of was there a crime committed and what is that crime?”
And he still focused on intent: did defendant know that death
was a natural and probable consequence of his actions?
Counsel made it clear, however, that he didn’t think an
acquittal was the right result. For example, he explained, “In this
case, the prosecution chose to file murder. Granted, there’s two
theories that the prosecutor has in this case, but they chose to file
murder. Didn’t choose to file manslaughter, didn’t choose to file
justifiable homicide. Those are not issues. The issue before us is
what the prosecutor chose to file, and you have to address that.
You have to deal with that.” Again: “We all agree people should
be held responsible for what they do, but in a court situation,
we’re limited to what’s charged. Again, it’s a homicide. The
prosecution has a lot of ways to charge homicide. … The choice
was made by the prosecutor here.”
In the end, without an instruction on involuntary
manslaughter, defense counsel was left to tell the jury this: “You
know, I’d love to tell you, sure, hold Tyshaun responsible; but
based on what we have here and now, this case has not been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It’s just the way it was pled.”
The court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the lesser-
included offense of involuntary manslaughter placed defense
counsel in the untenable position of arguing that his client—who
had plainly killed a man—should be set free.
5.2. The evidence of malice was not overwhelming.
The People insist the court’s refusal to instruct on
involuntary manslaughter was harmless because “there was
overwhelming evidence of malice in this case. … [Defendant]
17
cannot credibly claim that stomping on the victim’s head and
upper body 20 times did not constitute ‘malice’ sufficient for
second degree murder.”
We disagree. As discussed above, there was sufficient
evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude defendant
did not intend to kill Smith. Most of Smith’s injuries were
nonlethal. To be sure, that defendant unwittingly chose a victim
with a preexisting neck condition would usually be irrelevant, for
a defendant takes his victim as he finds him and should not
benefit from picking a vulnerable one. Here, however, Smith’s
prior neck injury speaks to defendant’s subjective awareness of
the consequences of his actions because it could show that
defendant did not intend to beat Smith badly enough to kill him.
Nor do the People’s two cited authorities—provided without
any discussion or analysis—support their position.
In Moye, the court concluded any error in failing to instruct
the jury sua sponte on a heat-of-passion theory of voluntary
manslaughter—in addition to instructions that were given on
imperfect self-defense manslaughter—was harmless under state
law. (People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 557–558 (Moye).)
There, the jury heard and rejected defendant’s theories of self-
defense and imperfect self-defense. (Id. at p. 558.) Once it did so,
there was little (if any) evidence to support the claim that he was
acting in a subjective “heat of passion” when killing the victim.
Specifically, defendant’s testimony that the victim kicked his car
and attacked him with a bat did not amount to legally sufficient
provocation required for a heat-of-passion defense unrelated to
the perceived need for self-defense. (Ibid.) But the evidence did
establish that after enlisting the help of two compatriots, the
defendant found the victim, chased him “over a chain link fence
18
and through a field, caught him and bludgeoned him to death
with a baseball bat, after which defendant disposed of the
bloodied murder weapon in a nearby storm drain.” (Id. at p. 557)
The strength of this evidence, coupled with the jury’s rejection of
the self-defense claim, rendered the error harmless.
In Flood, the trial court failed to instruct the jury that to
convict the defendant of evading a peace officer, the prosecution
was required to prove that the defendant evaded actual peace
officers. (People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 505 (Flood).) The
court found the error harmless under the Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18 test for federal constitutional errors because
the “[d]efendant never referred to this element of the crime
during the trial and did not argue to the jury that the prosecution
had failed to prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt;
indeed, he did not ask that the issue even be considered by the
jury. Furthermore, defendant presented no evidence regarding
the peace officer element, and failed to dispute the prosecution’s
evidence regarding the issue.” (Flood, at p. 505.) These actions
were “tantamount to a concession” of the element. (Ibid.)
Moreover, the Flood court noted, “the verdict
demonstrate[d] that the jury resolved every contested issue in
favor of the prosecution and, in particular, credited the testimony
of all of the witnesses who testified regarding [the officers’] status
as peace officers. On the only issue related to the ‘peace officer’
issue that defendant actually contested, the jury rejected
defendant’s contention and found that the motor vehicle in which
the officers were driving was ‘distinctively marked.’ ” (Flood,
supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 505.)
Unlike Moye, the case before us is not one in which the jury
rejected other theories of guilt in favor of one requiring a more
19
culpable mental state, indicating that if properly instructed, the
jury would still have found defendant guilty of a crime greater
than involuntary manslaughter. And unlike Flood, this is not a
case in which the jury demonstrably decided every contested
issue in favor of the prosecution and fully credited every
prosecution witness. To the contrary, the jury’s verdicts here—
acquitting defendant of premeditated murder, acquitting
defendant of felony murder, acquitting defendant of attempted
robbery, and finding the attempted-robbery special circumstance
not true—indicate it rejected the prosecution’s theory of the case.
Furthermore, since Angel provided the only evidence to support
the attempted robbery count, the jury apparently rejected or
found problematic at least some of Angel’s testimony.
Nor is this a case in which the court failed to instruct on a
peripheral issue, as in Moye, or a conceded element, as in Flood.
Unlike the trial courts in those cases, the court here refused
repeated defense requests to instruct on a lesser crime that
embodied the entire defense. Here, the court refused to instruct
on a lesser crime that targeted the flaws in the only element the
defense contested.
5.3. The jury struggled with its verdict.
“ ‘The necessity for instructions on lesser included offenses
is based in the defendant’s constitutional right to have the jury
determine every material issue presented by the evidence.
[Citations.] ... “True, if the prosecution has not established
beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged,
and if no lesser offense instruction is offered, the jury must, as a
theoretical matter, return a verdict of acquittal. But a defendant
is entitled to a lesser offense instruction—in this context or any
other—precisely because he should not be exposed to the
20
substantial risk that the jury’s practice will diverge from theory.
Where one of the elements of the offense charged remains in
doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury
is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction.” [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” (People v. Tinajero (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1547.)
There is evidence here that the jury struggled with just this
problem. As discussed, the defense did not contest identity and
conceded that defendant killed Smith. Defendant’s only claim
was that he lacked malice. Indeed, defense counsel acknowledged
that ideally, defendant should be convicted of something, and
lamented that the prosecution’s charging decision placed the jury
in such a difficult position. Yet without an involuntary
manslaughter instruction, the jury was left to decide between
first degree murder, second degree murder, and … nothing. As we
have discussed at length above, the error went to the heart of the
defense case that defendant did not try to rob Smith and didn’t
know the beating could kill him.
The jury agreed with that theory—at least in part. Jurors
acquitted defendant of premeditated murder. They acquitted him
of felony murder. And they acquitted him of attempted robbery.
In so doing, they rejected the prosecutor’s theory of the case and
at least some of Angel’s testimony. (See People v. Mullendore
(2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 848, 857 [failure to instruct on a lesser-
included offense was prejudicial where jury’s decision to convict
on another count indicated doubts about the defendant’s use of
force].) The jury deliberated for two days, asked several
questions, and received supplemental closing arguments. (See
People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 907 [six hours of
deliberations is evidence of a close case]; People v. Woods (1991)
226 Cal.App.3d 1037, 1052 [failure to give lesser-included offense
21
instruction was prejudicial where three days of deliberations and
request for read-back indicate close case]; People v. Pearch (1991)
229 Cal.App.3d 1282, 1295 [“Juror questions and requests to
have testimony reread are indications the deliberations were
close. [Citations.]”].) As such, it is reasonably probable defendant
would have achieved a better result if the jury had been properly
instructed. Therefore, defendant’s conviction must be reversed.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for
retrial.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
EDMON, P. J.
KALRA, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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