People v. Castano CA1/5

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Filed 6/16/26 P. v. Castano CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A171420
v.
DANIEL CASTANO, (Contra Costa County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. 05-140271-8)

Defendant, Daniel Castano, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his
petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 (petition).1
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously (1) denied his petition for
failure to make a prima facie showing for relief and (2) failed to provide him a
Marsden2 hearing upon his request to discharge and substitute appointed
counsel. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We recite only those facts relevant to the issues raised on appeal. In
2012, defendant shot and killed 17-year-old Fernando Jason Gonzalez outside
a neighborhood school. Maria G., a longtime acquaintance of defendant, saw

1 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Penal

Code.
2 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

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him reach through the passenger-side window of a parked sport utility
vehicle (SUV) and fire a gun about five times at Gonzalez, who was seated in
the SUV’s driver’s seat.
A jury convicted defendant of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and
active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). The jury
also found he committed murder for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)), and that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing
death (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d)). He was sentenced to 60 years to life in
prison.
In 2017, we affirmed the judgment on appeal with one exception.
We reversed the imposition of a 10-year, consecutive term for the gang
enhancement after concluding the trial court should have instead imposed a
15-year minimum parole eligibility period. (People v. Castano (June 27, 2017,
A145447) [nonpub. opn.].)
On December 5, 2023, defendant filed an in pro. per. petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6. In his petition, defendant claimed
eligibility for resentencing based on the changes to sections 188 and 189
brought about by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.; Senate Bill
1437). He reasoned that he was convicted of murder based on a theory of
imputed malice, which Senate Bill 1437 invalidated. The trial court
appointed counsel to represent him. After the prosecution opposed the
petition, the newly appointed counsel filed a reply brief on defendant’s behalf.
On July 18, 2024, defendant filed an in pro. per. Marsden motion
seeking a hearing on his request to discharge his appointed counsel and
substitute in new appointed counsel.

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On August 15, 2024, the trial court heard defendant’s petition.
Defendant, who appeared by video, was represented by his appointed counsel.
Neither defendant nor his appointed counsel raised the issue of his Marsden
motion. The court took the matter under submission, advising the parties an
order would be issued within 30 days.
On September 6, 2024, before the court issued the order, defendant
filed an in pro. per. notice of appeal of “all issues raised during the [section
1172.6] proceeding in this action, including the superior court’s neglect to
adjudicate his pre-judgment filed and pending Marsden motion . . . .”
On September 10, 2024, the trial court issued its amended order
denying defendant’s petition for failure to state a prima facie case for relief
under section 1172.6. A week later, defendant’s appointed counsel filed a
timely notice of appeal of the court’s order.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his
resentencing petition for failure to state a prima facie case for relief and
declining to hold a Marsden hearing based on his statutory right to counsel
under section 1172.6. Neither contention has merit.
I. No prima facie showing for relief was made.
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill 1437 fundamentally “altered the
substantive law of murder for accomplices . . . .” (People v. Arellano (2024)
16 Cal.5th 457, 467 (Arellano).) Specifically, the bill modified the felony-
murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine to prohibit
imposition of murder liability on a person who was not the actual killer, did
not act with intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying
felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (People v. Reyes
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 292, 295.) The bill also created “a procedure for

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convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended to
retroactively seek relief.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957
(Lewis).)
Under this new procedure: “ ‘A person convicted of felony murder or
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime . . . may file a petition with the court that
sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder . . . conviction
vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts . . . .’ ‘[T]he process
begins with the filing of a petition containing a declaration that all
requirements for eligibility are met ([§ 1172.6], subd. (b)(1)(A)), including
that “[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted
murder because of changes to [Penal Code] Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019,” the effective date of Senate Bill 1437 (§ 1172.6, subd.
(a)(3)).’ [Citation.] ‘When the trial court receives a petition containing the
necessary declaration and other required information, the court must
evaluate the petition “to determine whether the petitioner has made a
prima facie case for relief.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); [citation].) If the petition and
record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for
relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition. (See § 1172.6, subd. (c);
[citation].) If instead, the defendant has made a prima facie showing of
entitlement to relief, “the court shall issue an order to show cause.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)’ ” (Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 468–469,
2d bracketed insertion added.)
In determining whether a defendant made a prima facie showing under
section 1172.6, the court must determine whether, taking the allegations in
the petition as true, the defendant would be entitled to relief. (Lewis, supra,

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11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The court may consider the record of conviction,
including the charging document, verdict forms, closing arguments, and jury
instructions. (People v. Jenkins (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 924, 935.) In addition,
“the court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or
trial that is admissible under current law, including witness testimony,
stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed. The court may also
consider the procedural history of the case recited in any prior appellate
opinion.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) “ ‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s
factual allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an
evidentiary hearing.’ [Citations.] ‘However, if the record, including the
court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility determination
adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, at p. 971.)
Defendant insists he made a prima facie showing for relief under
section 1172.6 because, based on the jury instructions given at trial, it is
possible he was convicted under a theory of liability invalidated by the
changes to California’s murder laws. (See People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th
433, 470–471 [the inquiry at the prima facie stage is not whether the
instructions make it likely the defendant was convicted under an invalid
theory of murder but only whether the instructions foreclose that possibility
as a matter of law].) We disagree.
At trial, the court instructed the jury on multiple theories, including
first degree premeditated murder (CALCRIM No. 521); second degree
murder, defined as unlawful killing with malice aforethought (CALCRIM No.
520); and involuntary manslaughter (CALCRIM No. 580). No instruction
was given on the now invalidated theories of felony murder, aiding and

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abetting a murder, or the natural and probable consequences theory of aiding
and abetting a murder.
With respect to the enhancement allegations accompanying the murder
count, the jury was instructed under CALCRIM No. 1402 that if it found
defendant guilty of first degree or second degree murder “and you find that
the defendant committed those crimes for the benefit of, at the direction of, or
in association with a criminal street gang with the intent to promote, further,
or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members, you must then decide
whether, for each crime, the People have proved the additional allegation
that one of the principals used/personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm during that crime and caused death. [¶] . . . [¶] A person is a
principal in a crime if he or she directly commits or attempts to commit the
crime or if he or she aid and abets someone who commits or attempts to
commit the crime.” And, under CALCRIM No. 3149, the jury was instructed
that if it found defendant guilty of first degree murder, “you must then decide
whether, the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm during that crime causing
death. . . . [¶] To prove this allegation, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The
defendant personally discharged a firearm during the commission or
attempted commission of that crime; [¶] 2. The defendant intended to
discharge the firearm; [¶] AND [¶] 3. The defendant’s act caused the death of
the person.” (Sic.)
Finally, for purposes of defendant’s defense, the jury was given
CALCRIM No. 3400, which provided, in relevant part: “The defendant
contends he did not commit these crimes and that he was somewhere else
when the crimes were committed. The People must prove that the defendant
was present and committed the crimes with which he is charged.”

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Applying these instructions, the jury found defendant guilty of
premeditated, first degree murder, not as an aider and abettor but as the
direct perpetrator of the killing who acted with intent to kill. The jury also
found defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in
committing first degree murder, which act “caus[ed the] death [of the
victim].” Necessarily, the jury rejected the affirmative defense that
defendant was not present at the murder scene.
These findings confirm defendant was convicted under a murder theory
that remains valid under California law and not, as he claims, under the now
invalidated theory of imputed malice. As the California Supreme Court
explains: “The primary difference between express and implied malice is that
the former requires an intent to kill but the latter does not.” (People v. Soto
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 976.) Here, the jury found that defendant acted with
the requisite intent to kill, to wit, express malice, in finding him guilty of first
degree murder. Specifically, based on the language of CALCRIM No. 521,
the jury found the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
“[defendant] acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation” in causing
Gonzalez’s death. In doing so, the jury implicitly rejected defendant’s
defense—not that an accomplice committed the murder but that he was
somewhere else at the time of the event. Under these circumstances, we
reject defendant’s claim, made without any supporting facts, that he may
have been convicted of first degree murder under a theory of imputed malice
based on acts committed by a second perpetrator.
In so holding, we reject defendant’s argument that the court’s giving
CALCRIM No. 1402 invited the jury to find him guilty of murder based on
the natural and probable consequences theory of aiding and abetting. While
this instruction mentions aiding and abetting, it does so in connection with

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the enhancement attached to the murder count, not in connection with the
underlying theory of murder.
Thus, having reviewed the relevant record, we conclude the first degree
murder verdict as well as the true finding on the allegation that defendant
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury
or death to Gonzalez conclusively prove he was convicted as a direct
perpetrator of murder. The trial court was therefore correct that, as a matter
of law, defendant is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. (People v.
Beaudreux (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1247 [“reading all the charges, the
instructions, the verdicts, and the findings as a whole, we see no legal route
[defendant’s] jury could have taken to convict him without finding he was
[the victim’s] actual killer”]; People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 969–
973 [affirming denial of resentencing petition when the record of conviction
“unequivocally establishe[d]” defendant was the sole perpetrator and actual
killer]; People v. Myles (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 692–694 [affirming denial
of resentencing petition when defendant admitted at parole suitability
hearing that she was actual killer, such that defendant was “ ‘directly liable’ ”
and “ ‘not vicariously liable’ ”]; People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233
[defendant was “not entitled to any relief under section 1172.6” since he “was
the actual killer and the only participant in the killing”].) The order stands.
II. The failure to hold a Marsden hearing was harmless.
We quickly dispose of defendant’s remaining contention that the trial
court prejudicially erred by failing to rule on his request for a Marsden
hearing in order to obtain discharge of his appointed counsel and substitution
of new counsel.
A petitioner “ ‘whose petition is denied before an order to show cause
issues has the burden of showing “it is reasonably probable that if [he or she]

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had been afforded assistance of counsel his [or her] petition would not have
been summarily denied without an evidentiary hearing.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 974.) While in Lewis the petitioner was not afforded any
assistance of counsel, the same rule applies when, as here, the petitioner
(defendant) claims ineffective assistance of counsel.
Here, for reasons already explained, it is not reasonably probable that
defendant would have avoided summary denial of his petition had new
counsel been appointed to represent him. Simply put, defendant is legally
ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6 because he committed
first degree, premeditated murder by personally discharging his firearm,
causing death to Gonzalez. New counsel, even if highly effective, could not
have avoided this result. (See People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666,
678 [“When a petitioner is, unlike Daniel, not categorically ineligible for
relief, it is possible that further facts could be developed to show that he or
she was in fact convicted under a now-invalid theory of murder. . . . [¶] Here,
however, Daniel has not carried his burden to demonstrate a reasonable
probability that ‘his petition would not have been summarily denied without
an evidentiary hearing’ had the trial court appointed counsel for him”].)
DISPOSITION
The amended order of September 10, 2024, is affirmed.

Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

Simons, J.
Burns, J.

A171420/People v. Daniel Castano

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