People v. Miller CA2/4

CourtListener 10873359Calctapp10 juin 2026

Texte intégral

Filed 6/10/26 P. v. Miller CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B346395
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. BA109461)

v.

OLLIE M. MILLER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from postconviction order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, H. Clay Jacke II, Judge. Affirmed.
Sylvia W. Beckham, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Roberta L. Davis, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Ollie M. Miller appeals from the denial of his
Penal Code section 1172.6 petition.1 While recognizing his three
attempted murder convictions were not based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, defendant contends he is still
eligible for resentencing under an uninstructed theory of imputed
malice. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
On the afternoon of February 15, 1997, defendant,
codefendants Dion Mitchell and Reginald Carr, as well as Shaka
Jones3 and other members or associates of the Six-One and
Six-Deuce Brims (collectively Sixties Brims) congregated outside
a home on Menlo Street and 61st Street. The Five-Nine Hoover
gang, a rival Crips gang, claimed nearby territory. Two
occupants in a blue sedan drove by the group and flashed Hoover
gang signs. Defendant pulled a handgun and fired six shots at
the car.
At a nearby residence several hours later, defendant,
codefendants, and several others planned to “‘shoot up all’” rival
gang members from an alley running between Menlo and Hoover
Streets. Around 7:00 or 8:00 p.m., the men entered the alley

1 Subsequent unspecified references to statutes are to the current
or earlier version of the Penal Code, or to the present identical but
renumbered version.
2 We grant the Attorney General’s request to take judicial notice
of the appellate record in People v. Miller et al. (Feb. 25, 1999,
B118099) [nonpub. opn.].
3 Jones was originally charged in this case. In exchange for his
truthful testimony, Jones received a five-year prison term for assault
with a deadly weapon.

2
heavily armed. Defendant carried a nine-millimeter handgun,
while others carried an AK-47 assault rifle, .380-caliber
handgun, .357 magnum, and .25-caliber handgun. The men fired
approximately 40 gunshots in the direction of what they believed
were two individuals at the end of the alley.
Three children in the front yard of a residence on 61st and
Hoover Streets were struck by the bullets. A two-year-old
suffered gunshot wounds to her stomach, arm, and leg. Her
14-year-old brother suffered gunshot wounds to his legs and
head. Their cousin also suffered a gunshot wound to his leg.
Following indictment and jury trial, defendant and
codefendants were convicted of three counts of attempted murder
(§§ 664/187, subd. (a); counts 1–3) and conspiracy to commit
murder (§§ 182/187, subd. (a)) for the shooting occurring on
February 15, 1997.4 The jury found each attempted murder was
committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. (§ 664,
subd. (a).) The jury also found that a principal and defendant
personally used a firearm (§§ 12022, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5,
subd. (a)(1), 1203.06, subd. (a)(1)) and found defendant personally
and intentionally inflicted great bodily injury on two of the child
victims. (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1), 12022.7, subd. (a).) Defendant
was sentenced to an overall term of 50 years plus three
consecutive life terms.
A different panel of this court affirmed defendant’s
judgment. (People v. Miller et al. (Feb. 25, 1999, B118099)

4 Defendant was separately indicted for attempted murder in
connection with the shooting at the blue sedan. He was acquitted of
this offense and convicted of the lesser-included offense of assault with
a deadly weapon with personal firearm use. (§§ 245, subd. (a)(2),
1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)).

3
[nonpub. opn.] 1, 16.) In that direct appeal, defendant argued the
trial court prejudicially erred by not instructing the jury on
aiding and abetting under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, as this would have helped the jury determine whether
particular trial witnesses were accomplices to the crimes. (Id. at
p. 7; see § 1111 [criminal conviction cannot be “had upon the
testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such
other evidence”].)5
In 2024, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
with a claim requesting section 1172.6 relief. Treating this claim
as a “stand alone, 1172.6 petition,” the court appointed defendant
counsel, received briefing, and held a prima facie hearing. The
court denied the petition, finding defendant’s convictions not
based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law
Current section 1172.6 provides a resentencing procedure
for persons convicted of murder, attempted murder, and
manslaughter who could not be convicted under recently
amended law. (See People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 440;
Stats. 2021, ch. 551, §§ 1(a), 2.) Specifically, section 1172.6
provides that persons convicted of “felony murder or murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on

5 While noting this theory “conceivably could have been” but was
not raised by the parties at trial (People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th
1027, 1050), the court reasoned it was also possible “all parties agreed
not to instruct on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, . . .”
(People v. Miller et al. (Feb. 25, 1999, B118099) [nonpub. opn.] 8, 9.)

4
that person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter
may file a petition” to vacate such conviction(s) and be
resentenced on any remaining count. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
This resentencing procedure begins with a petition
declaring that (1) an indictment or complaint was filed allowing
the prosecution to “proceed under a theory of felony murder,
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine”;
(2) the petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter; and (3) the petitioner could not presently be
convicted of such offense under current law. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(1)–(3).)
To proceed to an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner must
establish a prima facie case for relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) This
prima facie inquiry, though “limited” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 971), is “more demanding than the inquiry into
facial validity.” (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 566
(Patton).) Conclusory allegations may be refuted by the record of
conviction. (Id. at p. 569.) On appeal, we independently review
this prima facie determination. (People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)

B. Defendant Did Not Establish a Prima Facie Case
Defendant does not contend he was convicted of attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
Nor does he dispute his convictions were based either on a
perpetrator or direct aiding and abetting theory. He contends,

5
however, that because the jury instructions did not expressly
require his personal intent to kill each victim, the jury could have
imputed malice to him. We are not persuaded.

1. Resentencing Eligibility is Limited to the Attempted
Murder Under Natural and Probable Consequences
Doctrine
To begin with, defendant is ineligible for relief under the
plain language of section 1172.6. Similar to the recent approach
taken by our Supreme Court when construing another provision
in section 1172.6, “[w]e interpret the statutory language to mean
just what it says” (People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, 678
(Morris)): Resentencing eligibility for an attempted murder
conviction is limited to “the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subds. (a), (b).)
Section 1172.6 prescribes materially different conditions for
resentencing eligibility for murder and attempted murder
convictions. Broad eligibility is prescribed for persons convicted
of murder “under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which is malice is imputed . . . .” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a),
(a)(1).) The eligibility conditions for attempted murder
convictions are not so broad. The only condition prescribed is
“attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.” (Ibid.)
The Legislature’s use of the phrase “other theory under
which malice is imputed” for murder and not attempted murder
is significant in two respects. First, it shows the Legislature
“knows how to use the term . . . when that is the intent.” (Morris,
supra, 19 Cal.5th at pp. 683–684.) Second, it clarifies legislative

6
intent to differentiate eligibility conditions for different classes of
convictions. (See People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 669
(Lopez).) As this phrase is specifically employed in one class of
conviction (murder) and is excluded in another (attempted
murder), it “‘“should not be implied where excluded.”’” (Id. at
p. 660.)
Under this plain construction, section 1172.6 says what it
means: resentencing eligibility “applies by its terms only to
attempted murders based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.” (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
539, 548.) As defendant admits in this appeal (and previously
argued on direct appeal), his convictions for attempted murder
are not based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.6 Thus, his petition was correctly denied. (See People v.
Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 599.)

2. Defendant Was Convicted as a Direct Perpetrator or
Direct Aider and Abettor
Notwithstanding our conclusion above, the record
conclusively establishes defendant’s guilt under two currently
valid theories of attempted murder—direct perpetrating and
direct aiding and abetting.

6 We reject the suggestion that defendant’s jury could employ a
natural and probable consequences theory of liability without ever
receiving instructions on it. The cases on which defendant relies prove
this point. (E.g., People v. Kauffman (1907) 152 Cal. 331, 335–336
[first instance in which jury received natural and probable
consequences instruction]; People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 249–
250 [CALJIC Nos. 6.11, 8.26]; People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th
248, 257–258 (Prettyman) [CALJIC No. 3.02].)

7
The first theory required defendant’s own “specific intent to
kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward
accomplishing the intended killing.” (People v. Lee (2003) 31
Cal.4th 613, 623 (Lee).) As the jury’s true firearm enhancement
and great bodily injury findings demonstrate, defendant was
convicted as a shooter—a direct perpetrator of attempted
murder—thus finding his specific intent to kill. (See CALJIC
Nos. 3.31 [requiring union or joint operation of act and “specific
intent in the mind of the perpetrator”], 3.31.5 [same], 8.66
[requiring direct but ineffectual act done by perpetrator “towards
killing another human being” while harboring “express malice
aforethought, namely, a specific intent to kill”].) As a “would-be
slayer” who fired on the victims, the jury found defendant
committed “willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted
murder.” (CALJIC No. 8.67.)
The second theory of guilt, holding defendant accountable
as direct aider and abettor, required findings that he share the
“‘specific intent’” of the direct perpetrator, “that is to say, the
person must ‘know[ ] the full extent of the [direct] perpetrator’s
criminal purpose and [must] give[ ] aid or encouragement with
the intent or purpose of facilitating the [direct] perpetrator’s
commission of the crime.’ (People v. Beeman [(1984)] 35 Cal.3d
[547,] 560.)” (Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 624.) “Thus, to be
guilty of attempted murder as an aider and abettor, a person
must give aid or encouragement with knowledge of the direct
perpetrator’s intent to kill and with the purpose of facilitating the
direct perpetrator’s accomplishment of the intended killing—
which means that the person guilty of attempted murder as an
aider and abettor must intend to kill. [Citation.]” (Ibid., citing

8
People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117–1118; see also
People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054.)
The jury instructions conclusively establish these elements.
To convict defendant under this theory (see CALJIC Nos. 1.11,
17.00),7 the jury was required to find he aided and abetted
attempted murder, the only “crime” to which aiding and abetting
principles applied. Under the relevant instructions, the jury was
required to find defendant aided, promoted, encouraged, or
instigated each attempted murder with “knowledge of the
unlawful purpose of the perpetrator,”8 and “intent or purpose of
committing or encouraging or facilitating the commission of the
crime.” (CALJIC No. 3.01.) In turn, CALJIC No. 8.66 defined
attempted murder as (1) a direct but ineffectual act toward
killing a human; and (2) the “person committing the act harbored
express malice aforethought, namely, a specific intent to kill
unlawfully another human being.”
Construed together, these instructions required that the
jury find defendant knew his co-shooters’ criminal purpose to kill,
and with the intent of committing, encouraging, or facilitating
those attempted murders, aided, promoted, encouraged, or
instigated them. “Thus, the jury necessarily found [defendant]
had an intent to kill, the very definition of express malice.”
(People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1191.)

7 CALJIC No. 1.11 informed the jury that the term “‘defendant’”
referred to all defendants on trial. CALJIC No. 17.00 required the jury
adjudicate guilt of each defendant on each charged offense.
8 CALJIC No. 3.00 instructed the jury that “principals” to a crime
included direct perpetrators—those who directly and actively commit
the act constituting the crime—and those who aid and abet the
commission of the crime.

9
3. The Jury Could Not Have Imputed Malice From
Isolated Instructions
Defendant parses isolated phrases in jury instructions that,
in his view, “invited” his conviction as an aider and abettor
without finding he “personally harbored intent to kill.” We
disagree.
Defendant first targets CALJIC No. 3.00, which provided
that each principal, regardless of the extent or manner of
participation, is “equally guilty” of the same crime. Defendant
argues the “equally guilty” language could be used as a means of
imputing malice from the direct perpetrator(s). As discussed, this
argument disregards clear instructions on the findings necessary
for both classes of principals. Under those specific instructions,
the jury could not have convicted defendant by imputing the
“mental state of the actual [perpetrator], rather than on
defendant’s own mental state in aiding and abetting” the
attempted killing. (People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 641.)
Next, defendant argues CALJIC No. 3.01 confused the jury
by setting forth elements of aiding and abetting an unspecified
“crime.” This instruction is not confusing. Defendant identifies
no phantom, “uncharged crime, contrary to the trial court’s
instructions” to which an aiding and abetting theory could apply.
(People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 206.) As discussed,
attempted murder was the only crime to which the jury could
apply aiding and abetting principles.
Finally, defendant argues that because CALJIC Nos. 8.66,
8.67, and 3.31.5 required a finding of intent to kill for “‘the person
committing the act’” and “‘would-be slayer,’” the instructions did
not require the aider and abettor personally harbor
premeditation or an intent to kill. Again, we discern no

10
ambiguities in these instructions, which address the action(s) and
mental state(s) of a different class of attempted murder
principal—the direct perpetrator, not the aider and abettor.

4. The Jury Found Defendant Personally Intended to
Kill
Notwithstanding these arguments, defendant admits the
jury made the very finding he avers is missing in this case: his
personal intent to kill. Because this finding was tied to
conspiracy to commit murder, however, defendant argues it is
“irrelevant because the record of conviction does not link the
conspiracy to the attempted murders.” Defendant suggests the
jury could have convicted him of conspiring to murder some
“other unnamed individuals” the same day he and the
codefendants committed the shooting of the child victims.
Defendant ignores the court’s ability to review “findings on
factual issues necessarily found, looking to the entire record (i.e.,
the jury instructions provided, applied to the evidence presented,
leading to particular jury findings).” (Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th at
p. 668, italics added.) This “‘issue-framing role’” is not
impermissible judicial factfinding because the court is not
“‘resolving a contested factual dispute’”; it is looking to necessary
facts underlying a conviction. (People v. Rodriguez (2026) 117
Cal.App.5th 1179, 1193; see Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 569.)
The record of conviction in this case provides the necessary
“link” between conspiracy to commit murder and each attempted
murder. The indictment and jury instructions connected these
offenses through the same victims, date, location, use of specific

11
weapons, and motive.9 (See e.g., People v. Nguyen (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 668, 673–674, 678–679 [intent to kill established by
conspiracy to commit murder over same retaliatory shooting as
attempted murder count]; People v. Lovejoy (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 860, 869 [similar approach applied for same victim].)
The parties’ closing arguments also link the offenses. The
prosecution aruged that defendant and codefendants conspired to
commit murder and “intended to kill [rival] Hoover Crips. They
almost very nearly succeeded in killing [the children]. The only
reason why they are being charged as an attempted murder and
not murder is because the miraculous efforts of [medical
personnel]. But for their heroic acts, they would be charged with
murder now.” Defendant and codefendants acknowledged this
theory but argued they were not involved.
Defendant identifies no part of the record from which the
jury could convict him of conspiring to murder some “other
unnamed individuals” unconnected to the attempted murder
victims. Such “‘an invalid theory was [not] supported by the
evidence’ and ‘argued by the parties.’” (Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th
at p. 645; see also Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 567 [“a
hypothetical alternate [theory] cannot be conjured from thin air
or a legal conclusion”]; Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 267
[jurors may not “‘indulge in unguided speculation’” without a
factual basis].) We therefore conclude that the resentencing court

9 Consistent with the indictment, CALJIC No. 6.23 instructed the
jury on the overt acts committed to further the object of the conspiracy,
including: meeting and planning to shoot rival Hoover Crip gang
members with an AK-47 rifle and nine-millimeter handgun on
February 15, 1997, the same date of the attempted murders; secreting
themselves in an alley; and firing “into a group of people at a nearby
home wounding three children.” (Italics added.)

12
properly found defendant failed to establish a prima facie case for
relief.

DISPOSITION
The postconviction order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MORI, J.
We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

TAMZARIAN, J.

13

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.