CourtListener 10873256•Bryant v. Rowe CA1/5
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Filed 6/10/26 Bryant v. Rowe CA1/5
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
KIMBERLY BRYANT,
Objector and Appellant, A173386
v.
LISA A. ROWE, as Trustee, etc.,
(Humboldt County Super. Ct. No.
Defendant and Respondent. PR2300075)
Kimberly Bryant, her sister, Lisa A. Rowe, and their two
brothers are beneficiaries of a trust originally established by
their parents. This dispute arose after their mother passed away
and the siblings found an instrument handwritten by their
mother that appeared to change the division of their mother’s
assets upon her death. Bryant appeals the trial court’s ruling
that the handwritten instrument had no legal effect on the
division of the trust assets. We reverse the trial court’s order and
remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
A.
With the assistance of a lawyer, Kent and Sherrey Bishop
established a trust in 2020 that named three of their four adult
children as beneficiaries: Rowe, Matthew Bishop, and Kent
1
Bishop, Jr.1 Bryant, the couple’s fourth child, was not a
beneficiary.
After her husband died, the same lawyer helped Sherrey
amend the trust to add Bryant as a beneficiary. In December
2020, Sherrey, the settlor and trustee, executed the First
Amendment and Restatement of The Kent and Sherrey Bishop
2020 Trust (hereinafter “Trust”). The Trust provided that, upon
Sherrey’s death, Rowe would serve as successor trustee and
would receive Sherrey’s house, bank accounts, and pets. A family
friend would receive a $10,000 gift. Sherrey’s personal property
would go to persons named in a separate personal property
memorandum, or otherwise to Rowe. The remainder of the estate
would be divided equally between the four siblings—Bryant,
Rowe, Matthew, and Kent Jr.
The Trust provided, referring to Sherrey, that “I may at
any time during my lifetime amend any of the terms of this Trust
by an acknowledged instrument in writing signed by me which
shall refer to this Trust and this specific power and which shall
be delivered to the then-acting Trustee.”
In 2021, on the day before Thanksgiving, Matthew and
Kent Jr. got into a fight at Sherrey’s house and Kent Jr. hit his
brother.2 Afterward, Sherrey was upset and cancelled the
family’s Thanksgiving plans.
1 Because Sherrey, her husband, and her two sons all share
the same last name, this opinion refers to each of them by their
first names, except that Kent Bishop, Jr., is referred to as Kent
Jr.
2 Around the same time period, according to Rowe, she had
told Matthew that “Mom and dad had left me the house and had
left the stocks to my siblings.” Rowe recounted that shortly
before Thanksgiving, her mother and Kent Jr. called her on the
phone, upset, and asked her about what she had said to Matthew
about the estate.
2
On Thanksgiving day, November 25, 2021, Sherrey
handwrote an instrument, comprising two pages of lined paper,
entitled “Changes to be made to my well.”3 The handwritten
instrument begins: “Nov. 25[,] 2021[.] On this day I’m (Sherrey
Lee Bishop) re-writing my will. The legal responsibilities, such
as transfers of properties and acounts has already been done.
The one provision I’m changing is the division of all bank
accounts, stock holdings, and real properties. They are to be
divided equally, ¼ each to my four children: Matt A. Bishop, Lisa
A. Rowe, Kimberly A. Bryant and Kent A. Bishop Jr.”
The second paragraph provides that “[u]pon my death,”
Sherrey’s house “is to be sold” with “[t]he profits to be divided ¼
ea[.] to my 4 children named.”
In the third paragraph, the handwritten instrument states
that a “prepared list of items in the house is being worked on.”
The fourth paragraph provides that Sherrey’s car, an
“MG[,] goes to” her grandson, “Zack Rowe.”
The fifth paragraph states that “[i]tems that the 4 children
received are to be kept within the family.” Immediately below
this sentence, Sherrey drew a bracket enclosing approximately 15
blank lines; in the margin, alongside the bracket, she wrote:
“Room for additional thoughts as needed.”
The final paragraph of the handwritten instrument states:
“These changes will be given to the Law firm that prepared my
first will. This paper will be their guide showing a change in my
wishes. Lisa Rowe will still be named to receive my death benefit
from the Cal Teachers fund. It will be in the amount of 6,000.00
plus.”
3 Excerpts from Sherrey’s handwritten instrument quoted
in this opinion reflect the instrument’s original spelling and
grammar.
3
At the end of the instrument, Sherrey printed out her
name, “Sherrey L Bishop,” and signed in the line above her name.
Next to her signature, she wrote: “Date 11-25-2021,” “1:06 PM,”
and her home address. Sherrey did not inform her lawyer of the
handwritten amendment to her trust.
Sherrey died approximately one year later. She had
considered her estate plan private. No one knew what was in the
trust and no one was aware of the existence of the handwritten
instrument until after Sherrey’s death.
Kent Jr. found the handwritten instrument a few days
after Sherrey died, when the four siblings had gathered at the
family home. Kent Jr. and Bryant’s husband had been going
through Sherrey’s papers to organize her unpaid bills. Kent Jr.
found the handwritten instrument in a basket that Sherrey kept
by her chair. Sherrey had used the basket to keep miscellaneous
papers, including bills that were not yet due, notes that she had
written to Kent Jr., letters she had typed to her grandchildren,
opened mail, junk mail, and magazines. The Trust was in a
green binder that was found in a separate location in Sherrey’s
bedroom.
B.
Rowe, as the successor Trustee to the Trust, filed a petition
in trial court seeking instructions as to whether the handwritten
instrument qualifies as an amendment to the Trust. Bryant
objected to the petition, asserting that the handwritten
instrument was effective in amending the Trust.
In concluding that the handwritten instrument had no
effect on the Trust, the trial court reasoned that the Trust
specified an exclusive procedure for amendment. The court
concluded that the amendment procedure was exclusive because
it used the mandatory word “shall,” referring to “an
acknowledged instrument in writing signed by me which shall
4
refer to this Trust and this specific power and which shall be
delivered to the then-acting Trustee.” (Italics added.) Given that
the handwritten instrument did not satisfy the amendment
procedure specified in the Trust, the court held that the
instrument was not effective. Accordingly, on April 21, 2025, the
trial court issued an order directing Rowe to dispose of Sherrey’s
estate in a manner consistent with the Trust.
DISCUSSION
A.
Bryant asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that
the Trust sets forth an exclusive method for amendment.
Reviewing the question de novo, we agree that the trial court
erred. (See McGee v. State Dept. of Health Care Services (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 1161, 1169 [“Absent a conflict in relevant
extrinsic evidence, the interpretation of a trust instrument is a
question of law which we consider de novo.”].)
Probate Code section 154024 provides that “[u]nless the
trust instrument provides otherwise,” a settlor may modify a
revocable trust by using the procedures for revocation of the
trust. Section 15401, subdivision (a), provides that a settlor may
revoke a revocable trust either (1) “[b]y compliance with any
method of revocation provided in the trust instrument,” or (2)
“[b]y a writing, other than a will, signed by the settlor . . . and
delivered to the trustee during the lifetime of the settlor.”
However, the second option (the statutory method) is not
available “[i]f the trust instrument explicitly makes the method
of revocation provided in the trust instrument the exclusive
method of revocation.” (§ 15401, subd. (a)(2).)
4 Undesignated statutory references are to the Probate
Code.
5
In Haggerty v. Thornton (2024) 15 Cal.5th 729 (Haggerty),
our Supreme Court held that section 15401’s “method is available
for modification unless the trust instrument ‘provides otherwise’
by expressly precluding it or by explicitly making a different
procedure exclusive.” (Id. at p. 741.) Haggerty rejected a line of
cases holding that a trust “ ‘provides otherwise’ ” under section
15402—meaning it precludes use of the statutory modification
procedure—“if any modification method is specified in the trust,
regardless of whether that method” is explicitly exclusive. (Id. at
p. 737.) Haggerty reasoned that “a trust instrument that merely
specifies a method of modification without limiting settlors to the
use of that method does not preclude the use of the revocation
procedures and therefore does not ‘provide[ ] otherwise’ from the
general rule.” (Id. at p. 736.) Under Haggerty, “[i]f a trust were
to provide that it ‘may only be modified by an acknowledged
instrument in writing,’ then the trust would preclude
modification via any different method of revocation, including the
statutory method.” (Id. at p. 740.) However, “if a trust were to
simply provide that it ‘may be modified by an acknowledged
instrument in writing,’ then the trust would not preclude
modification via any method of revocation.” (Ibid.)
In reaching its conclusion, Haggerty relied on the
legislative history of sections 15401 and 15402, which were
enacted in part “to expand the availability of the statutory
method for both revocation and modification” in keeping with
recommendations made by the California Law Revision
Commission. (Haggerty, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 734-735, 737-
738.) The Commission sought to respond to court decisions that
had held that when a trust prescribes a procedure for revocation,
the prescribed method must be followed rather than the statutory
method. (Id. at pp. 739-740.) According to the Commission, the
“prior ‘rule may be criticized as defeating the clear intention of
the settlor who attempts to revoke a revocable trust by the
statutory method.’ ” (Id. at p. 740.) Indeed, “ ‘the settlor may
6
have forgotten about the method provided in the trust, or may
not be aware of the case-law rule [that prescribing another
procedure in the trust instrument would displace the statutory
method].’ ” (Ibid.) Under the Commission’s proposed law, the
statutory method of revocation is available “ ‘except where the
trust instrument explicitly makes exclusive the method of
revocation specified in the trust. This allows a settlor to
establish a more protective revocation scheme’ ” to address
concerns about undue influence or lack of capacity, “ ‘but also
honors the settlor’s intention where the intent to make the
scheme exclusive is not expressed in the trust instrument.’ ”
(Ibid.)
Applying Haggerty here, we see no expression of intent that
the trust’s amendment procedure be exclusive. The Trust
provides (referring to Sherrey) that “I may at any time during my
lifetime amend any of the terms of this Trust by an acknowledged
instrument in writing signed by me which shall refer to this
Trust and this specific power and which shall be delivered to the
then-acting Trustee.” (Italics added.) The provision concerning
amendment contains no language conveying exclusivity, using
the permissive term “may” rather than the limiting phrase “may
only.” (See Haggerty, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 740.) Nor does the
Trust expressly prohibit the use of the statutory revocation
procedure. (See id. at p. 733.)
Rowe argues that the amendment language must be
construed in light of the Trust’s “Governing Law” provision,
which states that the Probate Code, beginning with section
15000, shall govern interpretation of the Trust “except as shall be
specifically modified herein.” But Rowe’s argument merely begs
the question whether the amendment language in fact
“specifically” modifies the statutory rule.
Rowe next points to the amendment provision’s use of the
word “shall” to require that the writing refer to the trust and be
7
delivered to the trustee. As Rowe notes, another provision of the
Trust provides that “[u]nless otherwise specifically provided in
this agreement or by the context in which used, I use the word
‘shall’ in this Trust to command, direct or require.” Rowe’s
contention ignores the fact that the amendment provision begins
with the permissive term “may.” And the Trust defines “the word
‘may’ ” to mean “to allow or permit, but not require.” In context,
the Trust provides that the settlor “may,” but need not, use its
method for amendment. The fact that the method requires
certain procedures does not make the method mandatory in the
first instance.
In Tarrant Bell Property, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 51
Cal.4th 538, our Supreme Court construed statutory language
that followed the word “may” with a phrase that included the
word “shall.” (Id. at p. 542.) The statute in question provided
that “a referee ‘may be appointed’ if, upon motion, a court finds
that [an] agreement exists between the parties ‘that provides that
any controversy arising therefrom shall be heard by a referee.’ ”
(Ibid.) Tarrant Bell concluded that notwithstanding the
subsequent use of the mandatory word “shall,” the earlier word
“may” should be construed as permissive. (Ibid.) As a result, our
Supreme Court rejected the argument that the subsequent use of
the word “shall” meant that the statute “required the trial court
here to . . . appoint a referee.” (Ibid.) Similarly here, the
amendment provision’s subsequent use of “shall” to specify the
substance of the amendment method does not transform the
method itself, which the settlor “may” elect to use, into an
expressly mandatory one.
B.
Rowe asserts that we should nonetheless affirm the trial
court’s decision on the ground that Sherrey’s handwritten
instrument is not effective because it lacks intent to amend the
Trust. We conclude that remand on this question is appropriate.
8
In interpreting a trust instrument, our “primary duty . . . is
to give effect to the settlor’s intentions.” (Barefoot v. Jennings
(2020) 8 Cal.5th 822, 826.) Before a purported trust instrument
may be given effect, however, “it must first ‘ “appear that [the]
decedent intended to make a testamentary disposition by that
particular paper.” ’ ” (Trotter v. Trotter Van Dyck (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 126, 135 (Trotter).) The question is whether the
settlor intended to amend the trust by that writing, rather than
by some subsequent instrument or action. (Ibid.) In determining
whether a writing is intended to effectuate a disposition of
property, the court may look to the words of the instrument itself
as well as the circumstances surrounding its creation. (See
Estate of Berger (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1293, 1305-1306 (Berger).)
For example, Berger held that a decedent’s handwritten
letter was intended to make a testamentary disposition in light of
the contents and level of formality of the letter. (Berger, supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1307-1308.) In addition to naming the
decedent’s beneficiary and listing her most significant assets, the
letter used the phrase “ ‘in the event of [her] death,’ ” recited the
decedent’s full name and address, and included a formal
signature line along with the date, time, and location of signing.
(Ibid.) The letter was also written at a time when the decedent
was thinking about her own mortality, as she was scheduled to
undergo a major surgery. (Id. at p. 1308.) Further, the fact that
the decedent did not have subsequent discussions about the
instrument with her family or others, or that she may have
forgotten about it in later years, had no bearing on the court’s
inquiry, which concerned the decedent’s intent at the time she
executed the instrument. (Id. at pp. 1309-1310.)
In Trotter, the decedent had sent emails and completed a
questionnaire indicating that she planned to make changes to her
will and trust, but her writings anticipated that her lawyer would
formalize her wishes by “ ‘redoing the will and trust.’ ” (Trotter,
9
supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 135.) The writings expressly
anticipated further discussions with the decedent’s lawyer,
indicated that the decedent was still working on coming up with
a list of items to be distributed to her children and grandchildren,
and stated that she would “ ‘prefer’ ” to disinherit one of the
original beneficiaries “ ‘if possible.’ ” (Id. at pp. 135-137.) In light
of the anticipatory and precatory nature of the writings, Trotter
concluded that they did not show that the decedent intended the
writings themselves to amend her trust. (Ibid.)
Here, Rowe contends that we should apply substantial
evidence review to the trial court’s “implied finding” that the
handwritten document lacked intent to amend the Trust.
However, the trial court made no determination as to whether
Sherrey’s handwritten instrument itself was intended to amend
her Trust; the court simply never reached this issue in light of its
conclusion that the handwritten instrument was ineffective for
failure to comply with the Trust’s amendment procedure.
In these circumstances, remand is appropriate to allow the
trial court to consider, in the first instance, the question whether
the handwritten document was intended to amend the Trust. On
remand, the trial court will have the opportunity to make any
necessary fact findings as to the circumstances surrounding the
creation of the handwritten instrument. (See Berger, 91
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1305-1306.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s April 21, 2025 order is reversed and the
case is remanded for a determination as to whether the
handwritten instrument was intended to amend the Trust and
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
10
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
JACKSON, P. J.
SIMONS, J.
Bryant v. Rowe (A173386)
11
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