In re C.W. CA1/5

CourtListener 10873255Calctapp10 juin 2026

Texte intégral

Filed 6/10/26 In re C.W. CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re C.W., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law. A175108
___________________________________
HUMBOLDT COUNTY (Humboldt County Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND JV2300069)
HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner and Respondent,
v.
K.W.,
Objector and Appellant.

At the jurisdictional stage of this juvenile dependency case,
the court found that both parents’ actions had placed the then-
four-year-old child at substantial risk of serious emotional harm
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (c).1
K.W., the child’s mother, now appeals from that jurisdictional
finding. Because we agree with mother that it is unsupported by
substantial evidence, we reverse the jurisdictional order in part.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and

Institutions Code.
1
BACKGROUND

A.

Mother and the child’s father, who is not a party to this
appeal, reside separately but share custody of the child. Mother
and father’s relationship has been contentious, and they have
been engaged in litigation against one another in family court.

The two have been the subject of numerous previous
referrals to the Child Welfare Services Division of the Humboldt
County Department of Health and Human Services
(Department), including one prior sustained dependency petition
concerning the child, based on substance abuse by both parents,
domestic violence by father, and inadequate supervision by
mother. In the earlier dependency case, the child resided in
foster care for approximately eight months before being returned
to her parents’ custody after the parents engaged in counseling,
high conflict co-parenting classes, and other services, and they
maintained their sobriety.

In early September 2024, mother contacted the Department
and reported that the child had made several statements that she
had been hurt or tickled when her father “poked her” or touched
her in the vaginal area. In August, mother had noticed that the
child’s vaginal area was “bright red and sore.” When mother
commented, “Owiee!,” the child stated: “It hurts cause Dada poke
it. I tell him to stop and he won’t stop and then he says he is
sorry.”

A couple days later, the child made a similar statement
while her mother was taking off her pull-up diaper. According to
mother, she then “asked her if it is when dada is changing her
diaper and she said no. I told her she can tell him to stop and tell
him not to touch her. [The child] then stated that he cannot stop
and he says he is sorry.”

2
A few days later, while mother was bringing the child to
her father, the child said to him, “Don’t touch my butt.” Father
responded, “only when I change your diaper,” and the child said,
“Noooooooo…”

The following day, while mother was taking off the child’s
pull-up diaper, the child “looked up at [mother] and wiggled her
tongue back and forth in her mouth and stated, ‘Dada do dat. It’s
funny and it tickles.’ ” When mother said, “What did Dada do?,”
the child “wiggled her tongue back and forth in her mouth, placed
her cupped hands over her vagina and stated, ‘It tickles, it’s
funny.’ ”

Several days later, the child commented during a diaper
change that “It hurts cause Dada scratch it.” When mother asked
her what she meant, the child rubbed her finger nails up and
down her inner thighs and said, “It hurts cause Dada scratch it
cause he loves me so much.” Mother asked if the child asked him
to stop, and the child responded: “He can’t stop, he won’t stop,
because he loves me so much.” Although mother had not initially
been concerned when the child first started making these
statements, the most recent statements alarmed her.

After consulting with relatives and friends, including a
licensed childcare provider, mother called a Department hotline
and reported the child’s statements. The Department advised
her to bring the child to the hospital to be examined. The child
received an external physical examination at the hospital, but
mother declined a more intrusive examination. Although the
doctor observed redness and irritation in the child’s genital area,
it did not appear abnormal.

The next day, social worker Mirian Alvarado and a
colleague came to mother’s home and attempted to interview the
child, but the child was focused on playing and made no

3
disclosures to them.2 The Child Abuse Services Team (CAST)
then interviewed the child in mid-September, at which point the
child was “unable to focus” and made no disclosures.3 The
Department closed its investigation, concluding that the
allegations that father had sexually abused the child were
unfounded.

In May 2025, mother again reported concerning statements
made by the child involving father. Mother was reading
children’s books about “body and touch” with the child and asking
her about the names of her body parts. Mother had purchased
the books because members of the CAST had given her one book
and advised her that “it’s a good idea to teach a child the names
of their body parts . . . so they know how to identify them.” While
reading one of the books to the child, mother asked whether
anyone had touched her private parts and the child said that her
dad had. According to mother, the child “took off her underwear
and was rubbing her vagina and anal area . . . in a clearly
abusive way.”

Fearing that father had sexually abused the child, mother
recorded audio of the ensuing conversation. Mother asked the
child “if it hurts when her dad touches her.” When the child did
not respond, mother asked “if she can show me how [her dad]
touches her.” The child then took off her underwear and
“rubb[ed] her vagina with her fist vigorously.” The child moved
her hand, “rubbing inside her butt crack and . . . stick[ing] a
finger in her butt,” and then explained that her dad “washes his

2 Alvarado advised mother to apply for a restraining order

against father, suggesting that if she did not do so, the child
could be removed from her because it was “a safety issue.”
Mother sought a protective order the following day, but her
application was denied.
3 Apart from the CAST interview, law enforcement did not

interview the child in connection with the sexual abuse
allegations against father.
4
hands after he touches her butt and vagina.” Mother asked if
father “asks her before if he can touch her or does he just do it
and [the child] responded that he just does it.” Mother “asked if
he thinks she is sleeping when it is happ[en]ing and [the child]
state[d] no.” Mother then asked her to repeat what she just said
without her pacifier in her mouth and the child then repeated the
same motions and statements. The next day, mother reported
the child’s statements by calling the Department hotline. Mother
also filed an application for a restraining order against father in
family court.

A few days later, at the end of May, Alvarado made an
unannounced visit to mother’s home and attempted to interview
the child. Alvarado “ask[ed] [the child] different questions about
her home and . . . about different body parts, what her
understanding of that was.” The child wanted to play with her
toys and “it was a little hard to engage her.” During the
interview, when Alvarado asked if she knew what hugs were, the
child said no. Mother interrupted the interview “[b]ecause [she]
knew [her] daughter was avoiding the questioning,” and mother
said, “Well, I give you hugs.” At times, mother asked the child
follow-up questions if she did not answer Alvarado’s questions,
became confused about her body parts, or did not recall
something she had said earlier. Subsequently, after Alvarado
went out to her car to call her supervisor, the child approached
Alvarado’s car with mother, wanting to speak with Alvarado.
Alvarado asked her what she wanted to share, and the child told
her that “Dad hit butt.” Alvarado asked “what that looked like”
and the child slapped her vagina.

The following month, another social worker, Shannan
Crozier, called mother to make an appointment to bring the child
into a Department office for another interview. During the
interview, the child was not comfortable speaking with the social
workers. Crozier attempted to engage the child, but she did not

5
respond to the questions and “just wanted to play games.” The
Department closed the investigation into the allegation of sexual
abuse by father as unfounded.

B.

The Department initiated this dependency case based on a
referral from the family court. (See § 329, subd. (a).) The
Department did not detain the child. After receiving competing
requests for restraining orders, the court had become concerned
that the parents’ actions had subjected the child to emotional
abuse. As relevant here, based on mother’s application for a
restraining order, the court was concerned that the mother’s
questioning of the child about sexual abuse, asking the child to
demonstrate such abuse, and recording the child could cause
“potential emotional harm.”

The Department’s dependency petition alleged that the
child “is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial
risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe
anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive
behavior toward self or others, as a result of the conduct of” each
parent. (§ 300, subd. (c).) With respect to mother, the petition
alleged that the child “is at substantial risk of serious emotional
harm as a result of the mother[’s] . . . excessive efforts to prove
allegations that the father . . . sexually abused the child. The
mother has repeatedly asked the child to repeat statements, used
leading questions, recorded her questioning the child, and has
had the child demonstrate the sexual abuse by
scratching/rubbing at her vaginal area. During an interview
between the child and the social worker, when the child did not
give the answer the mother expected, the mother moved to sit
with the child and ask leading questions to coax the child. The
child had a CAST interview in September of 2024 and has been
interviewed by the Department and law enforcement multiple

6
times, and no disclosures were made. The mother continues to
coax the child to try to get her to make a disclosure.”

With respect to father, the petition alleged that the child
was “at substantial risk of serious emotional harm as a result of
the father, . . . excessively questioning the child about what
occurs at the home of the mother . . . . The father's behaviors
include repeatedly recording the mother's home, including the
mother's interactions with the child, to gain information to
support the alleged abuse and neglect he believes is occurring.
The child has been interviewed by the Department and law
enforcement multiple times as a result.”

The petition also alleged that the child was at substantial
risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness due to both
parents’ failure or inability to supervise or protect the child
adequately. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).)

At the detention hearing, the court found that services
were available to prevent removal of the child from her parents
and ordered that the parents be provided with alcohol and drug
testing, substance abuse treatment, parenting education, and
mental health services pending further proceedings.

At the October 2025 jurisdiction hearing, the court received
testimony from social workers Alvarado and Crozier, both
parents, and Nicola Wilson, who was the child’s therapist until
August 2025. Wilson, who had provided parent-child therapy to
mother and the child for two years, testified that the child had
not made any disclosures to her, but Wilson made a mandated
report to the Department based on the statements reported by
mother. During the time Wilson worked with them, mother did
not seem intent on proving that the child was sexually abused,
and she did not appear to be coaching the child in any way.
Crozier testified that “in the beginning[,] [mother] didn’t believe”
that father could be sexually abusing the child, but that “with
more and more coming out she was starting to believe it.”
7
Similarly, mother explained that she did not “want to vilify the
father and [she had] asked for advice.” She “tried to do [her] best
. . . to not . . . influence [the child] and to find out the truth.”

In finding jurisdiction based on section 300, subdivision (c),
the juvenile court stated, “I don’t think [mother] was
intentionally trying to get [the child] to say things. I don’t think
she was doing that with malice. But I have a lot of concerns
when this child is four years old, has been in foster care eight
months of her very young life. The parents are in constant battle
with each other it seems. Both making accusations against the
other without substantiation.” The court noted that mother’s
belief that the child had been abused may have been influenced
by Wilson, who apparently believed, based on the child’s reported
statements, that the child had been abused. The court expressed
“fear that” Wilson’s opinion had “impacted mom because then she
has a therapist telling her this has happened to her child when
she was not in a position to make those assessments. So I don’t
fault [mother] for that.” The court found that, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the petition’s section 300,
subdivision (c), allegations were true, but rejected the allegations
under section 300, subdivision (b). The court continued the child
in the parents’ shared custody and set a disposition hearing.

At the disposition hearing in December 2025, the court
adjudicated the child a dependent and placed her with her
parents under a plan of family maintenance. Both parents
argued that they had engaged in services and made progress, and
that the case belonged in family court. Mother had completed a
Triple P Parenting course, a pre-recorded 12-hour high conflict
parenting course online, one out of six associated two-hour
classes, and a psychological evaluation, and mother was willing
to continue with services and therapy. The court acknowledged
“the progress the parents have seemed to have made.” However,
the court found that to dismiss the case with a voluntary case

8
plan “would be premature.” Because “[c]onflict between parents,
high conflict . . . [is] toxic for children,” the court expressed that
“at the very least, six months of steady involvement and
improvement . . . would need to be seen before we take it out of
juvenile court and . . . return it to Family Law.”

DISCUSSION

A.

Before addressing the merits of mother’s challenge to the
juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, we must consider whether
our review is appropriate given that the juvenile court’s order is
independently supported by its findings against father, who has
not appealed. In the circumstances here, we will exercise our
discretion to review mother’s appeal.

In dependency cases, the court exercises jurisdiction over
the child, not the child’s parent. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th
266, 283.) So long as jurisdiction is supported by one
“ ‘unassailable jurisdictional finding,’ ” the validity of additional
jurisdictional findings is “ ‘immaterial.’ ” (Ibid.) As a result,
when the juvenile court makes jurisdictional findings as to both
parents but only one parent appeals, the appeal may be moot.
(Ibid.) In such cases, the court of appeal nonetheless has
discretion to reach the merits of the appeal. (Id. at pp. 282-283)

In considering whether to exercise that discretion, we may
consider an array of factors, including whether the challenged
jurisdictional finding could potentially affect current or future
dependency proceedings or otherwise have negative consequences
for the appellant. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 285.)
Reviewing the validity of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
findings “may be particularly important” because the child
welfare agency and juvenile court may rely on a prior
jurisdictional finding in connection with a future dependency
petition. (Ibid.) Further, jurisdictional findings may affect
9
placement decisions as well as family court proceedings. (Ibid.)
Ultimately, we are guided by the goals of the dependency system,
which aim to maximize the protection of the child, preserve the
family, and ensure the child’s safety and physical and emotional
well-being. (Id. at p. 286.)

In the circumstances here, we agree with mother that
review is appropriate because the validity of the jurisdictional
finding could affect the juvenile court’s subsequent orders as well
as further family court proceedings. For example, at the
jurisdictional hearing, the child’s counsel expressed concern
about the child remaining in mother’s custody, and the court
wondered “why isn’t this child detained and not in the care of
either parent?” But if the jurisdictional finding against mother
were reversed, mother would be a “nonoffending parent” who is
entitled to greater safeguards before the child can be removed
from her custody in dependency proceedings. (See, e.g., In re
Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 697 [“a nonoffending
parent has a constitutionally protected interest in assuming
physical custody, as well as a statutory right to do so, in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s choices
will be ‘detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being of the child’ ”].) If the case is ultimately
returned to family court, as mother has requested, then the
juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings could prejudice mother in
that context. (See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 285.)

Accordingly, we turn to the merits of mother’s challenge.

B.

Mother asserts that there is insufficient evidence to
support the juvenile court’s finding that the child is at
“substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage” under
section 300, subdivision (c), as a result of her conduct. We agree.

10
As relevant here, section 300, subdivision (c), provides for
dependency jurisdiction when the child “is at substantial risk of
suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety,
depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward
self or others, as a result of the conduct of the parent or
guardian.” Section 300, subdivision (c), applies when “parental
fault” or neglect places the child at substantial risk of suffering
serious emotional harm. (In re Alexander K. (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 549, 557 (Alexander K.); accord In re Roxanne B.
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 916, 921.) To support jurisdiction, the
Department must establish the “offending parental conduct,”
causation, and a “substantial risk of . . . serious emotional
damage” as specified in the statute. (See § 300, subd. (c);
Alexander K., at p. 557; In re Brison C. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th
1373, 1379 (Brison C.).) Section 300, subdivision (c), reaches
“abusive, neglectful and/or exploitive conduct toward a child
which causes . . . the serious symptoms identified in the statute,”
not “run-of-the-mill flaws in . . . parenting styles.” (Alexander K.,
at p. 559.) The question is whether the circumstances at the time
of the jurisdictional hearing posed the statutorily defined risk of
harm. (Id. at p. 560.)

Here, there is little evidence that mother committed
offending conduct. (See Alexander K., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p.
557.) The petition alleged that the child was at risk due to
mother’s “excessive efforts to prove allegations that the father . . .
sexually abused the child,” which led the child to be interviewed
by Department workers and other professionals. Neither the
petition nor the court suggested that mother did anything wrong
in reporting the child’s concerning statements to the Department,
nor is there any evidence in the record that mother fabricated the
child’s statements. After mother reported the child’s statements
in 2024, the Department advised mother to take the child to be
examined at the hospital and the Department conducted
interviews of the child. When mother reported the child’s
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statements in May 2025, the Department sought to interview the
child on two more occasions. In allowing the child to be examined
and interviewed, mother was following the Department’s advice
or acceding to its requests. The Department apparently believed,
based on the child’s reported statements, that it was necessary
and appropriate for the child to be interviewed and undergo a
medical examination. Mother’s actions in doing what the
Department told her to do cannot constitute offending conduct.
(See Alexander K., at p. 557.)

At most, mother asked the child a few leading questions
and prompted the child to show her how she had been touched, to
obtain more information or document disclosures the child had
already made. But the juvenile court rejected the petition’s
allegations that mother had attempted to “coax” the child to
disclose abuse. The court found that mother was not
“intentionally trying to get [the child] to say things.” Consistent
with the court’s finding, mother testified that she has never been
trained in investigating or interviewing children, and she was not
trying to lead her daughter to give particular responses.

Even assuming that mother’s unskilled efforts to gain more
information about what had occurred rise to the level of offending
conduct, the record lacks substantial evidence that, at the time of
the jurisdictional hearing, the child was at substantial risk of
serious emotional damage from that conduct. Crozier, the social
worker, testified that, depending on the child, sexual abuse
investigations and medical examinations can negatively impact a
child. She explained that when a child is “being told they have
been abused . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . typically there is a negative
impact” such as regression, cutting, self harm, or issues with
eating and sleeping. But mother took steps to insulate the child,
who was four at the time, including by making her reports to the
Department outside of the child’s presence, having whispered
conversations with Department staff in a separate room,

12
declining the Department’s request to bring law enforcement to
an interview, and declining a more invasive physical exam at the
hospital. When mother took the child to be examined at the
hospital, mother “told her [she was] going to get a checkup”;
mother “didn’t tell her it had anything to do with anything she
had said.” When Department staff came to interview the child,
mother “just told [her] that . . . there was a couple people that
were going to talk to her” but she “didn’t tell her why or what or
anything.” There is no evidence in the record that mother ever
told the child that she was being abused.

Nor was there any evidence specific to the child that she
was beginning to show any signs of negative emotional impact
from mother’s questioning, as the Department acknowledges. In
her May 2025 investigation, Crozier was “not able to gauge the
[emotional] impact” of the sexual abuse investigations on the
child but testified that “[p]otentially there could have been
impact.” When asked what evidence there was that the child has
suffered emotional abuse, the only evidence Crozier pointed to
was that the child stuck her tongue out of her mouth and put her
hands in her mouth during an interview, but Crozier admitted
that she could not “correlate” that behavior to emotional abuse.
In a May 2025 interview, “[t]he child indicated she felt safe with
her mother and father.” Alvarado reported that the child did not
appear to be severely anxious, depressed, or ill. When asked
whether the child displayed any aggressive behavior toward
others during the investigation, Alvarado recalled only that the
child “playful[ly]” bit her mother. The investigation report
concluded that the Department “does not have enough evidence
to prove that [emotional abuse] has happened.”4

4 The Department contends in passing that the child was

exhibiting some sexualized behavior as a result of mother’s
questioning, noting that the child stated to Alvarado that “Dad
hit butt” and touched her vagina. There is no evidence in the
13
The Department was “concern[ed] that if the parents
continue their behaviors/actions there could be an emotional
impact to [the child] in the future.” (Italics added.) But by the
time of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding, more than four
months had passed since the May 2025 abuse allegations, and
there was no evidence that any offending conduct by mother had
occurred in the interim or would continue in the future. Indeed,
the Department’s briefing does not even argue that mother is
likely to continue any problematic questioning of the child.
Crozier explained to mother that “because of the situation of her
videotaping and having the child repeat the incident that it was
not appropriate and to let law enforcement interview moving
forward.” Mother testified that she did not plan on asking the
child to repeat any of the concerning statements she had
previously made, nor did she plan on bringing up the subject with
the child again. If the child were to make any further concerning
statements, mother would report them to the Department
hotline. In addition, mother had completed two years of parent-
child therapy with the child and had arranged to have the child
start individual counselling with Humboldt County Children’s
Behavioral Health.

record that the child’s touching of her private parts or related
statement constituted “sexualized behavior” or that the behavior
was harmful. Nor was there substantial evidence that mother
caused the child to display the behavior in question. The
jurisdiction report stated that the child made the statement,
“Dad hit butt,” when Alvarado asked her what she wanted to
share. Only after Alvarado asked the child “what that looked
like” did the child slap her vagina. Alvarado testified that she
was not with the child and mother immediately before this
interaction, so Alvarado would not have known whether mother
did anything to prompt the child. According to mother, she did
not say anything to prompt the child to speak to Alvarado.

14
In the circumstances here, there was insufficient evidence
at the time of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional ruling that the
child was at “substantial risk” of suffering “serious emotional
damage” based on mother’s questioning. (§ 300, subd. (c); see
Brison C., supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1379 [“Standing alone, the
past infliction of harm does not establish the substantial risk of
future harm. Rather, ‘ “there must be some reason to believe the
acts may continue in the future.” ’ ”].)

The Department primarily relies on the broader conflict
between mother and father, citing the “ongoing family law case”
and the juvenile court’s finding that the parents were in
“constant battle with each other it seems.” The dependency
petition did not allege, however, that ongoing parental conflict
placed the child at substantial risk of serious emotional harm;
instead the petition alleged more precisely that the child was at
risk from mother’s “excessive efforts to prove allegations that the
father . . . sexually abused the child.” The juvenile court rejected
the notion that mother was trying to do that or, indeed, that she
asked the child about sexual abuse out of “malice” toward father.
We thus are uncertain what offending conduct supports the
Department’s theory, much less offending conduct that caused a
risk of emotional damage.

Moreover, it is true that the juvenile court “may amend a
dependency petition to conform to the evidence received at the
jurisdiction hearing to remedy immaterial variances between the
petition and proof.” (See In re Andrew S. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th
536, 544 & fn. 4.) But the court may not make a material change
to the petition’s allegations without affording notice and a chance
to respond to the change. (See ibid.; In re I.S. (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 918, 927-932.) Here, the change cannot be
considered immaterial given that the court limited mother’s
counsel’s ability to question mother about the dynamic and
interactions with father. Although mother’s counsel sought to

15
examine her about the state of her relationship with father, the
Department objected that “[t]his is nothing that is relevant to the
allegations in the petition. We are not relitigating the Family
Law matter here.” The court sustained the objection, rejecting
mother’s counsel’s argument that the court should allow the line
of questioning because “the allegations have to do with how the
parents get along and whether it rises to the level of needing
Child Welfare intervention because of how the parents deal with
each other.” Although the court did not strike mother’s responses
to questions that had already been asked, the court instructed
mother’s counsel to “just move on from how [the parents] get
along.” In light of the position taken by the Department in the
juvenile court and the court’s ruling, we reject the Department’s
reliance on matters not alleged in the petition.

C.

Having found that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional ruling
was unsupported as to mother, we must consider the appropriate
resolution given that the jurisdictional findings against father
remain unaffected by this appeal. Mother requests that we order
the court “to dismiss the petition in its entirety if conditions no
longer exist warranting juvenile court intervention at the time of
remand.” Alternatively, mother requests that we order the court
to terminate jurisdiction after placing the child in her custody.
Where, as here, the juvenile court has jurisdiction over the child
based on the conduct of one parent, the court nonetheless has
authority to order the nonoffending parent to participate in
family maintenance services. (See In re D.L. (2018) 22
Cal.App.5th 1142, 1148; § 362, subd. (a).) Accordingly, and
mindful that circumstances may have changed since the October
2025 jurisdictional hearing, we will reverse the jurisdictional
findings as to mother and remand the case for the juvenile court
to issue appropriate orders based on the circumstances existing
at the time of remand.

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DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s jurisdictional order is reversed in part
as to the finding that pertains to mother’s conduct. The order is
affirmed in all other respects, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P. J.
CHOU, J.

In re C.W. / Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services v. K.W.
(A175108)

17

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