CourtListener 10873221•People v. Inman CA4/1
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Filed 6/10/26 P. v. Inman CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085348
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE416826)
MICHAEL WAYNE INMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego, Daniel
G. Lamborn, Judge. Affirmed in part and remanded with directions.
Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Eric
A. Swenson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General and Tyler L. Krentz,
Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Michael Wayne Inman of sexual penetration by foreign
object of a person under the age of 18 (Pen. Code,1 § 289, subd. (h); count 1),
oral copulation of a person under age 18 (§ 287, subd. (b)(1); count 2),
possession of matter depicting a person under age 18 engaged in sexual
conduct (§ 311.11, subd. (a); count 6), and employment of a minor to perform
prohibited acts (§ 311.4, subd. (c); count 7).2 Inman waived a jury trial on the
prior convictions and aggravating factor allegations, and admitted he had
been previously convicted of three felonies: two 1978 convictions of assault
with intent to commit rape (§ 220) with a section 12022.7 allegation, and a
2005 conviction for committing a lewd act on a child (§ 288, subd. (a)). The
trial court eventually found two of the prior convictions constituted serious
felonies and strikes under sections 667, subdivision (a)(1), 667, subdivisions
(b) through (i), 1170.12, and 1192.7, subdivision (c). In addition to the 25-
year-to-life sentence on count 1, the court sentenced Inman on that count to a
consecutive 10 years from two five-year prior serious felony conviction
enhancements (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)). It sentenced
Inman to concurrent 25-year-to-life sentences on counts 2, 6, and 7.
Inman’s sole contention is that none of his present convictions are
serious felonies under section 1192.7, subdivision (c), requiring that we strike
the two section 667, subdivision (a)(1) five-year prior serious felony
enhancements. The People concede imposition of the enhancements was
unauthorized. We agree and remand for resentencing with directions that
the trial court strike the two five-year prior serious felony enhancements and
resentence Inman.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Counts 3, 4 and 5 were charged solely against Inman’s codefendant,
Lawrence Henning Cantrell.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We need not recite the facts in detail. It suffices to say that Inman,
who was then 70 years old, met a 16-year-old girl and agreed to pay her $250
to perform sex acts with himself and a friend. He took the girl to a motel
where he digitally penetrated her and orally copulated her, filming it on his
cell phone. In 2013, Inman had approached a different 16-year-old girl,
followed her, and tried to grab her hand. That girl then saw he was touching
his exposed penis.
In its sentencing memorandum, the People conceded that “[i]n the
present case, [Inman] was not charged nor convicted of a third serious or
violent felony.” They argued that as a result, he normally would be
sentenced as a second strike offender under section 667, subdivision (e)(1) or
section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1). However, they argued Inman fell within
exceptions (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)), allowing the court
to sentence him as if he was a third-strike offender, namely one of his current
offenses was a felony that required Inman to register as a sex offender under
section 290.1, and additionally, Inman’s prior convictions for violating section
220 constituted “sexually violent offenses” under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 6600, subdivision (b). The People asked the court to sentence
Inman to a total term of “10 + 25-years-to-life.” The prosecutor did not make
any specific arguments concerning the additional 10-year term.
The trial court found Inman fell “within the spirit” of the “Three
Strikes” law, and declined to strike any of his prior strike convictions. In
addition to his 25-year-to-life sentence, it imposed two five-year
enhancements under sections 667, subdivision (a)(1), 668 and 1192.7,
subdivision (c).
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DISCUSSION
“The ‘Three Strikes’ law is a sentencing scheme that requires a court to
double or sometimes triple the punishment for a felony offense if the
defendant was previously convicted of a crime that qualifies as a ‘serious’ or
‘violent’ felony. . . . The ‘serious’ or ‘violent’ felonies that trigger this
sentencing scheme, commonly referred to as ‘strikes’ or ‘strike priors,’ are
enumerated by statute. . . . If a defendant’s current offense is a serious
felony, the defendant is also subject to a five-year prior serious felony
enhancement—a so-called ‘nickel prior’—in addition to any strike.” (People v.
Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 582; see People v. Thomas (1999) 21 Cal.4th
1122, 1129, People v. Arnett (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1609, 1613.)
The statute authorizing the prior serious felony enhancement is section
667, subdivision (a)(1). It provides that “[a] person convicted of a serious
felony who previously has been convicted of a serious felony . . . shall receive,
in addition to the sentence imposed by the court for the present offense, a
five-year enhancement for each such prior conviction on charges brought and
tried separately.” (Italics added.) The statute further provides that a
“ ‘serious felony’ means a serious felony listed in subdivision (c) of [s]ection
1192.7.” (§ 667, subd. (a)(4).) Section 1192.7, subdivision (c) identifies 42
offenses as serious felonies, including “any felony punishable by death or
imprisonment in the state prison for life.” (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(7).) For an
offense falling within the enumerated list without any change in elements
since the conviction, “the question whether that conviction qualifies as a
serious felony is entirely legal.” (People v. Kelii (1999) 21 Cal.4th 452, 456
[discussing prior convictions].) But if there is a factual question of whether
conduct underlying the crime qualifies the offense as a serious felony, any
such facts must be tried to the same factfinder that decided the defendant’s
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guilt of the charged crime. (§ 969f, subd. (a) [“If the defendant pleads not
guilty to the offense charged in any count which alleges that the defendant
committed a serious felony, the question whether or not the defendant
committed a serious felony as alleged shall be tried by the court or jury which
tries the issue upon the plea of not guilty”].)
Here, as the People concede, none of Inman’s convictions are listed in
section 1192.7, subdivision (c).3 And, while Inman received a life sentence
because he was a third-strike offender, the People correctly point out that the
section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(7) category requires that the offense be “itself
punishable by life imprisonment” (see People v. Thomas, supra, 21 Cal.4th at
p. 1130, italics added) without regard to application of the Three Strikes law
based on defendant’s status as a recidivist. (Id. at p. 1130.) The California
Supreme Court in Thomas dealt with section 667.5, subdivision (c)(7), which
similarly specifies that “ ‘violent felon[ies]’ ” include “[a]ny felony punishable
by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life.” In undertaking its
analysis, it noted the parallel language of section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(7).
(Id. at p. 1128 [“If we were to interpret section 667.5[, subdivision] (c)(7) to
mean a third strike defendant falls within its purview because of his life
sentence, not because of the underlying offense, a similar interpretation
would necessarily obtain for section 1192.7[, subdivision] (c)(7)].) In the
context of calculating conduct credits, Thomas explained that “ ‘[i]f a third
strike were automatically considered a “serious” felony by virtue of the fact it
3 Both sections 287, subdivision (b)(1) and 289, subdivision (h) provide
for a punishment of imprisonment in the state prison or in a county jail for a
period of not more than one year. Section 311.4, subdivision (c) provides that
the offense is a felony. Section 311.11, subdivision (a)(1) provides for a
penalty of “imprisonment in the state prison, or a county jail for up to one
year, or by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500),
or by both the fine and imprisonment.”
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carries a life sentence, the [section 667, subdivision (a)(1)] five-year
enhancement would be imposed in every third strike case involving a prior
serious felony conviction regardless of what offense constituted the third
strike.’ . . . We have held otherwise.” (Id. at p. 1129.)
More recently, the court in People v. Hernandez (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th
192, relying on People v. Thomas, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1122, reached a similar
conclusion when construing the phrase “offense punishable in California by
life imprisonment or death” of Proposition 36 (§ 667, sub. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(VIII)),
which disqualifies certain defendants from Three Strikes law reforms where
“ ‘[t]he defendant suffered a prior serious and/or violent felony conviction’ for
one of the ‘felonies’ listed in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), which
include ‘[a]ny serious and/or violent felony offense punishable in California by
life imprisonment or death’ (id. subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(VIII)).” (Hernandez, at p.
198.) The Court of Appeal in Hernandez was guided in part by Thomas’s
reasoning (Hernandez, at pp. 201-202) to hold that the determination of
whether an offense qualifies as a “super strike” depends on the nature of the
offense, not the effect of other prior convictions on the defendant’s sentence:
Thomas lent support for Hernandez’s conclusion “that the phrase ‘offense
punishable in California by life imprisonment or death’ (§ 667, subd.
(e)(2)(C)(iv)(VIII)) means an offense that itself has an associated statutory
punishment of life imprisonment or death, not an offense such as robbery,
which has an associated statutory punishment of two, three, or five years.
An offense such as robbery is not converted to an ‘offense punishable in
California by life imprisonment or death’ (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(VIII)) by
virtue of the fact that the particular offender has two prior serious or violent
felony convictions.” (Hernandez, at p. 202; see also People v. Harrison (2025)
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116 Cal.App.5th 1145, 1159 [holding Hernandez’s reasoning sound and
reaching the same conclusion about similar language in section 1170.91].)
Because Inman was not convicted of a serious felony in this case, the
two five-year prior serious felony enhancements are not authorized and must
be stricken. We have authority to correct a sentence that is not authorized by
law. (People v. Choyce (2025) 18 Cal.5th 86, 128; People v. Sanders (2012) 55
Cal.4th 731, 743, fn. 13.) But “when an error affects part of a sentence, the
case must be remanded for a full resentencing hearing as to all counts to
permit a trial court to exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the
changed circumstances.” (People v. Shaw (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 582, 588-
589, citing People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) We thus remand for
resentencing as stated below.
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DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded for resentencing, during which the trial court
is directed to strike both five-year prior serious felony enhancements imposed
under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). Upon resentencing, the clerk of the
superior court shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment and is directed
to forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, J.
RUBIN, J.
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