People v. Gonzalez CA4/1

CourtListener 10872504Calctapp9 juin 2026

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Filed 6/9/26 P. v. Gonzalez CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085535

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCD297736)

v.

JAIME ERNESTO GONZALEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Joan P. Weber, Judge. Affirmed.
Rachel Varnell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
Rogers and Amanda Lloyd, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

Jaime Ernesto Gonzalez went on a shooting spree in which he killed
one person and wounded three others. A jury found him guilty of murder,
attempted murder, and other crimes, and found true enhancement
allegations concerning discharge of a firearm and use of a deadly weapon.
The trial court sentenced Gonzalez to prison for an indeterminate term that
included firearm and deadly weapon enhancements attached to the murder
conviction. He complains the court abused its discretion by refusing to strike
those enhancements. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Gonzalez used a social media application to purchase an unregistered
handgun. In messages to the seller, he stated, “Imma do it solo,” and “Tryna
pull it on some Mexicans.” Within hours of obtaining the gun, Gonzalez went
on a shooting spree.
Gonzalez’s first stop was a residential neighborhood in Spring Valley.
Antoine Hamilton was outside the house of his neighbor helping to change
the battery in her car. Gonzalez drove by and stopped his car. When
Hamilton asked whether he could help Gonzalez find someone, Gonzalez told
Hamilton it was none of his business. Gonzalez exited his car, pulled out a
gun, and shot at Hamilton. The bullet missed Hamilton and entered his
house. His son was inside at the time. Gonzalez drove off.
Gonzalez proceeded to the Encanto trolley station, where he got out of
his car and fired several shots at a group of teenage boys. Two sustained
gunshot wounds that required hospitalization. Bullets passed through the
clothing of a third boy but caused no wounds. The shooting was captured by
video surveillance from which police were able to obtain a description of
Gonzalez and the make, model, and license plate number of his car.
Gonzalez’s final stop was the Paradise Hills neighborhood. Gonzalez
drove up to Eddie Fillmore and Raul Valdez, who were socializing outside
Fillmore’s house, and asked for directions. Gonzalez exited his car and fired
two shots into Fillmore’s back and one into his arm. As Fillmore ran to his

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house, he heard several more shots. Gonzalez drove away. A neighbor who
heard the gunfire called 911. A police officer went to the scene and found
Valdez dead on the ground. His body had seven gunshot wounds and 14 stab
wounds. Fillmore went to a hospital where he was treated for gunshot
wounds.
Police located Gonzalez and his car near the murder scene and arrested
him. They found a folding knife on his person and a fixed-blade knife, an
unregistered handgun, and bullets in his car.
A jury found Gonzalez guilty of one count of first-degree murder (Pen.
Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a); subsequent section references are to
this code); five counts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted
murder (§§ 21a, 187, subd. (a)); one count of carrying a loaded firearm in a
public place (§ 25850, subd. (a)); and one count of shooting at an inhabited
dwelling house (§ 246). The jury found true firearm enhancement allegations
attached to the murder and attempted murder convictions (§ 12022.53,
subds. (c), (d)) and a deadly weapon use enhancement allegation attached to
the murder conviction (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).
In his sentencing brief, Gonzalez asked the trial court to exercise its
discretion under section 1385 to dismiss the firearm enhancements in
furtherance of justice. He cited subdivision (c) but did not cite any specific
mitigating circumstance listed there. Gonzalez instead cited several
mitigating circumstances listed in the California Rules of Court, including:
(1) he had no prior criminal record; (2) a mental disorder was a significant
factor in the commission of the crimes; (3) he was under 26 years of age when
he committed them; (4) imposition of even one firearm enhancement would
add 20 years to his prison term; and (5) there were numerous firearm
enhancements in the case. (Id., rule 4.423(b)(1), (2), (4), (6), (10), (11).)

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Gonzalez asked the court to sentence him to prison for 25 years to life for the
murder conviction, to impose concurrent terms on all other convictions, and
to impose no additional time for enhancements. His sentencing brief
included a section on evidence relevant to his future youth offender parole
hearing. (See § 3051; People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261.) Gonzalez
attached copies of reports of two experts who evaluated him during the trial
after doubts about his competency were raised. One diagnosed him with
schizophrenia, and the other diagnosed him with an unspecified psychotic
disorder.
In their sentencing brief, the People urged the trial court to impose all
enhancements and to sentence Gonzalez to prison for 201 years to life. They
argued the court need not consider the mitigating circumstances listed in
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) that weigh in favor of dismissal of
enhancements because dismissal would endanger public safety. The People
cited this court’s decision in People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215
(Gonzalez) for the point that the trial court had to consider Gonzalez’s
dangerousness at the time he would be set for release if the firearm
enhancements were dismissed. According to the People, Gonzalez’s “cold-
blooded action in finding, approaching, and shooting at unsuspecting,
unarmed victims [was] clear evidence of his ability and likelihood in
committing future violence that would result in physical injury and serious
danger to others.” The People alternatively argued that dismissal or
reduction of the firearm enhancements was not warranted because
aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances. They
contended there was no credible evidence a mental illness substantially
contributed to the crimes. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(D), (5).) The People also
contended the facts that there were multiple firearm enhancements and that

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Gonzalez’s prison term would exceed 20 years (id., subd. (c)(2)(B), (C)) did not
warrant dismissal or reduction given his current and future dangerousness.
They attached to their sentencing brief copies of reports of two other experts
who evaluated Gonzalez during the trial after doubts about his competency
were raised. Both found he had no mental illness.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated it had reviewed the
parties’ briefs and the probation officer’s report. The court heard arguments
from counsel, which closely tracked their sentencing briefs, and then heard
several victim impact statements. The court stated it “rarely make[s]
comments at sentencings” but felt it had to do so in this case. It found
Gonzalez’s conduct was “shocking” and “should frighten every member of this
community.” The court noted Gonzalez was “hell bent” on obtaining an
untraceable firearm, he “wanted to kill as many people as he possibly could in
a two-hour period,” and the victims “were total strangers.” As to the murder,
the court stated Valdez “was gunned down and killed,” but “that was not good
enough for [Gonzalez],” who “went back to his car to get his knife to stab
[Valdez].” The court mentioned the conflicting expert opinions on whether
Gonzalez had a mental illness and found no mental illness contributed to the
crimes. It acknowledged his age as a mitigating factor that would be
considered at a future youth offender parole hearing. The prosecutor cited
Gonzalez, supra, 103 CalApp.5th 215, and asked the trial court to comment
on Gonzalez’s dangerousness when he would be eligible for release. The trial
court noted there were “no mental health issues” for which Gonzalez could
get treatment to reduce his dangerousness. It found “the whole goal of the
crime was to kill as many people as possible,” and it “ha[d] no basis for
knowing that in 25 years that that mentality would be lessened.” The court
“fe[lt] that he’s an extreme danger now, and [it] would be very concerned

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about his release in 25 years based on what [the court] ha[d] before [it].” The
court said it “ha[d] no crystal ball” and, given the lack of a treatable mental
illness as a causative factor in the crimes, it “ha[d] severe concerns for the
safety of the community going forward.”
The court sentenced Gonzalez to prison for 25 years to life on the
murder conviction (§ 190, subd. (a)), plus consecutive terms of 25 years to life
for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and one year for the
deadly weapon use enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). It imposed a
consecutive life term on each attempted murder conviction (§ 664, subd. (a))
but “in the interest of justice” declined to impose the attached firearm
enhancements (§ 1385, subd. (c)). It imposed concurrent terms on the
convictions of carrying a loaded firearm in a public place (§§ 25850, subd.
(c)(6), 1170, subd. (h)(1)) and shooting at an inhabited dwelling house (§ 246)
and stayed execution of the latter (§ 654, subd. (a)).
DISCUSSION
Gonzalez complains the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to
dismiss the enhancements attached to his murder conviction. He contends
the court applied the wrong legal standard in finding dismissal would
endanger public safety. That error, says Gonzalez, caused the court to
truncate its analysis and not to consider two mitigating circumstances
(multiple enhancements, sentence over 20 years) that justified dismissal. He
also contends the error was prejudicial because the court might have
dismissed the enhancements had it applied the correct legal standard and
considered the mitigating circumstances. Gonzalez requests dismissal of the
enhancements.
The People object to our consideration of Gonzalez’s claim of sentencing
error. They point out that although he generally asked the trial court to

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strike or dismiss the firearm enhancement on the murder conviction under
section 1385, he did not cite the specific statutory mitigating circumstances
he invokes on appeal. The People note Gonzalez asked the court to stay, not
to strike or dismiss, the enhancement for use of a deadly weapon. They fault
him for failing to object to the court’s finding that dismissal of the
enhancements would endanger public safety or to the standard it applied to
make that finding. The People argue these deficiencies resulted in a
forfeiture of the claim Gonzalez asserts on appeal.
Gonzalez preserved his claim of sentencing error for appeal. He asked
the trial court, in writing and orally, to impose no additional punishment for
the firearm and deadly weapon use enhancements attached to the murder
conviction. Although he requested the enhancements be “stayed,” he also
asked the court to “strike” or “dismiss” them. As the legal basis for the
request, Gonzalez cited section 1385, which authorizes a court to strike or to
dismiss an enhancement, not to stay it. (Id., subds. (a), (b)(1), (c)(1).) He did
not reference the subdivisions he cites on appeal—multiple enhancements
and enhancements whose application could result in a sentence of more than
20 years (id., subd. (c)(2)(B), (C))—but he did cite the corresponding
mitigating circumstances in the California Rules of Court (rule 4.423(b)(10),
(11)). That sufficed to put the circumstances before the trial court. (See Civ.
Code, § 3528 [“The law respects form less than substance”].) Once Gonzalez
presented his request to the court and it refused the request, he did not have
to object to the refusal to preserve his claim of error for appeal. (People v.

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Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 436; People v. Thomas (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th

612, 627.)1
We turn now to the merits of Gonzalez’s claim. Section 1385 gives a
sentencing court discretion to strike or dismiss an enhancement “in the
furtherance of justice.” (Id., subd. (c); see People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1024, 1033 (Walker).) In exercising its discretion, the court must give “great
weight” to the mitigating circumstances listed in the statute “unless the court
finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.
‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to
others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) The mitigating circumstances include:
“(B) [m]ultiple enhancements are alleged in a single case”; and “(C) [t]he
application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years.”
(Ibid.) We review a sentencing court’s decision not to strike an enhancement
under section 1385 for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mendoza (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298 (Mendoza); People v. Flores (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th
368, 376.) A court abuses its discretion if it uses the wrong legal standard,
makes factual findings unsupported by substantial evidence, or applies the
law to the facts in an arbitrary or capricious way. (People v. Knoller (2007)
41 Cal.4th 139, 156; People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 856.)
Gonzalez contends the trial court abused its discretion by applying the
wrong legal standard to his request that it strike the enhancements attached
to his murder conviction. He concedes that “if [a] trial court finds that

1 Our conclusion Gonzalez did not forfeit his claim of sentencing error
makes it unnecessary to consider his alternative argument that trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance by failing to preserve the claim.

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dismissing [an] enhancement would endanger public safety, it need go no
further in its analysis.” (See Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1033 [“in most
cases, ‘if the trial court finds that dismissal of an enhancement would
endanger public safety, then it is hard to see how dismissal would further the
interests of justice,’ notwithstanding the applicability of any [statutory]
mitigating factors”].) But, Gonzalez argues, in making that finding in this
case, the court improperly focused solely on his current dangerousness when
it should have considered whether his release from prison after service of 25
years for the murder conviction would result in physical injury or serious
danger to others. As support for this argument, he relies on this court’s
decision in Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th 215. That reliance is misplaced.
In Gonzalez, the trial court refused to dismiss a firearm enhancement
based on its finding the defendant “ ‘presently . . . does represent a danger to
society.’ ” (103 Cal.App.5th at p. 224, italics added.) The court interpreted
section 1385 as requiring it to decide whether the defendant “ ‘currently at the
time of sentencing represent[s] a danger to society.’ ” (Id. at p. 223, italics
added.) We held the trial court erred in its “singular focus on whether the
defendant currently poses a danger.” (Id. at p. 228.) We explained that
deciding whether dismissal of an enhancement would endanger public safety
is a “ ‘forward-looking inquiry.’ ” (Id. at p. 229.) The court must consider not
only the defendant’s current dangerousness but also his dangerousness when
he would be released from prison were the enhancement dismissed and, if the
sentence is indeterminate, the “safety valve” of approval by the Board of
Parole Hearings that is required for release. (Id. at pp. 228–229.)
The trial court in this case did not focus on Gonzalez’s dangerousness
only at the time of sentencing. The court did state he “is an extreme danger
now,” which was “an appropriate factor to consider” (Gonzalez, supra,

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103 Cal.App.5th at p. 228) since “ ‘past behavior is the best predictor of future
behavior’ ” (In re Ross (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1507). But the trial court
did not stop there. It responded to the prosecutor’s request that it consider
Gonzalez’s dangerousness when he would be eligible for release if the
enhancements were dismissed by acknowledging it “ha[d] no crystal ball”
with which to foresee the future. The court went on to state that, based on
Gonzalez’s desire “to kill as many people as possible” and the absence of a
mental illness by the treatment of which that “mentality would be lessened,”
the court “ha[d] severe concerns for the safety of the community going
forward” and “would be very concerned about his release in 25 years.” (Italics
added.) During the sentencing hearing, the court twice noted Gonzalez, as a
youth offender, would become eligible for release on parole during his 25th
year of incarceration. (See § 3051, subd. (b)(3).) The record thus shows the
trial court conducted the required forward-looking inquiry by considering
Gonzalez’s dangerousness at the time he would be eligible for release from
prison were the enhancements attached to the murder conviction dismissed
and the “safety valve that exists due to the review by the Board of Parole
Hearings.” (Gonzalez, at p. 229.)
For the foregoing reasons, we reject Gonzalez’s claim the trial court
applied the wrong legal standard in refusing to dismiss the firearm and
deadly weapon use enhancements attached to his murder conviction. “Given
the court’s consideration of the circumstances of the crime and . . .
determination that a long sentence was necessary for [Gonzalez] to become
rehabilitated after committing such a crime, we cannot say that the court’s
determination that dismissal of the enhancement[s] ‘would endanger public
safety’ (§ 1385(c)(2)) was ‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person
could agree with it.’ ” (Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 299.) Our

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conclusion the trial court did not erroneously find that dismissal would
endanger public safety makes it unnecessary for us to consider Gonzalez’s
related claim the error was prejudicial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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