CourtListener 10872148•In re Lucas J. CA1/5
Texte intégral
Filed 6/8/26 In re Lucas J. CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re LUCAS J. and MARIO B.,
Persons Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN
SERVICES AGENCY, A174350, A174358
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (City & County of San Francisco
ZACHARY B., Super. Ct. Nos.
Defendant and Appellant. JD24-3071, JD24-3072)
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Appellant, Zachary B. (father), is the biological father of Mario B., born
in April 2024, and the presumed father of Lucas J., born in May 2023
(collectively, minors).2 Father appeals from the juvenile court’s order of legal
guardianship as the permanent plan for minors under Welfare and
1 Father raises no substantial issues of law or fact.
We thus resolve his
consolidated appeals by abbreviated form of opinion as permitted by
California Standards of Judicial Administration section 8.1.
2 Minors’ mother and Lucas’s biological father are not parties to this
appeal. As such, facts related to them will be limited to those relevant to
father’s contentions on appeal.
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Institutions Code section 366.26.3 Father raises two issues, one of which is
conceded by plaintiff, the San Francisco Human Services Agency (agency).
Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by limiting his
supervised visitation with minors to once a month for three hours. As to
Mario only, father also argues, and the agency concedes, that the requisite
inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.;
ICWA) was not undertaken with respect to the paternal grandfather.
We uphold the visitation order as a proper exercise of the juvenile
court’s discretion. As to the ICWA issue, conceded as error by the agency, we
conditionally reverse and remand the case to the juvenile court to ensure
ICWA compliance as to Mario.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Both father and mother have a long history of substance abuse and
domestic violence. In April 2024, minors were detained and placed in foster
care shortly after Mario’s birth, when he tested positive for fentanyl and
amphetamines and mother failed to take him for follow-up appointments
related to his condition. Lucas also tested positive at birth for the same
substances. Based on these concerns, the agency filed dependency petitions
on April 23, 2024.
On August 21, 2024, the court sustained the allegations in an amended
petition, finding that Lucas and Mario were minors described by section 300,
subdivisions (b) and (g).
On September 4, 2025, the matter proceeded to a permanency planning
hearing under section 366.26. After hearing testimony from the agency’s
protective services worker and father, the court ordered a permanent plan for
3 All statutory citations herein are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2
minors of legal guardianship with their maternal grandparents. The court
also ordered supervised visitation for father once a month for three hours.
Afterward, the court dismissed the dependency.
On September 16, 2025, father filed a timely notice of appeal as to each
minor.
DISCUSSION
I. Visitation Order.
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(4)(C) provides that when guardianship is
selected as the appropriate plan at a permanency planning hearing, “[t]he
court shall also make an order for visitation with the parents . . . unless the
court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the visitation would be
detrimental to the physical or emotional well-being of the child.”
The juvenile court is afforded wide discretion in determining the
appropriate terms and conditions of visitation between dependent children
and their parents. (In re Megan B. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 942, 953.) On
appeal, we review a juvenile’s court visitation order for abuse of discretion.
(In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 48–51.) We disturb the visitation
order only if the juvenile court exceeded the bounds of reason.
(In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.)
Here, there was no abuse of discretion in providing father three hours
of supervised visitation once a month. While father claims he should have
received visitation “at least twice a month” because “three hours once a
month did not allow [him] to maintain a parental relationship with [minors],”
the court had reasonable grounds to disagree.
In particular, the record shows that at the time of the September 2025
permanency planning hearing, father had not visited minors since February
2025. There were also multiple documented incidents of domestic violence
3
between father and mother, including an incident on March 6, 2025, wherein
father was “ ‘hearing voices’ ” and threw mother on the floor, grabbed her face
to “ ‘shut [her] up,’ ” and kicked her. The legal guardians (maternal
grandparents) reported concerns to the agency regarding father’s behavior,
including his substance abuse and violence toward mother. Finally, despite
his long history of substance abuse, which the agency suspected was ongoing,
father had failed to engage in any of the services offered to him under the
reunification plan to address his condition.
Under these circumstances, the juvenile court reasonably found that a
legal guardianship for minors with maternal grandparents, with father
granted supervised visitation once a month for three hours, would best serve
minors’ primary need for permanency and stability. (In re Stephanie M.,
supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317 [after reunification services are terminated, a
parent’s interest in the care, custody, and companionship of the child is no
longer paramount and the court’s focus shifts to the child’s needs for
permanency and stability].)
II. ICWA Inquiry.
Father’s remaining contention is that the juvenile court’s implied
findings on April 24, May 2, and September 4, 2025, that ICWA (and
California’s analogue statutes) did not apply to Mario must be conditionally
reversed because the agency failed to inquire as to whether paternal
grandfather had Native American ancestry. The agency agrees with this
contention. We do too.
“Under ICWA’s state analogue statutes (Cal-ICWA; Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 224 et seq.), courts and child welfare agencies are charged with ‘an
affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be
an Indian child’ in dependency cases. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (a).)
4
Child welfare agencies discharge this state law duty by ‘asking the child,
parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others
who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or
neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the child,
the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.’ (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2,
subd. (b).)” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1125, italics added,
fn. omitted (Dezi C.).)
“When there is an inadequate inquiry and the record is
underdeveloped, it is impossible for reviewing courts to assess prejudice
because we simply do not know what additional information will be revealed
from an adequate inquiry. [Thus,] an inadequate Cal-ICWA inquiry requires
conditional reversal of the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights
with directions to the agency to conduct an adequate inquiry, supported by
record documentation.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125.)
This rule applies here. As the agency concedes, “[t]he record does not
show paternal relatives were asked about Indian ancestry.” Because the
mandatory ICWA inquiry was not completed as to Mario’s paternal
grandfather and possibly other paternal relatives, the appropriate course of
action is a conditional reversal with an order that such inquiry be
undertaken and documented.
DISPOSITION
This case is conditionally reversed and remanded to the juvenile court
for compliance with the inquiry requirements of ICWA and Cal-ICWA with
respect to Mario’s paternal relatives. In all other respects, the order of
September 4, 2025, is affirmed.
5
Jackson, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
Simons, J.
Burns, J.
A174350, A174358/S.F. Human Services Agency v. Zachary B.
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