People v. Hernandez CA4/1

CourtListener 10872100Calctapp8 juin 2026

Texte intégral

Filed 6/8/26 P. v. Hernandez CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D087440

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. FVI21003506)

ENRIQUE LUIS HERNANDEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Debra Harris, Judge. Affirmed.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Joshua Trinh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury convicted Enrique Luis Hernandez of, among other counts, one
count of sexual penetration by force of a victim under the age of 14 (Pen.
Code, § 289, subd. (a)(1)(B); count 8). In a bifurcated proceeding, the court
found true five aggravating factors. Hernandez was sentenced to a
cumulative prison term of 20 years plus 145 years to life, including a 12-year,
upper-term sentence for count 8.
On appeal, Hernandez claims insufficient evidence of force, violence,
duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury supports his
conviction of count 8. Resolving this matter by memorandum opinion
(see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847), we disagree and
affirm.
I.
Hernandez is I.R.’s mother’s cousin.
A.
At trial, I.R. testified that from the time she was around six years old
until she was 13, Hernandez touched her sexually about 20 times.
The last time Hernandez sexually touched I.R. was July 4, 2021, when
she was 13 years old. I.R. was at her godmother’s house, and Hernandez was
living in a trailer in the front yard. Hernandez “grabbed [I.R.] and pulled
[her] inside his trailer.” I.R. “didn’t go willingly.”
Once I.R. was in the trailer, Hernandez pulled her pants down. He
then “put his hand over [her] back[,] and he . . . stuck something inside of
[her].” He put a “round,” “bumpy” object that “hurt” and “went in and out”
“[i]nside [her] vagina.” While Hernandez was doing this, I.R. “was telling
him to stop.” I.R. confirmed she was “trying to get away,” explaining that she
“was trying to move but he had his hand on [her] back” while she was
facedown. She “felt, like, something came out of [her],” and then Hernandez
stuck his penis inside her vagina and had sex with her. She tried to scream
for help, but he “told [her] to shut up and not make any noise.”

2
The incident lasted about 20 minutes. Afterward, Hernandez told I.R.
that if she “ever told anybody, that he was going to come and hurt [her].”
B.
During an interview with law enforcement, a videotape of which was
played for the jury, Hernandez described the incident in the trailer. He
claimed he had been using a sex toy when I.R. entered his trailer to let him
know food was ready. He told her to come over to him, turn around, and
“slightly bend over[] or like hunch over.” He said he only “tapped her” with
his hand to get her to bend over. Hernandez then pulled down her pants,
stuck his index finger inside her vagina, took out his finger, and began
rubbing his penis “[b]etween her thighs,” “[t]owards the vagina.” His penis
then “went in,” he thrust twice, and he ejaculated outside her. He said, “I’m
sorry, I got excited.” She looked “[s]urprised,” and Hernandez told her,
“[D]on’t tell no one, please.”
At trial, Hernandez testified that what he said during the interview
“was a complete lie” because his family “has a history of being dealt [with]
[]poorly . . . [by] law enforcement.” He denied that the incident in the trailer
happened.
II.
Hernandez contends his conviction of sexual penetration by force of a
victim under the age of 14 must be reversed because it is not supported by
substantial evidence and violates due process. Specifically, Hernandez
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that the penetration was achieved
through “force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful
bodily injury on the victim or another person.” (Quoting § 289(a)(1)(B).) We
conclude otherwise.

3
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for substantial
evidence. In doing so, we examine the entire record in the light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine if a rational factfinder could find
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) Substantial evidence is reasonable,
credible evidence of solid value, even if circumstantial. (Ibid.) “Conflicts and
even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify”
reversal. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.) We will not reverse
unless under “no hypothesis” whatsoever could substantial evidence support
the jury’s verdict. (Zamudio, at p. 357 [cleaned up].) A single witness’s
testimony may constitute substantial evidence. (People v. Barnwell (2007)
41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052.)
“Force” in this context means “force sufficient to overcome the victim’s
will.” (In re Asencio (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1205.) “‘Force’ includes
circumstances where the victim did not want to engage in the act and did not
positively cooperate with it. Force includes efforts to move and to position
the victim’s body.” (People v. Aguilar (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1023, 1026.)
Physically immobilizing the victim also can constitute force. (Asencio, at
pp. 1205-1206.)
Here, Hernandez dragged an unwilling I.R. into his trailer. Once
inside, Hernandez pulled I.R.’s pants down, “put his hand over [her] back,”
and “stuck something inside of [her].” I.R. told him to stop and tried to get
away, but Hernandez held her in place with his hand on her back. This is
substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could have concluded
beyond a reasonable doubt that Hernandez sexually penetrated I.R. “by
means of force” beyond that included in the act of penetration itself.
(§ 289(a)(1)(B).)

4
In his reply brief, Hernandez relies on cases addressing the use of force
under section 288(b), which proscribes the willful and lewd commission of
certain “lewd or lascivious act[s]” on children “by use of force, violence,
duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim
or another person.” But the meaning of “force” in section 288(b) is different
from that in section 289(a). (See People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015,
1026; People v. McCann (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 149, 156.) Under
section 288(b), the requisite force must “be ‘substantially different from or
substantially greater than that necessary to accomplish the lewd act itself.’”
(People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 242.) The section 288(b) cases on which
Hernandez relies accordingly do not help him because force that may be
insufficient under section 288(b) can be adequate under section 289(a).
Section 289(a)(1)(B) is stated in the disjunctive. As we conclude there
was substantial evidence Hernandez sexually penetrated I.R. using force, we
need not address whether there was substantial evidence he also did so by
other proscribed means.
III.
We affirm.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

5

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.