People v. Edwards CA4/1

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Filed 6/4/26 P. v. Edwards CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D086037

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD305970)

HAROLD LEE EDWARDS, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Eugenia A. Eyherabide, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with directions.
Brad J. Poore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski and Stephanie H. Chow, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
A jury found Harold Lee Edwards, Jr. guilty of selling cocaine base
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a); count 1) and possessing cocaine base
for sale (id., § 11351.5; count 2). The court imposed a three-year prison term
on count 1, a concurrent two-year term on court 2, and stayed the sentence
pending Edwards successfully completing three years of formal probation.
Edwards contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it
could consider evidence of other uncharged sales of methamphetamine to
show intent, motive, lack of mistake, and common plan. He also asserts his
sentence for either count 1 or count 2 should have been stayed under Penal

Code1 section 654. We agree with both parties that the sentence on one of
these counts must be stayed. The sentence is vacated and the matter is
remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of the base term under the
current language of section 654. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
BACKGROUND
A San Diego police officer conducting surveillance in a high-narcotics
area noticed Edwards sitting near a fence with a woman whom the officer
recognized from prior law enforcement contacts in the same area. The officer
photographed what he described as a typical “hand-to-hand” drug
transaction—the woman handed Edwards cash and Edwards gave her a clear
plastic bag containing a white substance. After this exchange, a man, later
identified as Rigoberto S., sat next to Edwards and spoke with him.
A second man then approached Edwards and Rigoberto, handed
Rigoberto some cash, and received a substance from Edwards. The substance
appeared to be “crystal,” or methamphetamine. The officer opined that
Rigoberto was acting as the facilitator in the drug transaction between
Edwards and the second man. The officer directed additional officers to
contact the three individuals. Officers detained Rigoberto and found $2 in
cash on his person. Officers also arrested the woman; she had a pill bottle

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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containing a white powdery substance later determined to be 0.4 grams of
cocaine base.
When police arrested Edwards he had $589 in cash in his right front
pants pocket—one $100 bill, one $50 bill, and the remainder in $1, $5, $10,
and $20 denominations. In his left front pants pocket, Edwards carried a
brown plastic bindle containing a clear plastic bag with a white powdery
substance, along with another bag containing a crystalline material. These
substances were later determined to be 0.83 grams of cocaine base and 9.17
grams of methamphetamine. Edwards also possessed a backpack containing
four large bags of marijuana, two cellular phones, marijuana concentrate,
and 50 unused clear plastic baggies. Based on the quantity of narcotics, the
presence of numerous unused baggies, and the amount and denominations of
cash, the officer opined that Edwards possessed the drugs for purposes of
sale.
Edwards testified he kept partially smoked cigarettes in a plastic bag
in his pockets and he gave the woman and Rigoberto half-smoked cigarette
butts after they asked him for cigarettes. The cash he carried represented
money he had saved that month from his Social Security check and he
intended to use it for Christmas shopping. Although he admitted possessing
marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine base, he claimed the substances
were for personal use rather than for sale.
Over Edwards’s objection, the trial court instructed the jury with
CALCRIM No. 375 to explain how to consider the evidence that Edwards sold
and possessed methamphetamine for sale in determining his guilt as to the

cocaine base charges.2 During closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized

2 As given, CALCRIM No. 375 provided:

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that three separate sales had occurred, even though Edwards was not
charged with selling or possessing methamphetamine for sale. The
prosecutor further reminded the jury that the court had instructed them on
the limited purposes for which they could consider this evidence, and any
determination as to whether Edwards sold or possessed methamphetamine
for sale was governed by a preponderance of the evidence standard.

“The People presented evidence that the defendant committed the offense of
Health and Safety Code section 11379(a) and section 11378, selling and
possessing for sale, methamphetamine that were not charged in this case. [¶]
You may consider this evidence only if the People have proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in fact committed the
uncharged offenses. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a different
burden of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a
preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that the fact is more likely
than not to be true. [¶] If the People have not met this burden, you must
disregard this evidence entirely.

“If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged offenses, you
may, but are not required to consider that evidence for the limited purpose of
deciding whether: [¶] The defendant acted with the intent to sell cocaine base
in this case; [¶] The defendant had a motive to commit the offenses alleged in
this case; [¶] The defendant knew he possessed a controlled substance when
he allegedly acted in this case; [¶] The defendant’s alleged actions were not
the result of a mistake of accident; or [¶] The defendant had a plan or scheme
to commit the offenses alleged in this case.

“In evaluating this evidence, consider the similarity or lack of similarity
between the uncharged offenses and the charged offenses. [¶] Do not
consider this evidence for any other purpose except for the limited purpose of
determining the defendant's credibility. [¶] Do not conclude from this
evidence that the defendant has a bad character or is disposed to commit
crime. [¶] If you conclude that the defendant committed the uncharged
offenses, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other
evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of
Counts One and Two. The People must still prove each charge beyond a
reasonable doubt.”

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DISCUSSION
I.
No Error in Instructing With CALCRIM No. 375
Except as provided, evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or
her character—whether in the form of opinion, reputation, or specific
instances of conduct—is inadmissible to prove conduct on a specified occasion.
(Evid. Code, § 1101.) An exception permits admission of a defendant’s
uncharged conduct, not to show propensity, but to prove another material
fact, such as motive, intent, or identity. (People v. Rocha (2013) 221
Cal.App.4th 1385, 1393; Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) When such evidence
is admitted, the jury may consider it only if it finds, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the defendant committed the uncharged acts. (Alcala v.
Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1205, 1224, fn. 14.)
We review instructional error claims de novo. (People v. Mitchell (2019)
7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) This entails independently assessing whether the
instruction correctly states the law and, considering the instructions as a
whole and the entire record, determining whether there is a “reasonable
likelihood” the jury misapplied it. (Ibid.)
Edwards contends the trial court erred when it gave CALCRIM
No. 375, a standard instruction on other crimes evidence because, in his view,
no uncharged acts were admitted; he asserts the methamphetamine conduct
was inextricably intertwined with the charged cocaine base offenses. He
further asserts that the instruction permitted the jury to convict on
counts 1 and 2 under a preponderance standard. To make this argument,
Edwards relies on People v. Nicolas (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1165 (Nicolas). His
reliance on Nicolas is misplaced.

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In Nicolas, the defendant was charged with vehicular manslaughter,
which required proof of gross negligence. (Nicolas, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1172, 1175.) The prosecution introduced evidence that the defendant had
been texting and making phone calls immediately before rear-ending the
victim’s car. (Id. at p. 1172.) Over the defense’s objection, the court gave a
modified version of CALCRIM No. 375, instructing that these acts could be
proven by a preponderance but not used to show bad character. (Nicolas, at
pp. 1177–1178.) The Attorney General conceded on appeal that the phone-
use evidence was not uncharged conduct under Evidence Code section 1101,
subdivision (b), but “ ‘an indivisible part of the offense itself’ ” because it
directly caused the collision. (Nicolas, at p. 1178.) The Court of Appeal
agreed and held the instruction was erroneous because no true uncharged
acts had been admitted. (Ibid.) The erroneous instruction constituted
structural error—by applying a preponderance standard to the same evidence
used to establish gross negligence—the instruction impermissibly lowered the
prosecution’s burden of proof, creating conflicting standards governing
identical evidence. (Id. at pp. 1181–1182.)
This case is materially different. The evidence that Edwards sold and
possessed methamphetamine for sale was properly admitted as uncharged
conduct to prove motive and intent. It was not “indivisible” from the charged
offenses. Edwards sold cocaine base to one individual and, in a separate
transaction, sold methamphetamine to a different individual. Unlike
Nicolas, the uncharged conduct did not constitute the same evidence used to
prove the charged offenses. The trial court therefore did not err in giving the
jury instruction.

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II.
The Court Erred Under Section 654 By Not Staying
the Sentence on Either Count 1 or 2
Section 654 prohibits multiple punishment for the same act or
indivisible course of conduct. (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294.)
Before 2022, when a single act or omission was punishable under multiple
provisions, the court was required to impose sentence under the provision
carrying the longest potential term. (Former § 654, subd. (a).) Effective
January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 518 amended section 654 to afford trial
courts discretion to impose punishment under either applicable provision.
(§ 654, subd. (a).)
The parties agree that Edwards’s multiple punishments violate
section 654 because his possession of cocaine base for sale and the sale of
cocaine base arose from an indivisible course of conduct with a single
objective. Under the amended statute, the trial court has discretion to
impose the sentence on either count 1 or count 2, including the option of
selecting the shorter term. (People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379.)
Accordingly, the sentence must be vacated and the matter remanded to
permit the trial court to exercise its informed sentencing discretion.

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DISPOSITION
Edwards’s sentence is vacated and the cause is remanded for
resentencing consistent with this opinion. The judgment is otherwise
affirmed.

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

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