CourtListener 10869831•People v. Jackson CA5
Texte intégral
Filed 6/3/26 P. v. Jackson CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F088950
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CF4517156)
v.
DESHAWN LEE JACKSON, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Jonathan B.
Conklin, Judge.
Candace Hale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal; DeShawn Lee Jackson,
in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, and Hannah Janigian Chavez, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Snauffer, J. and DeSantos, J.
INTRODUCTION
In 1994, appellant and defendant DeShawn Lee Jackson (defendant) was
convicted after a bench trial of second degree murder with a firearm enhancement. He
was sentenced to four years plus 15 years to life. The judgment was affirmed on appeal.
In 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1
section 1172.6.2 In 2024, the trial court held there was a prima facie case for relief,
issued an order to show cause (OSC), and conducted an evidentiary hearing. It reviewed
the record from defendant’s bench trial, and denied the petition because it found beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of murder as the actual killer.
On appeal, appellate counsel filed a brief which summarized the facts and
procedural history with citations to the record, raised no issues, and asked this court to
independently review the record pursuant to both People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216 (Delgadillo) and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.
Defendant submitted a supplemental letter brief and argued the trial court violated
his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection because he was convicted by
a plea and not after a trial, and the court denied his petition without considering new
evidence of actual innocence.
We review the record and defendant’s arguments, and affirm the trial court’s
denial of his petition.
1 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 Defendant filed his petition in 2022 under former section 1170.95, which was
renumbered as section 1172.6, without substantive change on June 30, 2022. (People v.
Saibu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 709, 714.) We refer to the statute by its current number
throughout this opinion unless otherwise indicated.
2.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
On June 27, 1994, Gregorio Vello (Vello) was fatally shot in the parking lot of a
liquor store on South Elm Avenue in Fresno.4
On July 25, 1994, defendant was charged by complaint with the murder of Vello
with a firearm enhancement. On August 22, 1994, the court conducted the preliminary
hearing and held defendant to answer.
The Information
On August 31, 1994, an information was filed charging defendant with the murder
of Vello on or about June 27, 1994 (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), with personal use of a
firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and the special circumstance that the murder was
committed while defendant was engaged in an attempted robbery (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(17)(i)); and attempted robbery of Vello (§§ 664/211/212.5, subd. (b); count 2), with
personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). No one else was charged with murdering
Vello.
3 After notice to the parties and without objection, this court takes judicial notice of
the records in defendant’s direct appeal (People v. DeShawn Lee Jackson (May 14, 1996,
F024082) [nonpub. opn.]), and in a petition for writ of habeas corpus (In re DeShawn Lee
Jackson (Feb. 5, 2014, F068515) [nonpub. opn.]).
The following factual and procedural summary is from the clerk’s and reporter’s
transcripts from his trial as contained in his direct appeal, and the record of this appeal.
4 The victim’s last name appears as both “Vello” and “Bello” in the records of his
trial and the current appeal. The autopsy report and death certificate use “Vello,” which
we use in this case.
3.
DEFENDANT’S WAIVER OF A JURY TRIAL
AND AGREEMENT TO A BENCH TRIAL5
On November 28, 1994, the court convened a hearing in defendant’s case.
Defendant was present with his attorney. The court stated the parties had discussed the
case, and directed them to formalize their agreement.
“[THE PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, at this time, for the purposes of
these proceedings, the People would be moving to strike the special
circumstances alleged and also to move to dismiss Count Two, which is
attempted robbery. The People would be further agreeing to limit the
defendant’s exposure on a violation of Section 187 to a second degree.
And also, the personal use of a firearm is also reserved.
“THE COURT: And that is on a condition, I believe.
“[THE PROSECUTOR]: That is on the condition that the defendant waive
his right to a jury trial, agree to the submission of the police reports, the
Court’s consideration of that, however, not giving up his rights to present
his witnesses if he chooses to do so.”
The court asked defense counsel if she agreed with the prosecutor’s statement and
that was “something that you are recommending to your client?” Defense counsel said
yes.
The court stated defendant was 17 years old, he was found unfit for juvenile court,
and he was bound over for trial as an adult. The court explained the bench trial
agreement to defendant, and he said he understood and agreed.
The court explained to defendant, in great detail, that he had the right to a jury
trial, that he was waiving a jury trial, and that the court would act as the jury to determine
his guilt at a bench trial. Defendant said he understood, and waived his right to a jury
trial.
5 In letter brief in this Wende appeal, defendant repeatedly insists that he pleaded
guilty to murder and he did not have a trial, and his petition should have been granted
because of his alleged plea. We recite the entirety of the procedural background in order
to address defendant’s claims in his letter brief.
4.
The court explained the nature of the bench trial that the parties were going to
agree to:
“THE COURT: [Y]ou need to know at the very outset that if you and your
attorney and the District Attorney says, ‘Okay, Judge, you can consider
these [police] reports as evidence in this case,’ then in all likelihood, after
[finishing] reading them—I’ve only read halfway through them—if the
attorneys say that these are pretty damning reports, in other words, that they
are reports that I believe will show that a murder was committed and that
you’ve been identified as the person who committed that murder, and so in
all probability, if that is all there is to it, you’re probably convicted. [¶] So
this is—this is sort of like a—it’s sort of harsher than a full-blown trial
where we have witnesses. So you have to know that. In other words, it’s
much riskier what you’re doing now, although, I understand you have a
defense to present. I’ll certainly listen to the defense and see if that raises a
reasonable doubt in my mind as to your guilt. You need to know that
things are not looking good for you right now. [¶] Okay, are you with me?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.”
The court next explained to defendant his constitutional rights to confront and
cross-examine witnesses, and he was giving up that right; he had the right to call his own
witnesses in the defense case, which his counsel intended to do; and he had the right to
remain silent. Defendant said he understood.
“THE COURT: …Nobody can require that you testify. Part of the record
here, as I can understand it, is a discussion that you and [Detective] Stokes
had. I believe from what I’ve seen of it, it looks like you have largely
denied any involvement in this crime. But you talk about a lot of things,
and I don’t know how that is going to affect your defense in this case. It
may or it may not.”
Defendant said he understood and did not have any questions.
“THE COURT: Okay. So if we do what the attorneys suggest that we do,
we won’t have a jury, you won’t see the witnesses that are called to testify
against you, because they will all be here on paper, and the only witnesses
that we’ll see will be the witnesses that you call on your own defense, on
the alibi, I guess, the identification issue, and then any witnesses the
District Attorney calls with respect to your defense. In other words, if they
have witnesses and they know that those witnesses are not telling the truth,
5.
or whatever he has to say, we’ll hear that last. So it will only be their
partial testimony. [¶] Is that the way you understand it?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.”
The court again asked defendant if he understood and waived his right to a jury
trial, and to confront and cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses. Defendant said yes,
and defense counsel concurred with his waivers.
The court marked the police reports as the prosecution’s Exhibit No. 1 and
accepted them into evidence.
“THE COURT: [L]et me make sure you understand. If we were to stop
right at this point and you said, ‘I have no evidence to present, Judge,’
probably these reports would make a sufficient case against you to find you
guilty. You understand that?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.”
The court asked defendant if anyone forced or coerced him into agreeing to the
bench trial, and defendant said no. The court asked if he felt comfortable that this was
the best decision for him, and defendant said yes.
The court found defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury
trial and confront and cross-examine witnesses.6 The court directed the parties to give
their opening statements in the bench trial.
DEFENDANT’S BENCH TRIAL
Opening Statements
The prosecutor stated that Vello, who was 22 years old, was pushing his bicycle to
a liquor store on South Elm Avenue in Fresno, when defendant confronted him. A
witness was standing by the payphone, and stated defendant pulled a gun and fired one
6 On November 29, 1994, the second day of the bench trial, the court stated that it
needed to advise defendant about another issue. The court explained that in addition to
the murder charge, the information alleged that defendant personally used a firearm, and
defendant’s jury waiver also applied to the firearm enhancement. The court asked
defendant if this changed his mind about his waiver of a jury trial, defendant said no, and
he again waived his right to a jury trial.
6.
shot at Vello. The liquor store’s clerk heard the gunshot, ran outside, and saw defendant
running away. Both of these individuals identified defendant from photographic lineups.
The prosecutor also outlined other evidence that implicated defendant as the gunman.
Defense counsel stated the defense would present five witnesses who would testify
about defendant’s alibi and prove he was not present at the time and place of the
shooting.
The Prosecution’s Case
Based on a stipulation between the parties, the entirety of the prosecution’s case at
defendant’s bench trial consisted of the court’s review of police reports about the
homicide and investigation. The court considered the following evidence in these
reports.
The Crime Scene
At 8:14 p.m. on Monday, June 27, 1994, the police received a call about a
shooting at a liquor store on South Elm Avenue in Fresno. At 8:16 p.m., Officers
Maguire and Madden arrived at the scene. They found Vello lying on the ground in the
store’s parking lot, and he had a gunshot wound in his chest. Vello was wearing
headphones from a portable radio. A yellow 10-speed bicycle was on the ground, about
five feet away from Vello. An expended .32-caliber casing was two feet from the
bicycle.
The bicycle was subsequently processed for fingerprints, and only Vello’s prints
were found on it.
Initial Interviews with the Store Clerks
The officers interviewed E.W. and E.T., who were working inside the liquor store
at the time of the shooting. E.W. said he heard a gunshot, ran outside, and saw the victim
lying in the liquor store’s parking lot. E.W. saw a Black male, approximately 18 years
old, run away from the liquor store and head east towards Poppy Avenue. E.W. did not
see this person’s face.
7.
E.T. said he also heard the gunshot, ran outside, and saw the victim lying on the
ground. E.T. said he saw a Black male running from the parking lot, heading east across
South Elm toward Poppy. E.T. said he saw this person’s face and would be able to
identify him if he had the opportunity.
Initial Interview with Witness M.J.
The officers interviewed witness M.J. at the scene. M.J. said he was using the
payphone located outside, in front of the liquor store, when the incident occurred. He
saw a Hispanic male, later identified as Vello, walking and pushing a yellow bicycle
toward the liquor store entrance.
M.J. said he saw two Black males walking on the sidewalk next to the liquor store.
One of the men immediately started to grab at Vello’s bicycle, and Vello did not let go of
it. This same man told Vello to let it go. Vello held onto the bicycle and said something
in Spanish. M.J. said at that point, this same man used his left hand to pull out a small
black pistol. The gunman held the pistol about one foot away from Vello and, after a
moment, fired one shot into Vello’s chest. Vello fell to the ground. The gunman ran
away from the liquor store, and headed east across South Elm and towards Poppy.
M.J. said the second man had stayed outside the liquor store and near the
payphone, as a “lookout” during the gunman’s confrontation with Vello. A short time
after the gunman fled, the second man also left the parking lot and walked across South
Elm, heading east towards Poppy.
M.J. described the gunman as approximately 18 years old. M.J. said he could
identify the gunman and had seen him before. M.J. believed the gunman’s name was
“Deshawn” and thought he lived in the area of Florence and Poppy. M.J. said he had also
seen the second man before, could identify him, and thought that man’s name was
“Derrick.”
8.
The Victim
Vello was taken to the hospital and died during emergency surgery. The autopsy
showed a single bullet entered the front of his chest and pierced his heart in two places.
A .32-caliber bullet was recovered from his body.
Detective Stokes, who attended the autopsy, reported there was no evidence on
Vello’s body that “there was a struggle in which [Vello] was struck or struck anyone.
This was observed in that there were no wounds or lacerations or bruises to the victim’s
hands, arms or face, indicating a fight.”
The autopsy report stated there were no wounds or abrasions on Vellos’s arms or
hands, but fingernail scrapings were taken from under his fingernails and preserved.
A friend of Vello’s later contacted the police department and said he and Vello
had been at a park that day. Vello left to buy cold drinks from the liquor store and never
returned.
Second Interview with E.W.
On June 28, 1994, Detective Stokes interviewed E.W., the liquor store clerk, while
he was at work. E.W. said he was inside the liquor store when he heard the gunshot. He
went to the front of the store and looked outside, and saw a Black male run east across
South Elm, toward the business across the street.
E.W. said that later, on the night of the shooting, Ronnie Armstrong appeared at
the liquor store about an hour after the police ended their investigation at the scene.
Armstrong walked around outside of the liquor store, and made statements about his
friends being involved in the murder. E.W. believed Armstrong and his friends lived
together on Poppy. E.W. thought the gunman’s name was “ ‘Deshane.’ ”
Interview with the Jane Doe
Detective Stokes interviewed Jane Doe, who worked at the business across the
street from the liquor store. Doe said she heard a gunshot and saw a Black male run
9.
away from the liquor store, cross the center divider on South Elm, and continue running
through another parking lot.
Jane Doe was shown a six-person photographic lineup that contained defendant’s
photograph. She said the suspect’s picture was in the lineup, but she would not identify
him because she feared for her safety. Jane Doe was later shown a second lineup that
contained defendant’s photograph with five different subjects. Jane Doe said the suspect
was in the lineup and refused to identify him because she feared for her safety.
Second Interview with M.J.
On the evening of June 28, 1994, Detective Stokes interviewed M.J., who said he
saw Vello “just pushing his bike when those two guys tried to steal it from him and they
shot him for no real reason.” M.J. said he had previously seen the gunman on more than
one occasion around the liquor store, and he was willing to identify this person because
what he did “was too far out.”
Detective Stokes presented a photographic lineup to M.J., who immediately
pointed to defendant’s photograph and stated that, “without any doubt,” defendant was
the person who shot Vello “for no reason.” Stokes showed M.J. a photograph of Ronnie
Armstrong. M.J. said Armstrong was not the second suspect who was with defendant,
but he had seen Armstrong around the liquor store on other occasions.
Defendant’s Arrest and Interview
On July 1, 1994, E.W. called the police and reported defendant and Ronnie
Armstrong had just been in the liquor store. When officers arrived at the store, defendant
ran away but he was eventually taken into custody. He initially identified himself as
“Gary Smith,” then gave his true name.
Defendant was advised of the warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
384 U.S. 436, and said he would answer questions. Detective Stokes asked if he
understood that he was under arrest for the murder at the liquor store. Defendant said he
understood, but he was not involved. Defendant said his grandmother drove him by the
10.
liquor store later on the evening of the shooting, when the police were getting ready to
leave.
Detective Stokes asked defendant if he could remember exactly what he had done
on the day of the shooting. Defendant said he was home most of the day. At 7:00 p.m.,
he went to see his sister and her boyfriend at their home, which was around the corner
from where he lived with his mother. Defendant stayed at his sister’s place for about an
hour.
“[Defendant] continued by stating that he had stayed at his sister’s
house for approximately an hour and at around 2000 hours [8:00 p.m.], he
was picked up by his grandmother, [E.C.], and that [E.C.] took him and his
sister and her boyfriend …, along with [a child], over to his grandmother’s
apartment [in Fresno]. He then told me that the apartment was on Lee
Street, he believed, and it was a rest home. He then mentioned that his
‘auntie,’ as he referred to her, Monica Howard, could verify that he had
spent a good portion of the evening at the rest home. He stated that Monica
worked at the location and that he had spoken to her when he arrived with
his sister. He then told me that he had stayed at this location until his
grandmother took him back to his house on Rose. He mentioned that his
mother had gone to the hospital that night with some pains in her chest and
that it was some time later when she had returned from the hospital and
everything was okay, but that he was at home at that time.”7
Detective Stokes asked defendant if he knew Ronnie Armstrong. Defendant said
no. Stokes asked if he knew anyone who lived in an apartment complex in the area of
Poppy and Florence, and defendant said no.
Stokes asked defendant if he had fired any guns in the last few days. Defendant
said no, except for a BB gun. Stokes mentioned that gunshot residue could remain on his
hands for up to two weeks. Defendant then said he fired some shotguns approximately
three to four weeks earlier.
Defendant then said “he didn’t think it made much sense” for him to go back to
the liquor store on the night of the shooting if he was involved in the murder. Stokes
7 E.C. lived at an apartment complex on Lorena Street.
11.
asked who he had been with before he was arrested. Defendant said he was with his 15-
year-old cousin. Stokes asked defendant why he ran away when the police arrived, and
left his cousin behind. Defendant said he didn’t do that, he just walked through the field
and his cousin was going to catch up with him. Stokes asked where his cousin lived and
defendant said he wasn’t sure.
Stokes told defendant that he was positively identified by more than one person
who saw him commit the homicide. Stokes asked more questions about his association
with Armstrong, and showed him a photograph of Armstrong. Defendant repeatedly
denied knowing him. After more questions about Armstrong, defendant said he knew
Armstrong’s sister, who lived in an apartment near Poppy and Florence. Stokes asked
why he denied knowing Armstrong. Defendant said he knew Armstrong’s sister but said
that Armstrong “ ‘isn’t my partner.’ ”
Defendant said: “ ‘If I did it, why go back at [10:30] that night? I’m not a fool.’ ”
Stokes asked what he meant. Defendant said he went to the liquor store later on the night
of the shooting and knew E.W., the store clerk, saw him. Defendant said it did not make
any sense that he would go back to the crime scene just hours after the shooting occurred.
Second Interview with E.T.
On August 4, 1994, Detective Stokes met with E.T., the other liquor store clerk.
Stokes showed him a photographic lineup, and E.T. pointed to defendant’s picture and
said, “this was the suspect that [I] had in mind.” E.T. said this person’s name was
“Deshawn” and he regularly visited the store. E.T. said he could not be 100 percent
certain that defendant was the gunman because he did not see the suspect “face to face.”
E.T. stated that when he heard the gunshot and ran into the parking lot, he saw the
suspect running away. He said the suspect looked back “somewhat toward the scene,”
and E.T. was able to “see somewhat of the profile of the suspect’s face and he saw the
general height and build of the suspect.” E.T. said he immediately got the impression
12.
that the suspect running away was the person he knew as “Deshawn,” based on the
profile of the suspect’s face, and his general height, build, and complexion.
Interview with W.E.
On August 5, 1994, Detective Stokes interviewed W.E. Stokes advised that he
was going to show her a photographic lineup to see if she could identify the shooting
suspect. W.E. immediately replied that she would be able to pick out the suspect because
the suspect associated with her son and other young men in the neighborhood. The
suspect also hung around an apartment complex near her own residence. W.E. looked at
the lineup and immediately pointed to defendant’s photograph.
W.E. said that on the day of the homicide, she was walking to the store and
stopped at the corner of Lorena and Poppy. She was about to cross the street going west,
when she saw defendant run away from the South Elm area. He ran east on Lorena and
then southeast on Poppy. She assumed he was running to the apartment complex where
she knew he hung out. When she crossed the street, she saw a big commotion at the
liquor store.
DEFENSE WITNESSES
The defense called five witnesses who testified in person at the bench trial.
Defendant’s Mother
Defendant’s mother C.J. testified that defendant lived with her on South Rose
Avenue. C.J.’s mother E.C. lived in an apartment on Lorena Avenue.
C.J. testified that at 4:30 p.m. on June 27, 1994, she went home from work
because she felt sick and her chest was hurting. Defendant was at their house and asleep.
She woke him up and told him that her chest was hurting.
At some point after 4:30 p.m., defendant left their house and said he was going to
see his sister and her boyfriend at their nearby house.
C.J. said she next saw defendant when she went to E.C.’s apartment on Lorena,
between 8:30 p.m. and 8:45 p.m. She went to E.C.’s apartment because she needed to
13.
make a call and didn’t have a telephone. When C.J. arrived at her mother’s apartment
complex, E.C. wasn’t home. C.J. spoke to Monica Howard, the apartment complex’s
security guard, and asked for the key to E.C.’s apartment. They tried the key but it didn’t
work because E.C. had changed her lock. C.J. went back to Howard and asked to use her
phone to make a collect call to her sister. Howard agreed, and C.J. made the call and
talked to her sister for about 20 minutes.
C.J. testified that just as she finished her call, E.C. drove up to the apartment
complex with defendant, and his sister and her boyfriend in her car. Everyone went to
E.C.’s apartment.
C.J. told defendant that she was not feeling well and had to go to the hospital, but
didn’t mention which hospital. C.J. left her mother’s apartment around 9:00 p.m., and
went directly to Community Hospital’s emergency department. C.J. had to wait over an
hour to be seen, she was evaluated for another 45 minutes, and she was ultimately
released. C.J. went back to her house and defendant was there. E.C. arrived at the house
to check on her, and C.J. went to bed around 12:30 a.m.
C.J. testified that when she gave her initial statement to Detective Stokes, she was
upset because she had just learned defendant was arrested for murder.
Monica Howard
Howard testified that defendant’s grandmother, E.C., was her godmother. She had
known defendant and his family for many years, and defendant referred to her as
“auntie.” Howard worked as an office clerk and security guard at the apartment complex
where defendant’s grandmother E.C. lived. Howard’s duties included helping the senior
citizen residents if they were sick or needed assistance.
Howard testified that on Sunday, June 26, 1994, the day before the shooting, E.C.
returned to her apartment from Arizona. When she arrived, Howard gave her a message
from her son, that he was in jail.
14.
The next day, Monday, June 27, 1994, Howard was at her own home, which was
across the street from where defendant’s sister lived with her boyfriend. Around 7:00
p.m., she saw E.C., defendant, and defendant’s sister and her boyfriend at defendant’s
sister’s house across the street. Howard testified E.C. was moving defendant’s sister and
her boyfriend to live in her son’s apartment while he was in jail.
Howard testified that sometime around 8:30 p.m., she was in her office at the
apartment complex. C.J. arrived and asked Howard for the key to E.C.’s apartment,
because E.C. wasn’t there and she needed to use the telephone. Howard gave her the key
but it didn’t work, so Howard let C.J. use the telephone in her office. About 10 minutes
later, E.C. drove back to her apartment with defendant, and his sister and her boyfriend.
E.C. said her kids were driving her crazy “moving back and forth” between the Clovis
and Fresno homes.
Howard testified that about five minutes later, C.J. came to her office and said she
was going to the hospital because she had chest pains. Howard asked if anyone was
going with her. C.J. said no, they were busy doing their own thing, and she left. About
10 minutes later, E.C. left her apartment with defendant, his sister and her boyfriend, and
said she was taking them to her son’s apartment in Clovis, and then she would go to the
hospital to check on C.J. Howard didn’t see defendant again that night.
Defendant’s Grandmother
Defendant’s grandmother E.C. testified she went to Arizona in June 1994, and she
returned to Fresno on Sunday, June 26, 1994. When she arrived at her apartment,
Howard gave her the message that her son was in jail. E.C. also received a message from
her son’s apartment manager in Clovis, that something smelled inside his apartment.
On Monday, June 27, 1994, E.C. drove three times between her residence in
Fresno and her son’s apartment in Clovis. Her first trip was in the morning, and she took
defendant’s sister and her boyfriend to clean out the refrigerator in her son’s apartment
because the electricity had been turned off. She left them there and went to work.
15.
Sometime after 5:00 p.m., she drove back to Clovis, picked up defendant’s sister and her
boyfriend, and drove back to her home in Fresno. Defendant was waiting there.
Defendant asked if his sister was going to stay overnight at the Clovis apartment, and
E.C. said yes. Defendant said he would go back to Clovis with them.
E.C. testified she drove to C.J.’s home but C.J. wasn’t there. E.C. drove everyone
back to her own apartment in Fresno, found C.J. in the office, and defendant and the
others went inside E.C.’s apartment. C.J. complained of chest pains and went outside
with defendant. C.J. left and defendant stayed at E.C.’s apartment. E.C. testified she was
going to drive defendant, and his sister and her boyfriend, back to Clovis, but they
stopped at the house where the sister lived to get something. Defendant said he was
going to stay in Fresno because his mother went to the hospital. E.C. drove defendant
back to his own house and left him there.
E.C. took defendant’s sister and her boyfriend back to Clovis, then went to Valley
Medical Center to check on her daughter. She discovered C.J. was at another hospital,
went there, and learned she had been discharged. E.C. went to C.J.’s house, and
defendant was there with his mother.
On further questioning, E.C. testified she drove defendant to the apartment in
Clovis on her second trip, after the sun went down. She denied that when she initially
spoke to Detective Stokes, she agreed that it was possible defendant could have been at
the liquor store at 8:15 p.m.
Apartment Managers
T.A. and D.A. were the managers of the apartment complex in Clovis where
E.C.’s son lived. On Monday, June 27, 1994, E.C. arrived at that apartment complex
with defendant’s sister and her boyfriend. E.C. told the managers that her son was in
custody, and asked for the key to investigate the smell coming from his apartment. They
discovered his power had been turned off and food had spoiled. E.C. and her family
threw away the food. E.C. asked if defendant’s sister and her boyfriend could stay at the
16.
apartment to watch her son’s property, and D.A. approved. E.C. said they were going to
bring some of their things over, and they left Clovis.
D.A. testified that around 5:00 p.m., she saw defendant hanging around the
apartment complex in Clovis. She next saw him at 7:00 p.m., and did not see him again
that night.
T.A. testified he first saw defendant at the complex between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00
p.m. He last saw defendant between 9:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. He believed he also saw
defendant sometime between the first and last sightings.
REBUTTAL EVIDENCE
The prosecutor called Detective Stokes to testify in person as a rebuttal witness.
Stokes testified that on July 1, 1994, he went to defendant’s home on South Rose Avenue
to inform defendant’s family that he had been arrested for murder. C.J., E.C., and
Monica Howard were there. The house was less than one mile from the liquor store.
Stokes testified he asked them about defendant’s whereabouts on the day of the
shooting. C.J. initially said she saw him at 4:00 p.m., and then again at 10:00 p.m. or
10:30 p.m. E.C. said she dropped off defendant in the alley behind the South Rose house,
when it was definitely light outside but the sun was low in the sky. Stokes asked if this
time span would have been between 7:30 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. E.C. said that would be
about right but she wasn’t sure.8
Stokes testified E.C. said she made a number of trips between her apartment in
Fresno and her son’s apartment in Clovis, and defendant was with her on one trip. She
thought that she picked up defendant around 4:00 p.m. or 4:30 p.m. and drove to Clovis,
but Stokes testified her story became confusing as she tried to relate the times.
8 The prosecution introduced into evidence a weather report that showed sunset
occurred at 8:22 p.m. on June 27, 1994, and the homicide occurred at approximately 8:15
p.m.
17.
Stokes testified that after he took their statements, he informed defendant’s mother
and grandmother that the homicide occurred at the liquor store at approximately 8:15
p.m. In response, E.C. “made a statement that she thought that it was closer to 8 o’clock
that [defendant] had been dropped off. And I said something about, well, that still left
this window of time, and without any other explanation. And she said—both of them
acknowledged that” there was a window where defendant could have been at the liquor
store. E.C. thought it was closer to 8:00 p.m. when she dropped off defendant, and “not
closer to 7:30, but definitely closer to 8 o’clock.”
Detective Stokes testified he later spoke to Monica Howard, who said that on the
night of the shooting, she saw defendant at E.C.’s apartment around 9:00 p.m.
Verdict and Sentence
After hearing and considering the evidence introduced at the bench trial on
November 28 and 29, 1994, the court took the matter under submission.
On November 30, 1994, the trial court found appellant guilty of second degree
murder and that he personally used a gun in the commission of the offense. The court
stated it reached this verdict after reviewing the police reports introduced as Exhibit 1,
and the testimony of witnesses who appeared in court. The court stated the police reports
also contained inadmissible information, and it had disregarded references to statements
given by anonymous sources.
On June 29, 1995, the court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life for murder plus
four years for the firearm enhancement. The court found defendant was not amenable for
treatment and training at the California Youth Authority (CYA), but recommended initial
housing of defendant at CYA.
18.
POSTJUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS
Direct Appeal
In defendant’s direct appeal, appellate counsel filed a Wende brief, and defendant
did not file a letter brief. On May 14, 1996, this court filed the nonpublished opinion that
affirmed the judgment. (People v. Jackson (May 14, 1996, F024082) [nonpub. opn.].)
Defendant’s Writ Petitions9
In 1997, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court and
alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for filing the Wende brief in his direct
appeal. The trial court denied this writ. (See In re DeShawn Jackson, supra, F068515;
Exhibit A.)
In 2007, defendant filed a writ petition in the trial court and claimed the court
failed to adequately explain his waiver of his constitutional rights prior to his trial, and
attached the reporter’s transcripts from his trial in support of the petition. The court
denied the writ, and held the reporter’s transcripts from defendant’s trial “show that the
trial court did advise [defendant] that he was waiving his right to a jury trial. The
transcripts also show that [defendant] sufficiently understood that he was waiving his
rights.” (In re DeShawn Jackson, supra, F068515; Exhibit C.) A writ raising the same
issue was denied by the California Supreme Court. (In re DeShawn Jackson, supra,
F068515; Exhibit D.)
Writ Petitions Based on DNA Evidence
On October 21, 2013, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
trial court, and alleged there was newly discovered evidence of his innocence because the
scrapings taken from under the victim’s fingernails during the autopsy in 1998, were
9 As explained above, after notice to the parties and without objection, this court
takes judicial notice of the records in defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (In re
DeShawn Lee Jackson (Feb. 5, 2014, F068515) [nonpub. opn.]), which includes
documentary exhibits consisting of his prior petitions.
19.
tested for DNA in 2012, the tests showed the scrapings did not include defendant’s DNA,
and the DNA tests undermined the validity of his murder conviction. (In re DeShawn
Jackson, supra, F068515; Exhibit E.)
On November 14, 2013, the trial court denied defendant’s writ petition and held
“that the absence of [defendant’s] DNA in the right hand fingernail scrapings of the
victim does not ‘point unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability.’ [Citation.] The
fact that [defendant’s] DNA was not underneath the fingernails of the victim’s right hand
does not demonstrate [he] is innocent of his [murder] conviction.” (In re DeShawn
Jackson, supra, F068515; Exhibit E.)
On December 13, 2013, defendant filed a writ petition in this court, and again
alleged there was newly-discovered evidence of his actual innocence based on the results
of DNA tests conducted on the scrapings taken from underneath the victim’s fingernails.
Defendant argued the DNA tests undermined “key witness statements” from people who
identified defendant “as the perpetrator who grabbed victim[’]s bike and … shot him in
the chest.” (In re DeShawn Jackson, supra, F068515; writ petition.) Defendant claimed
that when M.J. spoke to the police, he said there was a struggle between the victim and
the perpetrator over the bicycle, and the absence of defendant’s DNA under the victim’s
fingernails established his actual innocence. (In re DeShawn Jackson, supra, F068515;
Exhibit E.)
Defendant filed supporting exhibits that included the 2012 report from the DNA
tests. (In re DeShawn Jackson, supra, F068515; Exhibit G.) He also attached a letter
from a defense attorney to defendant in 2012, explaining that the DNA evidence would
only be relevant “if we can establish that there was a struggle for the bicycle,” and the
attorney had been unable to locate M.J., the witness who was in the liquor store’s parking
lot. (In re DeShawn Jackson, supra, F068515; Exhibit I.) In 2013, the same attorney
sent to defendant a transcript of his investigator’s interview with M.J., and the attorney
advised defendant that M.J.’s statements did not help his case. (In re DeShawn Jackson,
20.
supra, F068515; Exhibit J.) In the interview, M.J. stated he “saw a young black male
approaching a Hispanic male walking with a bicycle. [¶ ] [M.J.] stated that as the young
black male approached the Hispanic male he heard the Hispanic male yelling for the
young black male not to take his bicycle. [M.J.] stated that he did not see either male
come in contact with the other male before the black male took one step back, pulled a
gun out and shot the Hispanic male…. [M.J.] stated that he is confident that the right
individual is in prison for the shooting.” (In re DeShawn Jackson, supra, F068515;
Exhibit K.)
On February 5, 2014, this court denied defendant’s writ petition without comment.
DEFENDANT’S PETITION FOR RESENTENCING
On August 12, 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section
1172.6, and requested appointment of counsel.
Defendant filed a supporting declaration that consisted of a preprinted form where
he checked boxes that asserted he was eligible for resentencing because a complaint,
information, or indictment was filed that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a
theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine; he was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter
following a trial, or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial in which he could have been
convicted of murder or attempted murder; and he could not presently be convicted of
murder or attempted murder because of changes made to section 188 and 189, effective
January 1, 2019.
On September 2, 2022, the court appointed counsel.
Initial Hearings
On September 30, 2022, the court convened a status hearing. Defense counsel
waived defendant’s presence. Counsel stated defendant was convicted after a bench trial,
21.
there were no jury instructions to review, and it might take time to obtain the transcript
from the bench trial.
The court gave a tentative ruling that defendant’s petition failed to state a prima
facie case because the section 12022.5 personal use enhancement was found true, “[b]ut
more importantly it appears the defendant was the actual shooter during the offense.”
On March 30, 2023, the court ordered for defendant to be transported for all
further hearings on his petition.
The Parties’ Briefs on the Prima Facie Determination
The prosecution filed an opposition to defendant’s petition, cited the trial court’s
verdict from defendant’s bench trial in 1994, and argued defendant failed to make a
prima facie case because he was convicted as the actual killer and ineligible for
resentencing. As a supporting exhibit, the prosecution filed a partial reporter’s transcript
from the bench trial.10
Defendant filed a reply brief and argued the trial court could not rely on factual
findings from the bench trial to make the prima facie determination and an evidentiary
hearing was required. As supporting exhibits, defendant filed the reports from the DNA
tests, that the scrapings taken from under the victim’s fingernails did not match
defendant’s DNA; and a declaration from M.J., dated January 8, 2020, that he told the
police that the gunman “look[ed] like” defendant but he was not sure, and now he was no
longer sure of the identification after learning about the DNA evidence.11
10 The prosecution also filed defendant’s form petition for resentencing filed in 2020,
pursuant to former section 1170.95, and the prosecution’s opposition to that petition,
arguing that defendant failed to make a prima facie case because he was convicted as the
actual killer. The trial court obviously denied defendant’s first petition, but the court’s
order is not in the record. Since we cannot determine the reasons for the denial, we will
not reject defendant’s second petition as an improper successive petition. (See, e.g.,
People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 949–951.)
11 M.J.’s declaration is different from the statements he gave to the police in 1998
and a defense investigator in 2013, that he was sure defendant was the gunman.
22.
The Court’s Issuance of the OSC
On June 11, 2024, the court held a hearing on the prima facie determination, and
noted that defendant was convicted of murder after a bench trial and there were no jury
instructions. The court stated it could only make the prima facie determination if it
considered the facts introduced at defendant’s bench trial, and gave a tentative decision to
issue an OSC and conduct an evidentiary hearing so the prosecutor could introduce the
trial evidence about the nature of defendant’s conviction.12
However, the court clarified that even if it conducted an evidentiary hearing on the
petition, the parties were not going to retry the case and the court would not hear
evidence on defendant’s renewed claim of mistaken identity. The court stated that
People v. Palacios (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 942 (Palacios) “makes clear that the purpose
of an 1172.6 hearing is not to relitigate trial errors,” and the court “would confine its
consideration as to whether or not there was [sic] sufficient facts to establish that
[defendant] could be convicted under the current theory.”
The court stated it would issue the OSC, but the evidentiary hearing would be
“very limited” as to whether defendant was convicted of murder under a theory that was
now invalid after the amendments to sections 188 and 189.
Defense counsel argued an evidentiary hearing was required because defendant
“took a plea to avoid the felony murder rule” and the robbery special circumstance.
Defense counsel said the police reports showed there were multiple suspects, and the
eyewitnesses said two men tried to get the bicycle from the victim. The court said that
Palacios “clarifies that we’re not retrying … [the] sufficiency of the evidence.”
12 In People v. Anaya (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 615, decided after the prima facie
hearing in this case, the court held a trial court’s findings at the conclusion of the
defendant’s bench trial could be relied on to make the prima facie finding under section
1172.6. (Anaya, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at pp. 618–619, 621–622.)
23.
The court requested the parties file briefs prior to the evidentiary hearing, and the
prosecutor could file the police reports considered by the trial court at the bench trial.
“[S]o the record is clear, I’m issuing the OSC today, finding that the defense has
established prima facie eligibility under the statute, and therefore I am issuing the OSC
back to the People to establish what we’ve already discussed.”
The Court’s Continued Hearing on the Petition
On September 26, 2024, the court convened another hearing on the petition.
Defense counsel stated she intended to call three witnesses at the evidentiary hearing.
The court stated:
“I am in receipt of all of your pleadings, and my tentative, this is not a
hearing to retry the guilt of the Defendant. And my observation of the
documentation submitted by the Defense is it appears to go to identification
and whether or not the identification at the time of the offense was
supported by appropriate evidence to support the conviction. That’s not an
issue before the Court. So while I’m going to allow you to present
witnesses, I’m just trying to frame the scope of the hearing. The scope of
the hearing is essentially the theory upon which the defendant was
convicted [of murder], and whether or not that theory was supported by the
evidence. But if it’s merely evidence going to the identification of the
Defendant, I would entertain a motion to either strike or to not allow that
testimony at the time of the hearing.”
Defense counsel argued the prosecutor had the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant was the actual killer, and that meant evidence of the
perpetrator’s identity was relevant. The court disagreed:
“This is not, and the case is made clear, this is not a retrial, this is not an
opportunity to re-weigh the evidence. This is an opportunity as to whether
or not the theory upon which the Defendant was convicted was one that is
currently permissible under the restated law. So in the broad scheme of
things, was there a theory of natural and probable consequences. Was there
a theory that would have allowed the jury to convict the defendant without
establishing he was the actual killer or acted, aided and abetted with a
specific intent to kill, or was involved in, and I’m going to lose the third
theory, but it doesn’t appear to be at play here in any case.
24.
“So I understand your concern that at the trial there may have been
an argument that there was insufficient evidence to overcome his alibi
defense. In other words, he wasn’t the one who pulled the trigger. That’s
not the issue before the Court, because there’s no theory before the Court
that, in fact, he acted, whoever the killer was, acted with the intent to kill.
The evidence supporting who the killer is, is not a subject of a [section]
1172.6 [petition] here. [¶] You are looking at me like I’m crazy.”
Defense counsel replied that defendant had just turned 17 years old when he
“agreed to a very strange bench trial.” The court replied that such issues “could have
been litigated 20 years ago, that could have been taken on a writ, could have been taken
on appeal,” and they were not legitimate issues given the narrow focus of a section
1172.6 petition. Defense counsel replied “the narrow focus of 1172.6 is to put the blame
on the person that actually pulled the trigger” and there was evidence to show defendant
was not the actual killer.
The court again disagreed, and stated that section 1172.6 addressed “what was the
theory of conviction of the Defendant, what was the theory?” The court had already
reviewed the transcript of defendant’s bench trial, the judge was very careful to consider
all the evidence, and the judge found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was
guilty of murder as the actual killer. “Now, whether or not there was evidence to support
that judge’s opinion should have been attacked at a prior time,” and identity was not the
focus of a section 1172.6 petition.
The prosecution argued a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was the appropriate
procedure for defendant to claim there was newly discovered evidence of innocence. The
section 1172.6 hearing was not “the correct vehicle to present issues of identity” because
“this is not a new trial, it’s an act of leniency by the Court with respect to the one area of
whether or not malice was imputed to the Defendant.”
The court concurred:
“[M]y review of all the current 1172.6 cases, mandate or dictate the
decision before the court is the theory of conviction. So hypothetically, if
the evidence in this case would have been that [defendant] and another
25.
person acting, and based on their actions, the victim was killed, and that
[defendant] was prosecuted under a theory of aiding and abetting the other
person, or [defendant] was prosecuted under felony murder theory of
natural and probable consequences based upon the actions of the other
person, we might have an 1172.6 issue to at least litigate. But there was no
evidence at all that there was a second actor in this case, or no theory of
prosecution that anybody other than [defendant] was the actor who caused
the death.”
Defense counsel asserted “there were two people present” at the time of the
attempted robbery and murder, and the police stopped looking for the second person.
Counsel stated the second person was likely Derrick Armstrong, a relative of Ronnie
Armstrong, who bragged about the crime. Counsel stated defendant presented five alibi
witnesses at the bench trial, and they had no reason to lie. The court said there was no
evidence that two people committed the murder together.
Defense counsel again complained that the police stopped looking for the second
suspect, the defense now had DNA that completely exonerated defendant, and defendant
filed a writ based on the DNA evidence but it was “thrown out” as untimely in 2012.13
Counsel intended to argue at the section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing that defendant was
the second suspect and he did not commit the murder.
The court responded: “[I]f that is the claim of the Defense, then you are correct, I
will not allow that.” Defense counsel acknowledged she had to argue that defendant was
the “second person, and not the first person, and that he wasn’t a major person and he
didn’t act without reverence for human life, and he didn’t contemplate the natural
consequences of the actions of trying to steal a bicycle. But yeah, I mean I get that I have
work to do.”
13 As stated above, the trial court denied defendant’s writ petition in 2013, and found
“the absence of [defendant’s] DNA in the right hand fingernail scrapings of the victim
does not ‘point unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability.’ [Citation.] The fact that
[defendant’s] DNA was not underneath the fingernails of the victim’s right hand does not
demonstrate [he] is innocent of his [murder] conviction.” (In re DeShawn Jackson,
supra, F068515; Exhibit E.)
26.
Defense counsel added that if defendant had a jury trial instead of a bench trial,
“probably no instruction of felony murder theory would have gone through.” The court
said: “[T]here was no theory that I, the Court was able to develop, other than the
allegation was [defendant] was the direct actual only killer that acted with specific intent
to kill.” The court again explained it was not foreclosing defendant from seeking other
remedies, but these issues were not relevant at the section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing.
The Parties’ Briefs for the Evidentiary Hearing
The prosecutor filed an evidentiary hearing brief, and argued the evidence from
the bench trial proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was convicted as the
actual killer, and he was ineligible for resentencing. As supporting exhibits, the
prosecution attached the entirety of the reporter’s transcript from the bench trial and the
police reports introduced at the bench trial pursuant to the parties’ stipulation.
Defense counsel argued the allegations in the information showed the People’s
intent to prosecute defendant on a felony murder theory, and again claimed he was
convicted because he entered a “plea” and did not have a full trial, that he “took a deal
that removed first degree murder and robbery from the charges to avoid prosecution
under a theory of felony murder or natural and probable consequences,” and his “plea
deal” removed the prosecution’s possible reliance on the felony murder rule and/or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. Defendant argued the prosecution had the
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of murder, which permitted
the defense to introduce evidence challenging his identification as the gunman.
THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING
On October 28, 2024, the court convened the evidentiary hearing, and said it had
already found defendant’s petition stated a prima facie case for relief under section
1172.6. The court again said it was only going to consider whether defendant was still
guilty of murder after the amendments to sections 188 and 189 on the felony-murder rule
27.
and the natural and probable consequences doctrine and it would not consider defendant’s
mistaken identity arguments.
The Parties’ Arguments
The court asked the parties to make offers of proof for the hearing. Defense
counsel stated defendant “took” a plea to avoid the felony-murder rule. The court replied
defendant had a bench trial and did not enter a plea. Defense counsel said it was a
“partial plea” and “more like a plea” than a trial, and defendant was charged under the
felony-murder rule because the information also alleged a robbery special circumstance.
Counsel asserted defendant was allowed to introduce evidence to prove he was not the
gunman, and the police stopped looking for the second suspect.
The court again stated defendant was trying to challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence that he was the gunman, which was not relevant for a section 1172.6 hearing.
The court had reviewed the transcript of the bench trial, where the prosecution introduced
evidence that defendant was the gunman and defendant called alibi witnesses. Defense
counsel again insisted there was never a trial. The court replied that defendant waived his
right to a jury trial at the beginning of the trial proceedings and agreed to the bench trial.
Defense counsel replied there was an impermissible shifting of the burden of proof to the
defendant to prove he was not the gunman.
Defense counsel stated that at the evidentiary hearing, she would call an expert
who would testify about a young person’s psychological state, and the evidence was
“more pertinent to resentencing than to guilt or innocence.” The defense would also call
an expert to testify about “the inadmissibility of the photo lineup” and “other failures of
police procedure” during the homicide investigation, and the DNA evidence that
allegedly exonerated him. Counsel also intended to call an expert to address the Racial
Justice Act.
The court again said defense counsel could not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence about whether defendant was the actual shooter, and the focus of the section
28.
1172.6 evidentiary hearing was limited to whether defendant was convicted of murder
under a theory that was now invalid. The court stated the defense wanted to show that if
defendant was retried today, the prosecution could not prove he was the actual shooter,
“which by definition would mean somebody else was the shooter, not a natural and
probable consequences theory … just that they got the wrong guy.” Defense counsel
claimed defendant “took a plea” to avoid prosecution under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.
The court overruled defense counsel’s arguments and held that defendant had a
bench trial where the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, to the
court as the finder of fact, that defendant was the gunman, defendant introduced alibi
evidence, and the court found him guilty of murder as the actual killer.
The prosecutor argued defendant should file a habeas petition to raise new
evidence to challenge identity. The prosecutor acknowledged the possibility that
defendant could have been charged under the felony-murder rule based on the special
circumstance, but that only showed that the record did not establish a prima facie case
and an evidentiary hearing was required. The prosecutor explained that even if the
felony-murder rule had been relied on, defendant was still guilty of murder if he was the
actual killer after the amendments to section 189.
The court asked defense counsel whether she intended to introduce new evidence
to show defendant was convicted of murder based on an imputed malice theory. Counsel
acknowledged she was “beating maybe a dead horse,” but again claimed the “trial” was
“tantamount to a plea” to avoid the special circumstance, there were no jury instructions,
and they didn’t know the basis for the judge’s verdict at the bench trial. “Essentially, it
was set up like, ‘Okay, you’re going to agree to a bench trial, and you’re going to get to
present your alibi defense. And if I don’t believe it, you’re guilty.’ ”
Defense counsel complained the prosecution failed to produce a gun, fingerprints,
or any forensic evidence, the alibi witnesses were credible, the photographic lineup was
29.
improper, and defendant was improperly questioned after his arrest without his parents.
Counsel said there was now DNA evidence that showed he was innocent, defendant filed
a writ based on the DNA evidence, and it was denied as untimely. The prosecutor replied
that its burden was to prove defendant was convicted of murder under a theory that was
still valid after Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), and
defendant was guilty as the actual killer.
The Court’s Denial of the Petition
On October 28, 2024, after hearing the parties’ arguments, the court stated it
considered defense counsel’s offer of proof to introduce evidence at the evidentiary
hearing to show the identification testimony at the bench trial was insufficient,
defendant’s alibi was supported by substantial evidence, and the defense would call an
expert about resentencing. However, the court stated defendant should raise these issues
in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus instead of the section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing.
The court also stated that defendant’s proposed evidence about the Racial Justice Act was
not relevant in a section 1172.6 proceeding.
The court said it understood defense counsel’s argument was that there was now
insufficient evidence to prove defendant was the shooter beyond a reasonable doubt, but
“[t]hat’s not a natural and probable consequences theory. This was a trial. There was
significant stipulated evidence, but I’m aware of no law that prevents the Court at [a
section] 1172.6 [hearing] from considering stipulated evidence.”
“I am finding, therefore, as the factfinder [at the evidentiary
hearing], that there is and was sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt to conclude that the theory of murder at the time of the conviction
was yet a valid theory of direct evidence that [defendant] was the actual
shooter, that the People did not rely on a natural and probable consequences
doctrine, and, therefore, if proceeding to trial today, the People have
established beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a legally sufficient
and appropriate method and theory of conviction, and, therefore, denying
the petition.”
30.
On November 15, 2024, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the court’s
denial of his section 1172.6 petition.
DISCUSSION
As explained above, appellate counsel filed a brief with this court pursuant to
Wende and Delgadillo. The brief also included counsel’s declaration that defendant was
advised he could file his own brief with this court. This court also advised defendant that
he could file a supplemental letter brief.
On December 12, 2025, defendant filed a letter brief, stated his counsel from the
section 1172.6 proceedings assisted him in composing the letter brief, and raised several
issues about the court’s denial of his petition and other matters. We address his issues
and affirm the trial court’s denial of his petition.14
I. Senate Bill 1437 and Section 1172.6
We begin with Senate Bill 1437, which became effective in 2019 and “altered the
substantive law of murder in two areas. First, with certain exceptions, it narrowed the
application of the felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e).... Under
that provision, ‘A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a [specified
felony] in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is
proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual
killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first
degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted
with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of [s]ection
190.2.’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448 (Curiel).)
14 In support of his letter brief, defendant filed documentary exhibits consisting of
defense counsel’s brief filed in the trial court prior to the section 1172.6 evidentiary
hearing, and the information that charged him with murder and the robbery-murder
special circumstance.
31.
“Second, Senate Bill 1437 imposed a new requirement that, except in cases of
felony murder, ‘a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought’ to be convicted
of murder. [Citation.] ‘Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.’ [Citation.] One effect of this requirement was to eliminate
liability for murder as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. [Citation.] …. Thus, under prior law, a defendant who aided and abetted an
intended assault could be liable for murder, if the murder was the natural and probable
consequence of the intended assault. [Citation.] The defendant need not have intended
the murder or even subjectively appreciated the natural and probable consequences of the
intended crime. [Citation.] Senate Bill 1437 ended this form of liability for murder.”
(Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449.)
Senate Bill 1437’s amendments “maintained the viability of murder convictions
based on implied malice, and the definition of implied malice remains unchanged.”
(People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298 (Clements).)
Senate Bill 1437 “added former section 1170.95, which created a process for those
convicted of murder under now obsolete accomplice liability theories to seek vacatur and
resentencing. Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature revised section 1170.95 through
the passage of Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775). Petitioners
who were convicted of attempted murder and manslaughter under now obsolete theories
may also seek relief.” (People v. Ramos (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 174, 183; People v.
Reyes (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 292, 295.)
A. The Prima Facie Determination
Section 1172.6 states that a petitioner may file for resentencing if “convicted of
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, or manslaughter.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).)
32.
The petitioner must declare: “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was
filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of
felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at
which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder. [¶] (3)
The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because
of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd.
(a)(1)-(a)(3).)
After counsel is appointed and the parties have the opportunity to submit briefing,
“the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
case for relief.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
In making the prima facie determination, the trial court may look at the record of
conviction to determine whether a petitioner has made the prima facie showing. (People
v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) The record of conviction consists of the charging
documents, closing arguments, jury instructions, and verdict forms. (People v. Lovejoy
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860, 865; People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 56;
People v. Jenkins (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 924, 935.) If the defendant was convicted after
a bench trial, the court’s findings in reaching a verdict may be relied on to make the
prima facie determination. (People v. Anaya, supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at pp. 618–619,
621–622.)
The court cannot engage in factfinding or weighing the credibility of witnesses to
make the prima facie determination. (People v. Lovejoy, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p.
865.)
33.
B. The Evidentiary Hearing
“Once a petitioner establishes a prima facie case for relief and the superior court
issues an order to show cause, the matter proceeds to an evidentiary hearing.” (People v.
Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951 (Vargas).)
“At the hearing to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief, the burden
of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under California law as amended by
the changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd.
(d)(3).)
“The admission of evidence in the [evidentiary] hearing shall be governed
by the Evidence Code, except that the court may consider evidence
previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under
current law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters
judicially noticed. The court may also consider the procedural history of
the case recited in any prior appellate opinion. However, hearsay evidence
that was admitted in a preliminary hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of
[s]ection 872 shall be excluded from the hearing as hearsay, unless the
evidence is admissible pursuant to another exception to the hearsay rule.
The prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer new or additional evidence
to meet their respective burdens.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court acts as an independent fact finder, makes
credibility determinations, weighs the evidence, and determines whether the prosecution
met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was still guilty of
murder after the amendments to sections 188 and 189. (People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 451, 457 (Rodriguez); People v. Gudiel (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 848, 858;
Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298; Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 51.)
“Although the parties may offer new or additional evidence to meet their
respective burdens, section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) does not contemplate a whole new
trial on all the elements of murder. [Citation.] Rather, ‘[t]he retroactive relief provided
by [section 1172.6] is a legislative “act of lenity” intended to give defendants serving
34.
otherwise final sentences the benefit of ameliorative changes to applicable criminal laws
and does not result in a new trial or increased punishment.’ [Citations.] Thus, the focus
at the evidentiary hearing phase of [a section] 1172.6 petition is ‘on evidence made
relevant by the amendments to the substantive definition of murder,’ which, in the
context of section 188, requires ‘the prosecution to prove that all principals to a murder
acted with malice aforethought.’ ” (Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 952.)
If the prosecution fails to meet its burden of proof, “the prior conviction, and any
allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the
petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
If the trial court “finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of
murder notwithstanding the amendments to sections 188 and 189, the petitioner is
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.” (Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 951,
italics added.)
C. Appellate Review After the Evidentiary Hearing
On appeal from the trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition after an
evidentiary hearing, we review questions of law independently, and the court’s
evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981,
988; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724.)
“We review the trial judge’s factfinding for substantial evidence. [Citation.] We
‘ “examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine
whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible,
and of solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in finding [the defendant
guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ [Citation.] Our job on review is different from the
trial judge’s job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all the
relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to
credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine whether there
is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact
35.
finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p.
298.)
With these principles in mind, we turn to the trial court’s ruling and petitioner’s
claims of the court’s alleged errors.
II. The Trial Court’s Denial of Defendant’s Petition is Supported by Substantial
Evidence
The court denied defendant’s petition after the evidentiary hearing because it
found the evidence from his bench trial proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he was
convicted of second degree murder as the actual killer. The court’s finding is supported
by substantial evidence.
A. Murder, Malice and Principals
“Second degree murder is ‘the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought but without the additional elements, such as willfulness, premeditation, and
deliberation, that would support a conviction of first degree murder.’ [Citation.] Malice
may be either express, i.e. when a defendant manifests an intention to kill, or implied.
[Citation.] ‘ “Malice is implied when the killing is proximately caused by ‘ “an act, the
natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately
performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who
acts with conscious disregard for life.” ’ ” ’ ” (Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p.
299.)
Imputed malice and implied malice are not the same doctrines. (People v. Schell
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 437, 443–444.) The amendments enacted by Senate Bills 1437
and 775 “maintained the viability of murder convictions based on implied malice, and the
definition of implied malice remains unchanged.” (Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p.
298.)
“Because direct evidence of a defendant’s intent rarely exists, intent may be
inferred from the circumstances of the crime and the defendant’s acts.” (People v.
36.
Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 457.) A defendant’s purposeful act of firing towards the
victim at close range, inflicting a mortal wound, supports an inference of malice and the
intent to kill. (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 742; People v. Cardenas (2020) 53
Cal.App.5th 102, 119–120; People v. Chinchilla (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 683, 690.)
“ ‘All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, ... whether they directly commit
the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission ... are principals in any
crime so committed.’ [Citation.] An aider an[d] abettor’s ‘guilt is based on a
combination of the direct perpetrator’s acts and the aider and abettor’s own acts and own
mental state.’ ” (People v. Krueger (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 431, 437, italics added,
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Lopez (2026) __ Cal.5th __ [343 Cal.Rptr.3d
407, 418, fn. 6; 587 P.3d 587, 596-597, fn. 6].)
When the record “makes clear that [the petitioner] was the actual killer and the
only participant in the killing,” then he was not convicted pursuant to a now-invalid
theory of imputed malice, and he is still guilty of murder after the amendments to
sections 188 and 189. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233.) “To the extent [a
petitioner] means to argue that the natural and probable consequences doctrine or any
other theory of imputed malice could apply to a sole perpetrator, that argument fails, as
these abrogated theories necessarily require a second participant.” (People v. Love
(2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1280, 1288.)
B. Analysis
As explained above, Senate Bill 1437 amended section 189, subdivision (e)(1) as
to the felony-murder rule, and now states that the participant in a qualifying felony is still
guilty of murder if he was “the actual killer.” (Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 50-
51.) The legislation eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine and
amended section 188, subdivision (a)(3) to state that “ ‘[m]alice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’ ” (Harden, supra, 81
37.
Cal.App.5th at pp. 50-51.) The statutory amendments did not eliminate a person’s
culpability for murder if that person was the actual killer.
When defendant filed his section 1172.6 petition, the trial court complied with the
statute and appointed counsel and held a hearing on the prima facie issue. The court
stated it could not make the prima facie determination from the record of defendant’s
bench trial because it would have to make factual and credibility findings, which was not
permitted for the prima facie finding. It issued the OSC and stated it would conduct an
evidentiary hearing.
The court considered the entirety of the record introduced at the bench trial, and
found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was still guilty of murder after the
amendments to sections 188 and 189 because he was the actual killer. The court’s
finding is supported by substantial evidence. While the robbery-murder special
circumstance was originally alleged, the court granted the prosecution’s motion to strike
the allegation based on the parties’ agreement for the bench trial. The prosecution’s only
theory at defendant’s bench trial in 1994 was that he was the actual killer, and it did not
rely on the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Even
if it had relied on felony murder, however, the evidence from the bench trial still showed
that defendant was the actual killer of the victim.
Defendant was identified by both E.T., the store clerk who ran outside, and M.J.,
the witness in the parking lot, as the man who confronted and shot the victim. W.E. also
identified defendant as the man who was running away from the liquor store shortly after
the murder. While defendant called alibi witnesses at his bench trial, their testimony
about defendant’s whereabouts was undermined by their prior inconsistent statements to
Detective Stokes, which left open a window of time for defendant to be at the liquor store
at the time of the murder.
At a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing, the trial court acts as the independent fact
finder, makes credibility determinations, and weighs the evidence. In denying his section
38.
1172.6 petition, the court herein clearly discounted the credibility of defendant’s alibi
witnesses. The court’s finding that defendant was the actual killer is supported by
substantial evidence, he was not eligible for resentencing as a matter of law, and the court
correctly denied his section 1172.6 petition after the evidentiary hearing.
III. Defendant Was Convicted After a Bench Trial
In his letter brief, defendant repeats the arguments his counsel repeatedly made
throughout the section 1172.6 proceedings, that he was not convicted of murder after a
trial, and he entered a plea in order to avoid the felony-murder special circumstance. “In
my case, I took a plea to avoid prosecution under the felony murder rule. The nature of
that plea has been a constant source of issues. [¶] In a nutshell, I agreed to a truncated
bench trial on a second-degree-murder charge at which I was only allowed to present an
alibi defense to avoid prosecution under the felony murder rule.”
Defendant asserts the trial court improperly prevented him from introducing the
DNA evidence at the section 1172.6 evidentiary to show “that I was not the shooter
because the prosecution did not present a theory of felony murder at trial. But the
prosecution did not present that theory because I took the plea to avoid prosecution under
that theory.” Defendant requests this court resolve whether he “took” a plea “to avoid
prosecution under the felony murder rule, qualifying me for relief under §1172.6.”
A. Guilty Pleas, Trials and Slow Pleas
“A plea of guilty, of course, is the most serious step a defendant can take in a
criminal prosecution. It operates first as a waiver of formal defects in the accusatory
pleading that could be reached by demurrer. [Citations.] Next, because there will be no
trial the plea strips the defendant of such fundamental protections as the privilege against
self-incrimination, the right to a jury, and the right of confrontation. [Citations.] As to
the merits, the plea is deemed to constitute a judicial admission of every element of the
offense charged. [Citation.] Indeed, it serves as a stipulation that the People need
introduce no proof whatever to support the accusation: the plea ipso facto supplies both
39.
evidence and verdict. [Citation.] ‘A plea of guilty is more than a confession which
admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to
give judgment and determine punishment.’ [Citation.] Finally, it severely restricts the
defendant’s right to appeal from the ensuing judgment.” (People v. Chadd (1981) 28
Cal.3d 739, 748.)
“ ‘[A] trial, even one where a defense is voluntarily forgone, is fundamentally
different from a guilty plea.’ [Citation.] At trial, the state is put to its burden of proof as
to the charges, whereas a plea ‘ “serves as a stipulation that the People need introduce no
proof whatever to support the accusation” and “ ‘is itself a conviction.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 745.)
A slow plea has been defined as “[a]n agreed-upon disposition of a criminal case
via any one of a number of contrived procedures which does not require the defendant to
admit guilt but results in a finding of guilt on an anticipated charge and, usually, for a
promised punishment.” (People v. Tran (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 680, 683, fn. 2.)
“Perhaps the clearest example of a slow plea is a bargained-for submission on the
transcript of a preliminary hearing in which the only evidence is the victim’s credible
testimony, and the defendant does not testify and counsel presents no evidence or
argument on defendant’s behalf. Such a submission is ‘tantamount to a plea of guilty’
because ‘the guilt of the defendant [is] apparent on the basis of the evidence presented at
the preliminary hearing and ... conviction [is] a foregone conclusion if no defense [is]
offered.’ ” (People v. Wright (1987) 43 Cal.3d 487, 496 (Wright), abrogated on other
grounds in People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 360.) If a defendant enters a slow
plea, the court must advise the defendant and obtain waivers of his constitutional rights.
(In re Tellez (2024) 17 Cal.5th 77, 91.)
“Submissions that are not considered slow pleas include those in which (1) the
preliminary hearing involves substantial cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses
and the presentation of defense evidence or (2) the facts revealed at the preliminary
40.
examination are essentially undisputed but counsel makes an argument to the court as to
the legal significance to be accorded them.” (Wright, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 496.)
There are a “wide variety of submissions that fall between these extremes.”
(Wright, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 496.) “When the defendant reserves the right to testify or
offer evidence and the record shows no sign of negotiations between defendant and
prosecution, the submission may or may not be a slow plea. Some defendants submit
their cases on the transcript simply to achieve the effect of a guilty plea without actually
having to admit guilt in open court and on the record. Others submit not to contest guilt
but to avoid expensive or burdensome trials or to impress upon the trial judge the
mitigating factors for sentencing. Some defendants appear to concede guilt as to one or
more of the offenses but contest it as to others.” (Wright, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 496.)
“An appellate court, in determining whether a submission is a slow plea, must
assess the circumstances of the entire proceeding. It is not enough for a reviewing court
to simply count the number of witnesses who testified at the hearing following the
submission. A submission that prospectively appeared to be a slow plea may turn out to
be part of a full-blown trial if counsel contested the sufficiency of evidence for those
counts or presented another potentially meritorious legal argument against conviction.
Conversely, a submission that did not appear to be a slow plea because the defendant
reserved the right to testify and call witnesses or to argue the sufficiency of the evidence
[citation] may turn out to be a slow plea if the defense presented no evidence or argument
contesting guilt.” (Wright, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 496–497, italics added.)
“If it appears on the whole that the defendant advanced a substantial defense, the
submission cannot be considered to be tantamount to a plea of guilty. Sometimes, a
defendant’s best defense is weak. He may make a tactical decision to concede guilt as to
one or more of several counts as part of an overall defense strategy. A submission under
these circumstances is not a slow plea, and the trial court is not constitutionally
41.
compelled by Boykin and Tahl[15] to administer the guilty-plea safeguards to assure that
the tactical decision is voluntary and intelligent. The advisements and waivers in such a
case are required only as a matter of the judicial policies.” (Wright, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p.
497, italics added.)
B. Analysis
We have set forth the entirety of the proceedings leading to defendant’s bench trial
in 1994, and the record unequivocally shows that defendant did not plead guilty or even
enter a “slow plea” to murder. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, stated he was
not forced or coerced to waive a jury trial, and expressly agreed to a bench trial pursuant
to the stipulation as to the nature of the evidence that would be introduced by the
prosecution and the defense.
The prosecution agreed to strike the special circumstance. It was still required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of murder, and it is clear the
prosecution’s only theory at the bench trial was that defendant was the actual killer.
Moreover, the defense presented five witnesses who testified about defendant’s possible
alibi, thus challenging whether the prosecution had met its burden of proof. Defense
counsel “contested the sufficiency of [the] evidence,” presented “a potentially
meritorious legal argument against conviction,” and “advanced a substantial defense,”
such that defendant did not enter a plea or even a slow plea, and instead was convicted
after a bench trial. (Wright, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 496–497.)
Defendant argues he is eligible for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6,
subdivision (a)(2), because he was convicted after he “ ‘accepted a plea offer in lieu of
a trial at which [he] could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder,’ ” and
he purportedly accepted a “plea” in exchange for striking the felony-murder special
circumstance. (Bold in original.)
15 Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122.
42.
Defendant’s argument turns the statute on its head. Defendant’s bench trial was
held in 1994, prior to the effective dates of the amendments to sections 188 and 189,
which raised the possibility that he was convicted of second degree murder based on a
now-invalid theory. The trial court found his section 1172.6 petition stated a prima facie
case, issued an OSC, and set the evidentiary hearing.
By issuing the OSC, the trial court acknowledged defendant was potentially
eligible for resentencing under section 1172.6. After the evidentiary hearing, the court
did not deny defendant’s petition because he was convicted after a bench trial, plea, a
“slow plea,” or because the felony-murder special circumstance was stricken. Instead,
the trial court correctly denied his petition after the evidentiary hearing because it found
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of second degree murder under a theory that
was still valid after the amendments to sections 188 and 189—that he was the actual
killer.
Also in his letter brief, defendant states the question about whether his conviction
resulted from “a plea or trial” is also an issue at a hearing on his motion for relief filed
pursuant to section 1172.1. Defendant claims the prosecution in the section 1172.1 case
“is now arguing that it was a plea, which means the judge and district attorney must agree
in order to grant me relief under § 1172.1. A finding that it was a trial allows the judge to
resentence me whether the district attorney agrees or not.” Defendant requests this court
to resolve this issue because “a decision on this matter is crucial to resolving the ….
[sections] 1172.6 and 1172.1 issues presently before the Fresno County Superior Court.”
Defendant did not file a section 1172.1 petition in this case. His request for this
court to resolve an alleged contested issue involving a section 1172.1 petition for
resentencing, which he claims is pending before the trial court in another matter, is
“wholly unrelated to the denial of his section 1172.6 petition for resentencing” and is
43.
“not cognizable” in this appeal. (People v. Hernandez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1111,
1117.)16
Based on the record before this court, defendant was convicted of second degree
murder after a bench trial, and the trial court’s decision to deny his section 1172.6
petition for resentencing was not based on whether he was convicted after a jury or bench
trial, or that the felony murder special circumstance was stricken. Instead, it was based
on finding that defendant was still guilty of murder as the actual killer, and the court’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence.
IV. Defendant’s Motion to Introduce DNA Evidence
Also in his letter brief, defendant asserts “the issue at the heart of this appeal
remains” that he has always “maintained [his] innocence.” Defendant states that he
wanted to prove his innocence at a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing because he was
recently granted parole and “leaving prison with a 31-year-old attempted robbery on my
record is preferable to a second-degree murder.”
16 We note that as of January 1, 2024, section 1172.1 states the trial court “may recall
a sentence and resentence a defendant on its own motion ‘at any time if the applicable
sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new
statutory authority or case law.’ ” (People v. Brinson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1040,
1046.) “A defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under
this section. If a defendant requests consideration for relief under this section, the court
is not required to respond.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (c).) Section 1172.1, subdivision (c)
“expressly denies defendants the right to file a petition for resentencing under that
section, and expressly excuses the trial court from acting on any such request that a
defendant might nevertheless file.” (People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 993.)
“If the court has recalled the sentence on its own motion, the court shall not
impose a judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense or lesser related offense if
the conviction was a result of a plea bargain without the concurrence of both the
defendant and the district attorney of the county in which the defendant was sentenced, or
the Attorney General if the Department of Justice originally prosecuted the case.”
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(4), italics added.)
44.
Defendant states he moved to introduce evidence at the section 1172.6 evidentiary
hearing to prove he was not the shooter “because the DNA tests of the victim’s fingernail
scrapings show that I was not the person who tussled with him, then shot him. I have
additional evidence to present; however, the issue here is not evidentiary, it is about
whether I qualify for relief under … [section] 1172.6.”
A. Section 1172.6 and Relevant Evidence
A section 1172.6 petition is limited to the issues implicated by that statute and the
amendments enacted by Senate Bills 1437 and 775. (See, e.g., People v. DeHuff (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 428, 438; People v. Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 947.) The statute
does not provide the petitioner with “ ‘a do-over on factual disputes that have already
been resolved’ ” at their trials. (People v. Farfan, at p. 947.)
“[T]he focus at the evidentiary hearing phase of a [section] 1172.6 petition is ‘on
evidence made relevant by the amendments to the substantive definition of murder,’
which, in the context of section 188, requires ‘the prosecution to prove that all principals
to a murder acted with malice aforethought.’ ” (Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 952,
italics added; Rodriguez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 457; Gomez v. Superior Court
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 778, 788.)
It is settled that a section 1172.6 proceeding does not permit a defendant to litigate
anew any trial issue or allow a challenge to factfinding from the original trial that
defendant would like to revisit. (Rodriguez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 457.) As
explained in Palacios, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th 942: “Just as a defendant may not raise a
new evidentiary objection on appeal, a petitioner who failed to make a specific
evidentiary objection at trial may not raise the issue for the first time at a resentencing
hearing. This is consistent with the limited nature of section 1172.6 proceedings and
reflects a reasonable legislative determination that resentencing hearings are not the
proper forum to litigate issues that could have been raised at trial.” (Id. at p. 954.)
45.
B. Homicide Defenses
The sole question at a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing “is whether the petitioner
committed murder under a still-valid theory.” (Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p.
294.) “[T]he burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder … under California law as amended by the
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
In People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158 (Mares), the court addressed
whether a defendant could raise new defenses at a section 1172.6 hearing that were not
raised at trial. The defendant in Mares was charged with murder. The evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing showed the defendant fought with and stabbed the
victim. The defendant pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter. (Mares, at p. 1162.)
The defendant subsequently filed a section 1172.6 petition. The trial court found the
petition failed to state a prima facie case because the record of conviction showed he was
convicted by plea as the actual killer. (Mares, at p. 1163.)
Mares held the defendant’s section 1172.6 petition was properly denied because
the prosecution pursued the murder conviction only based on the theory that he was the
actual killer, and “[n]othing in the record suggests [he] could have benefitted from Senate
Bill 1437’s changes in the law.” (Mares, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1166.) Mares
explained that for a defendant to show he was entitled to relief under section 1172.6, “he
must assert he would have defended himself by offering facts to support a murder theory
that is now abrogated.” (Mares, at p. 1166.)
“It is important to understand it is not relevant if [the defendant] wished to
claim (for instance) that he was misidentified and another person
committed the crime. That was a defense that was available to him at the
time of his plea. Senate Bill 1437 has no bearing on it. New evidence of
misidentification could support a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but it
would not show that he cannot be convicted ‘because of’ the changes to the
law, as required by section 1172.6.” (Mares, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p.
1168, italics added.)
46.
Mares further held:
“Had [the defendant] gone to trial, he possibly could, for instance, have
challenged the admission of his confession. [Citation.] He may instead
have acknowledged he was the killer but argued self-defense or some other
justification. [Citation.] These options were available to him at the time of
his plea, without any change in the law. [The defendant] did not plead
guilty to murder, he instead pled to manslaughter, and perhaps a jury would
have returned a manslaughter verdict if he had gone to trial. Arguing today
that he could not be convicted of murder for any of these reasons would not
show he cannot be convicted ‘because of the changes to [s]ection 188 or
189’ [citation], which is what he needs to establish a prima facie case.”
(Mares, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1168.)
C. Analysis
Defendant asserts the trial court erroneously denied his motion to introduce the
DNA evidence at the section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing, “because the prosecution did
not present a theory of felony murder at trial. But the prosecution did not present that
theory because I took the plea to avoid prosecution under that theory.” As explained
above, the trial court’s denial of defendant’s petition was not based on whether defendant
was convicted after a trial or a plea, or whether the prosecution relied on the felony-
murder rule. Defendant was still guilty of murder as the actual killer even if the
prosecution had relied on the felony-murder rule.
Moreover, the court correctly denied his motion to introduce DNA evidence,
regardless of whether he entered a plea or was convicted after a trial, because a section
1172.6 evidentiary hearing only addresses whether a petitioner was convicted of murder
under an imputed malice theory that was now invalid. In denying his petition, the court
found the evidence at the bench trial proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
was the actual killer and he was still guilty of murder after the statutory amendments. As
explained in Mares, his attempt to introduce new evidence on the issue of identity was
not relevant to the court’s decision to grant or deny his section 1172.6 petition at the
evidentiary hearing.
47.
In denying defendant’s motion to introduce DNA evidence, the court stated a
petition for writ of habeas corpus was the appropriate vehicle to raise his contentions
about newly discovered evidence. Defense counsel said a writ petition was filed based
on the DNA evidence, but “thrown out” as untimely in 2012. As noted above, this
court’s own records show defendant, in propria persona, filed a writ petition in the trial
court in 2013 and argued the DNA evidence showed his actual innocence. The trial court
denied the petition and held “[t]he fact that [defendant’s] DNA was not underneath the
fingernails of the victim’s right hand does not demonstrate [he] is innocent of his
[murder] conviction.” (In re DeShawn Jackson, supra, F068515; Exhibit E.) Defendant
then filed a petition before this court raising the same issues, and it was denied in 2013.
There is no indication these petitions were denied because they were untimely.
Even assuming, without deciding, the trial court abused its discretion in denying
defendant’s motion to introduce the DNA evidence, the record before this court shows
that any error was necessarily harmless. The evidence at defendant’s bench trial was that
M.J. said the suspect approached the victim and started to grab at the bicycle, and the
victim did not let go of it. The suspect again told the victim to let go of the bicycle, and
the victim continued to hold onto it. M.J. said at that point, this same suspect pulled out a
gun, fired one shot into victim’s chest, and ran away. When the police arrived at the
scene, the victim was lying on the ground and the bicycle was approximately five feet
away from him. The bicycle was processed for fingerprints and only the victim’s prints
were found.
Detective Stokes attended the autopsy and reported there was no evidence on the
victim’s body to show “there was a struggle in which [the victim] was struck or struck
anyone. This was observed in that there were no wounds or lacerations or bruises to the
victim’s hands, arms or face, indicating a fight.” The autopsy report stated scrapings
were taken from under the victim’s fingernails, but there were no wounds or abrasions on
the victim’s arms or hands.
48.
The absence of defendant’s DNA in the fingernail scrapings from the victim does
not establish his actual innocence since there is no evidence in the record before this
court that the victim and the gunman physically interacted in any way.
After independent review of the record, we find no reasonably arguable factual or
legal issues exist.17
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
17 Defendant is not foreclosed from filing another petition for writ of habeas corpus.
In his letter brief, defendant states that he was recently granted parole. Depending on his
custody status, defendant may instead file a motion pursuant to section 1473.7,
subdivision (a)(2), that states a person “who is no longer in criminal custody may file a
motion or vacate a conviction” based on “[n]ewly discovered evidence of actual
innocence.”
49.
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.