People v. Rodriguez CA2/2

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Filed 6/3/26 P. v. Rodriguez CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B344816

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. XCNBA346903
v.

ABEL ALVARO RODRIGUEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura F. Priver, Judge. Affirmed.
John Steinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Abel Alvaro Rodriguez appeals the summary
denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.6.1 We agree with the trial court the record of
conviction showed Rodriguez is ineligible for section 1172.6
resentencing as a matter of law. We therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
We recite only those facts necessary to support our
conclusion. The detailed facts are contained in our 2012 opinion
affirming in part and reversing in part Rodriguez’s convictions,
People v. Vasquez (Mar. 12, 2012, B225354) (nonpub. opn.)
(Vazquez).
In January 2009, the People charged Rodriguez and
two other men, Jamie Basurto Vasquez and Damian Rocha, with
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) relating to the April 2008 homicide of
Carl Cerda. The People also charged Rodriguez with being a felon
in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)) on two occasions
months after the homicide took place. As to the murder charges
against each defendant, the People alleged a principal’s personal
use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d), (e)) and gang
enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(C), (b)(4)).
The case went to trial, and all three defendants were tried
together. The jury instructions included CALCRIM Nos. 4002 and

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 CALCRIM No. 400 was given as follows: “A person may be
guilty of a crime in two ways. One, he or she may have directly
committed the crime. I will call that person the perpetrator. Two,
he or she may have aided and abetted a perpetrator, who directly
committed the crime. A person is equally guilty of the crime
whether he or she committed it personally or aided and abetted
the perpetrator who committed it.”

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4013 on accomplice liability but did not include
CALCRIM No. 402 or 403 on the natural and probable
consequences theory.
During deliberations, the jury submitted the following
question to the trial court: “We need clarification on points 2 & 3
of line 401 in the Juror Instructions—mainly regarding
‘intention’ and what ‘the crime’ is (or if it could be any crime).”
The court responded orally as follows: “[T]o prove that the
defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and abetting that
crime, the People must prove that—regarding points two and
three, the defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to
commit the crime, which I believe everybody agreed was murder;
and as for number three, before or during the commission of the
crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in
committing the crime of murder, all right?” The foreperson

3 CALCRIM No. 401 was given as follows: “To prove that the
defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and abetting that
crime, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The perpetrator
committed the crime; [¶] 2. The defendant knew that the
perpetrator intended to commit the crime; [¶] 3. Before or during
the commission of the crime, the defendant intended to aid and
abet the perpetrator in committing the crime; [¶] AND [¶] 4. The
defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the
perpetrator’s commission of the crime. [¶] Someone aids and
abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful
purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does in fact,
aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s
commission of that crime. [¶] If all of these requirements are
proved, the defendant does not need to actually have been
present when the crime was committed to be guilty as an aider
and abettor.”

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confirmed this response resolved the question, stating “We’re
good now.”
The jury convicted Rodriguez and Vasquez of the first
degree murder of Cerda. It acquitted Rocha. The jury found
Vasquez discharged a firearm causing death under
section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), (d), and (e). As to
Rodriguez, the jury found a principal had discharged a firearm
causing death under section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), (d),
and (e). As to both Rodriguez and Vasquez, the jury found the
gang allegations true under section 186.22, subdivision (b). In
addition, the jury convicted Rodriguez on two counts of being a
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of section 12021,
subdivision (a)(1). (Vasquez, supra, B225354.)
The trial court sentenced Rodriguez and Vasquez to terms
of 50 years to life on their murder convictions and enhancements.
It imposed concurrent sentences for Rodriguez’s other
convictions. (Vasquez, supra, B225354.)
On appeal, we reversed Rodriguez’s convictions for
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon because the jury did
not orally declare the verdicts in open court, rendering them
invalid under People v. Thornton (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 845, 858.
(Vasquez, supra, B225354.) We affirmed in all other respects.
(Ibid.)
In August 2023, Rodriguez filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6. That section is the procedural vehicle
by which persons convicted under legal theories invalidated by
Senate Bill 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), effective January 2019,
may be resentenced. In his petition, Rodriguez asserted, in a
conclusory fashion, he satisfied the requirements for
section 1172.6 relief. Among other things, he asserted he “could
not presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes made

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to [sections] 188 and 189 effective January 1st, 2019” (i.e.,
pursuant to Sen. Bill 1437). The petition contained no facts
pertaining to his conduct underlying his conviction to support
this or any other assertions.
The People filed an opposition and requested judicial notice
of our Vasquez opinion “as law of the case, and pursuant to
California Rules of Court, Rule 8.1115(b)(2).”
Rodriguez, through appointed counsel, filed a reply.
The trial court held a hearing on Rodriguez’s petition in
March 2025 pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (c). A few
days later, it issued an order denying the petition for failure to
state a prima facie case for relief. It explained “the jury
instructions did not allow the jury to convict [Rodriguez] under a
theory of imputed malice based on his participating in a crime
alone. Rather, the verdict forms and jury instructions show, as a
matter of law, [Rodriguez] was a direct aider and abettor and
manifested an intent to kill, and therefore, could still be convicted
of murder under current law.” The court then discussed how the
facts, as recited in our Vasquez opinion, compel the same
conclusion.
Rodriguez timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Senate Bill 1437 was enacted to “amend the felony murder
rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it
relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed
on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the
intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying
felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f); see also People v. Curiel (2023)
15 Cal.5th 433, 448 (Curiel).)

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As amended by Senate Bill 1437, section 188,
subdivision (a)(3) requires a principal in a crime to act with
malice aforethought in order to be convicted of murder, subject to
exceptions set forth in subdivision (e) (pertaining to felony
murder). (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.) “Malice shall not be imputed
to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) “One effect of this requirement was to
eliminate liability for murder as an aider and abettor under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 449.)
Senate Bill 1437’s amendments to section 189,
subdivision (e) narrowed the felony murder rule to permit
convictions for participants in the underlying felony to the
following persons: (1) the actual killer; (2) one who, “with the
intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree”; and (3) “a major
participant in the underlying felony [who] acted with reckless
indifference to human life . . . .” (See also Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 448.)
Section 1172.6 allows for the resentencing of persons
convicted under a now-abrogated theory of murder or attempted
murder liability. Specifically, it applies to persons “convicted of
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime, attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or manslaughter.” (Id., subd. (a).)
Thus, even after the enactment of Senate Bill 1437, a
person who willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation kills
another person (§ 189, subd. (a)), and any person who directly

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aids or abets such a person (§ 31; Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 462), remains liable for first degree murder and does not
qualify for resentencing under section 1172.6.
Here, Rodriguez contends the record of conviction leaves
open the possibility he was convicted under a theory abrogated by
Senate Bill 1437. It is undisputed the jury was not specifically
instructed on an abrogated theory. It was not instructed on the
natural and probable consequences theory (e.g., CALCRIM
Nos. 402 & 403). Nor was it instructed on any felony murder
theory. The sole instructions jurors received on accomplice
liability were CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401, which pertain to the
still-valid direct aider and abettor liability.
Nevertheless, Rodriguez argues the following language in
CALCRIM No. 400, as given, allowed the jury to impute the
malice of Vasquez, the actual shooter, to Rodriguez: “A person is
equally guilty of the crime whether he or she committed it
personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator who committed
it.”
As an initial matter, it is difficult to see how the doctrine of
law of the case does not foreclose Rodriguez from making this
argument. (See Leider v. Lewis (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1121, 1127
[“ ‘ “The decision of an appellate court, stating a rule of law
necessary to the decision of the case, conclusively establishes that
rule and makes it determinative of the rights of the same parties
in any subsequent retrial or appeal in the same case.” ’ ”].) On
direct appeal from his conviction, he argued CALCRIM No. 400’s
“equally guilty” language excused the prosecution from proving
his own mental state. After reviewing the other jury instructions
(CALCRIM Nos. 401, 520 & 521), we concluded as follows: “By
convicting Rodriguez of first degree murder under these
instructions, the jury necessarily found that he acted, either on

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his own or as an aider and abettor, willfully and with the intent
to kill.” (Vasquez, supra, B225354.) If it is binding here, this legal
conclusion would preclude any relief.
Even if law of the case does not foreclose Rodriguez’s
argument that the jury could have imputed Vazquez’s malice to
him, we stand by our conclusion in Vasquez and reach the same
conclusion here.
Rodriguez’s argument relies primarily on People v. Langi
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972. There, the Court of Appeal found the
jury instructions, even though they did not specifically instruct
on a theory abrogated by Senate Bill 1437, allowed the defendant
to be convicted on an aiding and abetting theory without
harboring intent to kill. Importantly, the Langi jury was
instructed on aiding and abetting liability and second degree
murder, a crime to which the court found “the standard aiding-
and-abetting instructions are ill-suited [where] a trial court uses
such [instructions] without tailoring [them] to the specifics of
[second degree murder].” (Langi, at p. 982.) Specifically, the
Langi court agreed with the defendant that “under the
instructions that were given, the jury was entitled to conclude
that, to be guilty as an aider and abettor of second degree
murder, [the defendant] need[ed] only have intended to
encourage the [actual killer’s] intentional act— . . . punching [the
victim]—whether or not [the defendant] intended to aid or
encourage [the] killing, and whether or not he personally knew of
and disregarded the risk of such a killing.” (Id. at p. 983.)
Here, in contrast, the instructions did not allow the jury to
convict Rodriguez of first degree murder without finding he
intended Cerda’s death. Aside from Rodriguez’s convictions, the
only other conviction in the case was of Vasquez for first degree
murder. The jury also found Vasquez personally and

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intentionally shot and killed Cerda, and, as to Rodriguez’s
conviction, a principal personally and intentionally killed Cerda.
The CALCRIM No. 521 instruction given for first degree
murder required the jury to find the defendant “intended to kill.”
To be guilty of murder on an aiding and abetting theory under
CALCRIM No. 401, the jury had to find the accomplice “knew
that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime,” “intended to
aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime,” and “did
in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.”
That instruction further specified aiding and abetting requires
the accomplice “kn[e]w[] of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose
and . . . specifically intend[ed] to, and d[id] in fact, aid, facilitate,
promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of
th[e] crime.”
In short, to the extent the jury convicted Rodriguez as an
accomplice and not, as the firearm enhancement findings imply,
the actual killer, it necessarily found Rodriguez (i) knew Vasquez
intended to kill Cerda; and (ii) both intended and acted to aid,
facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate that intentional
killing. This is not an imputation of intent but rather a finding of
independent intent to kill on the part of Rodriguez.
Rodriguez argues there is evidence of ambiguity in the
CALCRIM No. 401 instruction because the jury asked a question
about it. He then insists we cannot consider the court’s
clarification as part of the record of conviction. Whatever merit
there is in this position, we are satisfied the instructions here
were clear in requiring the finding of intent just described. The
jury’s question was what intent and crime the aiding and
abetting applied to. Again, Rodriguez’s codefendants were
charged only with murder, and the only conviction of a
codefendant was for first degree murder. To the extent the jury

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convicted Rodriguez of first degree murder as an accomplice, that
conviction could only have been based on a perpetrator
committing that crime. The CALCRIM No. 401 instruction
introduces the aiding and abetting elements as follows: “To prove
that the defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and
abetting that crime . . . .” (Italics added.) In describing the
elements, it proceeds to refer to “the crime.” Under the
circumstances, there is simply no way the jury could have
convicted Rodriguez of first degree murder as an accomplice
without understanding that “the crime” was first degree murder.
Finally, we note Rodriguez’s argument that the trial court
engaged in impermissible factfinding when it relied on the
factual background provided in our Vasquez opinion. As we are
able to affirm as a matter of law without any reference to those
facts, any error on the part of the trial court was necessarily
harmless.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s denial of Rodriguez’s section 1172.6
petition is affirmed.

RICHARDSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

GOORVITCH, J.

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