People v. Ray CA2/6

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Filed 6/2/26 P. v. Ray CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B342150
(Super. Ct. No. 19CR03322)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)

v.

GREGORY SCOTT RAY,

Defendant and Appellant.

Gregory Scott Ray appeals from the judgment after a jury
convicted him of 37 felony sex offenses against eight minors. The
trial court sentenced Ray to 50 years to life, and a consecutive
determinate term of 22 years four months.
Ray contends the trial court erred when it instructed the
jury regarding evidence of uncharged and charged crimes and
that use of a condom, alone, was insufficient to constitute
consent. He also contends the court erred when it imposed a
term of 25 years to life for count 19 pursuant to the “One Strike”
law (Pen. Code,1 § 667.61). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Between 2007 and 2018, Ray engaged in sexual activity
with eight boys aged 13 to 17.2 He met them online through
dating sites, or in one case, as a member of his son’s sports team.
Most of the counts involved oral copulation, or completed or
attempted anal intercourse. The one count alleging forcible
conduct, count 19, was supported by John Doe 4’s testimony that
when Ray unexpectedly initiated anal sex, he unsuccessfully told
Ray to stop and tried to push him away.
In addition to the eight victims, three witnesses testified
about uncharged conduct to prove Ray’s propensity to commit the
charged sex offenses. John Doe A testified that Ray touched his
testicles while giving him a massage. When John Doe B was 16
or 17, Ray sent him nude photos of himself. John Doe C was
receiving a massage when Ray’s hands moved to Doe C’s inner
thigh and toward his penis. In another incident, Ray gave Doe C
a hug from behind and reached his hands inside Doe C’s
underwear, touching his buttocks and penis. Evidence was
admitted of an uncharged crime of sexual battery (masturbation)
of John Doe 7, in addition to the evidence of the charged crime of
sexual penetration against him (count 36). This propensity
evidence was admitted as relevant to issues including Ray’s
intent.
Ray testified at trial. He admitted the conduct in some

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 The victims were identified as John Doe 1 through 8 to
protect their privacy rights. (§ 293.5.)

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counts, and denied others. He testified he believed most of the
victims were over 18.
The jury found Ray guilty of four counts of sodomy with a
person under age 18 (§ 286, subd. (b)(1); counts 4, 29, 34–35), one
count of forcible sodomy with a minor age 14 or older (§ 286,
subd. (c)(2)(C); count 19), four counts of lewd acts on a child
under age 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 7–10), 14 counts of lewd
acts on a child age 14 or 15 (§ 288, subd. (c)(1); counts 1–3, 11–15,
22–27), and 13 counts of oral copulation with a person under age
18 (former § 288a,3 subd. (b)(1); counts 5–6, 16–18, 20–21, 28, 30–
33, 37). Regarding an additional count charging sexual
penetration of a person under age 18 (§ 289, subd. (h); Doe 7,
count 36), the jury found Ray guilty of the lesser included offense
of attempted penetration of a person under age 18 (§§ 664, 289,
subd. (h)). The jury found Ray not guilty of an additional count of
section 286, subdivision (b)(1) (count 38).
For the violations of section 288, subdivision (a) (Doe 2), the
jury found true enhancements for victim under the age of 14
(§ 667.61, subd. (j)(2)), and multiple victims in the case (§ 667.61,
subds. (b) & (e)(4)). The jury also found true the multiple victim
enhancement for count 19 (Doe 4).
DISCUSSION
Jury instructions
“A trial court must instruct the jury, even without a
request, on all general principles of law that are ‘ “closely and
openly connected to the facts and that are necessary for the jury’s
understanding of the case.” ’ ” (People v. Burney (2009) 47
Cal.4th 203, 246.) “Even if the court has no sua sponte duty to

3 Section 288a was renumbered as section 287 effective
January 1, 2019. (Stats. 2018, ch. 423, § 49.)

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instruct on a particular legal point, when it does choose to
instruct, it must do so correctly.” (People v. Castillo (1997) 16
Cal.4th 1009, 1015.) We review claims of instructional error de
novo. (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 919
(Covarrubias).)
1. CALCRIM Nos. 375 and 1191A
Ray contends the court erred by instructing the jury with
CALCRIM No. 375 regarding uncharged conduct (Evid. Code,
§ 1101, subd. (b)) and CALCRIM No. 1191A regarding uncharged
sex offenses (Evid. Code, § 1108). We disagree.
CALCRIM No. 375 stated that the prosecution presented
evidence of uncharged offenses of sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd.
(e)(1)), exhibiting harmful material to a minor (§ 288.2, subd.
(a)(2)), and possession of child pornography (§ 311.1, subd. (a)). It
further stated, “The People presented evidence of other behavior
by the defendant that was not charged in this case.” It stated
that if “the uncharged offenses and acts” were proved by a
preponderance of the evidence, the jurors “may, but are not
required to, consider that evidence” for the limited issues of
identity; specific intent of “sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or
sexual abuse”; motive; knowledge the victims were under 18; lack
of mistake or accident; and plan or scheme. It stated, “If you
conclude that the defendant committed the uncharged offenses
and acts, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with
all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that
the defendant is guilty of counts 1 through 38. The People must
still prove each charge beyond a reasonable doubt.”
CALCRIM No. 1191A stated that if the same uncharged
crimes of sexual battery, exhibiting harmful material, and
possession of child pornography were proven by a preponderance
of the evidence, the jurors “may, but are not required to, conclude

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from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined to
commit sexual offenses, and . . . was likely to commit and did
commit” the charged offenses. It added that this evidence was
“only one factor,” was “not sufficient by itself” to prove guilt, and
“[t]he People must still prove the charge beyond a reasonable
doubt.”
Other instructions listed the elements of the uncharged
crimes and identified the victims for each. The jury was
instructed the “harmful material” and child pornography
evidence pertained to Doe 5. (CALCRIM Nos. 1140, 1141.)
Sexual battery applied to “John Doe A, John Doe C, and John Doe
#7 (specifically the allegation that defendant masturbated John
Doe #7 at the conclusion of a massage).” (CALCRIM No. 938.)
The instructions did not specify the “other behavior by the
defendant that was not charged” as stated in CALCRIM No. 375.
Our Supreme Court has “ ‘long held’ ” that the jury may
consider evidence of other crimes if “ ‘ “proved by a preponderance
of the evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210,
1259.) “If the jury finds the facts sufficiently proven for
consideration, it must still decide whether the facts are sufficient,
taken with all the other evidence, to prove the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at pp. 1259–1260; see People v.
Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 437.) These
principles were included in CALCRIM Nos. 375 and 1191A, given
here.
Our Supreme Court upheld an instruction that applied the
preponderance standard to an uncharged offense in People v.
Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007. Reliford concluded, “We do not
find it reasonably likely a jury could interpret the instructions to
authorize conviction of the charged offenses based on a lowered
standard of proof. Nothing in the instructions authorized the

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jury to use the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for
anything other than the preliminary determination whether
defendant committed [the uncharged conduct]. The instructions
instead explained that, in all other respects, the People had the
burden of proving defendant guilty ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
(Id. at p. 1016.) The instructions here meet that standard.
People v. Cruz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1178, and People v.
Holliday (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 536, 546, upon which Ray relies,
are inapposite because the juries there were instructed to apply
the preponderance standard to charged offenses. In contrast
here, CALCRIM Nos. 375 and 1191A designated the
preponderance standard only to uncharged offenses and acts
while CALCRIM No. 1191B required proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of charged offenses to be used as propensity evidence.
Ray contends his conviction of the lesser included offense of
attempted sexual penetration in count 36 should be reversed
because the jury was allowed to find the uncharged conduct of
sexual battery (masturbation) of Doe 7 based on the
preponderance of the evidence. Because the masturbation
occurred during the same massage as the attempted penetration,
Ray contends the instruction lowered the burden of proof. We
conclude otherwise.
Ray’s reliance on People v. Nicolas (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th
1165, 1177–1178 is inapt. There, the trial court erred because
the jury instructions allowed the jury to find the uncharged act of
using a cell phone while driving true based on the preponderance
of the evidence. Because using a cell phone while driving was
“ ‘an indivisible part’ ” of the charged offense of vehicular
manslaughter with gross negligence, however, the jury was
allowed to consider the defendant’s negligence which gave rise to
criminal liability under a lower burden of proof. (Id. at p. 1178.)

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In contrast here, Ray’s liability for attempted sexual penetration
was not based on his act of masturbating Doe 7’s penis. The two
acts constituted separate crimes, even though they were part of
“a single course of criminal conduct” and were “rapidly committed
against a victim.” (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 324–
325; see People v. Jones (2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 104.)
Ray also contends the reference in CALCRIM No. 375 to
“other behavior by the defendant that was not charged in this
case” (italics added) improperly allowed the jury to apply the
preponderance standard to behavior “integral to the charged
offenses.” He provides examples including Ray asking Doe 1 to
expose his penis before engaging in oral and attempted anal sex
with him, paying Doe 3 to not report his behavior, and telling Doe
6 he intended to take Doe 6’s virginity before doing so.
Evidence admitted pursuant to Evidence Code section
1101, subdivision (b) includes “other act[s]” and is not limited to
other crimes. (People v. James (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 399, 407.) A
preponderance of evidence instruction can be proper regarding
acts against a charged victim that do not constitute crimes.
(People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 667–668 [“ ‘prior
quarrels’ ” between defendant and homicide victim].)
“While a single sentence in an instruction ‘may or may not
be confusing, depending upon the context in which the sentence
lies,’ an instructional error ‘ “ ‘cannot be predicated upon an
isolated phrase, sentence or excerpt taken from the
instructions.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Quinonez (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457,
465–466.) “ ‘We look to the instructions as a whole and the entire
record of trial, including the arguments of counsel.’ ” (Id. at p.
465; see People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 36.)
Here, the instructions included multiple reminders that the
People must prove each charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

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(CALCRIM Nos. 220, 375, 1191A, 1191B.) And the jury was not
invited to apply the preponderance standard to “behavior” that
was an integral part of a charged offense. The prosecution’s
argument mentioned only the masturbation of Doe 7 and the
conduct involving Does A and C as uncharged acts under
CALCRIM No. 375. The argument focused on this specific
evidence and did not invite the jury to apply the preponderance
standard to the facts of the charged crimes themselves. There is
no prejudicial error. (People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 36.)
2. CALCRIM No. 1191B
Ray contends his Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process of law was violated by an instruction that if the jurors
were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Ray committed
some of the charged offenses, they could use that as “one factor”
to conclude he committed other charged offenses (CALCRIM No.
1191B).
This contention lacks merit. As Ray recognizes, we are
bound to follow the Supreme Court precedent of People v.
Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1167–1168, which upheld this
instruction. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57
Cal.2d 450, 455; People v. Meneses (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 63, 67–
68.)
3. CALCRIM No. 1030
Ray contends the jury instruction regarding count 19,
sodomy by force, fear, or threats, was erroneous and prejudicial
based on the language that a request to use a condom does not
establish consent. We are not persuaded.
After mutual oral sex, Ray unexpectedly flipped Doe 4 onto
his stomach and sodomized him. Doe 4 told Ray it hurt, told him
to stop, and tried to push him away. Ray did not stop and kept
pushing Doe 4 down. Doe 4 then “ ‘gave up,’ ” and it eventually

8
“became enjoyable.”
After the fact, Doe 4 told Ray he would have sex with him
again if he would “wear protection and we’d go softer.” Doe 4 also
texted Ray the next evening and expressed interest in having sex
with him again.
The jury was correctly instructed that sodomy by force
required proof that the minor did not consent to the act. (§ 286,
subd. (c)(2)(C); CALCRIM No. 1030.) The instruction as given
included optional bracketed language: “Evidence that the other
person requested, suggested, or communicated that the
defendant use a condom is not enough by itself to constitute
consent.”
Ray did not object to the instruction as given, even after the
prosecutor specifically referenced the bracketed language and
asked if there was an objection. By agreeing to the instruction
and not requesting that it be modified or clarified, Ray forfeited
the issue. (Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 901.)
Nor was the instruction erroneous. The language that a
request to use a condom, alone, is insufficient to constitute
consent is a correct statement of the law. (§ 261.7.) And Ray has
not shown that it was not “ ‘responsive to the evidence.’ ”
(Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 901.) His counsel argued
that Doe 4’s communications with Ray after the charged offense
showed he had consented. The jury instruction properly advised
the jury that Doe 4’s request that Ray use a condom if they had
sex again “is not enough by itself” to establish that he consented
to the earlier act. (§ 261.7.) Consent to sex on one occasion does
not establish consent for sex on another occasion. No error has
been shown because Ray has not shown a “reasonable likelihood
that the jury misconstrued or misapplied the instruction.”
(Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 926.)

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One Strike law
The One Strike law (§ 667.61) provides indeterminate
sentences of either 15 years to life or 25 years to life for certain
sexual offenses. Pursuant to the One Strike law, the trial court
sentenced Ray to 25 years to life for lewd conduct with a child
under the age of 14 (Doe 2) in a case with multiple victims (count
7), and concurrent sentences of 25 years to life for the other
counts against Doe 2 occurring on the same occasion (counts 8, 9,
and 10). (§§ 288, subd. (a), 667.61, subds. (c)(8), (e)(4), (j)(2).)
The court also imposed a consecutive sentence of 25 years to life
for count 19, sodomy by force against a minor age 14 or older (Doe
4) in a case with multiple victims. (§§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(C), 667.61,
subds. (e)(4), (m), (n)(5).) For the remaining counts in the case,
the court imposed a determinate sentence of 22 years four
months.
Ray contends the sentence for count 19 must be reduced to
15 years to life because the information4 did not give notice that
the prosecution was seeking 25 years to life for that count. We
reject this contention.
Count 19 of the information alleged sodomy by means of
force against Doe 4 (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(C)), with a special
allegation that “the defendant, within the meaning of Penal Code
section 667.61(b), (e)(4), has been convicted in the present case of
committing a specified offense against more than one victim.” It
thus alleged, and the jury found, all the facts necessary for a
sentence of 25 years to life pursuant to section 667.61,
subdivisions (m), (e)(4), and (n)(5). But the information did not
cite these subdivisions, and cited instead subdivision (b) of

4 References to the “information” are to the operative
pleading in this case, the fifth amended information.

10
section 667.61, which provides for a sentence of 15 years to life
“[e]xcept as [otherwise] provided.” The information thus did not
provide the notice required by due process that the prosecution
was seeking a sentence of 25 years to life for count 19. (In re
Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th 706, 712–713 (Vaquera).)
Nevertheless, we conclude the pleading error was harmless
and did not constitute a waiver or estoppel against the
prosecution (Vaquera, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 726) because Ray
had “timely actual notice that [the prosecution] was seeking a
25-year-to-life sentence” (id. at p. 727) by “means other than the
information” (id. at p. 728).
When discussing Ray’s rejection of a plea offer of 16 years,
the prosecution stated he was facing a maximum exposure of a
“significant determinate term followed by potentially two counts
of 25-to-life.” The court clarified that the indeterminate terms
must be consecutive for a total of 50 years to life following a
determinate term. (See § 667.61, subd. (i).) Ray’s counsel agreed
that was the potential sentence, and Ray said he understood.
Ray was thus “aware of the sentence the prosecution was seeking
at a time when he could have taken his sentencing exposure into
consideration in making key decisions about how to conduct his
defense, ‘including whether to plead guilty, how to allocate
investigatory resources, and what strategy to deploy at trial.’ ”
(Vaquera, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 727.)
The probation report recommended four consecutive terms
of 25 years to life for counts 7 through 10, citing section 667.61,
subdivision (j)(2), and a consecutive term of 25 years to life for
count 19, citing section 667.61, subdivisions (e)(4) and (m). Ray’s
sentencing brief requested concurrent sentences of 25 years to life
for counts 7 through 10, and acknowledged that a consecutive
sentence for count 19 “will be 25–life.” At sentencing, counsel

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stated that one term of 25 years to life for Doe 2 and a term of 25
years to life for Doe 4 were “correct.” At no time did Ray or his
counsel claim they thought the prosecution was seeking only 15
years to life for count 19.
Ray considered the potential One Strike sentences in his
case strategy. Counsel stated the counts involving Doe 2, and
count 19 involving Doe 4, were “why this case went to trial.” Ray
testified at trial that he never had sex with Doe 2. He admitted
having sex with Doe 4 but testified he believed he was 18. He
also testified he and Doe 4 discussed having anal sex in advance
and although Doe 4 said it hurt, he did not tell him to stop.
Although the jury rejected Ray’s version, he had “ ‘sufficient
notice to permit the defense to make informed decisions about the
case.’ ” (Vaquera, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 726.) Accordingly, any
error was not prejudicial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J. CODY, J.

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Kristy Imel, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Benjamin Owens, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David A. Voet, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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