CourtListener 10866361•Miller v. Dolmo CA3
Texte intégral
Filed 5/29/26 Miller v. Dolmo CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
SCOTT AARON MILLER, C103331
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 17FL04019)
v.
BESS-CAROLINA DOLMO,
Defendant and Appellant.
Self-represented appellant Bess-Carolina Dolmo (mother) appeals from the family
court’s order denying her application to vacate a prefiling order designating her as a
vexatious litigant and adopting a child custody recommending counselor’s
recommendations. Respondent Scott Aaron Miller (father) did not file a respondent’s
brief. We thus decide the appeal on the record, mother’s opening brief, and any oral
argument by mother. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2).)1
We affirm the denial of the application and dismiss the custody portion of the
appeal.
1 We deny mother’s requests for judicial notice filed on January 9, 2026, and January 30,
2026, because they are unnecessary to our disposition.
1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2021, the family court designated mother as a vexatious litigant and entered an
order prohibiting mother from filing any new self-represented litigation without leave
(the prefiling order). The judge who issued the prefiling order later retired and the matter
was reassigned to Department 125 for all purposes.
After a July 2024 bench trial, the family court ordered mother and father to share
legal and physical custody of their children, among other things.
In October 2024, mother filed an application for an order to vacate the prefiling
order (the application). It is unclear from the record whether the application was made to
Department 125 or to the presiding judge’s department. But the memorandum of points
and authorities accompanying the application states it would be heard by Department
125.
In December 2024, the family court appointed a private child custody
recommending counselor (counselor) following father’s ex parte application, set an order
to show cause hearing regarding custody in February 2025, and scheduled counselor to
return for the order to show cause hearing.
At the February 2025 order to show cause hearing, mother objected to the family
court’s consideration of counselor’s report on the ground that it was hearsay and that she
had the right to cross-examine counselor. Mother also requested a trial on counselor’s
report. The family court set a trial in September 2025, limited the trial to new issues
arising after the July 2024 trial, and continued the hearing on counselor’s report to allow
mother the opportunity to cross-examine counselor and lay foundation for her hearsay
objection (the February 2025 order).
On March 4, 2025, the family court held a combined hearing for the application
and counselor’s report. Judge Weng-Gutierrez, who was assigned to Department 125 at
the time, presided over the hearing. She rejected mother’s contention that the application
should be heard by the presiding judge, noting the matter was assigned to Department
2
125 for all purposes. Judge Weng-Gutierrez also stated she would adopt counselor’s
report as interim orders pending the September 2025 trial.
On March 10, 2025, Judge Weng-Gutierrez issued an order denying the
application (the March 2025 order). She further stated in the March 2025 order that she
found, under the totality of the circumstances, “it [was] in the best interests of the
children to adopt [counselor’s] recommendations . . . as interim orders pending trial on
[counselor’s] report.” She continued to order adoption of counselor’s report “as interim
child custody and visitation orders . . . with slight revisions as reflected in [an] attached
document.” The attached document was counselor’s report with some portions crossed
out. The legal custody portion of the attached counselor’s report gave father sole legal
custody of the children and stated, “the order for Sole Legal Custody shall be a Final
Custody order.”
Mother appeals from several orders. We permitted the appeal to proceed as to the
March 2025 order only.
DISCUSSION
I. The Application
Mother contends the ruling on her application must be reversed because (1) Judge
Weng-Gutierrez had no authority to hear or rule on the application, (2) the ruling
disregarded substantive and procedural errors in the prefiling order, (3) the delay in
setting the application hearing prejudiced her, and (4) the March 2025 order copied
analysis from father’s moving papers but disregarded facts and legal authorities raised by
mother. We disagree.
A. Jurisdiction
A vexatious litigant may file an application to vacate a prefiling order and remove
his or her name from the Judicial Council’s list of vexatious litigants. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 391.8, subd. (a).) “The application shall be filed in the court that entered the prefiling
order. . . . The application shall be made before the justice or judge who entered the
3
order, if that justice or judge is available. If that justice or judge who entered the order is
not available, the application shall be made before the presiding justice or presiding
judge, or his or her designee.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 391.8, subd. (a).)
“[T]he jurisdiction of a multijudge, multidepartment superior court is vested in the
court as a whole and if one department exercises authority in a matter which might
properly be heard in another such action, although ‘irregula[r],’ it does not amount to a
defect of jurisdiction.” (Shane v. Superior Court (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1237, 1249.)
“ ‘[F]amily court’ refers to the activities of one or more superior court judicial officers
who handle litigation arising under the Family Code. It is not a separate court with
special jurisdiction, but is instead the superior court performing one of its general duties.”
(In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 201.)
Here, the jurisdiction over the application is vested with the superior court because
it entered the prefiling order. Even if we assume without deciding that Judge Weng-
Gutierrez was not the presiding judge’s designee, her hearing and ruling on the motion
does not amount to a defect of jurisdiction.
B. The Propriety of the Prefiling Order
Mother also contends the ruling disregarded various alleged substantive and
procedural errors in the prefiling order. But the prefiling order is separately appealable
under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6) because it is an order
granting an injunction. (In re Marriage of Rifkin & Carty (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1339,
1347; Luckett v. Panos (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 77, 90.) “It is well established that an
appellate court may not review a decision or order from which an appeal could previously
have been taken.” (Rifkin & Carty, at p. 1347; accord, Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals
Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 212, 239 [“if an order is appealable, an aggrieved party
must file a timely notice of appeal from the order to obtain appellate review”].) By
failing to appeal the prefiling order, mother lost her opportunity to challenge it. (Rifkin &
Carty, at p. 1347.)
4
C. Other Contentions
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is
ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the
basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error
that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.)
This burden remains the same even when the respondent fails to file a brief. (Doe v.
McLaughlin (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 640, 655.)
“In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with
some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.” (City of
Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286-287.) We “may disregard factual
contentions that are not supported by citations to the record” and “legal arguments that
are not supported by citations to legal authority.” (Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 514, 520.)
Here, we reject the following conclusory arguments of mother unsupported by
citation to either the record or legal authority: (1) the hearing on the application was
unduly delayed and that such delay prejudiced her; (2) the March 2025 order incorrectly
stated she made a series of filings because some of them were in fact made by her former
counsel; and (3) the family court erroneously declined to file mother’s responsive
pleadings.
We further reject mother’s contention that the family court erred in repeating
portions of father’s arguments and disregarding her evidence in the March 10, 2025
order. The family court “need not address all the legal and factual issued raised by the
parties” as it is “required only to set out ultimate findings rather than evidentiary ones.”
(Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1124-1125.) Mother also
cites no authority supporting the proposition that a court cannot reiterate a winning
party’s analysis in its ruling.
5
II. Custody Order
Mother raises various procedural and substantive challenges to the custody portion
of the March 2025 order and to the February 2025 order. We dismiss the appeal from the
custody portion of the March 2025 order because that portion is not appealable. We lack
jurisdiction to review the February 2025 order because it is not part of mother’s appeal.
In determining whether an order is interlocutory, we look at the substance and
effect of the order. (Kinoshita v. Horio (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 959, 963.) “[W]here
anything further in the nature of judicial action on the part of the court is essential to a
final determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory.” (Lyon v. Goss
(1942) 19 Cal.2d 659, 670.) An interim custody order is interlocutory by definition and
therefore not appealable. (Lester v. Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 559.)
Here, the trial on counselor’s report was set for September 2025. The family court
explicitly stated both at the March 4, 2025 hearing and in the March 2025 order that it
adopted counselor’s report as interim orders pending trial. It is true that the counselor’s
report attached to the March 2025 order stated the legal custody order was final. But this
statement does not change the fact that a final determination of custody required future
judicial action—the trial on counselor’s report. As such, the custody portion of the
March 2025 order was an interlocutory custody order and not appealable.
Mother further contends the March 2025 order improperly limited the scope of the
trial, but she cites to the February 2025 order in support. We have no jurisdiction to
review the February 2025 order because it is not part of mother’s appeal. (See Dakota
Payphone, LLC v. Alcaraz (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 493, 504 [our jurisdiction is limited in
scope to the notice of appeal and the judgment appealed from].) And the March 2025
order makes no mention of the scope of the upcoming trial. For the same reason, we lack
jurisdiction to review mother’s challenge to the timeliness of counselor’s report, to the
appointment of counselor, and to alleged procedural defects in a subsequent hearing.
6
Mother also contends we must overrule the March 2025 order because the family
court engaged in “judicial intimidation” by asking the bailiff to “escort her out” after she
raised objections to evaluator’s report. We reject this contention because it is not
supported by any citation to legal authority. (Tanguilig v. Valdez, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th
at p. 520.)
DISPOSITION
The family court’s denial of the application is affirmed. The appeal from the
custody portion of the March 2025 order is dismissed. No costs are awarded. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
We concur:
/s/
EARL, P. J.
/s/
MAURO, J.
7
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.