CourtListener 10866360•People v. Herrera CA1/5
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Filed 5/29/26 P. v. Herrera CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A170583
v.
ROBERT ANTHONY HERRERA, (Sonoma County
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. SCR-750361-1)
Defendant, Robert Anthony Herrera, appeals from his conviction
following a jury trial for multiple counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child
under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); counts 2 & 4)1 and multiple
counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child aged 14 or 15 (§ 288, subd. (c)(1);
counts 6–9). On appeal, defendant argues: (1) the jury was incorrectly
instructed that as to counts 6–9, the People must prove the child was 14
years old, rather than 14 or 15 years old; (2) the trial court violated his
constitutional and statutory rights to a jury trial by imposing the upper term
on count 2 based on two aggravating factors that the jury did not specifically
find true as to count 2; and (3) remand for resentencing is required because
the trial court relied on aggravating factors not found true by the jury. In
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.
1
supplemental briefing, defendant argues that the residual clause in
California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(c),2 is unconstitutional based on the
reasoning of Lovelace v. Superior Court (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1081
(Lovelace), and therefore the trial court was prohibited from relying upon it to
consider additional aggravating factors. He further argues that People v.
Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069 (Wiley) supports his entitlement to a remand for
resentencing based on the trial court’s consideration of an aggravating factor
not found true by the jury. We remand for resentencing because the trial
court relied on an aggravating factor not found true by the jury.
BACKGROUND3
Defendant was the stepfather of Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. On
June 17, 2022, the Sonoma County District Attorney filed an information
charging defendant with four counts of lewd act upon a child, Jane Doe 1,
under the age of 14 years (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 1 [in the car], 2 [in Doe 1’s
bed], 3 [hugging and touching Doe 1], 4 [kissing Doe 1]) and five counts of
lewd act upon a child, Jane Doe 2, age 14 or 15 years (§ 288, subd. (c)(1);
counts 5 [in the car], 6 [massaging Doe 2], 7 [massaging Doe 2 at another
time], 8 [in Doe 2’s bed], 9 [“ ‘motorboating’ ”]). The information also alleged
as circumstances in aggravation that the victims were particularly
vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)) and that defendant took advantage of a position
of trust or confidence to commit the offenses (rule 4.421(a)(11)).4
2 All references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
3 We omit a detailed recitation of the facts underlying defendant’s
offenses because they are not necessary to resolve the issues in his appeal.
4 The information alleged other aggravating factors, but the trial court
granted the People’s motion to dismiss the other aggravating factors.
2
On August 22, 2023, a jury found defendant guilty on counts 2, 4, and
6–9, and not guilty on counts 1, 3, and 5. The jury also found true that Doe 1
and Doe 2 were particularly vulnerable victims and that defendant took
advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offenses.
The People requested that defendant be sentenced to the upper term of
eight years on count 2 based on the jury’s true findings on the two
aggravating factors. The People’s sentencing brief explained that under
section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) the court may sentence a defendant to the
upper term only if circumstances in aggravation which justify the imposition
of the upper term have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury
or a judge in a court trial, or admitted by the defendant. The People further
requested that the trial court impose consecutive sentences on the remaining
counts of one-third the middle term, for a total sentence of 12 years 8 months.
The probation report recommended the same sentence.
Defendant filed a statement of mitigation requesting that the trial
court impose the lower term of three years on count 2 because his tumultuous
childhood was a contributing factor to his commission of the offenses.
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).) He asked that the sentence on the remaining counts
run concurrently. Alternatively, he requested that he be sentenced to the
lower term on count 2, consecutive to one-third the middle term on count 6,
for a total term of five years, with the remaining counts to run consecutively.
At the April 24, 2024, sentencing hearing, defendant made a statement
denying that he committed the offenses5 and disputing the thoroughness of
5 At trial defendant testified that he kissed the victims on the lips with
wet lips but denied trying to put his tongue in Doe 1’s mouth. He
acknowledged giving Doe 2 massages but denied touching either victim’s
vagina or Doe 2’s breasts. He testified that he did not cuddle in bed with the
victims under their blankets.
3
the investigation. Both sides then submitted on their sentencing briefs. The
trial court began by stating its opinion that the case was thoroughly
investigated and resulted in defendant’s convictions on six counts, as well as
true findings on aggravating factors related to the vulnerability of each
victim and taking advantage of the position of trust. The trial court then
explained its sentence as follows: “I would note that pursuant to 1170(b)(1)
defendant is eligible for an aggravated sentence in light of the fact the jury
did find beyond a reasonable doubt three aggravating factors.[6] [¶] The court
would also with respect to [rule] 4.421 subsection c consider facts reasonably
related to the circumstances of the conviction. That would include the fact
that Mr. Herrera did in fact testify, denied the allegations and the elements
of the crime. The jury, having convicted on counts related to abuse of both
victims, did not believe the defendant and as such this court finding that to
be a reasonable interpretation of the testimony believes that the defendant
did in fact continue and still continues to take [sic (not to take)]
accountability and did in fact lie on the stand. So that as [an] aggravating
factor [will] also [be] considered by the court. [¶] . . . The court has considered
both aggravating and mitigating factors, all of those listed by counsel in his
sentencing brief, including argument related to childhood trauma and a lack
of criminal history or significant criminal history. The court has considered
both of those. [¶] With respect to the childhood trauma, it is articulated that
it’s related to a loss of a parent. The language of the statute does say abuse
6 It appears that the trial court’s reference to three aggravating factors
was based on the aggravating factors verdict form, which lists the factors as:
“1. The victim was particularly vulnerable—Jane Doe #1.
“2. The victim was particularly vulnerable—Jane Doe #2.
“3. The defendant took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to
commit the offense.”
4
or neglect, psychological or physical violence, but does allow room for
something other than those specific things. In my review of the sentencing
brief and the probation report and defendant’s own testimony, the court finds
limited nexus of that experience to the crimes committed. Nonetheless, even
if so, the court does find that the aggravating factors so outweigh the
mitigating factors that the aggravated term is appropriate . . . .” The trial
court sentenced defendant to a total prison term of 12 years 8 months,
comprised of the aggravated term of eight years on count 2, plus consecutive
terms of one-third the middle term on the remaining counts.
DISCUSSION
I. Instructional Error
Defendant asserts that his convictions on counts 6–9, involving Doe 2,
must be reversed because the written jury instruction incorrectly stated that
the People must prove the child was 14 years old, rather than 14 or 15 years
old. We find defendant forfeited this claim by not objecting to the ambiguity
in the written instruction given. However, even assuming no forfeiture, we
find no prejudicial error.
A. Additional Facts
Doe 2 was born in mid-October 2005. She testified that when she was
15, defendant would get into her bed and press his body against hers and
touch her under her clothing, including close to her vagina. He also gave her
massages from her feet to below her breasts, and sometimes she felt his
finger “glaze over” her vagina. On another occasion, defendant “motorboated”
her chest while she was wearing a V-neck shirt, by putting his face against
her chest and shaking his head back and forth. On Doe 2’s 16th birthday,
defendant left the house after an argument with Doe 2’s mother. He moved
back home on October 31, 2021. On November 6, 2021, the police interviewed
5
Doe 1 and Doe 2, after Doe 1 reported defendant’s inappropriate touching to a
school counselor. Defendant was also interviewed by the police and was
arrested immediately after the interview.
The jury was orally instructed with CALCRIM No. 1112 as follows:
“The defendant is charged in Counts 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 with a lewd or lascivious
act on a 14 or 15 year old child who was at least 10 years younger than the
defendant. [¶] To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People
must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant willfully touched any part of the child’s
body whether on the bare skin or through the clothing; [¶] 2. The defendant
committed the act with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the
lust, passions, or sexual desires of himself or the child; [¶] 3. The child was 14
or 15 years old at the time of the act; and, [¶] 4. When the child [sic] acted,[7]
the child was at least 10 years younger than the defendant. [¶] The touching
need not be done in a rude or sexual manner. [¶] Someone commits an act
willfully when he or she does it willingly or on purpose. It is not required
that he or she intended to break the law, hurt someone else, or gain any
advantage. [¶] Actually arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust,
passions, or sexual desires of the perpetrator or child is not required. [¶] It is
not a defense that the child may have consented to the act. [¶] In determining
whether a person is at least 10 years older than a child, measure from the
person’s birth date to the child’s birth date. [¶] Under the law, a person
becomes one year older as soon as the first minute of his or her birthday has
begun. [¶] Conviction of a sex assault crime may be based on the testimony of
a complaining witness alone.” (Italics added.)
7 The written instruction correctly states the fourth element:“When
the defendant acted, the child was at least 10 years younger than the
defendant.”
6
The written instruction provided to the jury correctly states that the
charges in counts 5–9 are for “a lewd or lascivious act on a 14- or 15-year-old
child who was at least 10 years younger than the defendant.” However, the
third element of the offense incorrectly states that the People must prove:
“The child was 14 years old at the time of the act.” Defendant argues this
incorrect statement in the written instruction was prejudicial instructional
error.
B. Analysis
As an initial matter, defendant’s claim of instructional error appears to
be forfeited. Defendant did not alert the trial court to the misstatement of
the victim’s age in one portion of the written instruction. (People v.
Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 906 [claim of instructional error forfeited
when defendant “did not object to, or request amplification or clarification of,
. . . the instructions at trial”].) Defendant’s claim is also without merit.
We independently review claims of instructional error. (People v.
Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) If a jury instruction is ambiguous, we
must decide whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury
misunderstood and misapplied the instruction. In doing so, we consider the
challenged language in the context of the entire instructions and trial record.
(People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 107.) We also “ ‘must consider the
arguments of counsel in assessing the probable impact of the instruction on
the jury.’ ” (Id. at p. 109.) The written instruction was ambiguous in that it
stated at one point that the charges were lewd or lascivious acts on a 14- or
15-year-old child but then stated the People were required to prove the child
was 14 years old. However, the verdict forms for the challenged counts each
state the jury found defendant guilty of “Section 288(c)(1) . . . , lewd and/or
lascivious act upon a child 14 or 15, in that the defendant did willfully,
7
unlawfully, and lewdly commit a lewd and/or lascivious act upon the body of
Jane Doe #2, who was 14 or 15 years old . . . .” (Some capitalization omitted.)
Further, Jane Doe 2 testified that she was 15 years old at the time of the
offense and defendant moved out of the house on her 16th birthday. The
prosecutor’s closing argument emphasized that as to the counts regarding
Jane Doe 2 (counts 6–9), the People were required to prove the victim was 14
or 15 years old. Defense counsel even commented in his closing argument
that the victims’ ages were “not an issue.” Defendant has not established a
reasonable likelihood that the jury misapplied the single erroneous statement
in one portion of the written CALCRIM No. 1112 instruction.
II. Sentencing
Defendant argues the trial court erred in sentencing him to the upper
term on count 2 because (1) the jury did not find the aggravating factors true
as to count 2 specifically; and (2) the trial court relied on defendant’s lack of
remorse or lack of accountability, which was not found true by the jury. We
reject defendant’s first argument. However, we remand for resentencing
based on defendant’s second argument.
A. Aggravating Circumstances Found True by Jury as to
Count 2
Defendant alleges that because the jury returned “generic verdict forms
that were not count-specific” regarding the aggravating factors, the jury did
not necessarily find the two aggravating factors true as to count 2. Therefore,
according to defendant, the trial court erred by imposing the upper term on
count 2. Defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object to the verdict
forms, and the record demonstrates no error, in any event.
The verdict form for the aggravating factors begins by stating that the
jury finds “as to the above offenses, enhancements and special allegations,
the following sentencing factors in aggravation relating to the crime and
8
relating to the defendant apply.” It then lists the following factors relating to
the crime: “1. The victim was particularly vulnerable—Jane Doe #1.
[¶] . . . [¶] 2. The victim was particularly vulnerable—Jane Doe #2. [¶] . . . [¶]
3. The defendant took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit
the offense.” The jury found each itemized factor true. Count 2 charged a
violation of section 288, subdivision (a), lewd and lascivious act upon a child
under 14, based on defendant’s conduct against Jane Doe 1. The jury was
also instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 3226 and 3233, which explain each
aggravating factor. CALCRIM No. 3226 begins by stating: “If you find the
defendant guilty of any of the crimes charged in Counts 1–9, you must then
decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that
Jane Doe 1 and/or Jane Doe 2 were particularly vulnerable victims.”
Similarly, CALCRIM No. 3233 begins by stating: “If you find the defendant
guilty of any of the crimes charged in Counts 1–9, you must then decide
whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant
took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the crime.”
Defendant’s complaint appears to be that the language of the verdict
forms was imprecise. “An objection to jury verdict forms is generally deemed
waived if not raised in the trial court.” (People v. Toro (1989) 47 Cal.3d 966,
976, fn. 6, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Guiuan (1998)
18 Cal.4th 558, 568, fn. 3; People v. Lewis (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1135, 1142
[failure to object to verdict forms in trial court “precludes consideration of
appellate challenge thereto”].) Defendant failed to object below to the
language of the aggravating factor verdict forms and has waived his
complaint that they were too generic to be relied upon by the trial court at
sentencing. Further, defendant did not raise this issue in his mitigation
statement. Nor did he object at his sentencing hearing to the trial court’s
9
reliance on any of the aggravating factors found true by the jury. (See People
v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 355–356 [holding defendant waived claim that
trial court abused its discretion in aggravating his sentence based on factors
that were inapplicable, duplicative, and improperly weighed] (Scott).) We
also reject defendant’s claim that the issue is preserved for review because it
impacts his substantial rights to a trial by jury. The aggravating factors
were argued to, and decided by, a jury.
Even if defendant had preserved this issue for review, we would reject
his contention that the jury may not have found the aggravating factors true
as to count 2. The jury instructions and the verdict forms make clear that the
jury’s true finding applied as to each guilty count, one of which was count 2.
Defendant’s mere speculation that jury may have found the aggravating
factors true as to the other counts on which defendant was convicted, but not
as to count 2, has no support in the record.
B. Trial Court’s Reliance on Additional Aggravating Factor
Not Submitted to Jury
Defendant contends we must remand for resentencing under People v.
Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch) because the trial court erroneously
relied on a third aggravating factor, that defendant failed to take
accountability, which was not decided by the jury. In his supplemental brief
he argues that the trial court’s reliance on rule 4.421(c)8 is unconstitutional
based on the reasoning of Lovelace, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th 1081, and that
Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th 1069 also supports resentencing.
8 Rule 4.421 enumerates 12 circumstances in aggravation “relating to
the crime” (rule 4.421(a)(1)–(12)) and five “relating to the defendant.” (Rule
4.421(b)(1)–(5).) Subdivision (c), sometimes referred to as the residual clause,
states circumstances in aggravation may also include “[a]ny other factors . . .
that reasonably relate to the defendant or the circumstances under which the
crime was committed.”
10
Defendant’s claims are based on the trial court’s statements at
sentencing that “[t]he court would also with respect to [rule] 4.421
subsection c consider facts reasonably related to the circumstances of the
conviction. That would include the fact that Mr. Herrera did in fact testify,
denied the allegations and the elements of the crime. The jury, having
convicted on counts related to abuse of both victims, did not believe the
defendant and as such this court finding that to be a reasonable
interpretation of the testimony believes that the defendant did in fact
continue and still continues to take [sic (not to take)] accountability and did
in fact lie on the stand. So that as [an] aggravating factor [will] also [be]
considered by the court. . . .”
The trial court’s authority to impose an upper term sentence is
addressed in section 1170, subdivision (b), which authorizes an upper term
“only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify
the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the
facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury or
by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) The People do not
dispute that the trial court relied on an additional aggravating factor not
presented to the jury. Instead, they assert that defendant forfeited this
challenge because he did not object at sentencing. Defendant responds that
the trial court relied upon an improper method of aggravating his sentence,
and thus it imposed an unauthorized sentence, which is an exception to the
forfeiture doctrine.
We question whether the unauthorized sentence exception to forfeiture
applies under these facts. The upper term sentence could have been imposed
based on only the aggravating factors of victim vulnerability and taking
11
advantage of a position of trust, which were found true by the jury. (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(2).) Therefore, the upper term is not a sentence that “could not
lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.” (Scott,
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354; People v. Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037,
1043.) However, to forestall a future claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, we exercise our discretion to excuse any possible forfeiture and
address defendant’s claim on the merits. (People v. Williams (1998) 17
Cal.4th 148, 161–162, fn. 6.)
The People do not argue the merits of defendant’s claim that the trial
court erred by relying on an aggravating circumstance not found true by the
jury.9 They also expressly do not contend that any error in failing to submit
the third aggravating factor to the jury was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
As our Supreme Court recently explained, section 1170, subdivision (b)
“trigger[s] the Sixth Amendment jury trial right with respect to every
aggravating factor (other than a prior conviction) the trial court uses to
justify an upper term sentence,” and “under the current statute a Sixth
Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven
aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other
9 The People’s supplemental brief argues that defendant’s claim that
the residual clause of rule 4.421(c) is unconstitutional fails on the merits
because suborning perjury or otherwise illegally interfering with the judicial
process is an enumerated circumstance in aggravation under rule 4.421(a)(6).
This argument supports the People’s position that the constitutionality of the
residual clause of rule 4.421(c) does not need to be decided. However, it does
not respond to the fact that the trial court relied upon an aggravating
circumstance that was not found true by the jury. In addition, defendant
argues that the trial court incorrectly considered the defendant’s “ ‘lack of
remorse’ ” or “ ‘lack of accountability,’ ” neither of which is an enumerated
circumstance in aggravation under rule 4.421.
12
aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.” (Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 768, italics added.) Such a violation is “prejudicial unless an
appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would
have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon to justify an upper
term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance
with the current statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so
determine, applying the Chapman [v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 17
L.Ed.2d 705] standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for
resentencing.” (Ibid.)
Applying these principles, we find the trial court erred in relying on the
defendant’s continuing failure to take accountability for his actions. This
additional aggravating factor was not decided by the jury but, rather, was a
conclusion made by the trial court based on both defendant’s trial testimony
and his continuing claim of innocence at sentencing. Although the jury did
not believe defendant’s testimony as to six of the nine counts charged, it was
never asked to decide the issue of his lack of accountability, and since the
jury was excused before sentencing, it obviously could not have made a
finding that defendant “continued” to fail to take accountability. “Only when
aggravating facts have been proven as the Constitution requires may the
court then rely on them to conclude, in its discretion, that those facts justify
an upper term.” (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1084.)
As noted, the People concede that any error in relying on aggravating
factors not determined by the jury is prejudicial under the Chapman
standard. We agree. The People did not prove, and could not have proved, a
lack of remorse or lack of accountability without burdening defendant’s
constitutional right to testify at trial and maintain his innocence. (People v.
Key (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 888, 900 [lack of remorse may not be used as
13
aggravating factor when defendant denies guilt and evidence is conflicting];
see People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 356 [at penalty phase of capital
crime prosecutor may properly comment on a defendant’s lack of remorse as
relevant to whether remorse is present as a mitigating circumstance but may
not suggest that lack of remorse is an aggravating factor].) We “cannot find
the omission of a jury trial harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to every
aggravating fact relied upon by the trial court to impose an upper term,” and
thus we must remand for resentencing. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 776.)
However, our remand is based only on the trial court’s reliance on
aggravating factors not found true by the jury. Defendant’s opening brief
argues that remand is required “not only [on] the ‘accountability’ issue which
the court independently relied upon without consideration by the jury, but
also the two aggravating factors which the jury found true.” He incorrectly
claims, without citation to the record, that as to the two aggravating factors
submitted to the jury, the jury was “never asked to find those factors true
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Defendant is wrong. The jury instructions for
the aggravating factors specifically state the People’s burden to prove the
allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.
Given that we find remand for resentencing is required because the
trial court relied on an aggravating factor not found true by the jury, we need
not address defendant’s arguments regarding the constitutionality of the
residual clause set forth in rule 4.421(c) as analyzed in Lovelace, supra, 108
Cal.App.5th 1081. (People v. Buza (2018) 4 Cal.5th 658, 693.)
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for
resentencing with directions that the trial court exercise its sentencing
14
discretion without considering aggravating factors that were not found true
by the jury. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
Jackson, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
Burns, J.
Chou, J.
A170583/People v. Robert Anthony Herrera
15
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