Sandles v. Cal. Commission on Teacher Credentialing CA5

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Filed 5/28/26 Sandles v. Cal. Commission on Teacher Credentialing CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DAVID LEE SANDLES,
F089140
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. BCV-23-102712)
v.

CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON TEACHER OPINION
CREDENTIALING,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Gregory A.
Pulskamp, Judge.
Prometheus Civic Law and Matthew Sean Harrison for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Carl W. Sonne, Assistant Attorney General,
Joshua A. Room, Shawn Paul Cook, and Matthew A. King, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Defendant and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION

Appellant David Lee Sandles seeks review of the denial of his petition for a writ
of administrative mandamus, which sought to set aside the decision of respondent
California Commission on Teacher Credentialing revoking his teaching credentials.
Appellant asserts the trial court applied the wrong standard of review by inappropriately
deferring to respondent’s findings, rather than conducting a limited trial de novo.
Further, appellant claims the court did not apply the factors set forth in Morrison v. State
Board of Education (1969) 1 Cal.3d 214 (Morrison), the seminal case on judicial review
of the revocation of teaching licenses. We agree with appellant on both counts. The
court applied neither the correct test nor the correct standard of review in evaluating
respondent’s decision. We find these errors were prejudicial, as it is reasonably probable
the court would not have reached the same conclusions as respondent, had it approached
this case using its independent judgment, rather than deferring to the agency.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellant first became credentialed as a teacher in California in April 2001,
ultimately holding multiple subject and specialist instruction credentials. Appellant
began working for the Bakersfield City School District (BCSD)1 in 2004, working as an
elementary and middle school teacher. By all accounts, appellant was an accomplished,
well-regarded, and effective instructor, and was respected and liked by his colleagues as
well as his students and their parents. He obtained a master’s degree in education in 2011
from California State University, Bakersfield (CSUB), and a doctorate in education in
2013 from California State University, Fresno. Appellant taught primarily low-income
and English learning students with “multiple educational and mental health challenges.”

1 BCSD is a large school district, comprising almost 30,000 students, over 4,000
employees, and more than 40 schools.

2.
He was named Teacher of the Year in 2008–2009, established and ran a successful
spelling bee program, received positive teacher evaluations, ran a districtwide summer
training institute for more than 500 teachers, and was the team lead for his middle
school’s Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports program, which received an
award.
Appellant’s relationship with his superiors became contentious in 2017. At a
May 2017 meeting of the local school board, appellant publicly spoke out about the new
superintendent’s demotion of his middle school principal and installation of a new
principal. Both appellant and his wife continued to speak out at various school board
meetings between 2017 and 2019, apparently consistently at odds with the administration
over various issues, including the cancellation of a summer school program appellant
taught and the failure to raise teacher salaries. Because of his comments at these
meetings, appellant claims he was the subject of hostility and retaliation from the
superintendent and the new principal. This included critical comments and other
communications from the principal and/or superintendent, the cancellation of programs
appellant had been involved with, exclusion from school board meetings, removal of
appellant from certain additional responsibilities, reprimands to appellant for taking
students off campus, a refusal to allow appellant a work-free break for lunch, and
overheard conversations about the superintendent and/or principal “ ‘getting rid’ ” of
appellant. Further, appellant learned the superintendent had threatened to contact
unspecified “friends” who worked for respondent to make sure appellant’s teaching
credentials were revoked. Ultimately, in April 2019, appellant began to see a therapist
and a physician, because he began experiencing panic attacks, difficulty sleeping,
depression, and heart palpitations due to his stress level from his working environment.
Prior to the start of the 2019–2020 school year, appellant was unsure whether he
would return to work for BCSD, given his concerns about retaliation and the impact on
his health. Because he needed to continue to work, he applied for and was offered a

3.
teaching position at CSUB. As the 2019–2020 school year began at BCSD, appellant
took a leave of absence, which was ultimately approved by the district, between
August 12 and September 14, 2019.2 During this period, the human resources
department for BCSD contacted appellant and advised that he needed to submit a request
for medical leave form showing his leave was approved by a doctor. Appellant provided
such a note on the district’s form,3 signed by his doctor, excusing him from work for the
above period.
The crux of this case is that appellant continued teaching for CSUB during his
leave period from BCSD.4 An assistant superintendent for BCSD was browsing a social
networking site while at work and saw photos of appellant posted on a CSUB social
media page. The photos contained no time stamps, and because BCSD teachers were
allowed to have employment outside of BCSD, the photos themselves did not depict
appellant doing anything necessarily improper. The assistant superintendent then decided
to investigate the matter further, calling a contact of his at CSUB and then independently
researching appellant’s teaching schedule at CSUB. In doing so, the assistant
superintendent discovered the class appellant was teaching for CSUB would have
overlapped with his work for BCSD, had he not been on leave. The superintendent with
whom appellant had been involved in an ongoing dispute then contacted the human

2 According to testimony from a human resources employee at BCSD, if a teacher
took a leave of absence, it would first come out of sick leave. Teachers accrued 11 days
of sick leave per year; if they did not use all of it, it would roll over to subsequent school
years.
3 The form appears to be a combined form used for all forms of medical leave,
including those requested pursuant to the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)
and the California Family Rights Act (CFRA), as well as for extended pregnancy
disability leave. It specifically directs the physician not to include or disclose any
medical diagnosis.
4 BCSD permitted teachers to hold outside employment, so long as it did not
conflict with their work duties at BCSD. Indeed, appellant had taught as an adjunct
professor at other universities during his tenure with BCSD.

4.
resources administrator for BCSD and directed her to investigate appellant’s purported
misuse of leave. The human resources administrator and the associate superintendent
then showed up unannounced during appellant’s class at CSUB and confronted him,
ultimately demanding that he come see them after the class concluded. Appellant did not
go see the human resources administrator, but instead sent her an email resigning from
BCSD. Various BCSD personnel testified that this use of leave violated the school
district’s leave or other policies, although the basis for this conclusion appears to be
strictly their testimony, as no written policies to this effect were apparently introduced
into evidence.
Unrelated to the current dispute between appellant, BCSD, and respondent, in
2002, appellant was arrested following an argument and “minor physical altercation”
between appellant and his wife. During the argument, at some point, appellant
purportedly kicked his wife in the back of her right calf, which left a “very slight red
mark on her leg.” Appellant was arrested and charged with two misdemeanors for
violating Penal Code section 243, subdivision (e)(1) (battery of a spouse) and Penal Code
section 415, subdivision (2) (disturbance of another person by loud and unreasonable
noise). He ultimately pleaded no contest to a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code
section 415 for disturbing another by a loud and unreasonable noise, which was later
expunged.5 Appellant disclosed this conviction to respondent in 2002, the year the
incident occurred. Appellant and his wife remain married.
Following appellant’s resignation from BCSD, respondent brought disciplinary
proceedings against appellant. Respondent alleged that appellant’s teaching credentials

5 We note that respondent, in its decision, repeatedly refers to appellant’s “domestic
violence,” seemingly to cast further disapprobation upon appellant and bolster its
conclusion to revoke his credentials. Given that appellant was never convicted of a
domestic violence or battery charge, we will refer to this as the “misdemeanor” or
“misdemeanor conviction” throughout this opinion.

5.
should be revoked for unprofessional conduct, unfitness for service, immoral conduct,
persistent defiance of and refusal to obey laws, and acts of moral turpitude, based on the
fact of his 2002 conviction and his use of leave in violation of BCSD’s policies.
The matter was heard by an administrative law judge (ALJ) between October 19
and 20, 2022, who heard testimony and took documents into evidence. The ALJ
concluded respondent had demonstrated appellant had engaged in unprofessional and
immoral conduct by violating BCSD’s leave policies,6 and had committed an act
involving moral turpitude, finding appellant’s submission of a medical leave form was
“dishonest” because it allowed him “to delay his inevitable decision about which job to
maintain and which job to resign from,” which was “contrary to the duties he owed to
[BCSD] and [his] students.” The ALJ found appellant had not engaged in persistent
defiance of any laws and that respondent had failed to demonstrate appellant’s unfitness
to teach. The ALJ noted that most of appellant’s career with BCSD was “marked by
quality teaching, leadership, and volunteering with his students to help them achieve
educational accomplishments, without issues raised by [BCSD].” According to the ALJ,
appellant “has continued his contribution to education, leadership, and to his community
through his work with CSUB.” Further, the ALJ noted that, “[w]hile not justified or
excusable, [appellant’s] violative conduct is attributable to his increasingly negative work
environment and removal from many of his [teaching] duties, and to a weakness in
character not previously or subsequently demonstrated.”
While the ALJ found appellant’s behavior “adversely affected” his students,
because it did not allow the district to permanently fill his position “though he likely
knew he would not return to work for [BCSD],” “any harm caused to the students was
temporary and isolated in nature.” Further, while the conduct occurred over the course of

6 The ALJ found the disclosed and expunged misdemeanor conviction was
irrelevant to the current disciplinary proceedings.

6.
approximately one month, the ALJ noted it “presented as one event of misconduct, and
not as multiple acts of wrongdoing or as a pattern of misconduct,” and was “unlikely” to
reoccur. Although the ALJ concluded appellant had made misrepresentations in his
testimony and submissions that showed indifference and a lack of remorse for his
conduct, it found appellant’s “misconduct is not deemed the most serious, if for no other
reason [than] he did not directly harm any student physically or emotionally. [Appellant]
was suffering emotional or physical difficulties which substantially contributed to the
misconduct. Having found and maintained work elsewhere, [appellant] no longer has
such difficulties. [Appellant’s] general good character was demonstrated through his
character witnesses and through his years of service to his students, employers, and to the
field of education.” Based on all of these findings and the ALJ’s consideration of the
evidence, the ALJ concluded revocation of the credentials was excessive, and directed
that appellant’s credentials be suspended for one year.
Respondent rejected the ALJ’s findings and decision in February 2023.
Respondent found that it had demonstrated appellant engaged in unprofessional conduct,
immoral conduct, and acts of moral turpitude. Respondent concluded it had not
demonstrated appellant showed a persistent defiance of any laws or unfitness to teach.
The basis for these conclusions was both appellant’s 2002 criminal conviction and his
violation of BCSD’s leave policies. Respondent found that the only way to protect the
public was to revoke appellant’s teaching credentials.
In August 2023, appellant filed a petition for writ of mandate to review
respondent’s order revoking his teaching credentials. The trial court denied appellant’s
writ, finding that it must defer to the propriety of any penalty imposed by an
administrative agency unless there has been a “manifest abuse of discretion.” It noted it
could only intervene if the penalty was an “ ‘arbitrary, capricious or patently abusive
exercise of discretion.’ ” While noting it would have given a “slight preference to the
penalty proposed by the ALJ,” it concluded the penalty imposed by respondent was “still

7.
certainly within the bounds of reasonable discretion.” Judgment was entered in
November 2024. A notice of appeal was timely filed.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards

Administrative mandamus actions such as this one are brought under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1094.5, which allows for a court to review “the validity of any
final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding” where “a
hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the
determination of facts is vested.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (a).) “The inquiry in
such a case shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded without,
or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any
prejudicial abuse of discretion.” (Id., subd. (b).) “Abuse of discretion is established if
the respondent has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order or decision is
not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Ibid.)
“Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in
which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the
evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are
not supported by the weight of the evidence.” (Id., subd. (c).)
Courts apply the independent judgment standard when the administrative action
substantially affects a fundamental vested right. (Hughes v. Board of Architectural
Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 789; Berlinghieri v. Department of Motor Vehicles
(1983) 33 Cal.3d 392, 395; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130 (Bixby)7.) Proceedings
to revoke a professional license substantially affect a fundamental right. (Sandarg v.
Dental Board of California (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1440; Owen v. Sands (2009)

7 Bixby is the seminal case which first clearly articulated that fundamental vested
rights are subject to independent judgment review by courts following action by an
administrative agency. (Bixby, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 144–147.)

8.
176 Cal.App.4th 985, 991; Evans v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th
958, 967, fn. 1; see Ed. Code, § 44945 [“The court, on review, shall exercise its
independent judgment on the evidence.”].) The parties agree the trial court was required
to utilize the “independent judgment” standard.
In implementing the “independent judgment” standard, trial courts are directed to
“afford a strong presumption of correctness” to the administrative findings, which is
another way of saying that “the party challenging the administrative decision bears the
burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight
of the evidence.” (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 817.) This
presumption is “ ‘an admonition to the court’ ” that provides “a starting point for review,”
but “is only a presumption, and may be overcome.” (Id. at p. 818.) “Because the trial
court ultimately must exercise its own independent judgment, that court is free to
substitute its own findings after first giving due respect to the agency’s findings.” (Ibid.)
In order to implement this standard, ultimately, the court still must weigh the evidence,
make its own credibility determinations, and reach its own independent decision.
(Rodriguez v. City of Santa Cruz (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1451; Vaill v. Edmonds
(1991) 4 Cal.App.4th 247, 258 [trial court must “make its own determination as to
whether the administrative findings should be sustained”]; James v. Board of Dental
Examiners (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1096, 1105 [trial court “reweighs the evidence in a
limited trial de novo”]; Petrucci v. Board of Medical Examiners (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d
83, 86–87.) This requires the trial court to weigh the same factors used by the agency in
rendering its findings, in order to make its own independent determination as to the
appropriateness of revoking a professional license. (Broney v. California Com. on
Teacher Credentialing (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 462, 474–475 (Broney) [concluding it was
error for trial court not to apply the Morrison factors to revocation proceeding for
repeated convictions for driving while intoxicated].)

9.
We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence, and its legal
conclusions de novo. (Rodriguez v. City of Santa Cruz, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1452; Angelier v. State Board of Pharmacy (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 592, 595, fn.3.)
The standards for revocation of a teaching license were first enumerated in
Morrison, supra, 1 Cal.3d 214. In Morrison, a teacher engaged in a brief homosexual
relationship outside of school with another teacher; some years later, after the fact of this
relationship was made known, the Board of Education investigated the matter and
ultimately revoked the appellant’s teaching credentials because the homosexual acts, even
though conducted outside of and away from the school, constituted “immoral and
unprofessional conduct, and an act involving moral turpitude.” (Id. at pp. 218–220.)8
In Morrison, the California Supreme Court held that the Board of Education could
not abstractly characterize conduct as “ ‘immoral,’ ” “ ‘unprofessional,’ ” or “ ‘involving
moral turpitude,’ ” unless it found that the specific conduct involved “indicates that the
petitioner is unfit to teach.” (Morrison, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 229.) In determining
whether the conduct at issue revealed the teacher was unfit to teach, the court noted trial
courts could and should consider the following nonexhaustive list: (1) “the likelihood
that the conduct may have adversely affected students or fellow teachers”; (2) “the degree
of such adversity anticipated”; (3) “the proximity or remoteness in time of the conduct”;
(4) “the type of teaching certificate held by the party involved”; (5) “the extenuating or
aggravating circumstances, if any, surrounding the conduct”; (6) “the praiseworthiness or
blameworthiness of the motives resulting in the conduct”; (7) “the likelihood of the

8 While the Education Code has since been substantially rewritten and renumbered,
and the specific section at issue in Morrison no longer exists, the code section at issue in
this case permits respondent to revoke teaching credentials for similar reasons, i.e., “for
immoral or unprofessional conduct, or for persistent defiance of, and refusal to obey, the
laws regulating the duties of persons serving in the public school system, … or for evident
unfitness for service.” (Ed. Code, § 44421.) Indeed, here, respondent revoked appellant’s
teaching credentials based on findings of unprofessional and immoral conduct, and for acts
of moral turpitude.

10.
recurrence of the questioned conduct”; and (8) “the extent to which disciplinary action
may inflict an adverse impact or chilling effect upon the constitutional rights of the
teacher involved or other teachers.” (Ibid.) These factors are relevant to the extent that
they assist in determining “the teacher’s fitness to teach, i.e., in determining whether the
teacher’s future classroom performance and overall impact on his students are likely to
meet the board’s standards.” (Id. at p. 230.) Where an examination is made with such
factors focusing the inquiry between the conduct alleged and the teacher’s fitness to
teach, only then are terms such as “unprofessional,” “moral turpitude,” and “immoral”
sufficiently particularized as to avoid constitutional due process concerns for vagueness.
(Id. at pp. 230–235.)
Lest there be any confusion, the California Supreme Court made clear in Morrison
itself that this multifactored analysis was subject to independent review by the courts. In
closing, the court specifically stated: “the relevant statutes, as well as the applicable
principles of constitutional law, require only that the board properly find, pursuant to the
precepts set forth in this opinion, that an individual is not fit to teach. Whenever
disciplinary action rests upon such grounds and has been confirmed by the judgment of a
superior court following an independent review of the evidence, this court will uphold the
result.” (Morrison, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 240, italics added.) While this opinion predated
Bixby by several years, and thus predated the general requirement that a fundamental
vested right be subject to independent judgment by the trial courts, the court in Morrison
cited to two opinions—Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67 and
Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners (1948) 32 Cal.2d 301—both of which were later
relied upon in Bixby. (See Bixby, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 143, fn. 9.) Thus, from both the
general rule set forth in Bixby concerning review of agency actions substantially affecting
fundamental vested rights, and the specific rule in Morrison concerning revocation of
teaching credentials, it is abundantly clear the trial court must apply its own independent
judgment to the matter at hand.

11.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Render an Independent Judgment Based on an Analysis
of the Factors Set Forth in Morrison
In this case, it is clear the trial court did not render an independent judgment and
instead deferred to the administrative agency’s findings.9 We find this based both on the
court’s language used to explain its decision and its failure to apply the Morrison factors
on its own. This warrants reversal of the judgment and remand to the court to conduct a
“limited trial de novo” and render an independent judgment on the evidence. This will,
of course, require the court to evaluate the Morrison factors.
The language the trial court used in its decision shows its failure to exercise its
independent judgment regarding any part of this matter. After recounting the procedural
background of the hearing before the ALJ and respondent’s ultimate decision revoking
the credentials, the court noted the ALJ and respondent “obviously differed in their
opinion regarding the appropriate remedy needed to sufficiently protect the public,
schoolchildren, and the teaching profession.” However, the court found it “significant to
note that the ALJ and [r]espondent both shared a great number of the same observations
about the case.” The court noted “both found that [appellant] had made positive
contributions to education and had received several commendations as a teacher”; both
“very appropriately rejected [appellant’s] misdemeanor conviction as a factual basis to
support any type of negative action against the teaching credentials”;10 both “concluded
that [appellant] engaged in unprofessional and immoral conduct when he failed to report

9 We note that respondent makes several waiver arguments in its brief, including
that appellant did not present all material evidence in the record in support of the
judgment. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.) We do not find
appellant’s opening brief so lacking as to warrant waiver. We find respondent’s other
waiver arguments similarly unconvincing.
10 It is perhaps because of the excessive deference the trial court gave to the
administrative proceedings that it failed to recognize that, in fact, respondent did not
discount the misdemeanor conviction at all. Instead, as discussed further below, respondent
specifically factored this misdemeanor conviction into its decision rejecting the ALJ’s
recommendation and revoking appellant’s teaching credential.

12.
to work for the [BCSD] due to a purported illness, while still being able to work for
CSUB during the same time period”; and both “agree that [appellant] made multiple
misrepresentations during the investigation and pendency of this matter” and lacked
“remorse.” As such, the only factual findings the court made were that the ALJ and
respondent agreed with each other on a number of points.
The trial court then went on to discuss the legal standard to be applied. However,
it failed to include any discussion of the independent judgment standard. Instead, it
stated that a penalty imposed by an administrative agency was “a matter vested in the
discretion of the agency” and that such a decision would not be disturbed “unless there
has been a clear abuse of discretion.” The two cases the court then cited—Nightingale v.
State Personnel Board (1972) 7 Cal.3d 507 and Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage Control
Appeals Board (1965) 62 Cal.2d 589—were not cases involving the “independent
judgment” standard. Nightingale applied the “substantial evidence” standard used in
cases when a “fundamental vested right” is not at issue. (Nightingale, at p. 514; Mann v.
Department of Motor Vehicles (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 312, 320 [“The ‘substantial
evidence’ rule applies when the administrative decision neither involves nor substantially
affects a vested right.”].) The opinion in Harris, meanwhile, was issued in 1965, some
six years prior to the California Supreme Court’s decision in Bixby, which first articulated
that administrative decisions substantially affecting vested fundamental rights must be
subject to independent judgment review. (See Bixby, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 141–147.)
Of the other cases cited in this section of the opinion, one—Brown v. Gordon
(1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 659—was likewise decided prior to Bixby. Another—Szmaciarz
v. State Personnel Board (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 904—relied on Nightingale, Harris, and
Brown for its authority that disciplinary decisions fell within the discretion of the
administrative agency and should not be disturbed unless “clearly excessive.”
(Szmaciarz, at p. 921.) The only cited case that recognized and appeared to consider the
independent judgment standard at all—Cadilla v. Board of Medical Examiners (1972) 26

13.
Cal.App.3d 961—ultimately declined to apply it, explaining that Bixby applied only to
the determination of whether the appellant had engaged in acts of moral turpitude and did
not apply to the question of what penalty was to be imposed for those acts. (Cadilla, at
pp. 965–968.) Thus, nothing about the trial court’s legal citations indicates that it
understood it was to be applying its own independent judgment to the case.
After citing this law about the deference to be given to the agency’s choice of
punishment, the trial court then noted that this “appears to be a case in which ‘reasonable
minds might differ as to the propriety of the penalty imposed.’ ” The court then observed
that it would not choose the same punishment as respondent, and would instead favor the
one-year suspension recommended by the ALJ, but then found the penalty was “within
the bounds of reasonable discretion.” It thus concluded respondent did not abuse its
discretion and denied the petition. All of this leads us to the conclusion that the court did
not apply its independent judgment in denying appellant’s writ. It is clear the court did
not appreciate its responsibility to make an independent judgment as to the facts of the
case or independently review the Morrison factors, but rather believed its role was
constrained to determining whether respondent had engaged in a “clear abuse of
discretion” as to the limited question of which penalty was appropriate. This is
fundamentally incorrect, and shows the court did not appreciate the scope and breadth of
its decisionmaking power.11 This alone is sufficient for reversal.

11 We do note respondent’s argument the trial court made an explicit finding that it
was exercising its independent judgment. Following its minute order, the court directed
respondent to prepare a draft order “consistent with this ruling for the Court’s signature.”
The draft order respondent prepared, which the court signed, stated: “The Court, having
read and considered all pleadings and documents on file in this action, having heard oral
argument, having taken the matter under submission, and having exercised its
independent judgment, hereby denies the petition for writ of administrative mandate.”
(Italics added.) We do not think a formulaic recitation of a different standard in an order
prepared by the prevailing party is sufficient to insulate the court’s decision from
criticism, particularly where the court’s own minute order explaining its decision
indicated it neither appreciated the standard it was required to apply nor in fact applied

14.
However, even more importantly, the trial court failed to analyze or interact—in
any way—with the factors enumerated in Morrison. Respondent concedes this point,
noting the “trial court did not conduct its own Morrison analysis.” We do not see how
the court could exercise its duty to conduct an independent review of the question at the
heart of Morrison—whether appellant’s behavior evidences his “unfitness to teach”—
without reviewing the facts and applying them to any of the applicable Morrison factors
or others as may be appropriate to the case. We do not find respondent’s argument to the
contrary to be persuasive. Respondent argues title 5, section 80302 of the California
Code of Regulations only requires respondent to employ the Morrison factors, not the
trial court. However, the requirement that the court employ the Morrison factors does not
derive from these regulations, but rather from Morrison itself. The Supreme Court in
Morrison clearly called for independent court review of the factors set forth in that case,
noting teachers may still be disciplined if the relevant body “properly find[s], pursuant to
the precepts set forth in this opinion, that an individual is not fit to teach. Whenever
disciplinary action rests upon such grounds and has been confirmed by the judgment of a
superior court following an independent review of the evidence, this court will uphold the
result.” (Morrison, 1 Cal. 3d at p. 240, fn. omitted, italics added.) Furthermore, virtually
every published case concerning this issue notes the trial court in fact applied the
Morrison factors when discipline was imposed for unprofessional or immoral conduct,
and the Court of Appeal has repeatedly endorsed this approach. (See, e.g., Crawford v.
Commission on Professional Competence of Jurupa Unified School District (2020) 53
Cal.App.5th 327, 338 [“Applying the Morrison factors, the trial court here found that the
[commission’s] decision was supported by the weight of the evidence.”]; Broney, supra,

that standard. (See Alberda v. Board of Retirement of Fresno County Employees’
Retirement Assn. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 426, 435.) Nor do we think the court’s passing
reference in its own minute order to “the weight of the evidence” shows the exercise of
independent judgment, since the court clearly viewed its decision as a deferential one
concerning the choice of punishment to be imposed. (Ibid.)

15.
184 Cal.App.4th at p. 476 [“the trial court, in addition to applying a per se rule, weighed
the evidence under the Morrison factors”]; Governing Board v. Haar (1994) 28
Cal.App.4th 369, 383 [“In applying the Morrison factors, the trial court stated that .…”];
West Valley-Mission Community College District v. Concepcion (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th
1766, 1777 [observing the trial court “considered the most pertinent Morrison factors and
concluded correctly that Miller is unfit to teach”]; Bevli v. Brisco (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d
986, 991 [“The Morrison factors must be analyzed in all cases of teacher discharge for
evident unfitness.”]; see San Diego Unified School District v. Commission on
Professional Competence (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1140; San Diego Unified School
District v. Commission on Professional Competence (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1462–
1466; Woodland Joint Unified School District v. Commission on Professional
Competence (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1440; Bassett Unified School District v.
Commission on Professional Competence (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1444, 1453–1454;
Perez v. Commission on Professional Competence (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1167, 1174–
1175; Board of Education v. Commission on Professional Competence (1980) 102
Cal.App.3d 555, 560; Board of Trustees v. Judge (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 920, 930.)
This independent review is of critical importance. As has been noted, “Morrison
is followed by the California courts for good reason. In the absence of a consideration of
all the evidence and a reflection of the factual base on which to apply the Morrison
standards, the trial court’s finding becomes little more than an abstract moral judgment.…
Without the Morrison standards ‘evident unfitness to teach’ would be vulnerable to such
a broad application virtually every teacher in the state could be subject to discipline and
discharge.” (San Dieguito Union High School District v. Commission on Professional
Competence (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 278, 284–285.) This independent review helps
protect against the revocation of a vested right in a professional license for reasons that
are arbitrary, capricious, prejudicial, or motivated by other personal or improper animus,
and prevents the license revocation from becoming “ ‘a “badge of infamy,” ... fixing upon

16.
[the teacher] the stigma of an official defamation of character.’ ” (Morrison, supra,
1 Cal.3d at p. 239.)
Nor can we say the lack of an independent review here was not prejudicial. (See
Broney, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 476 [conducting prejudice review upon finding
legal error in trial court’s review of license revocation].) In evaluating harmless error, we
ask whether it would have been “ ‘reasonably probable a more favorable result would
have been reached absent the error.’ ” (Thornbrough v. Western Placer Unified School
District (2013) 223 Cal.App.4th 169, 200.) Here, we conclude the error was prejudicial.
On even a cursory review, we know the trial court had at least a somewhat different view
of the evidence than respondent, since it specifically noted it preferred the ALJ’s lesser
sanction of suspension to full and permanent revocation of appellant’s teaching license.
Further, it is clear that respondent’s findings and conclusions are far from reproach and,
were a court to review these findings and conclusions independently in a limited trial
de novo, it is reasonably probable it might reach a result more favorable to appellant.
We note only a few issues readily apparent from our review of the record here.
First, because the central lesson of Morrison is that courts must look to whether the
specific conduct alleged renders appellant unfit to teach, we observe respondent’s own
decision is internally inconsistent in this regard. Respondent states it “failed to establish
by clear and convincing evidence [appellant]’s evident unfitness to teach.” Respondent
found the “evidence did not demonstrate [appellant] has a fixed character trait not
remediable upon receipt of notice his conduct fails to meet expectations of the employing
school district.” The decision states that there “was no evidence of such notice prior to
the visit” from the district’s human resources representative and the superintendent.
Further, “[u]pon receipt of this notice, [appellant] resigned immediately” and “did not
continue his dishonest behavior.” Respondent also found there was “no evidence
[appellant] has committed any further dishonest behavior since then.”

17.
In fact, respondent’s decision then went on to laud appellant’s prior service as a
teacher, noting there was “also no evidence that [appellant] is not fit, or is unsuitable for,
teaching by reason of temperamental defects or inadequacies.” Instead, “the evidence
demonstrated [appellant] had a [15]-year career with the District, the bulk of which were
marked by quality teaching, leadership, and volunteering with his students to help them
achieve educational accomplishments, without issues raised by the District.” Following
his resignation from the District, appellant “has continued his contribution to education,
leadership, and to his community through his work with CSUB over the past three years,”
per respondent. Respondent explains that, “[w]hile this does not justify [appellant]’s
egregious decision to lie to his District while working elsewhere and leaving his students
without consistent, effective teaching, the evidence fails to show a temperamental defect.
Rather, it shows poor judgment exercised in response to a work environment he found
challenging.”
Nonetheless, shortly thereafter in the same written decision, respondent directly
contradicts those statements, finding that appellant’s “misconduct makes him unfit to
teach.” Respondent also concluded appellant was “likely to engage in similar dishonest
behavior in the future.” These statements stand in direct contradiction to findings made
just shortly before in the very same ruling, concerning the same operative issue at the
crux of respondent’s (and the trial court’s) inquiry in this matter: whether appellant’s
purportedly immoral and unprofessional conduct makes him unfit to teach. Of course,
without an ultimate factual finding that appellant is unfit to teach, it would be improper
for respondent to revoke his teaching license. (See Morrison, 1 Cal. 3d at p. 240 [holding
California law requires respondent to find “an individual is not fit to teach”].)
The trial court also noted respondent appropriately rejected the 20-year-old,
expunged misdemeanor as a basis for discipline. This, however, is untrue. While
respondent’s decision ultimately states there was no “nexus between [appellant’s
misdemeanor conviction] and his fitness to teach,” it is simply wrong to say this

18.
misdemeanor was not important to respondent’s decision. In fact, respondent’s written
decision explicitly and repeatedly considers this conviction in weighing appellant’s
conduct and his fitness as a teacher. Respondent specifically concluded this
misdemeanor conviction was “unbecoming of a teacher,” that it did not matter if
appellant pled to a different or lesser charge, and that the conviction showed
“unprofessional conduct” because appellant is a role model for his students. Respondent
also specifically found appellant’s prior conviction was a basis to conclude he had
engaged in “immoral conduct.” Further, respondent concluded appellant’s misdemeanor
conviction “demonstrates dishonesty.” Later, in discussing the praiseworthiness or
blameworthiness of appellant’s conduct, respondent stated “there is only blameworthiness
attributable to respondent’s motives in committing [the acts leading to his misdemeanor
conviction]. Thus, this factor weighs heavily against fitness.” Respondent also found the
prior misdemeanor conviction helped negate any mitigation appellant sought to prove,
noting appellant “presented no evidence he was under any particular emotional or
physical difficulties at the time” of his misdemeanor conviction. Whatever the reason,
the court clearly was mistaken in its belief that respondent did not rely on appellant’s
prior misdemeanor conviction in evaluating his fitness to teach. It seems likely the court
would not reach the same conclusions in an independent review of this case, given this
misdemeanor conviction was completely unrelated to the crux of the dispute, was
decades old, had been disclosed previously, and has been expunged.
Further, it is reasonably probable an independent review of the evidence may
come to different conclusions about other critical issues for analysis under Morrison,
including the blameworthiness or severity of appellant’s conduct and any harm done to
the school district or its pupils. For instance, in rejecting the ALJ’s decision and revoking
appellant’s teaching credentials, respondent speaks in exceptionally grave terms of the
blameworthiness of appellant’s actions, focusing particularly on his purported
“dishonesty” which impacted “the youngest and most vulnerable of students.” While we

19.
certainly understand school administrators might prefer prompt decisions be made about
whether a teacher continues in their current employment, it does not strike us as the
gravest of sins for a teacher to use accrued sick leave for several weeks while considering
whether they will remain with their current position, especially in the context of what was
clearly a tempestuous and uncomfortable working relationship, even if this is technically
improper under the district’s policies.12 We note several cases in which respondent or its
predecessor entities have imposed much lesser penalties for seemingly much more severe
misconduct. (Broney, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 468 [respondent imposed a stayed
60-day suspension following teacher’s third DUI conviction]; Governing Board v. Haar,
supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at pp. 374–375 [respondent declined to uphold suspension of
teacher accused of multiple instances of inappropriate physical contact with female
middle school students]; Bassett Unified School District v. Commission on Professional
Competence, supra, 201 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1448–1450 [respondent found teacher should
retain her job at a school district from which she had taken sick leave for two entire
school years, while simultaneously working throughout both terms at two other teaching
positions; no indication license revocation was even considered].)
These prior instances of less severe penalties seem particularly notable in light of
the fact appellant specifically testified the superintendent who he claimed was retaliating
against him had threatened he “was going to get [appellant’s] credential, and that he had
friends at [respondent], and he was going to make sure that not only my credential was
going to be revoked, that they were going to have me pay some ungodly amount of
money.” Another witness corroborated having heard the superintendent claim “he would
have people’s credentials removed or taken from them.” Various facts about this case

12 Again, it is not beyond a doubt that this behavior was, in fact, improper under the
district’s policies. It appears appellant filed the forms he was requested to file, and that
there was some evidence it was BCSD that determined employees would use sick leave
first before accessing other types of leave.

20.
also lend credence to this narrative: that an assistant superintendent in charge of over
4,000 employees across 40 schools would recognize one particular teacher in a few
photographs posted online, know that particular teacher was out on sick leave, decide to
independently investigate the matter despite the photographs not depicting anything
necessarily improper, and then report these facts to his superintendent; that the
superintendent in charge of such a large school district would then direct an investigation
as to any violations of leave policies based on these photographs; and the fact that
respondent rejected a well-reasoned decision by an ALJ—a decision it had substantially
won—in favor of one using hyperbolic language as justification for revoking the teaching
credentials of a seemingly well-regarded and well-respected career educator.
The hyperbolic language which repeatedly stresses the severity of the harm to
appellant’s pupils is particularly notable as being out of place with the facts of this case.
Respondent does not suggest appellant was required by contract or otherwise to remain
employed with BCSD. Indeed, all parties seem to believe it would have been entirely
proper for appellant to simply resign at the start of the school year. It is therefore unclear
how appellant taking leave—even assuming such leave was somehow improper—
impacted his students in any particularly greater or different manner than if he had just
resigned on the first day of school. While we understand it may have been inconvenient
for the school district to find a substitute teacher on short notice, it is hard to see how this
injury to the district would be nearly as severe as respondent’s decision suggests,
especially in a district as large as BCSD. If appellant had simply resigned, BCSD would
still have been required to find a replacement teacher for his students. And if he had
resigned, his students would have missed out on his apparently exceptional teaching
capabilities regardless. We have been pointed to nothing in the record suggesting
appellant’s students were aware of any alleged violations of the district’s leave policies
by appellant, suggesting any students who may have viewed appellant as a role model
were not impacted by his purported “dishonesty.” On the whole, we find the light in

21.
which appellant’s conduct is cast in terms of its impact on his students doubtful. Further,
despite recognizing specifically that one of the factors in mitigation was “the absence of
any prior record of adverse action over many years of educational service,” and despite
conceding appellant in fact had no record of prior discipline over his many years of
estimable service, respondent nevertheless found this was “not a factor in mitigation.”13
Ultimately, we make no findings on these issues at this point, as that is not our
current task. We recount them here simply to explain why we are convinced the trial
court’s errors are not harmless. In light of all of the above, we are satisfied it is
reasonably probable the court’s exercise of independent judgment might lead to a more
favorable outcome for appellant here. Thus, on remand, the court must exercise its
independent judgment upon the evidence of this case, conduct a limited trial de novo, and
apply the Morrison factors to determine whether appellant’s alleged conduct ultimately
rendered him unfit to teach.

13 Respondent’s decision also appears to have wholly discounted other evidence of
appellant’s good character and “emotional or physical difficulties … which substantially
contributed to the misconduct,” both of which are expressly mitigating factors. (Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 5, § 80300, subd. (m).)

22.
DISPOSITION

Given the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, with directions to
reconsider this matter in a manner not inconsistent with this opinion. Appellant shall
recover his costs on appeal.

PEÑA, J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

HARRELL, J.

23.

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